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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ARABIA

(Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen)

PART 6

January to December 1952

**(Chapter I also contains certain 1950 and 1951 papers
on the Persian Gulf not previously printed)**

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING

ARABIA—PART 6

CHAPTER I.—PERSIAN GULF

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EA 1019/1

No. 1

THE SITUATION IN OMAN

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Younger. (Received 27th April)

(No. 36. Confidential) *Bahrain,*
 Sir, *25th April, 1950.*

Mr. Thesiger on his return from his recent travels in Oman was insistent that we should adopt a more realistic attitude towards the Sultan and treat him as Ruler only of the places under his effective control, viz., the eastern coast of the Gulf of Oman from the Batinah to Sur inclusive and Dhofar. He spoke very highly of the Abu Dhabi ruling family and was of opinion that if they acquire wealth as a result of the present oil operations in their territory, they could easily establish their influence over the tribes south of Buraimi which we at present regard as being subject to Muscat, and that they should be encouraged to do this. He told me that Shaikh Sulaiman bin Himyar (Muscat Leading Personalities No. 9), the leader of the Ghafiri faction amongst the tribes of Oman proper, had come down from the hills to see him and had asked to be recognised as an independent Shaikh by the British Government and for relations with him to be regulated by a treaty similar to that between His Majesty's Government and Abu Dhabi, and I gather he promised to let him have a reply. He admitted that the Imam was extremely fanatical and that there was no possibility of his being willing to enter into direct relations with a Christian Power. During the years I have been associated with the Persian Gulf, I have often wondered whether we ought not to treat the situation in Oman as we find it and risk incurring the Sultan's wrath by ignoring his claims and my conversation with Mr. Thesiger has naturally led me to ponder the whole matter again. I have, however, reached the same conclusion as I have always done in the past, namely, that it is in our interests to allow the existing situation to continue for the present in spite of its fictitious character, and that it would be very dangerous to make any change.

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2. It is a fact that the Sultan exercises effective control only over some portions of the coasts of Oman and none in the interior. For the purposes of this despatch the independent area may be divided into two units, viz.:—

- (1) Oman proper, extending southwards from the latitude of Ibri (23° 6' north) to the Arabian Sea and;
- (2) The Dhahirah and Jau, being the country lying west of the Hajar mountains between Ibri and Buraimi.

Oman proper is occupied by a number of tribes who belong mostly to the Ibadhi sect. The main tenet of this sect is to acknowledge no temporal or hereditary ruler but only an Imam or spiritual leader who can be elected when circumstances require. The Ibadhi faith established itself in Oman in the 7th or 8th centuries A.D. and according to Lorimer the first Imam was probably elected in 751 A.D. Ahmad bin Sa'id, founder of the present ruling dynasty, was elected Imam in 1744, when he was successful in expelling the Persians from Oman. His son, Sa'id, was elected Imam on his death in 1783 and continued as such until his death twenty years or more after, although he was the ruler of the country for only a few months. After his death the Imamate remained in abeyance until 1913 when the tribes rose in rebellion against the Sultan and elected Salim bin Al Kharusi as Imam. Since then there has always been an Imam, the present incumbent, Muhammad bin Abdullah Al Khalili (Muscat Leading Personalities No. 6) having been elected in 1920. The tribes of Oman are listed in Miles's "Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf," volume II, chapter 8. They are divided into two factions, the Ghafiri and the Hinawi, the head of the former being Sulaiman bin Himyar, whom I have already mentioned and of the latter Saleh bin Isa al Harthi. These two

leaders have the greatest say in the selection of a new Imam. The present Imam has his own governors stationed at different places in the Imamate and is reported by Mr. Thesiger to have an efficient though primitive administration and to maintain law and order throughout the area.

3. The Dhahirah and Jau tribes are mostly Sunni and owe no allegiance to the Imam. Lorimer writing in the first decade of this century includes the Dhahirah, which extends as far north as Sunainah (latitude 23° 40' north) in the Sultanate of Oman and states that the Sultan then had a governor at Arrarqi. Jau, which includes the Jabal Hafit and Huraimi, together with a tract to the north of it called Mahadhah which is occupied by the Beni Ka'ab he describes as independent Oman. Some of the tribes in these areas have so-called paramount shaikhs, but in reality every sub-section is independent and there is no kind of central authority to maintain law and order.

4. In 1921 Sultan Taimur reached an agreement with the tribes of Oman proper which is usually known as the Treaty of Sib. By it the tribes were allowed access to the coast and to sell and buy goods there and they in turn undertook to remain at peace with the Sultan and his subjects. According to the present Sultan, he is recognised by the present Imam as being responsible for his external relations, but there is nothing to this effect to be found in the Treaty of Sib. Since the treaty, its terms have been fully observed; the relations between the Sultan and the Imam are outwardly friendly and they correspond with each other. The Imam is old and in ill health and is constantly reported to be dying. The Sultan hopes when he does die that no new Imam will be elected and the tribes will agree to his succeeding to his authority. He does not wish to be elected Imam himself as this would entail the admission by him of an elective principle. There are some who think that the Sultan will be successful in achieving his object. He has been working towards it for many years and at one time made plans for subjugating Oman by force. He abandoned this when he was told that he could not be given the assistance of the Royal Air Force. Since then he has talked from time to time with various tribal leaders and he is reported to be on good terms with both Sulaiman bin Himyar and Saleh bin Isa. Mr. Thesiger, who has only visited tribes to the west of the Jabal Hajar, regards it as a foregone conclusion that a son of the Salim who became Imam in 1913 will be

elected to succeed the present Imam when he dies, but there are many on the Trucial Coast and in Muscat who do not share this opinion, and I am told that many of the tribesmen in the Jabal Hajar itself and to the east of it are tired of the Imam's fanaticism and antiquated ideas and would welcome the Sultan's rule in the hope that this would lead to the country being opened up and civilised. I fear that Mr. Thesiger is somewhat prejudiced in favour of the Imam and against the Sultan. From what I hear his stories of the golden age which prevails under the Imam's rule do not in all respects correspond with facts. If the Sultan had even half the personality of Ibn Saud he would most certainly succeed in his object. Unfortunately he is a shy, diffident little man and adopts a royal manner which causes offence or excites ridicule. Apart from this, his finances will not allow him to be generous. Even so, I think there is a distinct possibility that when the Imam Abdullah dies many of the tribes will ask him to be their ruler.

5. The Sultan has also endeavoured to maintain touch with the tribes of the Dhahirah and Jau. A few years ago his brother Said Tarik paid a successful visit to the Dhahirah and more recently his Minister of the Interior was instrumental in persuading the Na'im of Jau to recognise Saqr bin Sultan as their paramount chief. From time to time tribal shaikhs have also been to Muscat to see the Sultan. The present attitude of all tribes in these areas is, however, to refuse to recognise the Sultan's authority in any form and negotiations between the Na'im and Petroleum Concessions Limited broke down last year on account of this.

6. I have thought it desirable to explain the state of affairs at some length as it forms a background to the conclusions I have reached. The only point in favour of treating the Sultan from a more realistic point of view and recognising him as Ruler only of Muscat, the Batinah, Sur and Dhofar, is that as a general principle it is preferable to deal with things as they are and eliminate the fictitious. Apart from this I cannot see that we would gain any advantage. The Imam would certainly refuse to deal direct with us and though some of the tribal leaders like Sulaiman bin Himyar might make approaches to us, these are unlikely to lead anywhere so long as the Imam is alive. The Dhahirah and Jau tribes might well be willing to enter into agreements with us, but their demands would probably be exorbitant and we should

find it difficult to deal with breaches by them of their undertakings. They live in hilly country at a long distance from the coast and if we were to find ourselves compelled to assert our rights by force we might be faced with a situation such as that which used to exist on the north-west frontier of India. So far as Oman proper is concerned it appears to me quite clear that we must do nothing which would prejudice the Sultan's chances of succeeding to the Imam's authority when he dies. Apart from this there are three very strong reasons against taking the action proposed in respect of any of the areas concerned. Firstly, if we adopt the attitude that they are not included in the Sultan's dominions we have no *locus standi* to negotiate regarding their boundaries with Ibn Saud and we shall find it difficult to object if he should endeavour to bring them under his influence. Secondly, the Iraq Petroleum Company hold concessions from the Sultan covering all his dominions except Gwadar. Our action would automatically cancel their rights in these areas and open them up to all comers. Thirdly, we should bitterly offend the Sultan and he might even refuse to enter into a new treaty and have nothing more to do

with us. I have not worked out what the Sultan's friendship is worth to us in the present circumstances. It may not be very much, but any repudiation of it by him might well affect our position in the Gulf Shaikhdoms generally. I am convinced therefore that we must adhere to our present policy of regarding all the areas concerned as parts of the Sultan's dominions. I have been a little perturbed to find that at the beginning of the century Jau was not regarded as belonging to the Sultanate and I will endeavour to ascertain in details of the Sultan's relations with this tract during the last forty years.

7. If you accept my conclusions I would suggest that Mr. Thesiger should be told that the reply to Sulaiman bin Himyar's overtures is that his relations with His Majesty's Government must be conducted through the Sultan of Muscat and that it should be left to Mr. Thesiger to convey this reply to Sulaiman, if he considers it necessary to do so, in such manner as he thinks fit.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Jedda, the British Middle East Office and the Muscat and Bahrain Agencies.

I have, &c.

W. R. HAY.

EA 1643/75

No. 2

FUTURE JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF STATES

Mr. Bevin to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

(No. 77)
Sir,

Foreign Office,

20th November, 1950.

In my immediately preceding despatch I have set down certain general principles regarding the development of the judicial system of the Persian Gulf States. I now turn to the immediate problem of the extent of jurisdiction exercised respectively by the Rulers and by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom under the Orders in Council.

2. There are some anomalies in the present position. For example Bahrain, the most advanced State, has the most limited jurisdiction, whereas Qatar, where there are no local Courts, has the widest. I appreciate, however, that, whether or not it is desirable in principle to achieve uniformity or, alternatively, to ensure that the extent of the Rulers' jurisdictions is commensurate with the stage of development of their judicial systems, the scope for manœuvre is limited and in practice each State must be

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dealt with individually. In the paragraphs which follow I have, therefore, set out the present position and the basis on which you should, if your Excellency sees no objection, now approach the Rulers. The exact manner in which the proposals are made to the Rulers is left to your discretion.

3. In Bahrain, the Ruler at present has jurisdiction over Bahrain subjects only. He has already been informed that is the intention under the new Orders in Council to relinquish to him jurisdiction over the nationals of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial States. I consider that nationals of Muscat should be added and, because omission of them would be illogical in view of the other concessions, nationals of the Yemen.

4. The Ruler of Kuwait, under the present definition, exercises jurisdiction over all persons, other than British subjects, who are the nationals of any Moslem State. This definition is patently unsatisfactory.

B 2

I consider that on this ground the extent of his jurisdiction should be discussed with the Shaikh in order to arrive at an agreed list of States which may, broadly speaking, be regarded as Moslem. You should propose the same list as for Bahrain, plus nationals of Iraq, Jordan and Persia. If the Ruler so requests, Syria and Egypt might be added but, in adding them, you should stress the need for improvement of the Kuwait judicial system, possibly by the appointment of a legal adviser, in order to avoid criticism from Moslem States with legal systems more in keeping with modern requirements. I should prefer not to go beyond the strict interpretation of the present definition and, in consequence, not to surrender to the Ruler jurisdiction over nationals of the Lebanon.

5. The Shaikh of Qatar at present has jurisdiction over all Moslem persons other than British subjects. I consider that the Shaikh should be told that a more precise definition is desirable, and you should first propose the same list as for Bahrain. You may, if the Shaikh insists, add to this so as to make it the same as for Kuwait. You should also attempt to secure the Shaikh's agreement to his ceding jurisdiction over all persons in the employment of persons subject to the Order in Council (pointing out that this provision already exists in Kuwait and Bahrain). In approaching the Shaikh you may at your discretion explain to him that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the present administration of his State, and in particular the absence of any judicial system, are liable to give rise to grave criticism from the more advanced

Moslem States. This risk is increased now that economic development is bringing Qatar more into touch with the outside world. His Majesty's Government consider therefore that there should be some temporary restriction on the extent of the Shaikh's jurisdiction—which is at present wider than that of any other of the Protected States in the Persian Gulf—while, at the same time, they would offer to advise and assist the Shaikh in the introduction of a suitable judicial system. It could, moreover, be pointed out to the Shaikh that these proposals would do no more than bring Qatar into line with Bahrain, where Courts have long been established.

6. In the Trucial States, jurisdiction under the Orders in Council extends over all persons other than Trucial States subjects. I consider that no extension of the Shaikhs' jurisdiction is at present necessary or desirable. You should, however, if you consider it necessary, secure the agreement of the Shaikhs to the cession of jurisdiction over persons in the employment of persons subject to the Order in Council. This provision is included in the draft Order in Council which has been prepared.

7. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would inform me whether you think it desirable that the resultant agreements with the Rulers should be confirmed by exchange of letters.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Washington, Tehran, Bagdad, Jedda and the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I am, &c.

(For the Secretary of State)
G. W. FURLONGE.

EA 1643/75

No. 3

FUTURE JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF STATES

Mr. Bevin to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

(No. 76)
Sir,

*Foreign Office,
20th November, 1950.*

I have had under review the questions of (a) future judicial arrangements in the Persian Gulf States, and (b) the drafting of new Orders in Council, in the light of the discussions held with your Excellency in London and correspondence exchanged on these subjects. It now seems appropriate to set down certain general principles on which I would invite your comments. In

a separate despatch I shall inform you of the action required in connexion with the new Orders in Council which are in course of preparation.

2. I am advised that His Majesty's Government by accepting responsibility for the foreign relations of these States, may be held liable internationally to answer criticism for anything which occurs in them to affect the interests of foreigners. This applies in particular in the case of

foreigners subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts established under the various Orders in Council. I am aware that this proposition might not be accepted by the Rulers themselves, nor by certain Middle East Governments. Nevertheless, whether or not the position is made clear in the text of the written agreements between His Majesty's Government and the Rulers, responsibility for answering criticism is implicit in His Majesty's Government's position as Protecting Power and in their claim to represent the States in international affairs.

3. In differing degrees all these States are coming more and more into touch with the outside world; their administrations require therefore to be modernised and developed according to the circumstances of each individual State. In particular, the judicial systems of all need to be improved, and this applies not only to the courts established under the Orders in Council but also to the Rulers' Courts so far as they deal with cases affecting any foreign interest. Looking ahead, there are two alternative lines of development:—

- (i) Following the precedent of French Morocco, to maintain indefinitely a dual system of courts; or
- (ii) eventually to unify the two systems so that there is only one set of courts, which are those of the Rulers.

Of these two courses I consider that, having regard to all the circumstances, the second is preferable as the ultimate aim in these States. This however is essentially a long-term project, and it is not essential to make a final choice at this stage. What is necessary in the short term is to encourage the development of the local judicial systems and so to improve our own that both may be better equipped to meet modern requirements.

4. As regards the courts established under the Orders in Council, it is intended that, whatever system of law is adopted as a model, the main body of the law in each State should eventually consist of the Order in Council, the basic civil and criminal codes, King's Regulations and Rules of Procedure. It is proposed that this law should, where possible, be applied also in the Joint Courts, which might thus become one avenue through which improvements could be achieved in the Rulers' Courts.

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5. Another way in which the judicial systems of the Rulers may be improved is by means of legislation on subjects of common concern to persons subject to both sets of courts. It has been suggested that there are two methods of dealing with legislation on such subjects:—

- (a) Action would be taken independently by both the Rulers and your Excellency (legislating by means of King's Regulations issued under the Orders in Council). In this case, although the subjects would be the same, the details of the law applied in each set of courts would be different; or
- (b) the Rulers' laws and the King's Regulations issued by your Excellency would be similar in form as well as in subject. Thus a law would first be made by the Ruler and would then be applied by King's Regulations to persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Orders in Council.

Of these two methods (b) seems the more in accord with the aim of present improvement and ultimate unification. It would ensure also that, in an increasing number of cases, the law ordinarily applicable to complainant and defendant before the Joint Courts was the same. There will be matters on which the Rulers will make their own laws and for which a corresponding King's Regulation will not be required, and there may also be matters about which King's Regulations may be issued without reference to the Rulers. Nevertheless, whenever a subject is of common concern it seems appropriate, generally speaking, that the same law should apply throughout the State. The success of this method depends on the acceptance by the Rulers of the assistance of His Majesty's Government in the drafting of their laws, and on the preparation of drafts which are sufficiently simple for the Rulers' courts to apply. The legislative requirements will, however, not always admit of simplification, and I therefore consider it desirable that you should not only establish the tradition of assisting in the drafting of laws but should at the same time encourage the Rulers to improve their judicial and legislative machinery by such measures as the employment of British legal advisers.

6. I realise that much of the foregoing paragraph is at present relevant only to Bahrain and Kuwait, which administratively are in advance of the rest: the

principles however will be susceptible of application to the other States as and when their degree of development permits.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Tehran, Bagdad, Jedda and to the

head of the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.
(For the Secretary of State)
G. W. FURLONGE.

EA 1057/12

No. 4

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S FUTURE POLICY IN THE TRUCIAL STATES AND CENTRAL OMAN

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Bevin. (Received 30th November)

(No. 83) *Bahrain,*
Sir, *25th November, 1950.*

I have been asked to comment on a suggestion of Mr. Pelly's that a political officer should be posted at Buraimi, and on a letter from Mr. Stobart in which he reported that the acting Ruler of Sharjah was of opinion that we ought to exercise stricter control over both the Trucial Coast Rulers and the tribes of the interior. I have recently returned from a tour of the Trucial Coast during which I have thought much on these and cognate matters, and the opportunity appears to be a suitable one to discuss the whole question of future policy in the area. I accordingly have the honour to submit my views on the subject.

2. I would preface my remarks by stating that we are faced on the Trucial Coast with problems very similar in character to those with which the Indian Political Service had to deal in India. The shaikhdoms are a series of petty States which were in existence when we first began to exercise real control in the area 130 years ago, and to all intents and purposes have been frozen in the condition in which we found them. But for our influence, it is doubtful if any of them would have survived for so long in their present form. Similar little States existed in India, especially in Kathiawar, and during the concluding years of British rule in India our effort was expended in an attempt to persuade their rulers to federate. The question now arises whether we should make a similar attempt to persuade the Trucial shaikhdoms to federate, and also whether we should play a much more active part in the direction of their affairs in future by the exercise of what in India would have been called paramountcy. The interior of Oman presents us with a problem similar to that of the North-West Frontier of the old India. Fortunately, the Arab tribes do

not appear to have the same toughness, cohesion and tactical ability as the Pathans of the North-West Frontier. Are we now to follow in respect of them a close border or a forward policy? I served for many years on the North-West Frontier of India, and was more or less instinctively a supporter of the forward policy, though in view of subsequent developments I am a little doubtful now whether it was worth all the lives, money and effort which it cost.

3. Before I endeavour to suggest answers to the questions I have postulated, I may perhaps be pardoned if I describe very briefly the history of the Trucial Coast since 1820. For more than a century we were content to enforce the provisions of the Maritime Truce which gives the coast its name. Our sole object was to maintain law and order at sea. We avoided interference on land, and did nothing to prevent the disintegration of the original Jawasim shaikhdom of Sharjah, which has now split up into three separate shaikhdoms, or four if the area now controlled by the Shaikh of Fujairah is taken into account. Affairs on the Trucial Coast were handled by the Political Resident himself, who was represented on the spot by an Arab agent residing at Sharjah. The situation remained unchanged until the early 30s of the present century, when the refusal of the Persian Government to allow Imperial Airways to operate along their southern coast forced us to find an alternative route on the Arab coast of the Gulf, and to seek the agreement of the Shaikh of Sharjah to the construction of an airfield and rest house in his territory. This agreement was obtained in 1932, and since then the rest house, constructed at Sharjah in the form of a fort, has been the outward and visible sign of our authority on land. About the same time the Iraq Petroleum Company obtained concessions from the various Rulers with our approval

and support, and we thereby committed ourselves to the protection of their interests. Since then, we have been compelled to interfere more and more on land in order to maintain law and order, but only up to a distance of roughly twenty miles from the coast. Our increased commitments made it very difficult for the political resident at Bushire to deal promptly and adequately with the various problems which arose, and about 1934 the political agent, Bahrain was made directly responsible for the handling of Trucial Coast affairs. The first political officer was appointed to the Trucial Coast in 1939 with great reluctance by the Government of India, who thought his life would be in danger, and until recently only resided there for a few months in the cold weather so that the Arab Residency Agent continued to be the chief power in the land. Generally speaking, the Government of India were most averse to meddling in the internal affairs of the shaikhdoms, and showed no interest in their advancement and the development of their resources. The position changed when His Majesty's Government assumed responsibility for the Persian Gulf Residency on 1st April, 1947, since when the principles (a) that as the shaikhdoms are under our protection, we are responsible to the outside world that they are properly administered, and (b) we are under a moral obligation to assist to the best of our ability in their material development, were brought into prominence. For the last two years we have had a political officer permanently resident on the Trucial Coast at Sharjah, and in 1949 the post of residency agent was abolished. The most important decision which we have taken is to raise and maintain a force of Trucial Coast levies. Although this force was sanctioned primarily to assist in the suppression of the slave traffic, its rôle will, it is hoped, develop into one of far greater importance. The proposal to raise it has been welcomed by the Rulers, who, as Mr. Stobart's conversation with Shaikh Muhammad of Sharjah shows, are anxious that we should play a much more prominent part in maintaining law and order than has been the case up to date, and the recommendations I am making in this despatch are based on the assumption that we are successful in raising a force of sufficient strength and efficiency to convince both the Rulers and tribes that we have the power and the will to enforce authority.

4. I will deal first with our future relations with the Rulers. With the possible exception of Abu Dhabi, whose headquarters are

remote, and who approximates more to a tribal shaikh of the desert than to a ruler of a principality, all would in my opinion readily accept a much stronger lead from us. With their present very primitive administrations, their mutual jealousies and the very loose nature of the control we have attempted to exercise over them in the past, I do not consider anything in the nature of formal federation possible for many years to come, and even if it is considered that this should be our ultimate object, a very long period of preparation and education will be necessary. To begin with, I think we should endeavour to bring into being a council of Rulers of their representatives, excluding for the present Abu Dhabi. The council should at first be informal and should be summoned by the political officer as occasion demands, say roughly once every three months. There are many subjects with which it could deal. For instance, Mr. Stobart's conversation with Shaikh Muhammad arose from the depredations of the Awamir robbers. Each Ruler is trying at present to make his peace with them by making payments. Concerted action by the Rulers with the backing of our levies should make the problem a comparatively easy one to deal with. Another matter is the repair of underground irrigation channels at Dhaid. Various Rulers are interested in this place, and Ajman complains that he had imported labour from Oman and got the work done, but that the other landowners will not pay their share of the expenses. There are many other questions such as quarantine arrangements, education, the Dubai hospital and anti-locust work, in regard to which it might be possible to induce the Rulers to make combined efforts through a council of the kind proposed. There is no hope at present of persuading the Rulers to pool their resources, but through such a council it might be possible to persuade a rich Ruler like Dubai to contribute more towards a common object than his poorer neighbours. The political officer should himself preside at all meetings of the council; he would arrange the agenda and generally speaking use his personal influence to ensure that the discussions proceeded on right lines and terminated in satisfactory conclusions.

5. The problem of the interior is a much more difficult one, and I am of the opinion that we should at all costs avoid a policy of subsidies and punitive expeditions such as that to which we were committed on the North-West Frontier of India. If we are to go forward at all, we should do so very

gradually and carefully and we cannot make a start until the Trucial Coast levies are fully established. The elements with which we have to deal may be classified as follows:—

- (a) tribes under the effective control of our Rulers, such as the Beni Yas and Manasir between Abu Dhabi and Buraimi including the greater part of Buraimi itself;
- (b) tribes under the partial control of the Rulers, such as the Beni Qitab (under Sharjah) and miscellaneous tribes in the Ras al Khaimah hinterland;
- (c) completely independent tribes such as the Beni Ka'ab; and
- (d) tribes under the nominal control of the Sultan of Muscat, such as the Na'im and Al bu Shamis south of Buraimi.

The arguments in favour of a forward policy appear to me to be the following:—

- (a) to facilitate oil operations;
- (b) to ensure the safety of communications, *e.g.*, with Dhaid and the overland route to Muscat;
- (c) to ensure the development of the country which contains distinct agricultural possibilities—for instance, it is said that there were once 160 underground water irrigation channels between Sharjah and Buraimi, only about six of which are functioning; and
- (d) to prevent the vacuum being filled by any other power, especially Ibn Saud.

The chief arguments against any forward move are:—

- (a) we shall be involved in increasing expenditure which may be substantial if we are compelled to take any action of a military nature;
- (b) we may be accused of imperialism; and
- (c) some big political upheaval may render all our efforts abortive.

Of the arguments in favour, the first three have much weight. Regarding the fourth, if we are unwilling to accept any responsibility for the area I am not sure that we shall be on good ground in objecting to Ibn Saud's taking it over and introducing law and order, and although this would adversely affect our oil interests and would generally be regarded as a setback for us to begin with, I am doubtful whether in the long run it would weaken our position in

the Trucial Coast shaikhdoms proper. With regard to the arguments against, the first is the most serious and must be carefully considered. We cannot go forward without some expenditure on extra personnel, and on the entertainment of the shaikhs with whom we have to deal. We can, I think, avoid payment of subsidies except for a specific return, *e.g.*, air facilities. We cannot go forward without assuming responsibility for the protection of the tribes whom we take under our wing, and this might involve us in military action if there were a serious tribal incursion from Saudi Arabia or Oman. Provided we move carefully it is to be hoped that our levies will be adequate for any local punitive action which it may from time to time be necessary to take. I do not attach much importance to the other two arguments. The Trucial Coast is so remote and so unknown that I doubt whether a gradual forward movement would attract attention even in the Arab press. The third argument can be used against constructive action of any kind. We must do our best in the light of existing circumstances and not be deterred by the possibility of a world event. On the whole, I am in favour of a gradual forward policy on the lines I am about to describe, provided its financial implications are understood and accepted. Though there will be no immediate and direct return for the expenditure involved, the improved security afforded to oil operations which are at present being undertaken, and the additional area made available for future operations will in themselves justify the outlay, and it is now possible that in a few years time access may be obtained to the coveted area west of the Oman mountains where oil is believed to exist, and whence it could be piped to a point on the southern shores of Arabia less vulnerable than the oil ports in the Persian Gulf. Quite apart from this it is worth while spending money to bring peace and prosperity to a lawless and potentially fertile country.

6. I am not in favour of Mr. Pelly's suggestion to appoint a political officer, *i.e.*, a Foreign Service officer, to Buraimi. There would not be enough for him to do, and unless he were exceptional he would find life very trying in such a remote spot, and he would in any case be moved by the time he had acquired enough knowledge and personal influence to be really useful. I would propose that instead an additional officer should be attached to the levies

specifically for tribal relations and intelligence, but his duties might also include some recruiting. If a suitable man can be found, he should be appointed for five years at least. His first duty would be to get into touch with the tribes falling under (b) in paragraph 5 and to assist the political officer in devising ways and means of bringing them under the proper control of the Rulers to whom they are supposed to owe allegiance. He should also visit Buraimi at fairly frequent intervals in order to support Abu Dhabi's authority there and collect tribal information. In due course he should go further afield and endeavour to establish relations with the Beni Ka'ab. We may find it necessary to enter into a separate agreement with this tribe though it would be preferable to try and induce it to submit to the authority of one of the Trucial Coast Rulers. The implementation of this policy is likely to take a few years, and not until then need we consider the attitude to be adopted towards the tribes which owe allegiance to the Sultan of Muscat. Should we be successful in establishing our authority up to Buraimi, we may find it necessary to tell the Sultan that as he is completely unable to control these tribes, we propose to enter into direct relations with them whether he likes it or not.

7. The question of Fujairah is under separate consideration, and I would only remark here that if we do decide to adopt a gradual forward policy on the lines proposed, one of our first steps should be to bring the Shaikh of Fujairah under our protection.

8. I have one other point to make before I close this lengthy despatch. The post of Political Officer, Trucial Coast is at present a junior one and is held by a junior

political officer, who is ordinarily relieved after eighteen months. We have been extremely fortunate in being allowed to retain a young and very able officer in the person of Mr. Stobart for the last two years, and I attribute the present satisfactory attitude of the Trucial Coast Rulers as a whole, and especially their ready acceptance of the proposal to establish a Government force of levies at Sharjah, largely to his personal influence. If either of the policies I have advocated, *viz.*, (a) the adoption of a firmer attitude towards the Rulers, and the establishment of a council, and (b) a gradual forward move, are to be implemented, I consider that the post should be upgraded to that of a political agent and filled by an A 7 officer who has the rank of a consul and a salute of seven guns.

9. To sum up, my proposals are:—

- (a) that we should exercise a closer control over the Trucial Coast Rulers, and to this end summon periodic councils of the Rulers or their representatives;
- (b) that we should adopt a very gradual forward policy and appoint a special officer to the levies for the purpose of implementing it; and
- (c) that a political agent be appointed to the Trucial Coast directly subordinate to the political resident.

I should be grateful for instructions regarding the extent to which the policies proposed are approved and may be implemented.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office and His Majesty's Embassy, Jedda.

I have, &c.

W. R. HAY.

EA 1904/1

No. 5

PROPOSED APPOINTMENT OF A UNITED STATES CONSUL IN KUWAIT

Mr. Bevin to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

(No. 6)
Sir,

Foreign Office,
17th January, 1951.

With references to Mr. Furlonge's letter No. EA 1903/6 of 13th April, 1950, to your Excellency regarding the appointment of a United States Consul in Kuwait, further correspondence with the United States Embassy has resulted in agreement

on the conditions under which this appointment can be authorised. I now enclose a copy⁽¹⁾ of Mr. Furlonge's letter of the 17th January to Mr. Palmer of the United States Embassy, on the subject.

2. The main American objection has been to the condition that the exequatur should be issued by His Majesty rather

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

than by the Shaikh, and that no document should be issued to the Consul by the Shaikh himself. A compromise has been reached whereby the King will issue the exequatur, and the Shaikh would be asked to issue instructions to his authorities informing them of the appointment and requiring them to afford the Consul all proper assistance. This seems a logical procedure, and I enclose a suggested draft for issue by the Shaikh when the Consul is appointed. This is based on the Berat which is issued in similar circumstances by the Sultan of Zanzibar, and of which a copy has been given to the United States Embassy.

3. Unless you see objection, I should be glad if you would now arrange for the Shaikh to be informed that His Majesty's Government have agreed to the establishment of a United States Consulate in Kuwait on the following conditions:—

- (i) The exequatur will be issued by the King;
- (ii) the Consul will have no right of direct access to the Shaikh; and
- (iii) the Consul will correspond with the Kuwait authorities only through the Political Agent, except on purely routine matters. Routine matters are defined as—
 - (a) trade enquiries and information,
 - (b) transmission of general information material,
 - (c) requests for information on health and quarantine matters, and
 - (d) condolences and congratulations.
 On these matters the Consul will correspond with the Shaikh's secretary.

At the same time the Shaikh should be asked to issue an instruction on the lines of the enclosed draft (modified if necessary to conform with local procedure (when the Consul is appointed, and told that the

United States Government expect to make the appointment before 30th June. I shall be glad if you will inform me when this communication has been made to the Shaikh, and of his reaction.

5. The Americans have specially requested that they should not be debarred from all contact with the Shaikh, although they recognise that access to him by the Consul would be a privilege and not a right. I have agreed that on appropriate occasions an interview might be granted subject to the condition that all interviews should be arranged by the Political Agent, who would himself be present. I have in mind that interviews might take place on such occasions as first appointment or in order to convey congratulations in person.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Bagdad and Jedda.

I am, &c.

(For the Secretary of State)
G. W. FURLONGE.

Enclosure in No. 5

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve the appointment of as Consul of the United States of America at Kuwait, with power to exercise consular functions throughout the State of Kuwait, We, Abdulla Salim al Subah, Ruler of Kuwait hereby recognise the said..... as Consul of the United States of America within our State and call upon all whom it may concern to take due notice of this A'lan and to afford the said all such assistance as he may properly require in the exercise of his official functions.

Given at Kuwait this day of, 1951.

Ruler of Kuwait.

EA 1644/3

No. 6

FUTURE JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF STATES

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Bevin. (Received 31st January)

(No. 11) *Bahrain,*
Sir, *27th January, 1951.*

I have the honour to submit as requested my comments on your despatch No. 76 of the 20th November, 1950, in which you set

down certain general principles relating to judicial arrangements in the Gulf.

2. I agree generally with the principles stated in paragraph 2 of your despatch. His Majesty's Government will undoubtedly

lay themselves open to criticism if they do not interfere to prevent gross mis-government or serious disorders in the States and do not encourage their orderly progress on modern lines. On the other hand, the States are internally independent and interference on our part is far more likely to be an object of criticism not only in other Middle Eastern countries, but in other Asian countries such as India, than is non-interference in the United States and Western Europe. It follows, therefore, that we should only interfere drastically in the event of serious mis-government or disorders, and that on other occasions we should so far as possible confine ourselves to advice and do our best to make it appear that reforms are introduced on the rulers' own initiative and not at our instance. This applies in particular to judicial reforms regarding which it is desirable that we as a Christian Power should remain as much as possible in the background since in many cases they will involve the elimination or curtailment of the powers of the Muhammadan religious courts.

3. In paragraph 3 of your despatch you mention two alternative lines of development, viz.:—

- (i) to maintain indefinitely a dual system of courts, and
- (ii) eventually to unify the two systems so that there is only one set of courts, which are those of the rulers.

and you prefer the second as the ultimate aim. I agree generally as it should be our object to bring about such an improvement in the judicial systems in the States that it will be no longer necessary for us to retain any jurisdiction of our own. This, however, is a very long-term policy. The administration of justice in all the Gulf States is still on medieval lines, and even in the most advanced of them, Bahrain, uneducated Shaikhs still preside over some of the courts. In these circumstances, especially bearing in mind the interests of the oil companies, I regard it as essential that we should do our best to retain our jurisdiction at least over Europeans and Americans for an indefinite period. I have heard no criticisms locally of our extra territorial jurisdiction, nor so far as I am aware, have there been criticisms of it in the Middle East press. It will no doubt be attacked in due course, but this need not deter us from maintaining it for so long as we are able to do so and find it necessary.

4. In paragraph 4 of your despatch you propose that our law should be applied, where possible, in the Joint Courts, which might thus become one avenue through which improvements could be achieved in the Rulers' Courts. Mr. Jakins, in a long letter, which I am forwarding to you separately, has objected on the grounds that His Majesty's Representatives in the Gulf, generally speaking, have not sufficient legal experience themselves to teach the law to others. This criticism is sound, but the difficulty could be overcome by the appointment of British judicial officers with legal experience both at Bahrain and Kuwait, possibly as registrars, one of whose main functions it would be to sit on the Joint Courts. This is a theme which I hope to develop in more detail at a later date. Provided some such expedient is adopted, I concur in your proposal, though the task of educating the local judiciaries is likely to be a long and tedious one. I would also enter a caveat to the effect that although our present extra-territorial jurisdiction is accepted without much criticism any attempt to extend it would almost certainly be strongly resisted, and I do not, therefore, consider it practicable to persuade the rulers to submit to the Joint Courts cases or a type which are at present reserved for their exclusive jurisdiction.

5. I agree generally with the conclusions reaching in paragraph 5 of your despatch in the matter of legislation on subjects of common concern to persons subject to both sets of courts, and will do what I can to encourage the rulers to improve their judicial and legislative machinery by such measures as the employment of British legal advisers. Pending their acceptance of such advisers or experts, the registrars whose appointment I have advocated in paragraph 4 should be in a position to advise and assist the rulers on the lines proposed. Here too, however, I would advocate that we do not attempt to move too fast. We are dealing with small city States inhabited by primitive peoples and under patriarchal forms of government, and we do not want the wheels of the local administrations, nor indeed of our own offices, to be clogged by numerous and complicated legal enactments.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Tehran, Bagdad, Jedda and to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

W. R. HAY.

FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE SHAIKHDOMS

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Bevin. (Received 31st January)

(No. 13)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
29th January, 1951.*

The reports that have been current in some of the Middle Eastern countries that His Majesty's Government intend to bring about a federation of the Gulf Shaikhdoms has led me to consider the whole question of the future relations between His Majesty's Government and the Shaikhdoms, and I have the honour to submit some views on the subject.

2. Firstly, with regard to federation, although it may be possible to bring about some kind of union of the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms, as suggested in my despatch No. 83 of 25th November, 1950, I am very doubtful whether it will be possible to achieve a real federation of all the Gulf Shaikhdoms owing to local jealousies and geographical factors. As the Shaikhdoms develop, we might in due course persuade their Governments to send representatives to some kind of council which would endeavour to achieve co-ordination in such matters as education, health, postal services, &c., but I am doubtful if we will be able to achieve any kind of political union under a central authority.

3. It has been suggested to me that we ought to decide whether it should be our policy to develop our relations with the Shaikhdoms on colonial or diplomatic lines, *i.e.*, whether we are to endeavour to bring them more closely under our control or to aim at their eventual complete independence. My own opinion is that we should continue our present policy for as long as we have the power to do so and not change it substantially in either direction. We should preserve the internal independence of the Shaikhdoms and indeed increase it whenever possible while maintaining our control of foreign relations and the right to interfere to prevent gross mal-administration or preserve law and order in a serious emergency. The present situation is beneficial to all concerned. The Shaikhdoms enjoy as good Governments as they deserve; they, none of them, wish to be absorbed by any of their more powerful neighbours, thanks to our protection they have come through two world wars unscathed and trade flourishes with a minimum of restrictions. We, on the other hand, are

able to ensure that the British and American oil companies in the area carry out their operations in safety and without undue interference by the local authorities, to develop valuable air communication centres and to promote British trade interests. I do not pretend that the rulers and their peoples really love us, but they respect us and realise that they could not do without us and, therefore, are unlikely to agitate for any drastic change.

4. Some concern has been expressed regarding the results which education may have on the situation in the Gulf—for instance, within a few years some fifty Kuwaiti graduates may return to their home town. At present there is no "effendi" class in the Shaikhdoms, there are no local doctors or lawyers and no *intelligentsia* outside the ruling family and merchants. It is inevitable that with the spread of education there will be in due course demands for modifications in the existing patriarchal forms of government. When the time comes, we shall have to do our best to encourage reforms and ensure that they are carried out on the right lines. There may even be some anti-British agitation, but I am doubtful if there will be any really popular demand for complete independence in the Shaikhdoms for so long as we are able to give them our protection. Should, however, any demand for union with a neighbouring State arise, *e.g.*, should Kuwait demand union with Iraq or Saudi Arabia, which I consider most unlikely, we might find it politic gracefully to withdraw.

5. I do, however, consider that we should be wise to foster the internal independence of the States to the greatest extent possible, and, that as their internal administrations improve, we should gradually relinquish anything which detracts from that independence. We have already handed over the quarantine administration at Bahrain to the local government and hope shortly to do the same at Kuwait. In due course we should allow the Shaikhdoms to run their own postal and telegraphic services, possibly in co-ordination with some kind of council as suggested earlier in this despatch, and we should aim at ultimately handing over all jurisdiction to them, *c.f.* my despatch No. 11 of the 27th January. This, however, is a

long-term policy and for the present we must concentrate in persuading the rulers to improve the administration of the Shaikhdoms. Another point that must be borne in mind, though it is not strictly pertinent to the subject matter of this despatch, is that in due course the people of the Shaikhdoms are likely to demand an increasing share in the activities and profits of the oil companies and in particular employment on the senior staffs and probably membership of the directorates. This is a development which we should do our best to facilitate when the time comes.

6. What I have said above applies in full force to Bahrain and Kuwait. Qatar and

the Trucial Shaikhdoms are so primitive that we shall be compelled to keep them under close tutelage of a more or less "colonial" character for many years to come. Amongst other things we should, in my opinion, be willing to spend money on the development of those Trucial Shaikhdoms in which there is little prospect of oil being found.

7. I should be grateful if I could be informed to what extent you concur in these views for the guidance of myself and officers serving under this residency.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

W. R. HAY.

EA 1017/3

No. 8

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S FUTURE POLICY IN THE TRUCIAL STATES AND CENTRAL OMAN

Mr. Morrison to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

(No. 47)
Sir,

*Foreign Office,
2nd April, 1951.*

I have been considering the recommendations made in your Excellency's despatches No. 36 of 25th April, 1950, and No. 83 of 25th November, 1950, regarding the future development of the Trucial States and Central Oman and of our relations with the Rulers and tribal Shaikhs in these two areas. I have also read with interest the many additional reports on this subject which have been received from you and your officers during the past year, and I am now in a position to give you my views on the policy which I consider we should try to pursue.

2. The commitments of His Majesty's Government in the Trucial Shaikhdoms arise from the agreements made with their Rulers as a result of which they are described as British Protected States. I agree that, as indicated in paragraph 3 of your despatch No. 83, His Majesty's Government's responsibility for the external affairs of the Trucial Shaikhdoms and our consequent liability to answer internationally for them, connote an obligation to take such steps as are open to us.

- (a) to ensure that their internal affairs are conducted as efficiently as possible, and to prevent such abuses as could justifiably invite external criticism; and
- (b) to promote their progressive development in all fields.

I recognise therefore that justification for the maintenance of the special position of His Majesty's Government in the Trucial States depends largely on the adoption of a positive policy there. The need for this has become more apparent and more urgent now that the development of oil resources and of civil aviation is liable to bring these States into increasing contact with the outside world. I consider, moreover, that it is to the advantage of the United Kingdom, which has a considerable material interest in the area, to assist in improving the administrations of these States and in maintaining their independence. The first step in this direction has been taken by the establishment of the Trucial Oman Levies, and I am glad to learn that this has been welcomed by the Shaikhs as an earnest of the intentions of His Majesty's Government.

3. I therefore welcome your recommendation for a Council of the Trucial Shaikhs and I agree that, subject to the considerations in paragraph 4 below, you should proceed with this proposal. Although I appreciate that it may be preferable in the first instance to concentrate on achieving joint action by the Shaikhs on a "functional" basis, I hope that it may ultimately be possible to bring about closer political co-operation between them. I realise that anything in the nature of a formal federation may well be a long way

ahead, but I wish you to keep this possibility in mind and to report in due course, when the results of the initial steps have been seen, what you consider to be the likelihood of achieving it.

4. The timing of the negotiations with the Shaikhs for the formation of a council is a question which I feel requires careful consideration. The establishment of the Trucial Oman Levies has caused considerable resentment in the minds of King Ibn Saud and his advisers, and to follow this up immediately with what will presumably be regarded as an attempt to form an anti-Saudi Confederation may increase the tension. It might well lead to intrigues, initiated in Saudi Arabia, to frustrate the project, accompanied possibly by threats or promises which would affect the evidence given before the frontier fact-finding commission. On the other hand such evidence of His Majesty's Government's continued interest in and support for the Shaikhs against the influence of King Ibn Saud will have a beneficial effect upon their attitude and strengthen them against Saudi Arabian arguments. I do not doubt that you have these points in mind.

5. I understand the difficulty of including the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in a council with the rest of the Trucial Shaikhs. Nevertheless His Majesty's Government's responsibilities towards this State are the same as those towards the others, and I should prefer if possible to avoid excluding it from the proposals for a Council of Rulers since many of the problems and of the solutions may be common to all the Trucial States. If, however, the Ruler is unwilling to undertake joint consultation and action with the other Trucial Shaikhs, I hope that it will be possible to advise and assist him independently in the improvement of his administration.

6. I agree that in the initial stages the Political Officer on the Trucial Coast should prepare the agenda and play the leading part in the proposed council. I hope, however, that when the Shaikhs become used to the idea of joint action and are sufficiently experienced to take the lead in the council's deliberations, the Political Officer will be able to hand over his functions to the Shaikhs themselves. When this stage is reached, consideration might be given to the employment by the council of a British permanent secretary who would supervise the preparation of the agenda and the execution of the council's decisions.

7. My remarks so far have been confined to the settled areas of the Trucial States in which His Majesty's Government have definite obligations and the Trucial Shaikhs exercise control. The problem of our relations with the tribes of Central Oman and of our responsibilities in this area is much more difficult, and is fully discussed in your despatches under reference. Apart from the tribes of Dhofar and in the south-east, which are under the *de facto* control of the Sultan, I have considered the tribes of this area as divided into three groups:—

- (i) those under the complete or partial control of the Trucial Shaikhs;
- (ii) those which regard themselves as independent or over which the Sultan has purely nominal control, and
- (iii) those which recognise the authority of the Imam.

I have adopted this division in preference to that made in paragraph 5 of your despatch No. 83 because it has appeared better suited to the views I am about to express.

8. In so far as the tribes of Group (i) are regarded as owing allegiance to the Trucial Shaikhs, it may be considered that the commitments of His Majesty's Government in the settled areas of the Trucial Coast extend also to these tribes. I agree therefore that the Trucial Shaikhs should be encouraged to extend their control more directly over the territory of the tribes which can justly be regarded as owing them allegiance or as under their control. It seems likely that the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Abu Dhabi at least would welcome any suggestion of this kind from His Majesty's Government. I should, however, prefer some initial action to be taken by the Shaikhs themselves from their own resources, without the intervention of the Trucial Oman Levies. Although the Levies are intended for use in a normal internal security rôle and can be so used at any time in this area, I do not, in view of the considerations I have set out in paragraph 4 above, wish them to become involved in activities which are in the first place essentially a matter for the Shaikhs themselves.

9. With regard to the tribes of groups (ii) and (iii), there are two questions which are closely interrelated. The first, which is dealt with in your despatch No. 36, is whether or not it is desirable to establish

direct relationships with the paramount Shaikhs of the tribes in these groups. The second, on which you have made certain proposals in your despatch No. 83, concerns the adoption of a "forward" policy in Central Oman.

10. Generally speaking it has been the policy of His Majesty's Government in the recent past to regard the territory of the Sultan as extending over the whole of Oman and as far as the limits of the Trucial States. It is clear that this policy involves recognition of the Sultan's claim to exercise sovereignty over all the tribes in his territory, although in practice the claim may be hollow and his exercise of sovereignty at best purely nominal. I agree with the three reasons you give for not recommending any change in this policy, namely that to do so would:—

- (a) prejudice our position in the frontier negotiations with Saudi Arabia;
- (b) be contrary to the interests of Petroleum Concessions Limited, who hold a concession from the Sultan for the whole of his territory (except for Dhofar and Gwadar); and
- (c) be regarded by the Sultan as a most unfriendly act, and might consequently affect our position in the rest of the Persian Gulf.

I therefore accept your conclusion that it is not desirable to enter into direct relationships with the Shaikhs of the tribes in groups (ii) and (iii). I would note here that I am considering separately the question of the Shaikhs of Fujaira, whose request for independent recognition was reported in your despatch No. 39 of 6th May, 1950, and on which I hope shortly to give you my views.

11. I turn now to the proposals made in your despatch No. 83 for more positive action to develop the hinterland of Oman by a gradual extension of influence in this area, starting from the Trucial Coast. Such a policy would, as you have pointed out, lead to following results:—

- (a) facilitation of oil operations;
- (b) safeguarding of communications; and
- (c) promotion of agricultural development.

In addition it would prevent the extension of King Ibn Saud's influence.

12. I have already agreed in paragraph 8 above to the adoption of this policy in respect of the tribes of group (i). In the area of the tribes of groups (ii) and (iii) the

most important advantage to His Majesty's Government is probably the facilitation of the oil company's operations. The other two results would only be of advantage to His Majesty's Government in so far as they themselves helped to facilitate these operations, since His Majesty's Government have no specific obligation to sponsor the development of this area and no other sufficient material reason for doing so.

13. As against the adoption of a "forward" policy there are, in the first place, the arguments you give in paragraph 5 of your despatch No. 83. These objections appear to me to be considerable. I am doubtful whether there are facilities in this area in return for which subsidies could be paid, since any air facilities required are available either at Sharjah or at Muscat, and the oil company would themselves pay, in the form of royalties and down-payments, for any benefits to be derived from oil exploitation. There would, however, be certain inevitable administrative expenses involved in any policy for the extension of influence, for which there would be no direct return. I agree that the danger of accusations of "imperialism" may not be very great, but there would probably be criticism from Persia, Ibn Saud and the Sultan. These objections make it difficult for me at present to endorse a policy of which the direct advantage to His Majesty's Government is doubtful and which would inevitably involve His Majesty's Government in certain financial and administrative commitments.

14. I have been interested to learn of the enquiries made by Sulaiman bin Himyar and of Muhammad bin Salimin about the commencement of oil operations in their territories, as reported in your letters Nos. 378/76/50G of 14th December and 542/3/50 of 19th December to Mr. Furlonge. The facilitation of oil operations would, as I have stated in paragraph 11 above, be the greatest advantage for His Majesty's Government of the adoption of a "forward" policy and the enquiries made by these two Shaikhs indicate that they might be prepared to accept such a policy as well as to establish direct relations with His Majesty's Government. I agree, however, with the view you have expressed in your letter No. 1533/2/51 of 12th January to Mr. Furlonge, since to deal separately with these Shaikhs would be inconsistent with the policy stated in paragraph 9 above, and with the conclusion I have reached in paragraph 12. Equally, it would be unwise to

encourage the oil company to attempt to negotiate direct with the Shaikhs, since, apart from offending the Sultan and in the absence of any extension of His Majesty's Government's influence in this area, the company could not be assured of the necessary security or continuity for their operations even if their negotiations were successful.

15. Since, therefore, I am not at present in favour either of establishing separate relations with the Shaikhs of Central Oman or of pursuing a "forward" policy beyond the areas of the tribes of Group (i), I consider that you should take every opportunity both to support the Sultan fully in his claims to sovereignty over the whole of the territory of Muscat and Oman and also to press him to take more vigorous action to assert his sovereignty. Accounts differ as to the amount of support for the Sultan among the tribes of Group (iii) but it appears not entirely unlikely that the Sultan may succeed to the authority of the Imam after the latter's death. The visits of Sulaiman bin Himyar and of Saleh bin Isa al Harthi to the Sultan in recent years are possible indications of a willingness to accept his authority; and if Sulaiman is now genuinely anxious for commercial reasons to invite the oil company into his territory he may be willing, in return for a share of the Sultan's oil revenues, to allow them to operate under their concession from the Sultan. I appreciate, however, that, while the Imam is alive, the Sultan is likely to find it very difficult to make any real progress among the tribes which are under the former's control.

16. The same does not seem necessarily to apply to the tribes of Group (ii). Although both the tribes in the area around Buraimi and in the south-west along the Saudi Arabian borders are virtually independent, there are reports of visits by their Shaikhs to the Sultan and of presents given to them. In his "Notes on the Tribes of Muscat and Oman" (September 1950) Mr. Chauncy indicates that a number of these tribes (e.g. the Duru, the Al Bu Shamis and the Na'im) appear to be well-disposed towards the Sultan, though it may well be that those further north, such as the Bani Ka'ab, will remain impervious to any attempts on the part of the Sultan to extend his authority over them.

17. I should be glad therefore if you will, as you suggest in your letter of 12th January to Mr. Furlonge, discuss with the Sultan what further steps he considers it possible

to take in order to assert his authority over the tribes in Group (ii), and to increase his prospects of recognition by the tribes at present under the control of the Imam on the latter's death. You will no doubt discuss with him at the same time means by which the oil company can be enabled to operate in the interior of Oman, with particular reference to the requests from Sulaiman bin Himyar and Muhammad bin Salimin.

18. Finally, and in the light of the policies outlined above, I have considered your proposal that a separate Political Agency should be established on the Trucial Coast, directly subordinate to the Political Resident and in the charge of an A.7 officer. I agree in principle with this since I consider it to be in accordance with the increased responsibilities of the post arising from the development of oil operations, the arrival of the Trucial Oman Levies and the intention to establish a Council of Shaikhs. The possibilities of implementing this proposal will be discussed with you separately. I regret, however, that the intention to build a new agency building at Dubai has had to be postponed temporarily, for the reasons explained in Colonel Codrington's letter No. XCO1/91K1/1951A of 17th March.

19. To summarise the decisions indicated in this despatch:

- (i) I agree in principle to the establishment of a Council of the Trucial Shaikhs, including, if possible, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, initially under the chairmanship of the Political Officer on the Trucial Coast.
- (ii) I agree that the Trucial Shaikhs should be encouraged to extend their control over the territory of tribes which may legitimately be regarded as owing them allegiance.
- (iii) I do not at present wish to enter into separate negotiations with the Shaikhs of Central Oman, and I should not wish to encourage the oil company to adopt this policy.
- (iv) I do not in present circumstances favour the adoption of a "forward" policy in any territory over which the Sultan claims sovereignty.
- (v) I consider that the Sultan should be supported in his territorial claims and pressed to take action to assert them, and I hope that you will be able to discuss with him the means

to achieve this and also to enable the oil company to operate in the area of their concession.

- (vi) I agree in principle that an independent Political Agency should be established on the Trucial Coast, reporting direct to the Residency.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda and to the head of the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary of State)
G. W. FURLONGE.

EA 1511/1

No. 9

FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE SHAIKHDOMS

Mr. Morrison to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

(No. 48) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *2nd April, 1951.*

I concur generally in the views given in your Excellency's Despatch No. 13 of 29th January on the development of further relations between His Majesty's Government and the British Protected States in the Persian Gulf. In this despatch I propose to set down my comments on the details of your recommendations.

2. I agree that the practical possibility of achieving any form of political federation of these States is remote. I am indeed doubtful whether for the reasons given in paragraph 2 of your Excellency's despatch and because of the differing stages of development at which the States have arrived, such a project should even be adopted as an objective of policy unless there were a spontaneous desire for federation among the rulers themselves. In the backward Shaikhdoms of Trucial Oman the position is different, and here it may be that a form of federation, promoted with the assistance of His Majesty's Government, would ultimately provide the best hope of political and economic viability. For the Persian Gulf States as a whole, however, I see considerable advantage in your Excellency's suggestion of encouraging the rulers to consult together on matters which are, as it were, of regional concern. I note, for example, from the Bahrain Government's report for the year 1368, that a congress of doctors from the Persian Gulf area was held in Bahrain in November 1948. I welcome this example of consultation and hope that it may be continued and possibly extended to other spheres such as education. In due course when the States take over the administration of their own postal services, some co-ordination will be desirable and still more in the possible event of the introduction of a new currency for the Persian Gulf.

3. I agree that it is undesirable to attempt to bring the States more closely under the control of His Majesty's Government, in the sense, for example, of imposing upon them the more dependent status of Protectorate. I consider, however, that His Majesty's Government, being responsible for the foreign relations of these States, have both the right to intervene so far as is necessary to prevent serious maladministration and to ensure that their international commitments are carried out, and the obligation to assist generally in the development of the administrative systems of the States. I am thus in agreement with your Excellency's views on present policy, given in paragraph 3 of your despatch and I regard the two principles stated in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 47 as applying to all the British Protected States in the Persian Gulf.

4. On the other hand, although the goal of independence may not be attainable in the near future I should not wish to lose sight of it as the ultimate purpose. I readily appreciate that, from the point of view of the States themselves, many years of development and education may be necessary before they reach a stage of sufficient strength and maturity for this purpose to be fulfilled.

5. I therefore agree with your Excellency's recommendation that the internal independence of the States should be fostered to the greatest possible extent. In my despatch No. 76 of 20th November, 1950, I have outlined my views on the development of the judicial systems of the States, and I am considering separately your Excellency's despatch No. 11 of 27th January, 1951, in which you express general agreement with the conclusions I have reached. I hope that, with a view to the improvement of their administrations in other spheres also the rulers will be ready

to make the best use of the young men who return to their States after training and education abroad. I agree that it is the function of His Majesty's Government to encourage the reforms for which a demand is likely to arise, and to ensure that they develop on sound lines. It seems to me that only by assisting reasonable progress, even possibly in the face of opposition from those in authority, can His Majesty's Government hope to maintain their special position in these States.

6. At present the remarks in the preceding paragraphs apply chiefly to Bahrain and Kuwait and in some respects to Qatar. I have addressed you in my despatch No. 47 of 2nd April on future policy towards the

Trucial States. I would only add here that in the present circumstances I can hold out no certainty that funds could be provided for expenditure on the general development of these States over and above those already provided for the Trucial Oman Levies. This, however, does not preclude consideration of any recommendations for specific projects.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the head of the British Middle East Office and to His Majesty's Representatives in Jedda, Bagdad and Tehran.

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary of State)
G. W. FURLONGE.

EA 1644/17

No. 10

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN KUWAIT

Mr. Morrison to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

(No. 168) Foreign Office,
Sir, 31st October, 1951.

The proposals relating to the future development of the judicial system in Kuwait, which were made by Mr. Jakins in the early part of this year, have been fully considered in the light of the policy laid down in Mr. Bevin's despatches Nos. 76 and 77 (EA 1643/75) of the 20th November, 1950, and of your Excellency's despatch No. 11 (1642/11) of the 27th January, 1951. In the following paragraphs are set down my conclusions on this subject, which was discussed during your visit to the Foreign Office in September.

2. I agree that we should not, in preference to the policy already laid down, adopt Mr. Jakins's proposal to surrender all our jurisdiction in Kuwait to newly-established local courts. His proposal, it is true, contemplates a gradual surrender which would take place only in those matters in which the new courts had jurisdiction, as and when laws were introduced which they were given power to administer. Nevertheless I see the following objections to this course:—

(i) The argument in favour of the proposal from a comparison between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is not valid. In Saudi Arabia there is nothing, apart from diplomatic representation, which we can do to improve the judicial system. In Kuwait, however, we have a definite responsibility for the development

of the State. Internationally we are responsible for ensuring the just treatment of foreigners in Kuwait and we could not, in the present stage of Kuwait development, claim that the interests of *e.g.*, Europeans and Americans were being adequately safeguarded if we were to surrender jurisdiction over them to the local courts;

(ii) The return of the younger generation of Kuwaitis from education abroad may well lead to some conflict of views with the present established leaders of the community. The establishment of new courts on the lines proposed would be liable to accentuate this conflict and might raise doubts in the minds of the present leaders about our motives for giving the new arrangements our support. This would be unfortunate since it must clearly be our policy to reconcile the present administration to the acceptance of reforms which will be demanded and which we consider both necessary and desirable.

(iii) Finally, it is essential that there should be a uniform policy towards the judicial development of the States under our protection in the Persian Gulf. There are bound to be differences in detail but unless the objectives and method of procedure are the same for each State,

comparisons and jealousies will be bound to arise and the administration of individual policies will be wholly impracticable.

3. Although I should not wish to press on the Ruler the acceptance of a system of Joint Courts, I agree with the proposal made in your letter No. 1642/20 of the 14th February to Mr. Fry that the system in operation in Bahrain should be explained in detail to him so that he can make his own decision about the introduction of a similar system in Kuwait. It should be explained to him that the establishment of Joint Courts does not in fact represent a net restriction of the present scope of his jurisdiction, since, although the Joint Courts would exercise jurisdiction in certain cases which are at present heard before the Ruler's Courts, a similar transfer of jurisdiction would take place from the Political Agent's Courts to the Joint Courts.

4. I agree that in discussing with the Ruler the extent of his jurisdiction you should aim to clarify the present definition rather than in any way to curtail his existing powers. I realise that, in the circumstances now prevailing, it would not be possible to seek to restrict the number of countries over whose nationals the Ruler's Courts exercised jurisdiction and to this extent the instructions given in paragraph 4 of Mr. Bevin's despatch No. 77 of the 20th November, 1950, require modification. You should therefore explain to the Ruler that the present definition which has been adopted in the Kuwait Order-in-Council of 1949 is imprecise and that it would be more satisfactory to draw up an agreed list of

States for this purpose. You should seek the Ruler's agreement to define the extent of his jurisdiction as covering his own nationals and nationals of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Persia, Syria, Egypt, the Lebanon, the Yemen, Muscat and Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States. To this list may also be added the Palestinians referred to in your letter No. 1642/16 of the 3rd February who may for this purpose be defined as "stateless Moslems of Palestinian origin."

5. I note that in your despatch No. 11 of the 27th January you agree generally with the policy laid down in Mr. Bevin's despatch No. 76 of the 20th November, 1950, except that you consider that the process of reform and development will be a slow one. While I agree that it would be necessary to proceed cautiously with reforms, and particularly with any reforms which may involve a major change in the procedure in the local courts, we cannot afford to allow the judicial development of these States to fall behind the economic and political development. I have it in mind that the increasing economic importance of Kuwait and Bahrain will sooner or later bring with it demands for complicated legislation on matters such as company law and it would be unfortunate if, when the time came, the judicial administrations were not adequate to deal with the normal requirements of a modern state. Having said this I agree that the development may be slow, and necessarily so if the danger mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 5 of your despatch No. 11 is to be avoided.

I am, &c.
G. W. FURLONGE.

EA 1011/1

No. 11

PERSIAN GULF: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1951

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Eden. (Received 25th January)

(No. 5. Confidential) Bahrain,
Sir, 17th January, 1952

I have the honour to transmit herewith a political review of events in the Persian Gulf during the year 1951.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Bagdad, Jeddah and Tehran, His Majesty's Ministers in Beirut and Damascus, the head of the British Middle East Office (with two spare

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copies for the information of Mr. Crawford and Mr. Jones), His Majesty's Consul-General, Basra, the United Kingdom High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi, the Governors of Aden and British Somaliland, the British Resident, Zanzibar, the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf (with a separate copy for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies), the Senior Royal Air Force Officer, Persian Gulf (with

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a separate copy for transmission to the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq), the Political Agents in Bahrain and Kuwait and His Majesty's Consul in Muscat.

I have, &c.

W. R. HAY.

Enclosure in No. 11

Annual Report

General

The year has again been a quiet one and the shaikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat have been little affected by world events. There have been no signs of any Communist influence and Arab nationalism has made little appeal to the rulers and their subjects; the rulers showed a satisfactory willingness to pay no attention to the Arab League resolution on oil supplies for Israel. No sympathy was shown for the Persians in their dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The evacuation of Abadan by the company was received with astonishment mixed with a certain amount of relief as it had been feared that the use of force by His Majesty's Government might lead to war. Generally speaking the shaikhdoms are prosperous and the rulers and their people are content and do not look for any change. Events in Persia have stimulated the oil companies operating in the shaikhdoms to increase their payments both to the rulers and to local labour and in Kuwait and Qatar there has been a big step-up in production. Increasing use is being made of the Gulf airfields and the Rulers of Bahrain and Kuwait have shown a desire to modify the extent of the control of civil aviation which they have given us. Air Navigation Regulations have been issued at Bahrain, Kuwait and are shortly to be issued at Sharjah to facilitate the exercise of this control. Great difficulty was experienced at Kuwait in persuading the ruler to take action against the Lebanese company, Middle East Air Lines, who were using the Kuwait airfield without proper authority. Eventually the affair was settled as a result of negotiations with the Lebanese and no drastic action had to be taken. A new air agreement has been signed with the Ruler of Sharjah and the Ruler of Qatar has ceded us control of civil aviation in his territory without entering into a detailed agreement. The Gulf Aviation Company has continued to operate local scheduled services, but after the unfortunate death of Mr. Bosworth in an air accident in June showed signs of collapse. The British

Overseas Airways Corporation have now taken it over and have appointed Colonel Mostert a senior member of their staff to put it on its feet again. Very few cases of abduction into slavery have been reported and there have been a large number of manumissions and voluntary releases in Qatar. The Ruler of Qatar proposes to issue a decree in the near future abolishing slavery in his territory.

Bahrain

Shaikh Salman has enjoyed good health throughout the year. His chief concern appears to be the extravagance and misbehaviour of some of his relations. He is depressed by the great increase in the oil revenues in the Shaikhdoms of Kuwait and Qatar. The Bahrain Petroleum Company are paying him an extra £37,700 a month to keep him satisfied while they are making up their minds what to offer him so that he will receive roughly the same amount per ton of oil produced as rulers of neighbouring countries. During the course of the year he was given a written assurance by His Majesty's Government of protection against external aggression on the understanding that it would not be published. He had asked for this largely as a result of the Persian claims to Bahrain. His relations with the other shaikhdoms have been uniformly good and the Rulers of Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi have all paid visits to Bahrain during the year. He still, however, claims sovereignty over all the sea and the sea-bed between Bahrain and Qatar and has protested against survey operations which the International Marine Oil Company have been carrying out over the portion of the sea bed assigned to Qatar. In March Mr. Belgrave completed twenty-five years as adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain. Thanks to his efforts and those of the present ruler Bahrain is now probably the best-administered State in the Middle East. During the year a new educational hostel and a new secondary school and girls' school have been opened in Manamah and two new village schools have been opened. The plan for the extension of the Manamah customs jetty has been abandoned and it is now proposed to construct a pier near Jufair. This will entail the deepening and widening of the channel which forms the approach to Khor Kaliyah, and preliminary work on this is planned to start in the near future. The Bahrain Petroleum Company have announced that they no longer have any hope of finding additional oil in any of the areas in which

they are at present allowed to operate and that as the life of the existing field is limited they will have to start reducing production in about five years' time. This will not affect the operations of the refinery as the bulk of the oil refined there is derived from Saudi Arabia. In July the company granted a minimum increase of Re.1/- per day to all their local labour and announced their intention of making further increases in the near future. This has had the effect of increasing wages throughout the island. There has been some tension during the year between the Sunnis and Shiahhs as a result of disputes which occurred in the Manamah Municipality Committee and there are signs that the local indigenous Shiahhs who are known as Baharinah will not remain content indefinitely with their present subordinate position.

Kuwait

Shaikh Abdulla Salim has now been ruling for nearly two years. He has shown himself honest, well intentioned and very friendly in his relations with His Majesty's Government, but weak in dealing with his own family and generally speaking anxious to avoid responsibility and any kind of strong action. He is endeavouring to shuffle off all responsibility for local administration on to his financial adviser, Lieutenant-Colonel Crichton, whom he apparently wishes to use as a sort of buffer between himself and his more powerful relations. He spends an undue amount of his time in taking holiday trips in a new launch which he had constructed locally and has paid visits in this to both Bahrain and the Trucial Coast during the year. He is now fully committed to the employment of British experts. In addition to several British doctors some of whom date from his predecessor's time he now employs three British officials including Lieutenant-Colonel Crichton in his Finance Department and one in his Customs Department and he has recently engaged General Hasted as his State Engineer. Development is proceeding apace and it is hoped that with General Hasted's arrival it will be properly supervised and co-ordinated. The ruler has agreed to the formation of a Development Board for this purpose and Mr. Crichton will probably be its chairman. A town-planning scheme is being devised by a British firm and material for a large distillation plant are arriving. A palatial secondary school is under construction outside the limits of the town. A new

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agreement which has been reached with the Kuwait Oil Company provides for the sharing of profits on a fifty-fifty basis through the payment of royalties combined with income tax and will bring the State in future an income of from £50,000 to £60,000 a year. Only a small proportion can be absorbed in development schemes, especially in view of the present shortage of materials and the disposal of the balance creates an extremely difficult problem. Politically the year has been a quiet one both internally and externally. Partly as a result of the closing of the Abadan refinery the Kuwait Oil Company have nearly trebled their production which has now almost reached 800,000 barrels a day. The company have found a new oil-field at Magwa which is likely to be brought into production in two years' time. The American Independent Oil Company have not yet found any oil in the Neutral Zone. They can now operate in three Kuwait islands in which the Kuwait Oil Company previously claimed rights, since as part of the settlement reached with the ruler over the royalty question the latter company have withdrawn their claim to these islands.

Qatar

The visit which the ruler, Shaikh Ali, paid to Bahrain early in the year has served to broaden his outlook slightly but he remains unintelligent and narrow-minded and is still very much under the influence of his father, who is more alert than ever and shows no signs of dying. Ali is genuinely anxious to see Dohah develop on the lines of Bahrain and is less conservative in this respect than his adviser, Group Captain Plant. Progress up to date has been very slow but this has been due to the shortage of funds and the fact that a beginning had to be made from practically nothing. An agreement on the royalty question has recently been reached with Messrs. Petroleum Development (Qatar) (Limited), the local subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company and as a result the State will in future have a revenue of over £3 million a year. The ruler has agreed to the employment of a British State engineer and a British doctor and plans are being made for a power house, a hospital and a piped-water supply amongst other works. Meanwhile, a new primary school has been completed and a new fish, meat and vegetable market is under construction. The police have been compelled to dismiss some of their foreign element who were amongst their best men, but in spite of this are going

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ahead and now number over 200. They have replaced the untrained guards previously provided by the State in all the oil company's camps. There have been no serious political troubles internally or externally but as elsewhere in the Gulf the ruler's most difficult problem is presented by his own relations. He has been able to pacify them to some extent by increasing their allowances as a result of his greatly increased revenue, but they are always asking for more. Messrs. Petroleum Development (Qatar) (Limited) are rapidly increasing their production. They have experienced many labour troubles during the year, some of which threatened to develop seriously, and they appear to be generally inept in their dealings with both their local labour and the local government. The combination of the Superior Oil Company of America and the Central Mining Investment Corporation which obtained the concession for the Qatar sea-bed has taken the name of the International Marine Oil Company. It has been carrying out surveys in a comparatively limited area, and it is not known whether it has found any indications of the presence of oil.

Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms

The most important development of the year has been the establishment of the Trucial Oman Levies. They were started with a nucleus of about thirty men from the Arab Legion. Recruits from local tribes have been readily forthcoming and they are now up to the strength of eighty which has been sanctioned for the current financial year. Their progress was severely handicapped by a mutiny which took place amongst the Arab Legionaries in May. This was settled by the help of officers deputed from the Arab Legion and two officers and a few men were sent back to Ammam. The levies have done much patrolling and their presence has had a steadying effect. Amongst other things no case of abduction into slavery has been reported since their establishment. Apart from the pursuit of some highway robbers they have not yet been called upon to take any offensive action. The outstanding event politically was the murder of Shaikh Hamad, the Ruler of Kalba, at the beginning of July by Saqr, the eldest son of Sultan bin Salim, ex-Ruler of Ras al Khaimah. Saqr has established himself in Kalba, but all the other rulers have been informed that we do not recognise him and the action to be taken to remove him is still under consideration. Shaikh

Sultan bin Saqr, Ruler Sharjah, died in London in March after an illness lasting over two years. There was a dispute over the succession between his brother Mohammad, who had been acting in his place during his illness, and his eldest son Saqr. It was also solved peacefully in favour of the latter who has begun well and shows signs of being more progressive than the other Trucial Coast Rulers, but unfortunately has few funds at his disposal. Shaikh Shakhbut, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, visited Paris in August for the arbitration proceedings in the dispute between him and Messrs. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) (Limited) over oil rights in the sea-bed. This visit appears to have done little to broaden his outlook and he remains an uncivilised and somewhat wild Bedu. He is fortunate to have the support of two capable and steady-going brothers and with their assistance is steadily increasing his influence in the Buraimi area. Shaikh Said of Dubai is now nearly 70. He was awarded an honorary Commandership of the British Empire on the occasion of His Majesty's birthday. With the help of his son Rashid he manages to maintain excellent law and order in the large commercial port of Dubai without any formal administration. Attempts are being made to persuade him to improve his administration but a hope that he would set about this has been frustrated by a serious fall in his customs revenue. An up-to-date hospital was opened at Dubai in October. It was built and is being maintained from funds locally subscribed, but is administered through the Persian Gulf Residency. Shaikh Rashid of the little State of Ajman has agreed to the opening of a dispensary by an American mission in his capital. There is nothing to report about Umm al Qaiwain. Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammad, Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, strives to do his best encumbered as he is by father, brothers and numerous cousins. Rather surprisingly he has succeeded by forcible action in bringing under his rule the neighbouring village of Jazirat al Hamrai. He has showed himself unable to cope with the problems presented by Sha'am and Rams. Fighting broke out in Sha'am again in February with much damage to property and some casualties. The Political Officer, Trucial Coast, subsequently visited the village with a party of the Trucial Oman Levies, but by then peace had been restored. The rival parties now appear to have become tired of fighting, but

there is little sign of the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah establishing any real authority there. There has also been trouble between rival shaikhs at Rams which the ruler has been unable to deal with effectively. Messrs. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) (Limited) have abandoned the well they were drilling at Ras Sadr in Abu Dhabi territory and are now drilling at Jebal Ali in Dubai territory where they appear to have some hope of success. They are precluded from operating in a promising area west of Abu Dhabi owing to the dispute with the Saudis over the boundary. They have obtained a new land and sea-bed concession from Ajman and are negotiating for a sea-bed concession with Umm al Qaiwain and have been surveying in the area between Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah. The arbitration proceedings between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) (Limited) and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi over oil rights in the sea-bed were decided in favour of the latter and as a result Superior Oil Company are being permitted to carry out survey operations over the Abu Dhabi sea-bed.

Muscat

The Sultan returned from Dhofar at the end of February and has since resided at his capital, where he has chiefly concerned himself with the negotiations for a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with His Majesty's Government. The treaty of 1939, as the result of a notice of termination given by the Sultan, expired in February of this year. It was subsequently prolonged by agreement till 31st December to enable these negotiations to be completed. The new treaty was signed on 20th December. It is very much on the same lines as the old one except that mention of extra-territorial jurisdiction is omitted. The jurisdiction we previously exercised is being extended for ten years with certain modifications by virtue of a separate exchange of letters. We shall continue to exercise complete jurisdiction over citizens of the United Kingdom and the Colonies and jurisdiction over all Commonwealth citizens, except citizens of Pakistan and the Union of South Africa whose Government have declined to participate in the arrangements in cases brought against them by other Commonwealth citizens or by foreigners. Politically the year has been a quiet one and the atmosphere in Muscat is generally one of stagnation. The Sultan's Government is solvent, but has no substantial oil revenues. There is little money to spare for develop-

ment schemes, but some money has been set aside for an agricultural project on the Batinah Coast and steps are being taken to obtain the services of an agricultural officer from Pakistan. The tribes of the interior have been quiet though it is believed that their economic condition is poor. The Imam's authority is still undisputed and his relations with the Sultan are on the whole friendly. The latter is still dreaming of bringing the interior under his sway when the Imam dies and does his best to foster friendly relations with the various tribal shaikhs, but it is very doubtful whether he has sufficient force of character or personality to achieve his object. One of the two big tribal leaders of the interior, Sulaiman bin Hamyar, performed the pilgrimage in September and visited His Majesty's Government's officers on his outward and return journeys. He is still endeavouring to enter into direct relations with His Majesty's Government, but he has been told that such relations must be conducted through the Sultan. Nothing of importance has happened at Gwadar. The Sultan still maintains a British administrator there but an Indian doctor whose services he obtained left after a short stay. He has sanctioned the building of a new school which is badly required. There has been no exploration for oil, but the Sultan has agreed that Petroleum Development (Oman and Dhofar) (Limited) may carry out operations on the coast of Arabia opposite the Masirah Island provided they have a force of about 300 men to protect them. The reactions of the company to this proposal have not yet been ascertained.

Foreign Relations

Relations between the Gulf States and their neighbours have continued to be friendly in spite of disputes over boundaries and the ownership of islands. Some progress has been made in dealing with the disputes with Saudi Arabia as a result of discussions which were held with the Amir Faisal in London in August, when proposals were made for the settlement of the disputes over the ownership of various islands and shoals which may result in a settlement being reached though they have not yet done so. It was also decided that discussions should be held regarding the land boundaries during the cold weather but neither the place nor date of these has yet been fixed. Meanwhile, it has been agreed that no oil or military operations should be carried out in the disputed areas.

The Persians have from time to time ventilated their claim to Bahrain and in February they sent two sloops to the island of Bu Musa which they claim and made a number of enquiries from the local inhabitants. This island is under the sovereignty of the Ruler of Sharjah and a British company is mining the red oxide deposits there under a concession which they hold from him. There have been no incidents of importance on the Kuwait-Iraq frontier and the Ruler of Kuwait has at last paid compensation to the relations of certain Iraqis who were killed allegedly by a member of his family, in a smuggling incident on this frontier in the spring of 1948. It is hoped that negotiations with the Iraq Government for the demarcation of this frontier will be started shortly. Nuri Pasha, the Prime Minister of Iraq, paid unofficial visits to both Bahrain and Kuwait during the year. Mr. Mohammed Yunus, the Indian Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad continues to hold informal charge of Indian interests in the Gulf States and has paid two visits to Bahrain and Kuwait during the year. He is very courteous and reasonable and our relations with him and Indians in the Persian Gulf generally have been excellent. Nothing further has been heard of direct Indian representation in the Gulf States, but

it is believed that the Government of India intend shortly to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan of Muscat. Two Indian frigates visited the Gulf in January and made a good impression at the various ports at which they called. It is understood that the Government of Pakistan do not intend to seek for any representation in Bahrain for fear of offending the Persians. The Sultan of Muscat has refused to receive delegations which the Government of Pakistan wished to send to him to discuss a treaty and the lease or sale of Gwadur. Relations with the Americans have continued most cordially and there has been substantial co-operation with them in many matters. A consul has been appointed at Kuwait and their consular officers at Dhahran constantly visit Bahrain and less frequently Qatar, the Trucial Shaikhdoms and Muscat. Since April an officer of the rank of rear-admiral has held the appointment of United States Commander Middle East Force, although he has only one ship under his command. On two occasions two United States destroyers from Korea have visited Bahrain on their way back to the United States. U.S.S. *Maury* continues her survey of the northern waters of the Gulf during the winter months.

15th January, 1952.

No. 12

REPORT ON A VISIT TO THE STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION, WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ON IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA AND WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Sir R. Makins to Mr. Eden

*Foreign Office,
20th March, 1952.*

Sir,

In accordance with the instructions in your despatch No. EA 1051/26 of 12th February, I have the honour to submit a report on the situation as I see it in the States in the Persian Gulf under British protection and in Muscat, together with some observations on Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

2. I left London on 12th February and visited Bagdad, Basra, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, and Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman on the Trucial Coast. I also went to Dammam, Dhahran and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Owing to shortage of time and the difficulty of communications I was unfortunately unable to visit Muscat. On my way back from Bahrain I spent three days at Fayid at the invitation of the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and stayed a night with the Governor of Cyprus. I returned to the United Kingdom on 12th March.

3. I was accompanied in Iraq and Kuwait by Mr. Serpell of the Treasury and in Kuwait by Mr. Loombe of the Bank of England. It was a matter of great regret to me that it was necessary for both Mr. Serpell and Mr. Loombe to return to London from Bahrain on 22nd February to attend to certain questions arising from the discussions which, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. EA 1112/26, I had had with the Shaikh of Kuwait. I missed their

valuable advice and counsel in the latter part of my journey. Mr. Rose of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office accompanied me throughout the tour and was a most assiduous and efficient adviser.

4. In the course of my journey I conferred with Her Majesty's Representatives; with the British Advisers in the employment of the Governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar; with the leading representatives of the subsidiary companies of the Iraq Petroleum Company at Basra, Qatar and the Trucial Coast; and with the top executives of the Kuwait Oil Company, of the Bahrain Petroleum Company, and of the Arabian-American Oil Company in Saudi Arabia. I was received by the Regent of Iraq; by the Shaikhs of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman; and by the Emir of El Hasa in Saudi Arabia. In company with Her Majesty's Ambassador in Jedda I had an audience with King Ibn Saud on Friday, 25th February, at Riyadh, and was subsequently entertained to dinner by the Crown Prince, the Emir Saud. I met and talked with the majority of the British residents in the Persian Gulf States and a number of prominent Arabs. I had most helpful conversations with the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and Sir Thomas Rapp, and paid visits to service commanders and installations in the Canal Zone. I had talks with the American and French Ambassadors in Baghdad, the American Consul at Kuwait, and the American Consul-General at Dhahran, as well as with the United States Military and Naval Commanders in the Persian Gulf area.

5. The conclusions which it is possible to draw on a rapid journey of this kind are necessarily derived from somewhat fleeting impressions, but the recommendations which I have ventured to make are based not only on my own observation but on the talks which I was able to have with officials and others with long experience of the area. I have not made any recommendations in this report on the discharge of the judicial functions and responsibilities of Her Majesty's Representatives in the Persian Gulf States, since this matter is to form the subject of a separate enquiry by the Senior Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office.

6. I wish to record my grateful thanks to all Her Majesty's Representatives in the countries which I visited, to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and to the A.O.C. at Habbaniya, all of whom were of the greatest assistance to me. I was also received most kindly, and given every facility, by the subsidiary companies of the Iraq Petroleum Company in the area, by the Kuwait Oil Company, by the Bahrain Petroleum Company, and by the Arabian-American Oil Company.

7. I am leaving it to the Department to advise upon the distribution of this despatch and the enclosed report.

I have, &c.

ROGER MAKINS.

Enclosure in No. 12

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A.—CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL

1. The Gulf States cannot stand on their own politically or strategically in the foreseeable future. Her Majesty's Government must therefore either continue to be responsible for their foreign relations, or relinquish this responsibility to some other country or international body.

2. The States are administratively backward and weak. The international responsibility of Her Majesty's Government involves indirect responsibility for their internal stability, and the British jurisdiction over foreign nationals in the States involves a direct responsibility for internal security and impartial justice. Since Her Majesty's Government will be blamed for any shortcomings in the States, they must find means to ensure that the administrations are above reproach.

3. The responsibility of Her Majesty's Government involves a relatively small commitment in terms of resources. Therefore it not only should, but can, be worthily discharged. Her Majesty's Government's mission in the Persian Gulf cannot be carried out on the cheap.

4. The Gulf States are likely to have, from 1953 onwards, a sterling income of between £70 and £80 million per annum of which, on the most optimistic assumptions, they will be able to spend not more than £20 million wisely. Her Majesty's Government, in the interests of the sterling area as a whole, must therefore endeavour to safeguard the investment of between £50 and £60 million per annum.

5. The political responsibility of Her Majesty's Government in the Gulf States involves an obligation to defend them. In present circumstances, this requires a joint effort, and can be carried out, if at all, only as part of a combined plan for Middle East Defence. This is unlikely to be evolved until an Allied Command for the Middle East is set up.

6. Relations between the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the area are good, but there is inadequate consultation and agreement on major questions of policy. Both Governments should realise that the Arab is an adept at polite cunning and cupboard love, and should therefore shed any illusion that

one is more popular than the other in the long run, even in Saudi Arabia. Continuous effort should be made to obtain real agreement on policy and aims in the Middle East. This process would be greatly assisted by the establishment of a focal point in the area where the execution of agreed policies could be supervised. The Allied Command in the Middle East would serve this purpose. This is a further reason for setting it up as soon as possible.

7. Relations between the oil companies, and between the oil companies and the local Governments are good in general. But the companies are subject to ever-increasing demands. The Rulers watch each other and neighbouring countries closely, and it is inescapable that a concession made in a negotiation with one State will have, sooner or later, to be made in all the others. All the companies are therefore in the same boat, and there should be the maximum degree of consultation between them on all aspects of negotiations for changes in concession agreements. The oil-producing States all now receive more money than they can use and have as large a participation in the operations as they can undertake. Any further concessions will therefore be of no benefit to either party but will only aggravate the existing problem.

B.—CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: SPECIFIC POINTS

1. Trucial Coast

The decision to form a Council of the Rulers of the Trucial Coast should be put into effect as soon as possible.

2. Administrative and Financial

(a) The administrations in Kuwait and Qatar are rudimentary and unequal to the demands on them. They must be improved quickly. An essential step is the introduction of effective budgeting and budgetary control over the departments. The position of the principal British Advisers should be strengthened as much as possible.

(b) Controls over prices and rents should be established in Kuwait and Qatar (as in Bahrain) to guard against further inflation.

(c) Every effort should be made to get away from the system in Bahrain and Qatar by which the Shaikh receives a fixed percentage of the oil or other revenues for the use of himself and his family.

(d) There should be an allocation between current and development expenditure, and a settled policy for dealing with the surplus. Otherwise money will be frittered away.

(e) Oil royalties should be paid in sterling.

(f) If a Ruler refuses to accept the counsel of his Advisers, and the sound administrative and economic progress of the State is endangered, Her Majesty's Government should intervene through the Political Resident or Political Agent.

3. Economic Development

(a) In cases where funds are available for development, Development Boards should be set up, where they do not at present exist (Bahrain, Qatar), and strengthened, where they do (Iraq, Kuwait). All development should be under the undivided control of these Boards.

(b) Development plans must have regard to the availability of labour and supply and the Boards should be empowered by the Rulers to settle priorities.

(c) The sterling holders (Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar) should be given priority in the United Kingdom commensurate with their economic and strategic importance. Alternatively, Her Majesty's Government must accept the fact, and the disadvantage, that these States will turn to non-sterling area suppliers who can deliver development goods. The same applies to the supply of consumer goods. We must not be dog-in-the-manger.

4. Reserve Funds

(a) Arrangements should be made to ensure that the sterling holders receive the best advice available on the investment of their surplus funds and so far as possible that they follow it. But, beyond persuasion, it would be impolitic for Her Majesty's Government to attempt to control the use of the funds. A procedure for giving advice on investment is already under negotiation in the case of Kuwait. A similar procedure should be introduced in Qatar as soon as possible.

(b) The position of Iraq and Kuwait as large holders of sterling balances should be recognised, and they should be given an appropriate status at sterling area meetings which have hitherto been confined to members of the Commonwealth.

(c) Since Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar cannot in any foreseeable circumstances spend the funds accruing to them, the ultimate objective of Her Majesty's Government should be to persuade the holders to utilise them for the benefit of the area as a whole and the development of the less fortunate countries within it. This objective needs to be approached slowly, and with the utmost circumspection.

5. Supply

In addition to development goods, the Gulf States are often short of wheat (in the form of flour) and rice. The quantities involved are marginal and Her Majesty's Government should endeavour to ensure—

- (i) that adequate supplies are available;
- (ii) that they are distributed under governmental control.

6. Trade

Notwithstanding some disadvantages on the financial side, Her Majesty's Government should not intervene to restrict the development of the entrepôt trade in Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai.

7. Local Security

(a) The Trucial Oman Levies fulfil an important rôle in maintaining order in the Trucial Coast, preventing the slave trade, and as the outward sign of Her Majesty's Government's intention to fulfil their responsibilities for protecting the States against Saudi Arabian expansionism. They are at present too few and inadequately equipped. They should be brought up to a strength of 200 and properly provided for.

(b) There is no scope for increasing local forces other than for police and security purposes. Advisers should continue to be attached to the local police forces in Bahrain, Qatar and Muscat, and an attempt should be made to introduce an adviser on security in Kuwait. Her Majesty's Government should offer no objection to the raising by the Sultan of Muscat of a force to protect the projected operations of the oil company in Southern Oman.

(c) Consideration should be given to the defence of the airfields and bases in the area against surprise attack.

8. Anglo-American Co-operation at Bahrain

The American request for additional facilities within the naval base of Jufair (Bahrain) should be accepted without delay.

9. Civil Aviation

(a) Her Majesty's Government should endeavour to retain effective control of civil aviation and of the airfields in the Gulf States. This cannot be achieved without the agreement and co-operation of the Rulers, and prior consultation with them.

(b) It is doubtful whether Her Majesty's Government can for long hold the position that traffic between the Gulf States is United Kingdom cabotage. If this has to be given up, the admission of foreign countries to this traffic should not be allowed to become the occasion of a political challenge to Her Majesty's Government's position by other Arab countries.

(c) An early decision about the airfield at Kuwait is required. A new airfield is necessary, and it must either be constructed by the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Civil Aviation in agreement with the Ruler, or the Ruler must be allowed to do it himself. In the latter case Her Majesty's Government must be prepared to concede to the Ruler a larger measure of control over operations.

10. Education

Primary and Secondary Education

This is developing satisfactorily in Bahrain and Kuwait. The employment of Egyptian teachers is a potential source of weakness.

Higher Education

The arguments are evenly balanced between sending the majority of students to Universities in the Levant and sending them to the Universities of the West. In practice both will happen, and in either case—

- (a) a system of selection is needed in the States, which offers some guarantee of suitability;
- (b) a system of reception and supervision is required in the United Kingdom.

There should be regular visits to the States by British Council representatives for the purpose of advising and keeping in touch with local directors of education. The British Council post at Basra, which can most suitably undertake this task, should be maintained.

11. Information

(a) There is insufficient scope for a specially-appointed information officer, and for the distribution of non-Arabic publicity material.

(b) The best media for propagating the British point of view are the B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts and the proposed new Arabic newspaper. These should be developed to the highest possible standard. Local broadcasting services, where they exist, e.g., Kuwait, could, however, be assisted with material.

(c) Otherwise, there is no substitute for frequent personal contacts between the Political Resident and the Political Agents and the small number of influential personalities in each State.

12. Oil Companies' Relations with the States and with each other

(a) The Oil Companies can, and should, keep closely in touch with one another over:—

- Training schemes.
- Wages and employment policy.
- Provision of amenities.

(b) Each Company has to guard against the danger of becoming an *imperium in imperio*. The Companies can do, and to a great extent are now doing, this in the following ways:—

- (i) By training local inhabitants to replace foreigners in progressively higher posts.
- (ii) By avoiding too great an exclusiveness in such matters as education and technical training, the use of port and other facilities, &c.
- (iii) By keeping the Rulers closely informed of their activities and intentions.

(c) A company of mixed nationalities is in a stronger position than a company of one nationality only (Anglo-Iranian in Persia, Aramco in Saudi Arabia). Aramco is the weak link in the chain at present. An arrangement, on lines previously proposed, for an exchange of holdings would be advantageous, but is probably not practical politics.

13. Representation of Her Majesty's Government

(a) The present system and scale of representation of Her Majesty's Government is adequate. But the establishment must be kept up to strength. This has not been done recently, with harmful results.

(b) The Persian Gulf posts, including Muscat, are not, and never will be, ordinary Foreign Service posts, and special consideration must be given to their staffing. Attempts to assimilate them to the Foreign Service pattern are misconceived.

(c) All the staff (with the exception of one or two on the Political Resident's staff, but not excepting the Political Resident himself) should have fluent Arabic. It is also desirable that the Ambassadors in Iraq and Saudi Arabia should speak Arabic. The flow of Arabic students through the Middle East College of Arabic Studies should be adjusted with this in mind.

(d) The separate identity of the office of Political Agent, Bahrain, should be preserved and it should not be assimilated to that of Deputy to the Political Resident. The Political Agents at Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial States should all report direct to the Political Resident. The political work of the Residency and the Political Agency, Bahrain, can with advantage be combined in a single office.

(e) Since the Americans have appointed an Admiral to reside at Bahrain, consideration should be given to raising the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, to the rank of Admiral.

14. Advisers to the States

(a) The key to the orderly progress of Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain lies in the provision of suitable British advisers. The system of recruitment hitherto has been haphazard and unsatisfactory. Command of Arabic is most important for the principal advisers.

(b) Since there is a latent prejudice against foreign advice, the Advisers should be as few in number and as good in quality as possible. Their advice can be supplemented by *ad hoc* visits of British experts.

(c) An informal committee of officials should be set up in London to look for candidates and recommendations should be made to the Rulers as far as possible through the senior British Adviser in each State. Consideration should be given to the appointment of a senior and experienced Adviser in Kuwait. The Adviser in Qatar should be changed as soon as possible.

(d) Close contact should be maintained between British representatives and the Advisers in each State, and the Advisers should be given as much information about the policy and aims of Her Majesty's Government as is necessary for the efficient performance of their task. But this contact must be both informal and discreet.

15. Representation of States in London

While the channel of communication with the Ruler must remain with the Political Resident and the Political Agents, the present arrangements for the representation of the Shaikh of Kuwait are inadequate. It would be advisable to establish a "Kuwait House" in London (which would no doubt be followed by a "Bahrain House" and a "Qatar House") to perform certain functions, e.g., the supervision of Kuwaiti students in the United Kingdom.

I.—GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Political and Social Organisation of the States

1. The Persian Gulf States under the protection of Her Majesty's Government, consist of Bahrain Islands, population 112,000, Kuwait, population 150,000, Qatar, population 16,000, and seven small States on the Trucial Coast, total population 80,000, of which the largest and most important are Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Dubai. The population figures are approximate except in the case of Bahrain, the only State to have had a census. Outside the Persian Gulf to the South of the Gulf of Oman is the Sultanate of Muscat. Although the Sultan is not under British protection, his State has been closely associated with Her Majesty's Government through Treaties of Friendship for 150 years. Since its problems are in many cases closely connected with those of the other States, it will be assimilated to them for certain purposes in this report. The population may be about half a million, of which not more than three-fifths certainly recognise the authority of the Sultan.

2. British interest in the Persian Gulf dates from the 17th Century when the East-India Company established trading posts there primarily for trade with Persia through Hormuz. It was not until the beginning of the 19th Century, however, that British influence became predominant and it was consolidated by the signature of agreements with the various Shaikhs on the Arabian side of the Gulf. The purpose was the traditional blend of humanitarianism and self-interest; in particular, to safeguard the trade route and to stop the supply of arms to Baluchistan and the North-West frontier. The earliest treaties with the Shaikhs related to the suppression of piracy and undertakings to keep the peace (as a result of which the part formerly known as "the Pirate Coast" has since been known as "the Trucial Coast") and undertakings not to indulge in the traffic in slaves or arms. Later came the agreements in which the various States handed over to Her Majesty's Government the responsibility for their relations with other countries.

3. Although Bahrain is much more advanced administratively and socially than the other States, the basic pattern is similar in all the States (and incidentally in Saudi Arabia). There is a ruling family (of anything up to 150 male persons) for whose benefit the State is run. The more important States have a thriving merchant community. The rest of the population are either employees of the

Shaikhs and merchants and oil companies, or wandering Bedouin. The Shaikhs exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over their own subjects, and the nationals of certain other Arab States, and religious courts have separate jurisdiction in certain matters. Before the oil period a Shaikh's revenues were derived from his own land and possessions, supplemented in some cases by small customs duties and other levies of one kind or another. Now, as then, the revenues flow into the Shaikh's pocket and he distributes them among his family. It was only last year that the Shaikh of Kuwait ceased to sign all cheques on the public account personally.

4. The older members of the ruling families, who are likely to remain in power for some years, are generally speaking half educated and untravelled, and they do not know any language other than their own. They have the shrewdness, the suspicion and the obstinacy of the semi-educated; and even the better elements among them are old-fashioned in their political, economic and social outlook. They are not fitted either by temperament or training to comprehend the economic and financial problems of the modern world, and the difficulty of dealing with them is greatly enhanced by the need for exposition of complex ideas in Arabic. Though the rulers are in some cases men of good character and moderate views, their families are often selfish and rapacious. Collectively, therefore, the governing elements tend to be self-centred and avaricious, and the concept of mutual help among the various States is virtually unknown.

5. The younger members of the Ruling families are in many cases partly Westernised. Some have been or are being educated in Cairo and Beirut, or in England and the United States. They know some English and have acquired expensive tastes as well as some of the less desirable habits of Western civilisation. In this process of evolution they seem, unfortunately, to be developing little sense of public responsibility or administrative talent. Since this class will profit most from an increase in the public revenue, their narrow and selfish outlook and their continuing political and social incapacity may be a source of great weakness and difficulty in the future. A sound system of education could correct this in time. But it will be a long process.

6. The merchant class, perhaps because they have to work hard, appear to offer much better material for public life and responsibility although here the "get rich quick" attitude is prevalent. There is not yet an official class. The poorer classes, in so far as they have emerged from the tribal state, show considerable aptitude for technical skills, but, as in other parts of the Middle East, the gap between the ruling minority and the working and nomadic elements of the population is far too great. Such is the nature of a society now called on in some cases to handle wealth on a scale, which even a highly developed community would find it difficult to absorb.

Economic Resources

7. Apart from oil, the Gulf States are virtually devoid of economic resources. Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar still have a small trade in pearls. Muscat exports dates and fish, and there are one or two deposits of red oxide on islands off the Trucial Coast. Apart from the dates in Muscat and Bahrain, practically all foodstuffs have to be imported.

Relations between the Gulf States

8. These are still largely affected by the personality of the Ruler in each State and there is no element of real cohesion. As a result of territorial and sea-bed disputes the Ruler of Bahrain is in bad relations with the Ruler of Qatar; and their differences have been exacerbated by Qatar's sudden riches. The Ruler of Bahrain's relations with the Ruler of Kuwait are not more than correct, and he is also jealous of Kuwait's vast wealth. The Ruler of Bahrain is, however, in close touch with the Trucial Shaikhs who look to him in many matters for advice and guidance. Although there are perpetual boundary squabbles, the Trucial Shaikhs (with the exception of one murderous usurper) get on reasonably well among themselves and there is scope for closer co-operation between them.

Relations between the Gulf States and their Neighbours

9. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Persia are the most important.

(a) Saudi Arabia

Bahrain has an insular outlook. The relations of the Ruler with King Ibn Saud are correct and the main possibilities of trouble lie in the disputes about the

ownership of islands and the demarcation of sea-bed boundaries. Kuwait, sandwiched between two powerful neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, has in the past, and partly for historical reasons, tended to lean on King Ibn Saud. But the future of the neutral zone, in which it is now believed that oil has been found, presents a likely matter of dispute between them. Qatar and the Trucial Shaikhs are somewhat overshadowed by their powerful neighbour, who has boundary disputes with nearly all of them. King Ibn Saud approves of the Ruler of Qatar but disapproves of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, who stands up to him. Muscat has also unresolved disputes with King Ibn Saud about boundaries and tribal allegiances.

(b) Iraq

There is a latent irredentism in Iraq towards both Kuwait and Persia (Khuzistan). The Iraqis are jealous of the new wealth of Kuwait, and it is not forgotten that Kuwait was once administered from Basra. Altogether relations are uneasy. There is a dispute over the demarcation of the frontier which is almost certainly on top of an oilfield and the Iraqis want possession of two islands belonging to Kuwait which cover the approaches to their projected new port at Umm Qasr. Smuggling and frontier incidents have been a perpetual cause of trouble between the two countries. There are signs of Iraqi propaganda in Kuwait itself, organised through visiting bands of Iraqi students, and there are other lesser sources of discord. The present Ruler of Kuwait is anxious to improve relations and recently made an official visit to Iraq.

(c) Persia

Persia is, with Iraq, the main source of basic foodstuffs for the Gulf States, especially meat and grain. Much of it is smuggled in return for exports of sugar from the States. The main political issue is the Persian claim to Bahrain, which is raised by the Persians on every possible occasion. It is on this account that Her Majesty's Government has recently given an assurance of protection to the Ruler. The claim meets with no answering enthusiasm in Bahrain.

(d) Other Arab States

The Gulf States look largely to Egypt and the Lebanon for their press, wireless and general culture. Egyptian newspapers get quickly into the States by air. Beirut radio is listened to and Egyptian films are shown. Many of the wealthy classes have been or are educating their sons in Beirut or Cairo and there are Egyptian teachers in the schools both of Kuwait and Bahrain, although there has been a reduction of the Egyptian influence on education in both these States during the past two years. Kuwait certainly, and probably the other States, are exposed to Egyptian anti-British propaganda. I myself found an example in the guest-house of the Ruler of Kuwait. Muscat, on the other hand, is oriented towards India.

Arab Nationalism

10. There are no obvious signs in the Gulf States of the influence of the Arab League but I have no doubt that Nationalist feeling is not far below the surface. I was struck both in Iraq and Saudi Arabia by symptoms of strong nationalist and anti-foreign prejudice.

The Impact of Oil

11. The impact of oil development on these primitive territories has been severe and may yet be disastrous. In considering this problem, it is desirable to consider the oil-producing States of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq together. Persia is omitted; it is important as an influence and an example, but its internal position is not immediately relevant. Egypt is also only considered in relation to its political and cultural influence.

12. The problem is twofold: the effect of the States in which oil has been found and the effect on the States in which it has not been found. The former may have too many, the latter too few resources, and the disparity created between similar States adds strains and stresses to an already unstable area. The oil-producing States are Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. They contain over 11 million inhabitants. With the exception of Iraq, they have practically no natural resources. Yet this year they will be drawing a revenue, from oil alone, of well over £100 million. In 1953 this will rise to over £170 million, of which just under half will accrue to the Persian Gulf States. In subsequent years the figures

will be still higher even if present rates of royalty are maintained and no new oil-fields are brought into production.

13. Bahrain and Iraq have been drawing a steady income from oil revenues for some years, but in the other cases this wealth has come in a sudden flood, augmented by the round of so-called 50/50 agreements initiated by the Aramco Agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 1950. The strains which this access of wealth creates are chiefly administrative, economic and social. They are similar in all the States, but differ in degree, being most violent in Kuwait and Qatar and least violent in Bahrain.

14. The States in which no oil has yet been found are the Trucial Shaikhdoms and Muscat in the Gulf area, and Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan and Israel in the Middle East. All these territories are in need of additional resources for development, but will fall rapidly behind their neighbours if these are not available. The prospects of striking oil are probably most hopeful in the interior of Muscat and that part of Abu Dhabi which borders on Qatar and which is claimed by Ibn Saud.

Attitude to the United Kingdom and the United States

15. These are the two countries which bulk largest in the consciousness of the countries of this area—the United Kingdom because of her special position in the Gulf States and Iraq and the United States because of their special position in Saudi Arabia. There is an awareness of Soviet Russia and sensitivity to Soviet propaganda.

16. It is idle to suppose that, except in limited circles, either the British or the Americans are popular. We are, I believe, respected for our administrative record, and both the Americans and ourselves are tolerated as fountains of power and wealth. Though we may with some reason flatter ourselves that in the Gulf States and Muscat we have some genuine popularity, at heart the Arab countries are out to get as much as they can as fast as they can out of the British and American Governments and their oil companies, and here, more than anywhere, "l'appétit vient en mangeant." The Shaikhs and Governments are watching each other like hawks, and any advantage which is given to one will at once be claimed by the others, whether it is needed or not. Because Ibn Saud has a railway, the others want railways, and so on, all down the line. British and American interests will stand or fall together, and the shadow of Abadan hangs heavy upon the whole area.

II.—BRITISH INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Political

17. Her Majesty's Government are responsible for the protection and for the conduct of the foreign relations of these States. Her Majesty's Government are therefore responsible internationally for all that goes on in them, in particular as it affects foreigners, over whom they exercise jurisdiction, and foreign countries. Her Majesty's Government have an obligation towards the States themselves to assist and encourage their development and prosperity. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf is the chief representative of Her Majesty's Government in the area. His office is situated in Bahrain and subordinate to him are Political Agents in Bahrain and Kuwait, Political Officers in Qatar and the Trucial Coast and a Consul-General in Muscat.

Strategic

18. The strategic importance of the States lies in their oil resources, actual and potential, and in their geographical position. Her Majesty's Government maintain naval forces in the area under a Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, who is under the Command of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station. There are three sloops on the station and a survey vessel is usually in the Gulf. There is a small R.A.F. establishment at Bahrain and a staging post at Sharjah. The aerodrome at Bahrain is partly owned and maintained by the R.A.F. in conjunction with the Ministry of Civil Aviation. There are no military aircraft based in the area. There is a small force at present numbering eighty men, the Trucial Oman Levies, under the orders of the Political Resident, based at Sharjah for the maintenance of order and the prevention of slave trading on the Trucial Coast. There are no other military forces in the States.

Financial

19. The oil revenues in Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar will create sterling balances at the rate of between £50 and £60 million per annum. In the interest of the sterling area, Her Majesty's Government will want to endeavour to ensure that these balances are wisely invested.

Economic and Commercial

20. Apart from oil, the economic and commercial interests of Her Majesty's Government in the States lie in the scope which these growing States offer as markets for British goods and in the British share in the entrepôt centres of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai, through which trade for 1951 is estimated at £10 million, or 50 per cent. of the total imports (excluding Muscat). This trade is conducted mainly with Saudi Arabia and Persia. Both Bahrain and Kuwait are important staging points for civil aviation and there is increasing cabotage traffic between the States. Her Majesty's Government also exercise indirect responsibility for the lighting and buoying services in the Persian Gulf through their official representation on the Board of the Persian Gulf Lighting Service.

III.—NOTES ON THE MAIN ISSUES

Political Objectives of Her Majesty's Government

21. Her Majesty's Government should aim in the first place to foster as far as possible the internal stability and independence of these States. This is not easy owing to the lack of a foundation on which to build. It is therefore necessary to work through the provision of British Advisers and through the Political Officers in the hope that in time their advice and the effect of education on the younger generation will bring results. The question is whether nationalist aspirations will remain quiescent long enough for this to happen. There are already indications of restlessness in such matters, for example, as civil aviation, jurisdiction, and postal services. The difficulty is that the more the States come into contact with the outside world, as a result of their growing economic importance, the greater is the pressure for "independence"; whereas at the same time their administrative problems increase and they are correspondingly less capable of dealing with them on their own. This applies with special force to Kuwait.

22. In the second place it is necessary to look ahead to the ultimate future of these States *vis-à-vis* the outside world. The Rulers probably realise at heart that their independence is artificially maintained by our presence and that if we were to abrogate our position they would be absorbed or dominated by their larger neighbours (Bahrain by Persia, Kuwait by Iraq, and the others by Saudi Arabia). So long as this remains so, Her Majesty's Government ought not to contemplate any voluntary withdrawal.

23. It is well to enquire whether there are other alternatives to the continued assumption by Her Majesty's Government of their present responsibilities or the domination of the States by their neighbours. These would only be protection by another major Power, or the placing of the States under some form of international control or tutelage. The disadvantages to British interests of these alternatives are sufficiently obvious to need no further analysis.

24. Her Majesty's Government must thus maintain their position and this policy can be carried out in the following way:—

- (i) by maintaining close personal relationships between the political representatives and the Rulers;
- (ii) by making sure that we are consulted in the appointment of British advisers;
- (iii) by maintaining our judicial functions and ensuring that they are adequately discharged;
- (iv) by our willingness to spend money on such things as the Trucial Oman Levies which demonstrate that we intend to stay and to adopt a positive policy;
- (v) by our readiness to give responsibility in all internal matters (and possibly in some matters of foreign relations as well) to the local administrations as they become capable of taking it;
- (vi) at the same time by maintaining our protection and, as a result, our right to intervene in the last resort in the case of gross maladministration.

The Political Situation in Individual States

25. *Bahrain*.—The present Ruler takes a keen personal interest in the affairs of his State which, thanks to the efforts of the British Adviser is better administered than any other of the Middle East "oil" countries except Iraq. There is a reasonably good system of budgetary control, although one-third of the oil revenues is still set aside for the use of the Ruler and his family. The latter number about 130 people but, although in some cases holding official positions, they have little capacity or inclination for administration. There are one or two capable local officials such as, for example, the Director of Education. Relations between the Ruler and the Political Agency are cordial. The Ruler has however shown some signs of restlessness recently and of a desire for greater independence. This may be partly due to disappointment at the knowledge that his oil reserves are likely to diminish whereas those of his neighbours appear unlimited. The policy of soaking the oil company prevails here as elsewhere in the Gulf, and there is the same anxiety on the part of the Ruler not to miss anything that his neighbours are getting. This attitude is no doubt due partly to greed, but partly also to reasons of prestige. There is as yet no sign of any popular challenge in Bahrain, or in the other States to the patriarchal type of government.

26. *Kuwait*.—The Ruler is high-principled and devoid of any marked tendencies to personal extravagance. He is, however, of a retiring disposition and disinclined to take responsibility for administration, particularly where this may bring him into conflict with the views of other members of his family. The latter, for the most part, lack any sense of administrative responsibility, although certain of them are nominally in charge of Departments. The obvious successor to the present Ruler, Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak, is in charge of security and was the principal rival to the present Ruler at the time of his succession two years ago. He is a powerful figure and has so far co-operated loyally in carrying out the Ruler's wishes. This may well be, however, because his loyalty has not yet been put to the test. Kuwait is more exposed than other States to influence from other Arab States: it has strong Egyptian and Lebanese connexions and there is a latent anti-British feeling which would grow as a result of any apparent extension of British control. It is in Kuwait that the problem of maintaining our position and discharging our responsibilities will be most acute.

27. *Qatar*.—The Shaikh is an unintelligent man with an exaggerated conception of his own prestige and a fear of his relatives. The latter exert constant pressure on him to increase the size of their allowances. The Ruler's father, who abdicated in 1949, is still alive and living in the State. His son constantly refers to him and accepts his guidance in everything, and until the old Shaikh dies, it may be difficult to achieve any real advance in the State. The Ruler is still afraid of openly flouting the wishes of Her Majesty's Government and so long as this is not offset by his fear of his family, it may be possible to assert considerable influence on him.

He has one son who shows a promising interest in administrative matters and it may be possible to educate him up so as to become a moderately capable successor to his father. There is a well-disciplined police force under a British Commandant, but it has to contend with some resentment on the part of members of the Ruler's family at the restriction on their freedom of action, which its presence implies. The main problem of Qatar is the almost total lack of human and physical resources. It offers hardly any foundation on which to build a sound administration.

28. *The Trucial States*.—The organisation of these States is little removed from the tribal and no administrations exist in any of them. The Shaikh of Dubai resisted attempts by the Political Officer last year to persuade him to introduce an elementary administrative system into his State. It has already been decided in principle that an effort should be made to foster co-operation between Rulers of the small States and bring them together into a Council. While it may prove difficult to bring the Rulers to agree on any really contentious matter, I am convinced that on general political grounds the decision is right and should be put into effect as soon as possible. The Council would meet at regular intervals but not too frequently, and would be likely to get away to a better start if any really contentious issues were not raised at the first meeting. The formation of such a Council would be evidence that we have a forward and constructive policy on the Trucial Coast and would be an indication that we do not propose to submit to the Saudi Arabian penetration which is menacing nearly all these States to a greater or lesser degree.

29. *Muscat*.—The Sultan is acutely jealous of his independent status, compared with the other Persian Gulf Rulers. He is very friendly to Her Majesty's Government but resents anything which he regards as an intrusion on his sovereign position. This inclines him to be suspicious of proposals or advice which are put to him. It is significant that he has approached the United States Government, through the United States Consul-General at Dhahran, for Point Four aid. There are no revenues from oil because the Company (I.P.C.) have so far been unable to exploit their concession for Muscat and Oman. This is due to the absence of control by the Sultan over the interior of Oman, where the tribal Shaikhs either regard themselves as independent, or else recognise the authority of the Imam, an elected religious leader. Thus the Sultan's writ runs only in the coastal area and in the extreme South. The Sultan has hoped to win the allegiance of the tribal Shaikhs by adopting a reactionary policy and by not interfering with them. Such a policy, however, leaves a large area open to Saudi Arabian penetration with the possibility that the Shaikhs, many of whom have been influenced by the sight of oil operations elsewhere, might negotiate with other oil companies for the exploitation of their territories. The Sultan has not been willing to accept an arrangement under which I.P.C. may negotiate with the Shaikhs with his approval nor have the Shaikhs been willing to acknowledge the Sultan's sovereignty before they begin negotiations with the Company. Instead, however, the Sultan has announced that he now intends to take positive action to assert his authority and thus "close the gap."

Strategic Aspects

30. The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf itself arises mainly from the oil which is produced in the area. It has been estimated that the Western Allies cannot sustain a protracted war without the use of some of the Persian Gulf oil. The production of crude in the Persian Gulf States and Iraq in 1952 is likely to reach over 100 million tons as against 30 million tons in 1946. The production of crude in the Western Hemisphere is over 450 million tons. Iraq and the Gulf States (excluding Persia) therefore produce about 20 per cent. of the free world's crude production. It might well be argued that the new Canadian fields, when they are producing, would make up for the loss of Gulf crude. But there are obvious dangers, political, financial and economic, in a situation in which the free world is wholly dependent on the Western Hemisphere for its oil supplies.

31. The Persian Gulf is also important as a sea route. This importance would be positive if allied strategy involved the development of a line of communication between Iraq and Persia via Shatt-el-Arab, but in any circumstances the Gulf is of negative importance as a sea route. If a hostile power were to gain possession of the head of the Gulf it would be able to deploy submarines into the Indian Ocean. The airfields and bases in the area, including Dhahran, appear at present to be virtually defenceless. While this is a military matter, I think it should be considered whether the minimum defences required for protection against a surprise attack should not be provided so that the installations could be held until reinforcements could be brought in by air or otherwise.

32. I do not propose to enter into the present plans for Middle East defence in this paper. But my impression is that the situation is not satisfactory, and that British and American strategic thinking and plans for the area have not been fully co-ordinated. I regard the setting up of a Middle East Command as essential to give focus and direction to the formulation and preparation of strategic planning throughout the area.

33. An investigation has been made into the possibilities of raising local forces in the Persian Gulf to provide a nucleus for its defence. The result of this investigation is not hopeful. Little more than local police and security forces sufficient to maintain order in the event of civil disturbance and prevent local conflicts between the States and tribes are feasible.

Frontier Disputes

34. The problems arising from the innumerable unsettled frontiers in this area are exacerbated by the potential existence of oil. The dispute of greatest strategic importance is the Saudi claim to part of the coast line of the State of Abu Dhabi. This part of the coast is regarded as the most promising area for the striking of oil and furthermore there is little doubt that Aramco are interested in the area and have assisted the Saudis in the preparation of their claims. It is

important that this claim of Ibn Saud should not be conceded. With the potentialities of Qatar as a source of largely increased amounts of oil and with the prospect of finding oil in Abu Dhabi and in the hinterland of Muscat, there is a possibility of a major oil development leading to the construction of a pipe-line from Qatar through Muscat to a point on the southern coast of Arabia giving a direct outlet to the Indian Ocean and avoiding the narrows of the Persian Gulf. The Saudi claim to the coast of Abu Dhabi would cut the line of this outlet and might make the scheme impracticable.

35. At present the I.P.C., who have the Abu Dhabi concession, are prevented from operating in the most promising area of their concession on account of the disputed frontier. If, as seems probable, no progress can be made in the frontier negotiations while Ibn Saud is alive, efforts should be made to effect an operating agreement between I.P.C. and Aramco which would enable the former to begin drilling in the area, on the lines of the operating agreement which at present exists between Aminoil and the Pacific Western Oil Company in the Kuwait neutral zone. It should be added that the South-Eastward penetration of Saudi Arabian influence into Muscat is undoubtedly connected with the potentialities of oil in the hinterland of that State.

36. The other frontier which has possibilities of trouble is the frontier between Iraq and Kuwait. This frontier has been described, but not yet demarcated, and attempts are now being made to settle this matter with the Iraqi Government. It is almost certain that the rich Basra oil-field extends across this frontier, and quite a small difference in the final demarcation might be of financial significance.

Administrative, Financial and Economic Questions

37. It must be clearly understood that the orderly financial and economic development of these States depends on the existence of a sound system of administration. This does not come naturally to the Arabs, and advice and supervision is essential if they are to have it. Broadly speaking, the efficiency of the administration in an Arab country is proportionate to the amount of British administration and advice which they have received in the past. It is at its best in Iraq; it is to be seen at its worst in Saudi Arabia. The first requirement is the institution in each State of a proper system of budgetary and financial control. Unless this is done, there will be gross waste and misuse of public funds. One of the obstacles to it is the concept that the revenues of the State are the personal property of the Ruler and the ruling family, and it will be necessary to make a concession to this concept by the establishment of a Privy Purse of dimensions which might appear fantastic in a modern State. But if progress is to be made at all there must be some compromise with traditional habits of mind. One point needs immediate correction. In Bahrain and in Qatar one-third and one-fourth of the oil revenues respectively are allocated to the personal use of the Ruler and his family. With the increase in revenues this percentage basis produces most undesirable consequences. Every effort should be made to get away from it, and to persuade the Rulers to accept a sum in each annual budget which bears some relation to the actual needs of himself and his family.

38. It may well be desirable for an expert on budgets to visit the various States to advise the administrations how a modern budget should be drawn up.

39. The second essential step is an allocation of the revenues between current expenditure, capital development, and the reserve. The current budget and the development budget should be separated. The latter should be drawn up on the basis of the report made annually by the local Development Boards.

40. There remains the question of the currency. The rupee is in use locally in the Persian Gulf and until last year the State balances, if any, were held in rupees, in which currency all oil company payments were made. In the latest agreement made by the Kuwait Oil Company the oil revenues will in future be paid in sterling. In the negotiations at present in progress between the Ruler of Bahrain and the Bahrain Petroleum Company it is proposed that the oil revenues in this case also should be paid in sterling, and the Ruler has in principle agreed to this. It is important that in any new agreement with the Ruler of Qatar the same stipulation should be included. If this is done, the question of currency becomes of smaller importance. It is perhaps worth recording that there appears to be no demand at present in any of the States to abandon the rupee. The enquiries which I had about the possibility of instituting a Persian Gulf currency were quite perfunctory. But sentiment on this may change in favour of individual currencies, particularly in Kuwait.

41. The third essential step is to introduce controls to counteract the inflationary effect of increased spending power in these small and rudimentary places. In Bahrain control of prices and rationing of basic food-stuffs already exist. But even in Bahrain the price and wage structure is threatened by the increased demand on Bahrain's resources and labour due to the mounting inflation in the El Hasa province of Saudi Arabia across the bay. In Kuwait, although statistics are non-existent, the cost of living has risen sharply during the last few months, and there are all the elements for a steady and continuous rise. There are shortages of labour, housing and materials, while the spending power is constantly increased by the enlarged revenues of the ruling family and the profits of the land, gold, and other speculators. Land and housing control as well as wage and price control would seem to be required if the situation is not to get out of hand. The same applies in Qatar, where the factors which threaten the economy of Kuwait will operate with added intensity.

42. It is to be hoped that the Rulers will accept the advice of their Advisers as to the need for effective budgetary and other controls, but if they do not the question arises whether Her Majesty's Government should intervene. In principle Her Majesty's Government are responsible only for the external affairs of the States and have no direct responsibility for their internal administration. But in practice these responsibilities cannot remain in watertight compartments. The administrative efficiency and economic stability of the States must be a matter of concern to Her Majesty's Government, and I therefore consider that the Political Resident and the Political Agents should keep in close but unofficial touch with the Advisers in the various States on all these matters. If in their opinion the economic stability or the administrative efficiency of any State is menaced by the attitude of the Ruler, then the fact should be reported to Her Majesty's Government. It is my view that, generally speaking, Her Majesty's Government should intervene in such circumstances and tender appropriate advice to the Ruler concerned.

43. The situation is not without its dangers. The chances that these countries will absorb this wealth without some economic and political strains are not great. Anything that goes wrong will be blamed on us. The pace of development is, for purely physical reasons, unlikely to keep up with popular demand. There will be criticism because one section of the population is unduly favoured, and in the case of the ruling families and their hangers-on this is only too likely to be true. Such matters as the housing of European advisers before the local population will be raised. There will most probably be financial scandals. All these things will react on the position of Her Majesty's Government, and it is for this reason that the quality of the advisers and our representatives must be of the best.

Economic Development: General

44. The possibilities of economic development in the Gulf States, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are subject to an absolute limitation owing to the paucity of resources. There are in addition the practical limitations of difficulty of supply and shortage of labour. There is a further limitation which should be mentioned. Experience shows that it is an unprofitable venture to attempt to grow things of a kind and in a place not intended by nature. I consider therefore that it would be unwise to push agricultural development far in any of the territories under consideration except Iraq.

45. If the problem of development is to be tackled intelligently and unwise spending avoided the establishment of Development Boards in each State with adequate authority is essential. The situation in this respect is best in Iraq, where a Development Board under ministerial chairmanship and with an experienced British secretary-general is actually functioning. It has moreover an annual income fixed by law at 70 per cent. of the oil revenues and its activities have to that extent been taken out of politics. At the same time it is still in its early stages, and its efficiency and authority may yet be impaired. It is proposed that there should be an American member of the Board, and a candidate has been selected, but his arrival in Iraq has been held up by various technical points connected with United States Legislation. It is desirable that the American member should take up his appointment, and that he should then be the unofficial channel for advice on the utilisation of Point-Four funds. Otherwise there may be some confusion.

46. In Kuwait a Development Board has been established with some difficulty and sits under the chairmanship of the Financial Adviser. It consists of the official heads of the various departments and the Ruler has not permitted any member of

his family to take part in it. It has not yet had time to draw up a plan, nor has it yet been given any real authority.

47. In Bahrain no Development Board exists and development projects are dealt with by the Adviser in consultation with the Adviser in the Public Works Department. It would be desirable even here to regularise the position by setting up a Development Board.

48. In Qatar the administration might at first sight appear too rudimentary to justify the establishment of a Board, but it would ensure that the situation developed in the right way when the revenues roll in if a small board was set up without delay. It may be said here, in passing, that the absence of a proper Development Board in Saudi Arabia may well be responsible for some of the disorder in the affairs of that country.

49. Generally speaking, therefore, we should use all our influence in these various countries to ensure that the Development Boards are set up on the right lines and are given sufficient authority. In particular, since it will not be possible to secure materials for all the possible projects at the same time, they should have power to settle priorities between the various projects in the general plan.

50. The prospects of development differ in each State, and the following paragraphs give a brief synopsis of what is possible in individual countries. There is also included for purposes of comparison paragraphs on Saudi Arabia, and on the development possibilities in the countries of the Middle East in which no oil has yet been found.

Economic Development: Individual States

51. *Bahrain.*—The development in Bahrain has been proceeding slowly and steadily over a period of years. There is an adequate water supply, electric light and public transport, and good roads. The primary and secondary school buildings both for boys and girls are well under way and other housing projects are being developed with both better-class and working-class accommodation. A project for a new deep-water port is being actively studied. Otherwise the policy is to go slow and place a large proportion of the surplus to reserve. I consider that the policy of cautious progress and of not outstripping the capacity of the population to absorb modern developments has been abundantly justified, but, in view of what is going on in other parts of the area, I believe that the time has come to quicken the pace and that this would be justified by Bahrain's financial position. The town still lacks a modern drainage system, and while there are some physical difficulties, a sewage disposal scheme should be practicable. Natural gas from the oilfields could be brought into use in the city. There is also scope for improvement in agriculture by raising the standard of products and diversifying the agriculture to a limited extent. But unless elaborate systems of water conservation are introduced not a great deal is possible in this direction, and my impression is that great expense would not be justified. There is room for the erection of a good hotel, but there is the obstacle that, under the present Ruler, a licence for the sale of alcoholic liquor would not be granted. There is virtually no scope for the development of secondary industries.

52. *Kuwait.*—Kuwait has no natural fresh water and there is virtually no prospect of finding any. Her development beyond a certain point therefore depends on the realisation of a project to pipe water from the Shatt-el-Arab. This is a feasible project, but its realisation depends on the settlement of other difficulties between Iraq and Kuwait, and the political objections to Kuwait becoming entirely dependent on Iraq for the majority of its water supply will need to be carefully considered. Even so, the use of this water, which would probably be limited in quantity, for agriculture would mean a very expensive agricultural development. The main prospect of development in Kuwait lies in public utilities, e.g., electric light, water distillation and roads, health, housing and education. There is a need for a deep-water port and a new airfield, and there is of course the possibility of using natural gas from the oilfields. There is virtually no scope for the development of secondary industries, though furniture-making is a possibility as the Kuwaitis are traditionally good craftsmen in this field.

53. *Qatar.*—Qatar is a desert, mainly stony, and devoid even of oases. While there may be limited quantities of fresh water, the water table is high, the rainfall very low, and quantities are therefore almost certainly severely limited. Here again public utilities, housing, education, health and roads all give scope for development. But as the total population is only about 16,000 they will not need to be on a very large scale. There is also a scheme for developing a deep-water

port, though this is not very easy to justify on economic grounds. There appears to be no scope for the development of secondary industries, nor for that matter for the development of trade on any considerable scale.

54. *Trucial Coast*.—There is thus very little scope for development beyond public utilities, health, education and housing.

55. *Muscat*.—The same applies generally in this territory, but there is a rich agricultural strip along the coast where the quality of the products could no doubt be improved, and there is also scope for the development of a fish-processing industry if the Sultan can be persuaded to embark on it. The interior of Muscat is largely unsurveyed, and the possibility of finding minerals there should not be excluded.

56. *Iraq*.—This is the only country in the area which has resources capable of substantial development. It has an ample water supply and areas of land which have been fertile in the past. It has a promising plan of development drawn up by the Development Board after considering a report by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This plan is estimated to cost approximately £150 million spread over six years, though it is very doubtful whether development can proceed at so high a rate. The limitations of development in Iraq are mainly supply of materials and eventually labour and technical assistance. The time factor is also important, since before development schemes can be brought to the point of production much preliminary work on drainage, dams and canals is required. This means that Iraq will not be able to spend its funds very fast in the next three or four years. While these schemes are being brought to fruition there may not be a great deal to show for the work of the Development Board other than its projects in the fields of housing and health. This may cause political difficulties, and as the schemes progress other difficulties of a social character may appear. Emigrants will be needed to work on the reclaimed land and there is a doubt whether the Iraqi is well adapted by character and training to make a success of small-scale intensive cultivation. The development of agriculture in Iraq will be not only beneficial to Iraq itself but also to the Middle East area as a whole, since its exportable surplus would go far to make up the deficiencies in basic foodstuffs of the other Middle Eastern countries. The conclusion is that the sooner the Iraq Development Board can get under way the better it will be for the political, economic and social stability of the country, and if Her Majesty's Government attach real importance to the strategic position of Iraq and her usefulness as an ally, the materials necessary for the early stages of the development plan should be given a very high priority.

57. The prospects for the developments of secondary industries are somewhat less encouraging, but there may be scope for the use of natural gas and, as agriculture develops, for the establishment of agricultural processing industries.

58. There are also indications of mineral deposits (especially copper) in the north which may be capable of exploitation.

59. *Saudi Arabia*.—While there may be more underground water than is sometimes supposed, much of it is found in reservoirs which can easily be pumped dry, unless water conservation works are carried out. This has already happened at Riyadh. It is most unlikely that there are possibilities of large-scale agricultural development except perhaps in the case of the extreme south-west. Existing attempts at agricultural development on the north-east coast outside the oases look very unpromising.

60. There is no sign of workable mineral resources and the prospects of industrial development appear to be negligible. There may be some opening for a fish-processing industry on a small scale.

61. On the other hand, public utilities offer a field for further development, and a good deal of work on electricity supply, &c., is in progress. Finally, there is the extension of the Dammam-Riyadh railway through Medina to Jeddah, which can certainly swallow up a great deal of money. It is, however, most doubtful whether this project is economically justified.

Other Middle Eastern Countries

62. *Syria*.—Syria appears to be without minerals and oil, and is likely to remain an agricultural country. There are drainage and irrigation schemes under consideration. The prospects of industrial expansion have probably reached their limit but there are ports and public utility schemes which could still be undertaken. It has been estimated that the worthwhile development in Syria would be covered by £50 million.

63. *The Lebanon*.—The further development of the Lebanon mainly depends on the harnessing of the Litani River. It has been estimated that the worthwhile development of the Lebanon could be covered by £25 to £30 million.

64. *Jordan*.—Jordan offers some scope for development, if the Jordan Valley can be developed. But this depends on political agreement with Syria and Israel on the division of the waters of the Yarmuk and the Jordan. There are large deposits of phosphates in the south which could be developed if transport difficulties could be overcome. The prospects of industrial development are small and it is probable that the total worthwhile development would be covered by about £40 million.

Summary of Financial and Economic Outlook

65. It will be clear as a result of this analysis that at least in Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq it will not be physically possible to spend on development all the funds which will accrue in the next few years, and that substantial reserves in sterling will be accumulated. On the other hand Bahrain will not have much more than can be used for development purposes, and is faced with the prospect of a slowly falling revenue from oil in the next few years. The Trucial States and Muscat can only do very little by way of development so long as oil has not been found in their territories, and the same applies to Syria and Jordan. The Lebanon can probably find the finance for the development which she needs.

66. Taking the oil producing States together I give below in tabular form a statement of the position. This is necessarily a very broad approximation and the figures will not bear analysis in detail, but the table does give a reasonably accurate idea of the orders of magnitude which are involved.

COMPARATIVE TABLE SHOWING FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF MIDDLE EAST OIL STATE

	(Figures in £ million)																	
	(1) (a)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)			(6)		
	Total estimated revenue from oil			Total estimated revenue from other sources			Other Government expenditure			Allocation for development			Estimated maximum expenditure on development			Balance unexpended (i.e., amount available for or allocated to reserve)		
	1952	1953	1954	1952	1953	1954	1952	1953	1954	1952	1953	1954	1952	1953	1954	1952	1953	1954
Iraq ...	31	48	53	26.8	27	28	33	35	37	21.7	33.6	37.1	15	25	35	9.8	15	9
Kuwait ...	30	59	60	.5	.75	1	6	9	13.5	4	12	10	4	10	10	20.5	41	38
Bahrain ...	1.5	2.7	2.7	.6	.8	1	1	1.4	1.9	.5	.7	1	.5	.7	1	.6	1.4	.8
Qatar ...	2.4	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)
	7.5	12		.1	.2	.3	1.1	1.5	1.9	.4	.8	1	.2	.8	1	1.2	5.4	9.4
Saudi Arabia	60	60	60	15	15	15	34.4	35	35	9	19	29	9	19	(29)	(31.6)	(21)	(11)

NOTES

- 50/50 agreements will shortly be in force in all countries. The revenues shown in column (1) are liable to vary according to the price of oil and cost of production.
- This represents 70 per cent. of the oil revenues which is by law allocated to the Development Board. The remaining 30 per cent. goes to the Government and is included in the figure shown in column (4).
- These figures for Iraq are based on the latest Report of the Iraq Development Board.
- Based on the Saudi Arabian 2nd Budget (1952). Figures in the Budget are far too low and have been increased in this table.
- These figures assume the completion of the Riyadh-Jedda railway proposal, over a period of 3½ years; a most optimistic assumption.
- These figures for Saudi Arabia cannot be regarded as anything more than a statement of the money not accounted for elsewhere. They cannot be regarded as necessarily available for investment since the money is probably swallowed up in commissions and *ex gratia* payments of one sort and another.
- Includes £22 million (partly in Rupees) received in January in respect of outstanding oil company payments for 1951.
- Bahrain figures for 1952 based on the Government's Budget.
- Qatar figures for 1952 based on the Adviser's draft budget (not yet approved by the Ruler).
- These figures assume production in 1952-53-54 at 3-5-8 million tons, and a total revenue of 30s. per ton to the Ruler under a 50/50 agreement.
- These figures are calculated on an average revenue of 35s. per ton for 1½ million tons of Bahrain produced crude.

Claims on United Kingdom Resources

67. The funds which will be spent on development, and the surplus which will remain over, represent a large potential claim on United Kingdom resources. As far as development expenditure is concerned, the question arises as to whether it is desirable that the bulk of these funds should be spent in the United Kingdom, and, if so, what steps should be taken to enable this to be done. There is a strong disposition both in Iraq and in Kuwait to give development orders to the United Kingdom. In Iraq however the development plan is sufficiently advanced to make their demands for steel very urgent. The more steel that can be delivered in 1952 and 1953 the better start Iraq will get with the irrigation schemes on which her successful development depends. In so far as we cannot provide steel, we are holding up Iraq's development. The same will apply to Kuwait, as soon as her development plan can be drawn up and is under way. If these two countries can get reasonable delivery dates they will undoubtedly place the bulk of their contracts in the United Kingdom. But if they cannot, three consequences will follow. In the first place the orders will go to continental suppliers, particularly Germany, who are already in the market and offering attractive delivery dates. In the second place the placing of such orders will inevitably lead to the introduction of foreign, and particularly German, experts and advisers. In the third place the States will lose confidence in the utility of holding sterling which they find they cannot use for their development, with highly undesirable consequences. Iraq would almost certainly leave the sterling area and make demands on the I.P.C. which will put a heavy strain on the cohesion of the Company. Kuwait will call upon us to fulfil our undertaking to provide dollars for essential needs of the State where such needs are not available from non-dollar sources, and might even renew her demand for payments in dollars from the American Company. Bahrain's needs are much smaller but the same applies there, and it will apply also on a still smaller scale in Qatar.

68. My impression is that Iraq and the oil-producing States in the Persian Gulf have not hitherto been given the consideration due to their strategic and economic importance in the discussion of priorities in Whitehall, and their needs have tended to be lost in the struggle between the supporters of the Commonwealth and Colonies and the supporters of the countries with whom we have bilateral trade agreements. In 1951 Egypt and Israel each received $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as much steel as Iraq, and Persia four times as much. I consider that there is a strong case for giving a higher priority to the oil-producing States for steel and other development goods.

Surplus Funds

69. The employment of the funds which cannot be used for current expenditure or development raises questions of peculiar difficulty. It has already been observed that the Arab mentality likes to keep money *in specie* in a hoard, and putting out money to interest is against the teachings of the Koran. Moreover, the Arab is far from inclined by nature to spend money for the benefit of anybody but himself and his family, even to help a fellow Arab. The contribution made by the Arab Rulers to the relief of the Arab refugees from Palestine has been very small. The only exception to this hitherto has been a small loan from King Ibn Saud to Syria.

70. The first step is clearly to try and ensure that the surplus funds are properly invested rather than left on call at the bank. Proposals have already been made to the Ruler of Kuwait that an investment committee should be set up in London, which would be responsible to him, to advise on the investment of Kuwait balances; and the facilities which the Bank of England offers to large sterling holders have been offered to Kuwait. The Ruler at first sight regarded these proposals with suspicion, but it is probable that his suspicions will be overcome and certainly very desirable that they should. Great care must, however, be exercised by the investment committee and the British authorities concerned in handling this matter. The first essential is to gain the Ruler's confidence and lead him on to contemplate different types of investment by easy stages. Above all it is essential that he should feel that we have no hidden motives in this matter, and that our only wish is to see the surplus used for the mutual benefit of Kuwait, the United Kingdom and the other countries of the sterling area. The Ruler will take fright at once if he thinks that we are trying to get control of his money. Finally it is obvious that the Ruler will not agree to any scheme for investment in British securities if he has to pay income tax on the proceeds. The same principles will

apply to Qatar as soon as there is any considerable surplus to invest. For the moment the Adviser in Qatar is anxious to invest some balances in British securities and has asked for advice in the matter. I am strongly of the opinion that a system similar to that proposed for Kuwait should be instituted without delay in the case of Qatar. While the amounts at present in question are small, they may well become large in the future and a great deal of trouble may be saved if the arrangements for investment are put on the right lines from the start.

71. The problem in Bahrain is of smaller dimensions and the arrangements for investing the reserve funds seem to be working satisfactorily. The Bahrain Government acts on the advice of its agents in London.

72. Iraq and Kuwait will soon become important holders of sterling balances, more important than some of the Commonwealth members of the sterling area, e.g., New Zealand and Southern Rhodesia. In the case of Iraq, and perhaps later in the case of Kuwait, it may help them to a sense of their responsibilities and to an understanding of the issues involved in membership of the sterling area if they were given a status at Commonwealth financial meetings commensurate with their importance as members of the sterling area. I could not suggest that they should be full members of any conference, but only that they should be admitted to some meetings at all events with the status of observers.

73. The ordinary investment of these surplus funds in British Government securities can hardly provide more than the initial answer to the problem of their utilisation. To this there does not seem to be any obvious solution. The suggestion has been made that either directly or through the medium of a Middle East Development Corporation these surplus revenues should be used for the benefit of the area as a whole, and in particular for the development of those States in the area which have been unlucky enough not to strike oil. Attractive as this proposal is, I am satisfied that it is wholly premature. Neither the nature of the Arabs, nor their relations *inter se*, nor the political situation in the Middle East is favourable to the launching of any such project. Even proposals limited to assistance to the Arab refugees would fall on deaf ears. There is the fact that we do not want to encourage the Rulers to become involved in Arab League politics, which would be likely to follow any direct participation in their development, nor could the employment of funds in developing projects in the Levant be recommended to the Rulers as a sound financial project. Moreover, it would merely add to the demand for development goods, of which their lenders would already be short. The only step in this direction that might be possible at present is to suggest to the Shaikh of Kuwait that he might make grants for educational and other purposes (e.g., the foundation of schools) in the impoverished Shaikhdoms of the Trucial Coast. But even if he were favourable to such an appeal the sums involved would be relatively unimportant.

74. The setting up of a Middle East Development Corporation might duplicate the functions of the International Bank, particularly those of administering and financing investigating teams, nor would it be desirable to encourage the idea that the Corporation might consider schemes which the bank could not.

75. The only way to utilise the funds for helping the Middle East area as a whole would be indirect, for example, by making the sterling available through the International Bank. Even if this were possible under the statutes of the Bank, there may well be objections to any such proposal at the present time since it would involve further immediate claims on sterling resources but I record it since I believe that it is only through this sort of method that the objective, which is very desirable in itself, can be attained.

76. Other suggestions of varying degrees of fantasy have been made, for example, that the Ruler of Kuwait should invest in an oil pipeline or in a fleet of tankers. But whether or not such proposals are desirable or feasible, I am quite clear that the Rulers can only be led up to them by stages, and that until they acquire confidence in the system of advice on the investment of their surplus funds, they are unlikely to approve more than the simplest proposals.

Supply

77. In addition to development goods, consideration should be given to the question of supply of basic commodities to the Gulf States. Until 1949 they received allocations of wheat, mainly in the form of flour, rice and sugar. The allocation system for sugar is still in effect, the allocations of flour and rice have been discontinued. It is true that the allocation system was a matter of some complaint by local merchants on the grounds that the price was too high; but complaints have been equally voluble, when, as happened recently, the supply failed.

It is clear that it is in the interests of the economic stability of the States that adequate supplies of these basic commodities should be assured to them and that they should be distributed under governmental supervision. Otherwise local merchants tend to corner supplies and force up the price with disturbance to the economic life of the country. Since the quantities involved are marginal in the case of flour (it may amount to one shipload of flour a year for all the protected States) I consider that steps should be taken by Her Majesty's Government to ensure that this quantity of flour is in fact available to the States.

Trade

78. The trade of the Gulf States is concentrated in the three big entrepôts of Bahrain, Kuwait and Dubai. There are no very clear or up-to-date figures for the trade passing through these entrepôts, but according to the best estimates available in Bahrain the total imports of the three centres is something over £20 million, of which about half is re-exported.

79. In the case of Kuwait the re-exports may amount to as much as 70 per cent., mainly to Saudi Arabia, to Iraq (partly smuggled), and Persia.

80. In the case of Bahrain re-exports are about 35 per cent., mainly to Saudi Arabia, Persia and to Qatar. In the case of Dubai the percentage is as much as 70-80 per cent., mainly to Persia. In this case the trade has fallen off by as much as two-thirds in recent months owing to the restrictions on imports into Persia imposed as a result of the Persian crisis. Doha in Qatar used to have a considerable trade with the interior, but this has largely been diverted to Danman in Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain the entrepôt trade, which has recently been increasing, is second in importance only to the oil as a source of prosperity. It might be supposed that the opening of the port of Danman would threaten the continued prosperity of Bahrain. But at present there is no fear in Bahrain on this score. The port of Dammam is expensive and the restrictions imposed by the Saudi Arabian authorities on imports are both arbitrary and exorbitant. It is therefore preferable to buy goods in transit through Bahrain and get them into Saudi Arabia by dhow. Dubai is almost entirely dependent on the entrepôt trade for its prosperity.

81. The encouragement of these entrepôts represents some small financial risk of leakage through the controls, and there is a free exchange market of sorts in each place. There is some risk in Kuwait that the free market will grow with a corresponding drain on dollars, but on balance it would appear undesirable to interfere with the free development of these entrepôts. There is considerable evidence in all three centres of keen Japanese competition.

82. The Kuwaitis carry on a substantial and lucrative trade with India in smuggling gold—probably controlled from the Lebanon. Information about the extent of the trade is hard to come by, but the volume may be as high as £10 million-£15 million per annum. The gold reaches Kuwait in the form of Tola bars and is smuggled into India against payment in rupees, the customary currency of the Persian Gulf. Recently there has been some signs that the Indian authorities may be reluctant to repatriate the rupees earned by Persian Gulf merchants as a result of their gold smuggling activities.

Civil Aviation

83. Her Majesty's Government's signature of the I.C.A.O. Convention covers all territories under their protection. Thus we accepted international responsibility for the execution of the terms of the Convention and in effect for civil aviation in the Persian Gulf States. No reference was made to any of the Rulers before we signed the Convention, and it thus remained for us to ensure, by domestic agreements with the Rulers concerned, that we were in a position to carry out our responsibilities. As a result of these agreements the Rulers have all agreed that we should control civil aviation in their States.

84. We have also maintained that, since the Persian Gulf States are, for all international purposes, United Kingdom territory, traffic between the States themselves and between any of the States and any other United Kingdom territory is United Kingdom cabotage. The latter contention is disputed on commercial grounds by foreign airlines, and since we might find it difficult to get other countries to support us, probably the only answer is to improve our own air services so as to oust competitors. The former contention is liable to be disputed on political grounds by other Arab countries who are unwilling to recognise our position in the Gulf. We should have difficulty in getting the Rulers to support us in this contention especially when the air line concerned belongs to another Arab State.

85. The Ruler of Bahrain has already requested that he should be consulted about applications to exercise traffic rights at Bahrain and similar requests will presumably be received from the other Gulf Rulers in due course. We might claim that, by virtue of our Civil Air Agreements with the Rulers we are not bound to agree, but it is a reasonable request and, since we must rely on the Ruler's co-operation if we are effectively to control the airfield, it is clearly in our interest to agree provided that this does not interfere with efficient operation.

86. *Kuwait Airfield.*—At the time of the negotiations for the Air Agreement in 1949, there was some discussion about the building of a new airfield in Kuwait. At that time the oil company were using the airfield to a considerable extent and were prepared to contribute towards the building of a new field which would more adequately meet the requirements of their own and international traffic. The oil company's interest declined, however, with the completion of their major development projects and they withdrew their offer. The Ministry of Civil Aviation were no longer anxious to build a new field and it was eventually decided that they were under no definite obligation to the Ruler to do so. A tentative proposal was, however, made last year that an operational airfield should be developed in Kuwait. This is being examined by the Air Ministry but no final decision has yet been taken. There is no doubt that the present airfield is too close to a developing city and there is every indication that Kuwaitis would like to see a new field. The present field is in fact an undignified affair and unworthy of the new schemes which are being made for the layout of the town. Before any approach to the Ruler on this subject could be made, it would be necessary to have a decision on the operational requirement and on the incidence of the cost. Although the Ruler might be prepared to pay, it would probably make the maintenance of Her Majesty's Government's authority in civil aviation matters more difficult if he owned the airfield. If, therefore, an operational field is required, there would be advantage in having a joint-user airfield, the cost of which would be shared between the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Air Ministry. If the Air Ministry are not interested and expenditure by the M.C.A. alone is not justifiable, it will be necessary to suggest that the Ruler should pay and accept that he should have a considerable say in how it is used.

Information

87. There is very little scope for information work in the Gulf States. There are no newspapers and no informed public opinion. The principal papers in circulation are Egyptian and the most widely heard radio stations are the B.B.C. and Beirut. Since Egyptian newspapers and periodicals have such free circulation it is natural that a good deal of anti-British propaganda is current, but I do not recommend that any special steps be taken to counteract this. The B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts are listened to, and the best course would be to raise these to the highest possible standard and frequency. There will be increasing scope for the provision of suitable films for Arab audiences. As regards the printed word, I understand that there is a new Arabic newspaper in preparation and the distribution of copies of this newspaper to selected recipients would appear to be the best means of spreading British information. Apart from this, there is really no substitute for putting the British point of view through the Political Resident and his staff and the Political Agents direct to the rulers and to the small number of influential men in each community.

88. Cultural activities can best be conducted through advice from British Council representatives. It would be advisable for a representative to visit each of the States once every three months and establish contact with the local directors of education. This can best be done from Basra, and it is essential that the British Council post there should be maintained.

Education and Technical Training

89. Both Bahrain and Kuwait have extensive educational systems under which free education up to secondary school standard is provided by the State. Teachers are mainly Palestinian or Egyptian. There was a preponderance of the latter in Kuwait until about two years ago, at which time the Egyptian Government abandoned its policy of subsidising their salaries.

90. Until recently both Governments sent their students for higher education to Egypt. They now propose to send students to the United Kingdom and also to the American University at Beirut. Kuwait has at the moment 27 boys in this country and Bahrain has 15. The Bahrain Government have considerable

difficulty in finding vacancies for their students at English universities and those here at present are all paid for by private individuals. The number of Kuwait students is likely to increase considerably over the next few years as a result of the Oil Company's fixed annual contribution towards the advanced training of Kuwaiti students. The majority of the present students in this country are paid for by the State but the method of selection and placing appears to be haphazard. The boys arrive in this country without advance details of their qualifications or of their intended course of study and the Ruler's representative has to find vacancies for them at short notice.

91. Education in Qatar is only just beginning. A new school has been built during the last year but has not yet been used. Slow progress has been made and this is said to be partly due to the fact that the Shaikh himself mistrusts the effects of education, having seen its results elsewhere in the Middle East. In the Trucial States there are small local schools at Sharjah and Dubai.

92. There are no British teachers in any of these schools except at Bahrain where there is one teacher on loan from the Oil Company. Except under some such arrangement it may now be difficult to introduce British teachers. Any assistance which can be given by Her Majesty's Government in connexion with organisation, examinations or finding of teachers can best be done by the British Council.

93. If students from the Gulf are to come to the United Kingdom there is need of a better system of allocation of vacancies in universities and colleges and supervision of the students during their period in this country. There is also need for a general improvement of the local examination systems, especially in Kuwait, so as to provide a better basis for the selection of students for education in the United Kingdom. This would enable advance notice to be given of the numbers of vacancies required and the subjects which the boys wish to study. There should be a gap of anything up to two years before university entrance which could be used in acquiring a knowledge of English. It has been suggested by Sir Rupert Hay that there may be a number of retired officers and officials with experience in Arab countries who might be happy to take in students from the Gulf and help them in learning English.

94. There is some danger that if the United Kingdom becomes the main source of higher education the students will acquire a superficial veneer of Western culture which may have undesirable results on their return to the Persian Gulf. From this point of view there is much to be said for making more use of the American University in Beirut and other institutions in the Levant. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom the boys would get a knowledge of Western methods which is badly needed and which they would not get in the Middle East, where they would also be exposed to all the influences of Arab nationalist politics. Besides this, their education in the United Kingdom would help to ensure the continuation of the British link with the Persian Gulf.

95. Generally speaking the danger is that too many students will be sent abroad for university education and that there will not be the possibility of absorbing them into appropriate positions on their return to their countries. This is particularly true of Kuwait. This is a further argument in favour of introducing an appropriate system of selection of candidates for higher education in each State.

96. All the Oil Companies in the Persian Gulf area have some form of training schemes for local employees. In the case of Aramco their scheme is based on a complicated system of job analysis and incentives. The training continues for a fixed proportion of a man's working time and it is on his results that promotion, increase of pay or improvement in the amenities granted to him are granted. The Kuwait Oil Company have only recently started their technical training school. Unlike Aramco they do not regard the teaching of English as important except in so far as it comes in the course of a man's work, nor have they evolved the complicated analyses and system of incentives which Aramco have adopted. Training is given to newly engaged Kuwaitis and to selected employees. It lasts for a set period according to subject, after which the pupils are transferred to the branch in which their particular skill is used. Under the Bapco scheme educational training is given to a fixed quota of men nominated by each department every year. They are first given general education in English, arithmetic, &c., and subsequently, if they prove satisfactory, they go on to specialised technical training. In Qatar, Petroleum Concessions, Limited, have not yet started a regular training scheme. So far they have two elementary classes, one for general education and one for technical training. The company complain that the state of primary education in Qatar is so poor at present that they have no basis on which to build.

97. The schemes run by the various companies are all very different. That of Aramco is the most thorough and comprehensive. It aims at getting the maximum advantage for the company from the Saudi Arabian employees and in this the company's attitude differs very considerably from that of the Kuwait Oil Company. The latter are undisturbed by the tendency of pupils whom they have trained to go off to the town in search of more lucrative employment, since they consider that this outlet will become saturated sooner or later and then trained pupils will return. The attitude of Petroleum Concessions, Limited, appears to be that it is the job of the State to provide a man with basic education and that they cannot be expected to do more than work from this point.

98. There is a problem of technical assistance, which differs from the problem of the appointment of advisers. As the pace of development accelerates, there will be a lack of technical personnel of every kind. This can probably best be obtained through the appointment of firms of consultants, or through the foreign contractors employed, rather than through direct Government action.

Anglo-American Relations: Civil and Military

99. The relation between the British and American representatives in the area are very close and cordial. There is most satisfactory co-operation between the embassies in Bagdad and Jedda. In Kuwait the American Consul is careful to maintain the position that he communicates with the Ruler through the Political Agent. In Bahrain there is a satisfactory contact with the United States Consul-General at Dhahran, and between the United States and British naval commanders, but the contacts between the United States Commanding the Base at Dhahran and R.A.F. Commanders in the Gulf could with advantage be more frequent.

100. But, in spite of this good situation in the field, the position is not really satisfactory. There are no common political or strategic aims in the area, nor is there even consultation on matters of the first importance. For example, the agreement between the United States authorities and the Saudi Arabian Government for the control of the base at Dhahran was concluded without consultation with, or notification to, the United Kingdom. Yet the terms of this agreement will have a direct effect on the British position in Iraq and the terms on which the British bases in Iraq are held and, at the request of Nuri Pasha, the United States Ambassador at Bagdad has already given a copy to the Iraqi Government. An American admiral was appointed to Bahrain without consultation, although this appointment has a direct effect on the position of the British Naval Command in the area. The appointment of the United States Consul at Kuwait was necessarily a matter for consultation, but the United States Government were not disposed to accept our views, and our acquiescence in the appointment was, in my judgment, unfortunate. Kuwait is far too small a place to support a foreign consular corps. This case illustrated the difficulty which has been experienced in getting the United States Administration to appreciate the nature and the implications of our special position in the Gulf States.

101. The position is similar as regards the oil companies. Here, again, the relations seem excellent on the ground, and there is a good deal of consultation, though there is no common policy, on matters such as technical training, education, and relations with the local Governments. But the degree of consultation on major matters of policy which is necessary if the companies are to maintain their position does not appear to exist. There are obvious difficulties in full consultation between commercial concerns which are competitive; and the United States anti-trust laws may well be a deterrent. The key to the situation lies at Dhahran, where Aramco, having given so much in the past, are in a rather weak position. Nevertheless, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that any concession made in one State will have, sooner rather than later, to be made in all the others; that in dealing with the Arab it does not pay to be too easy; and that, unless the oil companies, with the full support of their Governments, hold the line, they will be forced back to a point where the efficiency and profitability of their operations will be in danger and the countries themselves on the edge of chaos.

102. This lack of real understanding and agreement between the two Governments on political and strategic objectives is common to the whole Middle Eastern area from Persia to Libya; it is due in part to lack of a place in the area at which policy can be discussed and co-ordinated. Washington is too far back,

and the individual representatives in the area too scattered and partially informed. The interests of both countries in the area are similar and very great: yet American activities tend on the whole steadily to weaken the British position in the area without increasing the American position very much. If the process is allowed to continue, the joint interests of the two countries and of the other Western Powers will be gravely prejudiced.

103. The process of reaching Anglo-American agreement would be assisted and hastened by the establishment of an Allied Command in the Middle East. This would be a focal point in the area where agreed policies could be supervised and worked out. Its creation might well serve as a catalyst which would precipitate the ingredients of a clear and coherent policy in the political and strategic fields and would help to clarify the economic issues as well.

104. There is one specific point which requires an early decision. The Americans have a shipping control office in Bahrain and the members of it are at present living in the town. The Ruler has shown some anxiety both as to the number and the activities of this American party. The United States authorities have now asked that they should be brought within the base at Jufair. It is my strong view that this request should be granted without further delay. The question of the numbers of the Americans and the general co-ordination of their activities can be settled later.

Oil Companies' Relations *inter se* and with Governments

105. The oil companies working in the Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia are all faced with similar difficulties. They are under constant pressure from the Governments for concessions over payments and facilities, and each Government is determined not to be outdone by its neighbours. Aramco are being pushed farthest of all. They were the first to offer the 50/50 arrangement in 1950 and they have now been the first to move their Board of Directors to the country in which they are operating. They are apparently prepared to undertake almost any project at the request of the Saudis, whether or not it is directly connected with oil production. The Kuwait Oil Company reached agreement with the Ruler last year for a 50/50 arrangement and the situation here appears relatively stable. Relations between the Company and the Ruler have always been good and the negotiations were conducted in a friendly manner, although the Ruler was quite firm in his demand for terms which gave him similar advantages to those obtained by Iraq. There is less pressure here than in Saudi Arabia for the provision by the Oil Company of facilities although the latter assist in supplying water from their distillation plant and help in other ways where required, and are subject to a good deal of minor "chiselling" by members of the ruling family. In Bahrain the Ruler has asked the Oil Company for a 50/50 arrangement but insists that his revenue should not be less than that of his rival, the Ruler of Qatar. The Bahrain Petroleum Company are finding it extremely difficult to make him understand the basis of this type of agreement and negotiations are still proceeding. The Ruler's attitude is no doubt affected by the knowledge that his own oil reserves are limited and that whereas the production (and therefore the revenues) in neighbouring States will increase, in his own case it will not and within a short time will begin to decline, though they will not entirely cease. The Ruler of Qatar, who agreed last year with the Petroleum Concessions Limited for an increase in his royalty rate, is refusing to sign the document confirming this until the Company agree to start negotiations immediately for a 50/50 arrangement. Relations between the Ruler and the Company were not entirely satisfactory last year, when the Company replied with counter-demands to the Ruler's request for an increase in his royalty. The royalty rate was, in fact, far below that prevailing elsewhere and, despite the short time they had been operating there was no possibility of avoiding an increase. While I was in Bahrain, information was received from the Superior Oil Company that in all probability it would abandon its sea-bed concession on the ground that the returns from a 50/50 arrangement would not justify further outlay on expenditure and drilling. This decision, if confirmed and made known, can only have a salutary effect on the Arab world and remind them that Western coffers are not inexhaustible.

106. With the possible exception of Saudi Arabia there is no indication that any agitation for "national" control is imminent. In the circumstances in which all these companies are operating, however, they are always liable to criticism on account of exclusiveness. This results from their need to establish "little Empires"

in which every sort of service and amenity is provided for their employees. In Saudi Arabia the distance of Dhahran from the Hejaz accentuates this danger, and there were signs among Saudis in Dhahran and Dammam of resentment of the Oil Company. In Kuwait the Ruler is said to regard himself as having a share in the Company's operations as a result of the 50/50 arrangement. Kuwait is, however, in closer contact than the other States of the Persian Gulf with nationalist influence in other Arab countries and the danger of nationalism cannot be far below the surface. In Bahrain the danger is probably less than elsewhere since there is a high proportion of Bahrainis among the subordinate staff and most of these live in the town of Manama, being transported to and from work daily by the Company. This helps to avoid the sense of exclusiveness in that there is a direct and constant contact between the town and the Company's camp. In Qatar the Company's operations are centred on an isolated camp on the opposite side of the peninsula from the capital and main centre of the population. Although the Company have not long been operating in Qatar they have had inevitably to provide for their employees comprehensive services and amenities within their own camp and this contrasts unfavourably with the services available elsewhere in the State provided by the Government. There is no sign at present that the comparison is regarded with critical eyes by Qataris, but unless the progress of development in Doha can be speeded up such criticism will inevitably be voiced in the future. Meanwhile the Company would do well to allow the local population to make use of such facilities as they can where comparable facilities are not available elsewhere in the State. This applies, for example, to the use of the Company's port at Umm Said which is the only deep-water port in the peninsula.

107. The main problems with which the oil companies have to deal are described in the previous paragraphs. As regards the first, demands from Governments, it is obviously important that all companies should keep in close touch with one another so as to be sure that they do not outbid one another with the various facilities which they provide. Even more important is that they should consult together wherever possible before submitting to financial or organisational demands by their Governments. As regards the danger of criticism of their activities and position within the States, it is most important that the companies should keep the Rulers fully informed of their plans so that the latter are associated at all stages with what is being done in their States. All of them realise the importance of training local employees so that they can take the place of foreigners such as Indians and Pakistanis. B.A.P.C.O. have already made considerable headway in this; for example, the whole of the bitumen plant and the condenser which supplies it is staffed with Bahrainis. It may not be long, however, before they have to do more and take in local representatives at a higher level. Above all it is essential in the Persian Gulf States that the companies should maintain close contact with Her Majesty's Government's representatives. The companies working in the Persian Gulf appreciate this and Her Majesty's Government have been regularly informed or consulted about all recent negotiations.

Representation of Her Majesty's Government

108. *Qualifications.*—It was not inappropriate that the Persian Gulf area was the responsibility of the India Office until 1947 since the task of Her Majesty's Representatives approximate much more closely to those performed by the Indian Political Service than by the Foreign Service. The Political Resident must be on terms of personal friendship with the Rulers of the States and his area, and as at present not one of them except the Sultan of Muscat speaks one word of English it is essential that he should have a good command of Arabic. He must have a knowledge of law and the administration of justice, in which he himself takes part. He should have a knowledge of administration since the position of Her Majesty's Government in the States brings with it an indirect responsibility for good internal administration. He must be in touch with the British advisers in the various States and be on such terms with them as to be able to give them discreet advice when occasion demands. His position and responsibilities differ considerably from those of a head of mission in the Foreign Service. They have been discharged with great distinction by Sir Rupert Hay.

109. Similar conditions apply to the post of Political Agent in the various States. For them a knowledge of Arabic is indispensable. Special care should, therefore, be taken in making appointments in the Persian Gulf and the posts there should not be treated as if they were ordinary Foreign Service posts. It is important that the demands for fully qualified Arabic-speaking Foreign Service Officers should

be satisfied and the flow of officers through the Middle East College of Arabic Studies regulated accordingly with an adequate allowance for wastage. Until the present younger officers have acquired experience, every effort should be made to avoid dispensing with the services of temporary officers of proved quality with a good knowledge of Arabic. I consider that even though the Foreign Service has been unified, those officers who have learnt Arabic should normally expect the greater part of their career to lie in Arabic-speaking countries, and that the Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Amman at least should be reserved for officers who know Arabic. I do not believe that the need for this qualification will decrease in the near future, for while the number of persons in those countries who can speak English may become greater, the growing feeling of nationalism will increasingly require business to be done in Arabic. This tendency is noticeable even in Iraq. It follows that the application of the principle of a unified Foreign Service must not be carried too far.

110. *Establishment.*—The present Foreign Service establishment in the Persian Gulf is adequate, but it is essential that it should be kept continually and fully up to strength. The climatic conditions and the dispersal of the Political Agents mean that unfilled posts throw an unacceptable burden on other officers. The situation in this respect recently has been most unsatisfactory. In view of the increasing importance of economic and financial questions due to the growing wealth of the area, there should be an economic and financial adviser on the Political Resident's staff, who should not, as at present, be asked to undertake other political or administrative duties. The posts which may be necessary in order to discharge the judicial responsibilities of Her Majesty's Government in the States should not be regarded as posts in the Foreign Service and therefore counting against a ceiling. It would be an administrative absurdity to equate the post, say, of Registrar, with that of a First Secretary of Embassy.

111. There has been a proposal to amalgamate the office of the Political Resident and the Political Agent at Bahrain and to give the Political Agent, Bahrain, the title of Deputy Political Resident. In my view this proposal is misconceived. The Political Resident's functions differ from those of the Political Agent. All the Political Agents should be on the same level, though not necessarily of the same rank, and all should report direct to the Political Resident. The Political Agent at Bahrain should not be in a different position from that of the others, nor should it necessarily follow that, when the Political Resident goes on leave, the Political Agent, Bahrain, rather than the Political Agent in one of the other States should take his place. On the other hand, there are good administrative reasons for combining the offices of the Political Resident and the Political Agent in Bahrain, and this can be done without confusing the separate functions of the Political Agent and the Political Resident.

112. *Conditions of Service.*—Special attention should be given to the housing of staff in the Persian Gulf area. It is most undesirable that the representatives of Her Majesty's Government should be less well housed and looked after than the employees of oil companies, commercial concerns and the European employees of the Shaikhs. This applies particularly to such matters as lighting, air conditioning and water supply. Attention should also be paid to the recommendation of the Medical Adviser to the Political Resident that it is unwise for young children to spend the summer in the Persian Gulf.

113. *Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.*—While it is not strictly my affair, it is impossible not to comment on the situation created by the appointment of the American Rear-Admiral at Bahrain. He is appointed for six months only and commands one sloop which is changed every four months. This amounts at least to five calls on most of the Shaikhs every year by senior American naval officers. This not only throws a burden on the Shaikhs' hospitality, but shows the American flag in a manner quite disproportionate to the American strength and strategic intentions in the area, and to our own naval activities. It would help to redress the balance if the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, were in future to be given the rank of Rear-Admiral.

British Advisers in Local Administrations

114. There are British advisers in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. The problems which their presence creates are both general and specific. The administrations are incapable of coping with the problems now confronting them without advice, but, while this is recognised, there is a latent dislike and suspicion of foreign advisers derived from the pride and the national feeling of the Arab. The provision of British advisers is essential in order to preserve the administrations from

collapse and to protect the great interest of Her Majesty's Government arising from the prospective accumulation of sterling balances in the hands of Kuwait and Qatar. But this carries with it the risk that anything which goes wrong in these States will be blamed on the British advisers. It follows that the advisers must be as high in quality and as few in number as possible. Moreover, if they are to be really effective they must know Arabic and not many of the present advisers do so. Apart from Bahrain, which benefits from the unique experience and authority of Mr. C. D. Belgrave, the appointment of the advisers in Kuwait and Qatar has been haphazard. I do not underrate the difficulty of finding men with the necessary qualifications, but I cannot sufficiently stress the importance of ensuring that competent people are appointed. It is difficult enough to persuade a Ruler to accept a British adviser. It is much more difficult and embarrassing to persuade a Ruler to dismiss an adviser who has been appointed on our recommendation. Although the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government is indirect, the issues at stake are of sufficient importance to warrant a special procedure to select competent men and put their names forward through the Senior British Adviser in each case. For this purpose contact should be maintained between Her Majesty's Representative and the particular British Advisers in each place and an informal board of senior officials might be instituted to look for and consider possible candidates.

115. Specifically, the situation in Bahrain is satisfactory at present, but the question of a successor to Mr. Belgrave will arise in the not too distant future. In Kuwait the principal British advisers are the Financial Adviser and the Chief Engineer. The Financial Adviser unfortunately knows no Arabic, and has perhaps on that account not yet established the position of influence and authority which is necessary for the principal adviser in this State. There has been an awkward incident connected with the Adviser in the Department of Customs. The Adviser has been exonerated, after an enquiry, of certain allegations which were made against him, but his contract will expire in the near future and my view is that he should leave and should not be replaced. It is more important that the hands of the Financial Adviser and the Chief Engineer should be strengthened, and we should gain credit by not insisting on an Adviser in the Department of Customs as well. It would be desirable to make renewed efforts to secure the appointment of an Adviser for security and police matters. Finally, since Kuwait is so important to the United Kingdom at the moment, the presence of an administrator with authority and experience and with a knowledge of Arabic is desirable. In spite of the difficulties, consideration should be given to the appointment of such a man, if one can be found, who could act as Senior Adviser in Kuwait.

In Qatar the Financial Adviser is doing his best but he has neither the administrative nor the financial experience necessary to cope with the very serious problems with which he is confronted. A change should be made as soon as possible.

116. There is no purpose in suggesting the appointment of a British Adviser in any of the Shaikhdoms of the Trucial Coast at present. The question need only be considered if oil is found in one of the Shaikhdoms, or if sufficient progress is made with the proposal for closer co-operation and union between them.

Representation of the Gulf States in London

117. At the present time, only the Ruler of Kuwait has a representative in London and his functions are formally limited to those of liaison with the oil company. It is important that the channel of communication with the Rulers should remain the Political Resident and the Political Agents in the Persian Gulf, and there is no reason to depart from this arrangement. On the other hand, there are a number of functions which have to be performed on behalf of the Shaikhs in London and these will increase with the growing wealth of Kuwait, Qatar and to some extent, Bahrain. These functions will include dealings with the Bank of England and financial authorities in regard to the investment of the sterling balances, placing and supervision of students in the United Kingdom, recruitment of advisers, contacts with British industry, and the reception and entertainment of visiting members of the ruling families. The Office of the Representative of the Ruler of Kuwait is inadequately equipped for this purpose. I suggest that we should work for the establishment of an office in London, which might be called "Kuwait House." It would serve as a centre for the discharge of the functions which I have mentioned and as a focal point for Kuwaiti activities in the United Kingdom. If this were followed by the establishment of "Bahrain House" and "Qatar House," I would see no objection, although the functions which these offices would perform would at first be more restricted.

RECOGNITION OF FUJAIRAH AS A BRITISH-PROTECTED STATE

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Eden. (Received 15th April)

(No. 25)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
2nd April, 1952.*

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending at your telegram No. 228 of March 17th and to report that, by an exchange of letters recently concluded, Shaikh Mohammed bin Hamad al Sharqi of Fujairah has been accorded recognition as the eighth Trucial Shaikh enjoying special treaty relations with Her Majesty's Government. I enclose copies⁽¹⁾ of the letters exchanged between Mr. Wilton and the Shaikh.

2. By the exchange of letters the Shaikh accepts as binding on himself all the obligations contained in "The Existing Treaties between the British Government and the Trucial Chiefs 1906" and the "Supplementary list of undertakings, &c., of a confidential nature between the Trucial Chiefs of Oman and the British Government 1911-12." He also undertakes not to grant an oil, fishing or pearling concession without the permission of Her Majesty's Government (except, in the case of a fishing and pearling concession, to a subject of one of the Trucial States), to recognise the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government as defined in the Trucial States Order in Council 1950, to recognise the right of Her Majesty's Government to fix the boundaries of his shaikhdom and to settle any disputes between him and his neighbours, and to render such assistance as they require to the Trucial Oman Levies. In his letter of acceptance Shaikh Mohammed asked for an assurance that he was free to deal with any oil company and Mr. Wilton, in a letter of which I enclose a copy,⁽¹⁾ assured him that he was, provided that he did not conclude a concession with them without Her Majesty's Government's agreement.

3. With regard to paragraph 2 of Mr. Sarell's letter of March 15th, I did not consider that there was any point in com-

plicating the exchange of letters by excluding from their scope articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty of 1820, although I agree that we should probably not to-day be prepared to take any very active steps to secure their observance. In fact Shaikh Mohammed told Mr. Wilton that ashore he flies a plain red flag (like that flown by Muscat and Abu Dhabi) and that Fujairah vessels at sea flying the flag known as Trucial Coast Number 1.

4. In accordance with the instruction in your telegram No. 98 of February 5th, the Sultan of Muscat and the Ruler of Sharjah were informed beforehand of our intention to accord recognition to Shaikh Mohammed. The Sultan raised no objection. The Ruler of Sharjah on the other hand repeated his claim that Fujairah was Sharjah territory and announced his disappointment at our decision. He also addressed a letter on the subject to Mr. Wilton. I enclose a copy,⁽¹⁾ together with a copy⁽¹⁾ of Mr. Wilton's reply. Mr. Wilton presented Shaikh Mohammed to the rulers of the other Trucial States at the first meeting of the Trucial Council on March 21st and informed them of Her Majesty's Government's recognition of him.

5. With regard to paragraph 5 of Mr. Sarell's letter of March 15th I recommend that Her Majesty be asked to grant the Shaikh a three-gun salute, which should be dynastic, and shall be grateful to be informed in due course of Her Majesty's commands in the matter.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch without the enclosures, to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Jedda, the Head of the British Middle East Office, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, and the Senior Royal Air Force Officer, Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

(for W. R. HAY),
MARTIN LE QUESNE,

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

REPORT ON A VISIT BY THE LEGAL ADVISER TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE PERSIAN GULF STATES IN APRIL 1952

Sir E. Beckett to Mr. Eden

*Foreign Office,
6th June, 1952.*

INTRODUCTION

This report is supplementary to that of Sir Roger Makins who recorded that he had intentionally omitted to deal with legal and judicial matters and left them for me. Certain passages, however, of Sir Roger Makins' report form the background to this report. These passages are attached as Annex I.

2. I visited Bahrain, where I stayed nine days at the Residency—and Kuwait, Qatar and Sharjah where in each case I stayed two days at the Agency. Judge Haines accompanied me throughout and his assistance has been of inestimable benefit; though the responsibility for this report is entirely my own, it is in fact the result of our joint work. In Annex II I have given my comments and impressions on points of detail taking each of the States or jurisdictional areas separately. In this Annex will be found the results of interviews and discussions on legal matters which I have had and comments on the courts and prisons and so forth which I visited. I have omitted any mention of the general "sight-seeing" in which I was able to indulge and the interesting discussions which I had on other matters, though all these were extremely enlightening as giving a picture of the framework into which the legal and judicial system is to be fitted.

3. My immediate task is to make recommendations and comments with regard to the legal and judicial system at present in force in the Persian Gulf States under British protection, primarily with regard to the British courts in these territories, but also with regard to the laws and courts of the Rulers of the territories, since, as Sir Roger Makins made clear, Her Majesty's Government are internationally responsible for the manner in which the Rulers exercise the internal independence which they enjoy. My main recommendations are set forth in summary form in the immediately following paragraph, and developed with the reasons in later paragraphs or in annexes.

Summary of Recommendations

4.—(i) The preparation of simple codes (Criminal, Civil, Evidence and Procedure) which the Foreign Office have already undertaken should be hastened. These codes will be based on those in force in some predominantly Arab and Moslem territory, and of which the text already exists both in English and Arabic. If necessary, the Foreign Office should engage another part-time lawyer for this work in addition to Mr. Howes, who like Mr. Howes should work under the supervision of Judge Haines. The draft codes should be vetted by a Committee consisting of Sir H. Trusted and Sir T. Creed, or of other persons with similar judicial experience in Moslem countries. These Codes should be put into force as soon as possible by Queen's Regulations in all the British courts in the Persian Gulf. All my enquiries indicated the desirability of pushing on with this work (see paragraphs 6 and 7 and Annex II, section I, paragraphs 1 and 4).

(ii) The Rulers of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar should as soon as possible be persuaded to enact and adopt the Arabic texts of these codes for use in their own courts. The Political Resident considers that we shall encounter greater difficulties over this in Kuwait than in Bahrain or Qatar. A system of dual jurisdiction inevitably produces complications and disadvantages. These are very much mitigated if the system of law applied by the two jurisdictions is the same. We have already in Bahrain progressed in the direction of unification by the practice whereby the local Ruler enacts laws and they are then made applicable in our courts by Queen's Regulations (see paragraphs 6 and 7 and Annex II, section I, paragraphs 1 and 4).

(iii) A British lawyer should be appointed as soon as possible to reside at Bahrain as a member of the Agency staff to perform the following duties:—

(a) Registrar of the Agency Court at Bahrain and of the Chief Court and Full Court.

(b) Assistant Judge of the Agency Courts at Kuwait, Qatar, Trucial States and Muscat.

(c) General legal adviser to the Political Resident and the various Political Agents (see paragraph 9 and Annex II, section I, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7).

(iv) The Rulers of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar should each be persuaded to employ a British legal official. In the case of Qatar this action could be delayed for a year or two but it should be taken as soon as possible in the other two States. In Bahrain and Qatar this British legal official would be on the staff of the Adviser. In Kuwait he should perhaps be on the staff of Abdullah Mubarak or whoever fulfils generally in that territory the duties of Home Secretary. The duties of these lawyers would be (a) to draft and where necessary suggest local legislation by the Ruler, and (b) generally to act as legal adviser to the Rulers' Governments in matters other than Moslem law; (c) to take charge of certain offices which the Government of the Ruler requires for matters such as the registration of Companies, patents or trademarks, and (d) finally to keep in close touch in legal matters with the Agency and with the legal officer on the Agency staff at Bahrain referred to in (iii) above (see paragraph 8 and Annex II, section I, paragraphs 1 and 4; section II, paragraph III; section III, paragraph 6).

(v) *Joint Courts*.—No change should be made at present by way of increasing the classes of cases tried by the Joint Court in Bahrain but the Ruler might be asked to agree that the Junior Joint Court should take all cases in first instance and that the Senior Joint Court on which he sits personally should act only as a court of appeal. In Kuwait in absence of further developments there is no need at present to press for the creation of a Joint Court for Mixed Cases. It is, however, possible that the extension (or creation) of a Joint Court system in both these territories may be expedient later, if and when the Rulers have adopted codes. In Qatar, the Joint Court system should be adopted in all Mixed Cases, except prosecutions by the Police which should not be regarded as mixed cases even if the prosecution relates to an offence committed by a local national against a person subject to one jurisdiction or *vice versa*. The revised Orders-in-Council for Bahrain and Qatar should be so drafted as to provide for Joint Courts in all mixed cases and for appeals from Joint Courts but they should contain a general rider permitting derogations from these provisions with the concurrence of the Political Resident. In the case of Kuwait, where the question of the establishment of Joint Courts has not been approved by or even discussed with the Ruler, the insertion of such a provision might cause offence even though the exercise of the Resident's discretion would make it ineffective. Consequently there should be consultation with the Political Agent, Kuwait, before a Kuwait Order in Council containing any reference to Joint Courts is introduced. In the Trucial States the Joint Court system should be applied in all mixed cases other than criminal cases where one of the persons subject to our jurisdiction is the accused. These cases should go to the Agency court (see paragraph 11 and Annex II, section III, paragraph 9; Annex II, section IV, paragraph 4; and Annex IV).

(vi) There should be a second professional Assistant Judge of the Chief Court. As it is uncertain at present how often he would be required, he should be paid a retaining fee and a fee for each visit he pays to the Persian Gulf. He should be ready to fly out to the Gulf whenever the Chief Court has to exercise jurisdiction at a time when Judge Haines is not available and also when required to make up the Full Court. After the retirement of Sir Rupert Hay, the Political Resident should not sit as Judge of the Chief Court (except occasionally to hear small criminal appeals where no professional Judge is present in the Gulf). He should, however, remain *ex officio* Judge of the Chief Court under the Order-in-Council and as such competent to make administrative Court Orders. He should also be eligible for membership of the Full Court, although he should not be required to sit on this Court unless a professional Judge is not available. (See paragraph 10.)

(vii)—(a) Consideration should be given to the question whether in the revised Order in Council for the Trucial States the Agency, (rather than the Ruler as at present) should have jurisdiction over nationals of one Trucial State when in the territory of another (Annex II, section IV, paragraph 3).

(b) It would appear that it is now expedient that the Trucial Coast Rulers should be persuaded to enact nationality laws to define who their subjects are. Various applications for passports are now received by the Agency at Sharjah where it is difficult to decide whether the passport should be issued or not. Of course, if the change to which I have referred at (a) above is adopted, the necessity for these nationality laws will become greater unless the alternative is adopted of one law

creating one Trucial States nationality. There is, however, no great urgency for these nationality laws, and their preparation may involve the Political Officer in difficult discussions with suspicious Rulers, but no doubt a beginning would be made with the Rulers who are the most easy to deal with. (See Annex II, section IV, paragraph 3.)

(viii) Officers appointed to fill the posts in the Persian Gulf of Political Agent, Assistant Political Agent or Political Officer should, before they take up their appointment, spend two or three months acquiring the elementary legal knowledge necessary to enable them to carry out their judicial duties. Half of this time should be spent in the Foreign Office and the other half in the Gulf where they should study as observers the administration of justice and acquire a knowledge of the working of the Registry of the Courts. This means that there should be an overlap in appointments made to the Persian Gulf so as to allow a period for judicial training before an officer takes up his appointment without leaving the post to which he is proceeding vacant with all the disadvantages that this would entail (paragraph 12).

(ix) A Persian Gulf gazette should be issued in which all judicial appointments and their termination would be announced and notice of all Queen's Regulations would be given (paragraph 13).

(x) The procedure for the drafting and issue of Queen's Regulations needs to be speeded up, since at present a long delay is caused by much detailed correspondence between Bahrain and the Foreign Office on points of drafting. This is particularly undesirable when the Queen's Regulation is intended to apply the substance of some local law issued by the Rulers. The appointment by the Rulers of legal advisers and the appointment of a qualified lawyer to the staff of the Residency should help to ensure that both the Rulers' laws and the draft Queen's Regulations submitted by the Residency are suitable for enactment with very little alteration in the Foreign Office (Annex II, section III, paragraph 6).

Unification of Jurisdiction Probably Ultimately Inevitable

5. In making my recommendations in the preceding paragraph as to the steps that should be taken now, I thought it may be well to have in mind the probable course of future development. I think that in the three principal States, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, progress on the legal side already lags somewhat behind that made in material development and administration. I am well aware that for political and psychological reasons greater difficulties are always likely to be encountered in bringing about improvements on the legal side, but it is none the less necessary that such improvements should be made. For reasons which are given in Annex III I am convinced that for political reasons we shall have to be ready to agree at some future time that the present dual judicial system shall be replaced by a single judicial system, which will all be under the Ruler, and that therefore, in all that we do now, we should have this probable ultimate development in mind. While such a goal is in fact consistent with the general British policy in regard to territories for which Her Majesty's Government are responsible and there are always objections to a dual judicial system, it is not for this reason that I suggest that we should prepare ourselves for this change but because I think it is a change which for political reasons we shall be obliged to accept. I do not even suggest that we should take steps now which would hasten such a change, but rather that the steps that we take now should be such as to make the single judicial system work as well and as satisfactorily as possible when the time comes when it will be necessary to accept it.

Codes

6. For the purposes of the present exercise of jurisdiction by our own courts I think that the first necessity is to hasten and complete the reform which it is already decided to undertake, namely, the putting into force of codes, by Queen's Regulations, as a simple system of codified law to take the place of Indian Codes and the law in practice of the Presidency of Bombay in 1947. This Indian law is far too complicated to be suitable for application by our courts in these territories. We shall need a Code of Criminal Law, Civil Law, Code of Procedure and Evidence. The Codes should be simple and short as possible and should be based on codes in use in territories containing a population of which the majority is Moslem and of which texts in Arabic already exist. In brief, we should strive to reach as soon as possible a position where all the law, which a Judge of our Courts in the Persian Gulf States needs to consult, could be contained in three or four slim

volumes. The only law which the Judge would then need to consult would consist of:—

- (i) The Order-in-Council setting out the law applicable in our jurisdictions, establishing the Courts and giving powers to the Courts and to our judicial officers.
- (ii) The Codes, criminal, civil and procedure, containing the main body of the law to be applied in the Courts; and
- (iii) The Queen's Regulations being the statutes dealing with specific subjects on which legislation is required.

The Code of Criminal Law will, I hope, be ready for adoption in two or three months' time. Rules of the Court dealing with procedure already exist in draft form. In preparing the subsequent codes it should be borne in mind that speed and simplicity are more important than perfection and that the legislative process of amending our codes, if and when they are found in practice to be defective, is a simple one.

7. When we have got these codes, or some of them, in force in our own courts we should then endeavour to persuade the Rulers of the various territories to enact and adopt them for their own courts. The population of the three most important of the Gulf States is likely, as far as one can see, to continue to be predominantly Moslem and Arab but with a foreign and non-Moslem minority which is of great importance. In a word, these States will remain more like miniature Egypt than miniature Jordans and I think that a codified law has always been found to be and is likely to be the most satisfactory legal system for a Moslem State with a large and important non-Moslem minority.

British Legal Adviser for Rulers

8. I think that both in Bahrain and Kuwait and Qatar it is most desirable that the Ruler should have in his service an English lawyer. In Bahrain this lawyer would be a member of the staff of the Adviser, Mr. Belgrave. In Qatar he would be on the staff of the adviser, but the appointment would be delayed a year or two. In Kuwait I imagine he would be on the staff of Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak (who seems to be Home Secretary plus Chief Criminal Judge) and, perhaps also if the arrangement is possible, on the staff of Shaikh Abdullah bin Jabir (who seems to be Minister of Justice plus Chief Civil Judge). The functions of this British lawyer would broadly be threefold:—

- (i) To act as legislative draftsman for the Ruler, that is to say, to prepare the English text of the laws which the Ruler from time to time must enact, and to be responsible for seeing that these laws are made as complete as is necessary and, where they deal with technical matters, are prepared in the light of the necessary technical advice.
- (ii) To take charge of the administration of certain types of local laws; for instance, if, as in Bahrain, the Ruler wants to have a Company Law he would be in charge of the registration of companies formed in Bahrain. Further, in Bahrain, where there is a need for the registration of patents and trademarks, the legal adviser might be in charge of the office for the registration of these patents and trademarks and relieve the Political Agency of a function which under present arrangements may fall initially upon it. In this connexion see paragraph 17 of section I of Annex II, in which I have recommended that Mr. Howes should go to Bahrain in order to establish a registry for patents and trade marks.
- (iii) This lawyer should also keep close touch with the Agency over legal matters and be responsible for ensuring both that the Agency become aware of local legislation or projected local legislation which should be made enforceable in our Courts by Queen's Regulations and that the Agency are given a chance to comment on these laws in draft before they are enacted.

If this recommendation is carried out, it means that the Foreign Office will have to find three suitable lawyers. It will not be practicable to make knowledge of Arabic a precondition of appointment, but a promise to be very diligent in acquiring quickly a good knowledge of the language should be required.

A Full-time British Legal Officer on the Staff of Agency at Bahrain.—His Duties

9. As regards the personnel required for the exercise of our own jurisdiction I think there is a pressing need for the whole-time services of one professional

lawyer in the Gulf. This professional English lawyer should, I think, have the following functions:—

- (a) He should be Registrar of the Court of the Political Agent in Bahrain. As Registrar he could take and perhaps deal more satisfactorily than Mr. Hafiz can with the minor cases in the Joint Court and also greatly assist the Political Agent in the bigger cases.
- (b) He should be Registrar of the Chief Court and of the Full Court.
- (c) He should also be appointed Assistant Judge in the Political Agent's Courts in all the other States except Bahrain. Consequently he would be able when required to go to Kuwait, Qatar or elsewhere to take the more difficult cases in the Political Agents' Courts.
- (d) He should act as Legal Adviser to the Political Resident and to the Political Agent, Bahrain, subject always to such advice as Judge Haines may give on his visits here. There are of course questions of international law with which the Residency and Agency are concerned, but with which it would be a mistake to trouble him because even if he had advised, they would still have to be referred to the Foreign Office. I also anticipate that, if he performs all the duties which I have indicated, he will in any case be very fully employed. There will be other cases where his advice has been obtained, but where it will be proper for the matter to be referred to the Foreign Office before it is acted upon. In these cases the fact that he has been consulted should be stated and his advice, with reasons, quoted. It would thus be possible for the Political Resident and Political Agent to obtain legal advice at all times and also relieve Judge Haines of a great deal of work of this kind which falls on him during his visits which are made primarily for judicial purposes.

The performance of these four functions by a professional lawyer would be a great strengthening of our own judicial system in the Gulf and would certainly provide whole-time work and justify the payment of a reasonable salary (see also Annex II, section I, paragraphs 5-7).

A Second Professional Assistant Judge of Chief Court

10. When Sir Rupert Hay ceases to be Political Resident we shall not have as the future Political Resident an officer who should be asked to take cases in the Chief Court, except perhaps small criminal appeals when there is no Assistant Judge present in the Gulf and during the hearing of which he should, if my recommendation in paragraph 9 above is accepted, have the assistance of a professional Registrar. It will therefore be necessary to have on call another suitable lawyer who can take cases in the Chief Court and also sit on the Full Court. This new Assistant Judge might be remunerated by the payment of a retaining fee plus a fee for each time he has to visit the Gulf to perform judicial duties. This system of remuneration might be adopted unless and until by reason of the frequency of his visits to the Gulf a salary on half-time basis would be more satisfactory. Mr. Howes who has done work on the codes to which I have referred in paragraph 6 above has already sat once on the Full Court in Bahrain as well as sitting on the High Court bench of the Control Commission Court in Germany, and might be suitable for this appointment as Assistant Judge.

Mixed Cases

11. The Foreign Office in Despatches to the Political Resident Nos. 76 and 77 of 20th November, 1950 recommended the development of the Joint Court system in all the territories. It was intended that the system should be extended to every type of mixed case where it is not at present in force, including cases where there is a police prosecution in a case which is essentially a mixed case. The reason for this recommendation by the Foreign Office was that it was thought that the Joint Court system was not merely a means of securing justice in a mixed case but also a method by which the Ruler or his judicial officers might by sitting with the Political Resident acquire a knowledge of the principle of justice and procedure which we should wish them to apply generally. I think that the Foreign Office's recommendation should still be applied fully to the Trucial States, except in criminal cases where the accused is subject to our jurisdiction, which should go to the Agency Court because of the uncertainty of securing under the Joint Court system

an effective appeal, and in Qatar, except in regard to the police prosecutions. On the other hand, as a result of the knowledge which I have acquired during my visit I do not now recommend that there should be any such change in regard to the Joint Court in either of the two principal States, Bahrain or Kuwait. In Kuwait the Joint Court system has never been applied at all. Apart from the probable considerable political difficulty of persuading the Ruler of Kuwait to adopt it, I do not think that in Kuwait its adoption would at present serve the educative purpose which the Foreign Office had in mind. I do not think that, given the personalities and positions of the members of the Ruler's family whom he will appoint to perform judicial functions in a Joint Court, the Political Agent would at present be able to become *de facto* (if not *de jure*) president of the Court and generally to direct the procedure. Even if the Political Agent was impressive both in his knowledge of Arabic and in the acuteness of his judgment, I rather doubt if he would be able to do more than to prevent positive injustice. In Bahrain the present position with regard to mixed cases is peculiar and it is dealt with in detail in Annex IV (see also Annex II, section I, paragraphs 10 and 11). The only cases which at present go to the Joint Court are (i) civil suits where the plaintiff is under our jurisdiction and defendant is under Ruler's jurisdiction: (ii) criminal prosecutions instituted by a private complainant when complainant is under our jurisdiction and defendant under the other. In view of the number of police prosecutions, class (ii) is rare. In the bigger mixed cases⁽¹⁾ the Ruler of Bahrain sits in person in Senior Joint Court with Political Agent. He is able and conscientious in the performance of his judicial duties and of great dignity. He would inevitably be the leading figure at any joint court on which he sat and, speaking broadly, it would be impossible for the Political Agent, except by constant interruption, to direct the procedure. In the Junior Joint Court, where at present Mr. Hafiz sits with Shaikh Mubarak, brother of the Ruler, he is in fact able to direct the procedure. In Bahrain and Kuwait the time when it may be expedient to develop and increase the Joint Court system will be when the Rulers have been persuaded to enact codes (*vide* paragraph 7 above) and when the local judges must perform become more professional and less paternal and royal. On the other hand, I think it would be an improvement if in Bahrain the present Junior Joint Court could take all cases in first instance (which will now be less numerous than they have been because of the increase in the Ruler's jurisdiction) and the Senior Joint Court only sit as a Court of Appeal. The present new draft Order-in-Council for Bahrain will require a small change if this recommendation is adopted (*vide* Annex IV, paragraph 8). A future revised Order for Qatar could be on the same lines. As regards Kuwait there should be consultation with the Political Agent, Kuwait, before any provisions relating to Joint Courts are inserted in the Kuwait Order. In the case of the Trucial States, the Joint Court should be adopted for all Mixed Cases except criminal cases where persons subject to British jurisdiction are the accused.

Legal Training of Officers sent to the Persian Gulf

12. Officers sent out to the Persian Gulf States have inevitably as part of their duties both in Agency and in Joint Courts to perform judicial functions of importance. Even if, as a result of the Chief Court exercising jurisdiction in the first instance (as it will be empowered to do in all territories under the new Orders in Council) the Chief Court takes the most important and difficult cases, it will still be the case that Political Agents and Political Officers will have to try alone (or in Joint Courts) serious crimes and civil cases which present difficulty. Further, even if the recommendation which I have made in paragraph 9 above is adopted and as a result in all the territories except Bahrain, a professional judge for the Agency Court will be available, it will still remain true that Political Agents will exercise jurisdiction in a large number of cases and become increasingly involved in legal questions. It is therefore necessary, if Her Majesty's Government are to fulfil their responsibilities in the Persian Gulf territories in the manner which is set out in Sir Roger Makins's report, that Political Officers and Political Agents should have a little legal training before they take up their duties. The legal training need not be very deep or occupy a large period of time. It will be largely designed to show the officer in general how to go about things, where to find the law that he wants and where the most usual pitfalls lie. I recommend that persons appointed to these offices in the

⁽¹⁾ Civil cases where the sum in dispute exceeds 500 rupees.

Persian Gulf should, before they take up their duties (unless of course they have served in the Gulf in a similar capacity already) first spend a period of weeks in the Foreign Office where they will study the law which is to be applied in our courts in the Gulf. (I hope that before long this will be the simplified codified law to which I have referred in paragraph 6 above. At present it is, in addition to the Order in Council, the more complicated Indian Codes and Law.) While so engaged in the Foreign Office they should be under the supervision of Judge Haines if he is there, or of Mr. Howes in his absence. During this period they should spend some time acquiring an acquaintance, rather greater than that of the ordinary layman's, in the administration of the justice in England, more particularly of the Courts of summary jurisdiction. In other words the Magistrate's Court and the County Court is better, for the purpose than the High Court and the Old Bailey. Next, and I am inclined to think that this is even more important, they should on arrival in the Gulf before they take up their duties, spend some time as observers in the various courts in Bahrain, Kuwait and also Qatar and see how things are done in the Gulf in practice. While they are doing this work, the professional Registrar at Bahrain, if appointed, would I think be their chief mentor. But the whole training need not delay their taking up of their duties more than a month or two. This experience will make a great difference and prevent there arising a repetition of an instance in future which has arisen in practice where an officer acting as Political Agent is called on immediately to exercise jurisdiction in a serious or difficult judicial case without having had any more acquaintance with law or justice in the Gulf or elsewhere than an ordinary intelligent layman. I am bound to add, however, that the public interest will not be served if the month or two occupied in legal training results in the Residency or the Agencies remaining for longer periods short of staff.

Persian Gulf Gazette

13. I recommend that the Residency should issue a Persian Gulf Gazette. There is a small printing press in Bahrain which was able to print adequately the form of memorial service for his late Majesty. It is for consideration whether it is best to use the local press or get the Gazette printed in the Foreign Office. It might be published in five sections: Section (1) Residency; Sections (2) to (5) the four Agencies. In the Gazette all judicial appointments and their termination would be announced and notice of all Queen's Regulations given. In fact the text of the Queen's Regulations would be published as supplements to the Gazette. Other notices could be published in the Gazette.

Legal Training of Local Judges

14. It is most desirable that the Rulers should send abroad for legal training men who will in the future occupy judicial posts in their own Courts. I was informed in Kuwait that it is the intention to send to England two sons of Shaikh Abdullah bin Jabir. It is equally important that if Rulers do send young men to gain legal training in England the Foreign Office should do its utmost to ensure that they get into the right hands and receive the utmost benefit from their stay there. For legal training which would be shorter and less expensive there is much to be said for the University at Khartoum which has a law school, assuming that the law school is prepared to accept them as students and that general political conditions in the Sudan remain favourable. It may be desirable to make enquiries of the Sudan Government with regard to this matter. In a general way I mentioned to the Ruler of Bahrain the desirability of young men who fill in the future judicial posts receiving some legal education abroad.

Subordinate Officers of the Courts

15. I think that at Bahrain a slight increase of staff, involving a full-time clerk for the Agency Court, will be required to perform subordinate duties connected with the Agency Court and the Joint Court under the Registrar, viz., the receipt of plaints, the assessment and collection of Court fees, the keeping of the Court files and the making of entries in the registers of the Court (*vide* Annex II, section I, paragraph 18 below).

Companies' Law in Bahrain

16. The Ruler of Bahrain is keen that it should be possible to incorporate Companies in Bahrain, and I was given to understand that Mr. Ballantyne, who is in private legal practice, has been requested to draft a Company Law. I think

it is unlikely that Mr. Ballantyne will, in fact, be able to produce a draft which is satisfactory. My recommendation with regard to this idea and similar ideas is broadly that we should not in any way oppose them in principle but rather welcome them and stress that, if it is to be possible in Bahrain to incorporate Companies, the necessary legislation must be properly drafted, which it is unlikely that lawyers in private practice will be able to do, and the companies' registration office must be properly managed, as otherwise there will be difficulties and abuses. In this connexion see paragraph 8 above, where I suggest that this is work which, amongst other things, could be done by a legal adviser in the service of the Government of Bahrain.

Conclusion

17. I was able, before I left Bahrain, to show this report in draft form to the Political Resident, Sir Rupert Hay, and Mr. Le Quesne, First Secretary, and to hear their comments, of which I have been able to take account in preparing the final version. While I believe that they are in general agreement in the substance of my report, I have the sole responsibility for its contents. Throughout my visit I received every possible assistance from everybody, from the Political Resident and the staff of the Residency (where my rather excessive requests for shorthand and typing were cheerfully accepted) and Agencies on the one hand, and from the Rulers and their officials on the other hand. My thanks are therefore due to all these people, but particularly to Sir Rupert Hay, whose hospitality I enjoyed for nearly a fortnight, and to Mr. Pelly, Mr. Weir and Mr. Wilton, with each of whom I stayed two days and during that period occupied practically the whole of their time.

W. E. BECKETT.

ANNEX I TO No. 14

Page 3, paragraph 2

The States are administratively backward and weak. The international responsibility of Her Majesty's Government involves indirect responsibility for their internal stability, and the British jurisdiction over foreign nationals in the States involves a direct responsibility for internal security and impartial justice. Since Her Majesty's Government will be blamed for any shortcomings in the States, they must find means to ensure that the administrations are above reproach.

Page 3, paragraph 3

... Her Majesty's Government's mission in the Persian Gulf cannot be carried out on the cheap.

Page 6, paragraph 13

(b) The Persian Gulf posts, including Muscat, are not, and never will be, ordinary Foreign Service posts, and special consideration must be given to their staffing. Attempts to assimilate them to the Foreign Service pattern are misconceived.

Page 6, paragraph 14

(a) The key to the orderly progress of Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain lies in the provision of suitable British advisers. The system of recruitment hitherto has been haphazard and unsatisfactory. Command of Arabic is most important for the principal advisers.

Page 11, paragraph 24

Her Majesty's Government must thus maintain their position and this policy can be carried out in the following way:—

(iii) By maintaining our judicial functions and ensuring that they are adequately discharged.

Page 26, paragraph 111

... The posts which may be necessary in order to discharge the judicial responsibilities of Her Majesty's Government in the States should not be regarded as posts in the Foreign Service and therefore counting against a ceiling. It would be an administrative absurdity to equate the post, say, of Registrar, with that of a First Secretary of Embassy.

ANNEX II, SECTION I TO No. 14

BAHRAIN

The Ruler

My interview with the Ruler of Bahrain on my arrival and my talks with him at dinner at the Residency at the beginning of the visit were purely formal and social, but Sir Rupert Hay took me (Judge Haines was also there) to say goodbye to him on the afternoon of my departure. On His Highness's invitation, I then summarised what I had seen in Bahrain and made the following four suggestions to him:—

- (1) There should be a British lawyer on the staff of the Adviser.
- (2) The Senior Joint Court should be a Court of Appeal for Mixed Cases and the Junior Joint Court should take all Mixed Cases in first instance.
- (3) That His Highness should enact for his own people our codes when we had adopted them for our courts.
- (4) That he should send abroad for legal training persons to whom he intended to entrust judicial functions.

The Ruler seemed favourably disposed to (1) and (2). I do not think that he really understood (3) as he talked about a Basic law which his people were considering and Judge Haines thinks he was probably thinking of a series of regulations for the two municipalities of Manama and Moharraq. He did not comment on (4). The interview took an hour and the Ruler was as friendly and courteous as I am told he generally is. Sir R. Hay later transmitted these four suggestions to the Ruler in writing.

Prison: Police Headquarters

2. I visited the prison at Bahrain, the Bahrain Police Headquarters and the Town Police Station at Manama. The Commander of the Police Force is an Iraqi who served for nine years in the Iraq Levies and then for some period in Palestine. Inspector Hyde from the Police in England is the Traffic Controller, and I believe the *éminence grise* of the Bahrain Police Force, which I gather to be about 300 strong. The office at headquarters seems to be quite impressively equipped with filing cabinets, typewriters and so forth. The police quarters which surround a big courtyard of an old fort seem to be extremely neat and tidy and there is a complete absence of all smell. This is also true of the prison. No complaint can be made about the two special cells reserved for Europeans, each with its own flush W.C. This prison only keeps a prisoner serving a sentence of less than three months,⁽¹⁾ and I was informed that the prisoners were employed about the place on cleaning and similar duties. They are shackled by chains fastened around the ankles and attached to a chain around the waist. The shackles did appear to be fairly light and the ankles were protected by bandages. Amongst the prisoners I saw was Hayatun, the murderer convicted in Muscat, whose sentence of death Mr. Morrison commuted to fourteen years' imprisonment. Judge Haines was very much struck with the extraordinary improvement in Hayatun's health since he had last seen him. Hayatun has a record of bad behaviour while a prisoner, including attempted rape while performing duties about the prison. It is hoped that his transfer to Aden will be effected quickly.

Manamah Police Station

3. The Town Police station is under an Arab officer, Abdul Karim, who has had considerable training in India and also taken and passed a course at the Police College at Hendon. He therefore has not only a very good knowledge of English, but also a good knowledge of how things are done both in England and in India. One of his junior officers, his cousin, also speaks English quite well and at least one other of the officers has an acquaintance of English because Abdul Karim gave him his orders in English while I was there. He described to me the course of a recent murder trial where the Bahrain Police had prosecuted and also told me of the finding of a body in a public garden the night before where suicide by poison was suspected, and he wanted a post-mortem but could not get it unless the deceased's relatives consented. I gathered from him that any person arrested by

⁽¹⁾ Longer sentences are served at the model Penal Settlement on Jeddah Island, which I was going to visit but was prevented from doing by a mechanical defect in the Resident's launch.

the Police has to be brought before a magistrate twenty-four hours after the arrest and any continuation of the detention before trial must be under authority from the magistrate. We saw the cells in the Manamah Police Station. In one of them there was an oldish man, thought to be somewhat mentally deranged, who had broken his wife's arm with a stick; a young man detained on suspicion of theft, a person required as a witness in civil proceedings who had failed to attend a summons to appear, and a little boy who had been reported missing by his father. The police were keeping the little boy for medical examination for the purpose of discovering if they could who was responsible for the boy stopping away from his home.

Talk with Mr. Belgrave

4. I had a long talk of some 1½ hours with the Adviser, Mr. Belgrave. It is only necessary to record here that during this talk Mr. Belgrave told me that he had long been convinced of the desirability of the Ruler enacting suitable legal codes and would be ready to press the Ruler to enact for his own courts the codes which were adopted in our own courts if my recommendation on this point is accepted and carried out and assuming, of course, that the codes are suitable for territories such as Bahrain. I gave Mr. Belgrave my reasons for thinking that a British lawyer should be included as a member of his staff and developed my reasons for this, indicating the sort of work I thought he would do (*vide* paragraph 8 of Report). Mr. Belgrave was non-committal on this point and he did not seem hostile to the proposal.⁽²⁾ At the end of the talk Judge Haines handed him a redraft of the Ruler's law with regard to the acquisition of real property by persons other than Bahrain nationals and which he and I had prepared, and I imagine Mr. Belgrave will advise the Ruler to re-enact the law on this point in the form we have suggested.

Professional Registrar for the Agency Court at Bahrain

5. As stated in paragraph 9 of the Report, I think a whole time professional lawyer should be appointed to the staff of the agency in Bahrain. I have indicated there the work that I think he should do. I only want to add here that, as Registrar of the Agency Court for Bahrain, he would be in court when the Political Agent is trying a case sitting in front of the Judge just below the Bench and would therefore not merely ensure that the Political Agent's papers were in order but would also when necessary be able to bring legal points to his attention, in the same manner as a magistrate's professional clerk does, when a Bench of Magistrates is trying a case in England. Further, though he would take the bulk of the small cases which Mr. Hafiz at present deals with and usually sit in the Junior Joint Court, I do not think he should monopolise all this judicial work. Arrangements should be made so that the Assistant Political Agent or Political Officer at Bahrain does some of this judicial work so as to gain judicial experience in case he has to act as Political Agent and take the more serious cases either in the Agency Court or in the Senior Joint Court.

6. Mr. Mawdsley, a Solicitor, who had legal experience in India and also in J.A.G. work during the war, has appeared as Counsel before the Agency Court, Chief Court and Full Court and is now in Bahrain as a private legal practitioner, is thought by the staff of the Residency and of the Agency to be suitable for this appointment. I have talked to him and he makes a favourable impression on me. He would be willing to accept such an appointment. His idea of a remuneration of a basic salary is about £1,200 per annum plus local allowances, which seems to me to be by no means excessive.

The Agency Court at Bahrain

7. If the appointment which I have indicated were made, it would counteract, I think, effectively what I find to be the main defect in the Agency Court at Bahrain as well as strengthening our judiciary in the other territories.

(a) At present the Political Agent hears in person about 50 cases a year, civil and criminal. He has to sit in the Agency Court about twice a week.

⁽²⁾ A week later, Mr. Belgrave told me that he had had a conversation with the Ruler generally about my visit. Mr. Belgrave had explained to the Ruler that I was not critical of the way justice was being administered at present but was merely looking ahead when material developments might require development in the judicial sphere as well. He said that the Ruler appeared to take this quite well and he had even put to the Ruler the idea that the Ruler should have a British lawyer in his employment and that the Ruler had not objected to this idea either.

All civil cases, where the amount claimed is more than 5,000 rupees or in which Europeans or Americans are involved are in practice taken by the Political Agent and also all criminal cases where the penalty may be more than two years or in which the accused is European or American. If my recommendations are accepted the Political Agent, when sitting judicially in the Agency Court, will be in a much better position than he is to-day. His papers should be in order, he will have in Court a professional Registrar whom he could consult, and he himself (including any Assistant Political Agent or Political Officer acting for him) will have had a little training before he is ever called upon to try a case himself.

I think, however, that the number of these cases will be nearly halved now that we have agreed to the Ruler exercising jurisdiction over the nationals of other Gulf States and over Saudi Arabians.

(b) Then there are the minor cases in the Agency Court at present tried by Mr. Hafiz, which are surprisingly numerous, being in number about 1,500 a year. Mr. Hafiz has to sit in the Agency Court five days a week. The criticism of Mr. Hafiz's judicial work comes from various sources. Judge Haines found the records in a very unsatisfactory state and, though on his instigation, the arrangements for the keeping of the records, which is under Mr. Hafiz's supervision, were improved, it is still the case that Mr. Hafiz cannot be persuaded to make an adequate note of the evidence or any record at all of the arguments on point of law. Other criticism is that Mr. Hafiz goes frequently wrong on law and procedure, but, owing to the inadequacy of the records, it is often difficult to ascertain exactly the grounds of the decision afterwards. It has never been suggested that he has been unfair and it is quite probable that the justice that he has administered has been felt to be generally satisfactory by the litigants.

Perhaps Mr. Hafiz is happiest in the Junior Joint Court (*vide* paragraph 11 below). I think he is in his element administering "palm-tree" justice.

8. I saw Mr. Laver, Acting Political Agent, deal with an application for the giving of security by a successful plaintiff when the defendant had appealed to the Chief Court and a stay of execution pending appeal had been refused. It was a case between two merchants where there had been judgment for a substantial sum which the defendant had paid and also for Rs.2,000 taxed costs, which had not yet been paid by the defendant. After argument the defendant was ordered to obtain in the form of bonds personal guarantees from two other substantial merchants, to be agreed by defendant or approved by the Court, for the repayment of the amount of judgment and costs in the event of the defendant's appeal being successful. The Court refused to order that the security should involve the mortgage of property. An order for execution for the Rs.2,000 costs was ordered, the defendant having an opportunity of avoiding execution by paying up within the three or four hours which would elapse before the order for execution could be drawn up and issued. Mr. Ballantyne appeared for the plaintiff. His court manner was correct and I think he was helpful to the Court. Mr. Laver showed that he had already acquired some experience in dealing with cases judicially.

9. I also saw Mr. Hafiz taking small civil cases in the Agency Court of which he is a Judge, but no cases of real interest or difficulty came before him during the hour that I sat in the Court.

The Senior Joint Court

10. I went to the Bahrain Law Courts to see the working of the Senior Joint Court where the Ruler and Mr. Laver were sitting to hear civil cases in which the plaintiffs were persons subject to our jurisdiction and the defendants local nationals. (This is the only class of case which is heard in Joint Courts in Bahrain.) During the one and a half hours that I was there three cases were heard out of a list of ten. A copy of the list will be found at the end of this Section. I left because the Ruler was kind enough to spend so much time explaining things to me while the litigants were waiting before him that I feared the Court would make little progress with its list. The third case for the present purpose is sufficient to act as a guide in studying the procedure in the Joint Court. This was a case between a plaintiff, a Pakistani national who is a Karachi wholesaler with a branch in Bahrain managed for him by Shaikh A, in which Shaikh B is sales manager, and a defendant who is

a retail merchant. As a result of a sale of goods the defendant had owed the plaintiff a balance of Rs. 2,941. The case had been before the Majlis-et-Tujara (Committee for Commercial Matters) which had examined the plaintiff's books and found that the defendant had owed the plaintiff this sum as a result of sales of goods. The defendant's case was that he had discharged the greater part of this sum by weekly payments made in accordance with a local custom by which a retailer makes payments to a wholesaler every Saturday until the cost of the whole of the goods is paid for, and this the plaintiff disputed. There was no written record of these weekly payments on the plaintiff's books, nor had the defendant any receipts in writing to prove these weekly payments. I was informed that there was nothing extraordinary in such a case in Bahrain for no written record to be made of such payments. According to the defendant, he had made the weekly payments to Shaikh A—the plaintiff's general manager in Bahrain. Both parties were represented in court by vakils. The case had also been to the Sharia Court where the defendant had undertaken to accept the oath of Shaikh A that he had received no money but he would not accept the oath of Shaikh B. The Joint Court adjourned the case on the grounds that it should go back to the Sharia Court to see whether the matter could be settled by an oath and that, if necessary, it should go again before the Majlis-et-Tujara. It might be that the Sharia Court would recommend that Shaikh A should take the oath as the defendant demanded. I was given to understand that case is only settled by the oath of one or the other party, if both sides agree to accept that oath as binding and that, if the matter could not be settled on this basis by oath or further investigation by the Majlis-et-Tujara, the Joint Court would then have to examine the parties and witnesses and reach some conclusion as to which side was speaking the truth. I did not elicit whether in this event the Shaikh A to whom the defendant alleged he had actually given the money would be made to appear and give evidence, but I think he would. This case I think illustrates very well how the Senior Joint Court works. The proceedings are all in Arabic and in fact the Ruler conducts them, though apparently he is ready to consult the Political Agent and to allow the Agency interpreter to ask questions. It appears that the Joint Court is in the habit of sending cases for this or that aspect to be considered by the Majlis-et-Tujara or the Sharia Court so that the case will come up many times before it is finally dealt with.

If it had happened that the plaintiff had been the local national and the defendant the Pakistani merchant, the case would have been dealt with in the Agency Court and the procedure would have been very much different and it is quite possible that, owing to the difference in procedure, a different decision might be given, although the actual transactions between the parties had actually been the same.

The Junior Joint Court

11. I spent about one and a half hours in the Junior Joint Court on which Mr. Hafiz and Shaikh Mubarak, a brother of the Ruler, sit. The Junior Joint Court takes civil cases where the sum in dispute does not exceed 500 rupees and also the two or three criminal cases a year where there is a private prosecution. As already stated elsewhere, the only class of cases in Bahrain which go to the Joint Court are cases where a person subject to our jurisdiction brings a case against a person subject to the Ruler's jurisdiction. I listened to three cases. In one of them the plaintiff claimed the balance of payment for the sale of goods and the defendant almost at once admitted that he was willing to pay up, if the plaintiff was willing to swear on the Koran that the sum was due. An oath on the Koran was administered in the Court and the defendant very cheerfully produced the necessary notes from his bag and paid up.

In another case the plaintiff had bought goods from the defendant which were not delivered within the time required by the contract, and the plaintiff claimed that in the circumstances he was entitled to repudiate the transaction and obtain back the money which he had paid. The case had been referred to the Majlis-et-Tujara which found favour in the plaintiff on this point and the defendant had paid back his purchase price and taken his goods back. All this part of the case had already been heard and decided in the Senior Joint Court. There now came before the Junior Joint Court a supplementary claim rising out of the same matter because the plaintiff alleged that he had been put to certain expenditure in warehousing the portion of the goods which had arrived, and that the defendant should pay the cost of this. The two parties were represented by vakils and the defendant's vakil, after trying to re-open the issue which had been decided already in the Senior Joint

Court and being told that he could not do this, then stated that he could admit in principle the defendant's liability to pay the plaintiff's present claim, but said that the amount of the plaintiff's claim was not agreed. The plaintiff's vakil then said he would obtain from the warehouse where he had stored the goods the receipt for the money which the plaintiff had paid. The defendant's vakil then said that he would then accept the evidence.

This case is interesting as indicating the way the parties proceed in these Arab countries, because in England, for instance, the plaintiff would never have thought of bringing this supplementary claim into Court without already having ready to present to the Court the evidence on which his claim rested. But here in the Joint Courts and in the Bahrain Government Courts it is the usual thing for cases to come before the Court time after time and be adjourned for the fulfilment of this or that procedural requirement, when really all these requirements should have been complied with before the case is ever brought into the Court at all.

Another point which interested me was the question of the vakils. These, I understand, have in no way the position corresponding to that of a solicitor in our Courts. They are not required to have any knowledge of law or procedure, though in practice they may well acquire it. In the Ruler's Courts, however, a vakil has to be enrolled before he is allowed to appear, and the Court therefore exercise some sort of control over the vakils that it hears. It is a point for consideration whether our own Courts should introduce a corresponding control over the vakils which appear before them, in addition to requiring the production of a power of attorney.

Bahrain Government Court

12. I spent a couple of hours in the Bahrain Government Court, where Shaikh Daij, brother of the Ruler, and Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed, cousin of the Ruler, were sitting on the Bench with Mr. Belgrave. The calendar was a very short one and I only mention one case because it deals with motor cars. In this case a Bahraini driver of a very long and heavy Dodge lorry had to turn a corner where the street was very narrow. There was an old woman of 60 squatting in the street on the inside of the turn. The lorry driver stopped and asked the old woman to move, and she replied: "Go on, my son." He then drove on quite slowly round the corner and, owing to his seat being on the left-hand side and the corner and the old woman being on the right-hand side, he was in no position to see what happened, but in fact he drove over the legs of the old woman and broke them and she died in hospital as a result of the accident. He was prosecuted by the Bahrain Police for negligent driving and Mr. Hyde appeared for the prosecution. I only saw the end of the case when the driver was acquitted, as I think undoubtedly he should have been. In fact the relatives of the old woman made no claim for compensation before the Court, though there may have been some private settlement out of Court. In any case, I was told that if a claim had been made for compensation in the Court, it would have been rejected on the finding of the criminal proceedings that the driver was not guilty of negligence, and this shows that liability for motor car accidents in Bahrain depends upon negligence. The Bahrain Government Court has for some years not applied the principles of Sharia Law in ordinary civil and criminal cases and, as far as I can make out, the Court is in the process of making Judge-made law, being inspired to a large extent in criminal cases by the Sudan Code. (Contrast this with Kuwait and Qatar *vide* section II, paragraph IV, and section III, paragraph 8.)

13. After the sitting was over, the members of the Court said that they would like to discuss with me two interesting civil cases where they were called upon to make a decision of principle and where their decisions would be of considerable importance as a precedent. These two cases were as follows:—

- (i) A was the owner of a house, and an adjoining courtyard. A sold the adjoining courtyard to B. The gutters carrying rain from A's roof projected a foot or two into the courtyard which A had sold to B. B, having bought the courtyard, wished to build a house there, and A's gutters were in the way. B claimed that A was obliged to remove his gutters at A's expense. A claimed that B had bought the courtyard with the gutters and that he, A, was entitled to keep the gutters where they were. The Court consulted the Municipality at Muharraq, whose opinion, I understood, was considered of value as evidence of local law and custom applicable in such a case. The Court, however, were not

bound by this opinion. The opinion of the Municipality was that A was obliged at his own expense to remove the gutters and arrange for the disposal of his rain water in some other way. The members of the Court, however, were doubtful whether this was fair or right. One of them mentioned that it was already settled that if, for instance, A had had a window looking out on to this courtyard, B was not entitled to ask A to block up his window. Judge Haines and I, influenced no doubt by the principles of English law, were rather in favour of B's view than that of A. I mentioned, however, that the most desirable solution seemed to me to be that the Municipality should have power in such cases to order that the gutters should be removed and the rain water disposed of in another manner, but that in such a case the cost should fall on B rather than on A.

- (ii) A testator had left one-third of a house for the benefit of some charity for the poor. The trustee did not, as he might have done, choose to have the house valued at the time of the trustee's death and set aside one-third of the value for the benefit of the charity. He left the charity with a one-third interest in the house. In the course of time the value of the house very greatly increased as compared with what it had been when the testator died. Now the trustee, who was the beneficial owner of the other two-thirds of the house, wished to do what he could have undoubtedly done before, namely, set aside for the charity one-third of the value of the house as at the time of the testator's death. The matter was referred to the Qadhi, and the Qadhi was of the opinion that the trustee was entitled to discharge his trust by setting aside now one-third of the value of the house as at the date of the testator's death. The Court, however, were doubtful whether the Qadhi's decision was right and equitable and, therefore, whether it ought to follow it although they foresaw difficulties if they did not. Judge Haines and I shared the view of the majority of the Court and thought that the trustee must now be bound by the choice he had previously made, even though it was now financially disadvantageous to him. The matter had, in fact, only come to the Court at all because a relative of the trustee, who may have had a grievance against him, brought it there. This case also illustrates the desirability of there being somebody in Bahrain to fulfil the functions in regard to charitable trusts (which are not Wakf, where there is already such an official) which the Attorney-General fills in England, that is to say to protect the interest of the indefinite class of poor beneficiaries of the charitable trust.

I think these three cases illustrate the way the Court for Bahrain works. The two Shaikhs are, I believe, sensible and fair-minded, without, of course, having any legal training at all. It appears that this Court, which I understand tries to follow its own decisions in points of principle, is gradually building up from the bottom the system of case law for Bahrain.

Sharia Courts

14. There being still time I paid brief visits to the two Sharia Courts, the Sunni one and the Shiah one. The faces of the Qadhis would certainly provide wonderful material for a portrait painter. There was a family dispute between husband and wife in one of the Courts where only the bride and bridegroom's fathers appeared and, as usual in Qadhi Courts, there were four or five people speaking rapidly at once. The decision was that the parties must bring the husband and wife before the Court personally and also the necessary witnesses.

Land Registry

15. I paid a brief visit to the land register office and had a talk with the Chief Registrar, who had done this work in India. The work seemed to be done very carefully and efficiently. It is now compulsory to register all new transactions with regard to land and as a result the titles for about one-fifth of the land in the territory are now registered in the Registry. As I understand it, the Registrar publishes any applications for registration in such a manner as effectively to bring to the notice of all concerned the applications for the registration of a title and if the applications

are not challenged (or if any objections made are overruled judicially) the registration of the new title in the Registry is conclusive and irrebuttable evidence of title. A question has arisen, however, as to the effect of ten years' adverse possession as constituting a claim to ownership which may override a registered title.

Court Fees: Agency Court

16. It has been suggested that the table of Court Fees requires reconsideration. This will be a matter for the new Registrar to consider in connexion with the new Rules of Procedure.

Patents and Trade Marks

17. The elaborate draft for the registration of Patents and Trade Marks prepared by the Foreign Office is practically ready. At present the scheme is that it should be an annex to a Queen's Regulation and that the Ruler should enact a law (of which a draft exists) by which the Queen's Regulation is adopted as part of his law and his nationals can apply to the Agency for registration, &c. (i.e., a reversal of the usual practice but leading to the same result of one law for all, but the work and expense of running the little patents office falls on us and not on the Ruler). I recommend that we should proceed as at present proposed and that Mr. Howes should pay a short visit to Bahrain to start the thing going. I think that the Agency with Mr. Mawdsley's assistance should then be able to cope with the work, but I hope that the office and the work will soon be transferred to the Ruler's Government, as it could be if and when the Ruler has a British lawyer in his service.

Agency Court: Subordinate Staff

18. In Bahrain the volume of Court work is so great that provision of subordinate officers is necessary.

The present staff is:—

The Political Agent's Court—

Obaidly—part-time only. He acts also as Clerk of the Senior Joint Court and keeps minutes of its proceedings.

The Judicial Assistant's Court—

Chief Clerk—Abdullah bin Ibrahim Nabal. He also acts as Clerk of the Junior Joint Court and keeps minutes of the proceedings.
Assistant Clerk—Shahim bin Abul Aziz.
Farrash.

The Judicial Assistant's staff is a full-time staff and is fully occupied. If the proposed appointment of a legally qualified Registrar is agreed the extra work imposed on him will most probably necessitate an increase in the clerical staff.

The Subordinate Staff of the Chief Court is at present the Head Munshi, Mohammed Ali, who gives only part-time to this work. If a legally qualified Registrar is appointed he and his staff will undertake the subordinate duties of the Chief Court.

Details of Cases coming for hearing before the Senior Joint Court on 23rd April, 1952 (vide paragraph 10 of this section)

1. *Execution Suit No. 184/51*.—The Decree-holder is requesting the execution of Decree No. 84/51, for Rs. 1,892/8/-, issued in his favour against Syed Haider bin Saiyid Khalaf, the Judgment Debtor.

2. *Civil Suit No. 3/52*.—It is a new suit lodged by the Plaintiff Jooni Lal s/o. Purshottam versus Ismail bin Khalil Almeer claiming that he holds a Sanad, i.e., a promissory note for Rs. 5,250/-, drawn by the defendant in his favour. He admits receiving Rs. 2,910/- towards the Sanad and is asking for the balance, i.e., Rs. 2,340/-.

3. *Civil Suit No. 139/51*.—The Plaintiff Shaikh Mustapha bin Abdul Latif claims Rs. 2,941/-, being balance outstanding in his books against the defendant Mubarak bin Saif. The Court referred the case to the Majlis-et-Tujara for examining the books of the parties. The Majlis reported that the amount claimed was proved in accordance with the Plaintiff's books. The defendant stated before the

Court that the Majlis-et-Tujara depended on the Plaintiff's books and did not consider his statement that he settled this amount by means of weekly payments known in Bahrain as "MUSABA'AH" which is a payment made by the retailer on every Saturday to the wholesaler who supplied the goods until the cost of the goods is paid. He said he was prepared to pay the claim if the Plaintiff would take an oath that he did not receive the money. The Court then referred the case to the Shara' Court for administering the oath. The Shara' Court has reported that Abdul Wahab Al Khan who dealt with the defendant on behalf of the Shaikh Mustapha bin Abdul Latif as he was running the office of the Plaintiff, was summoned and was prepared to take the required oath, but the defendant did not agree and wanted Shaikh Ishaq to take the oath. They have referred the case back to the Court.

4. *Civil Suit No. 50/52.*—This is a new suit filed by Ali bin Akbar against Abdul Wahab Rashid Alkhan, claiming Rs. 11,889/8/-, balance due to him from an original amount of Rs. 93,889/- cost of empty gunny bags.

5. *Civil Suit No. 74/51.*—The parties were summoned for the last sitting of the Court, but the defendant could not be traced and the summons was not served on him. The case is a claim for Rs. 810/-, said to be a balance due from the defendant Abdulla bin Mohamed bin Toque against a Sanad "Promissory note" for Rs. 850/- which he drew in favour of the plaintiff Mohamed bin Ahmad.

6. *Civil Suit No. 2 of 1952.*—The parties were summoned for the last sitting of the Court, but the defendant could not be traced. This is a claim for Rs. 2,755/15/-. The plaintiff Ali Akbar bin Husain states that the defendant gave him a cheque for Rs. 3,000/- but was dishonoured by the bank. He returned the cheque to the defendant Abdulrahman Alshamlan who gave him Rs. 245/-. He is now asking for the balance due from the defendant.

7. *Execution Suit No. 17/52.*—The Decree-holder Ismail bin Ahmad requests the execution of Decree No. 202 of 1951 for Rs. 1,076/-, issued in his favour against the Judgment Debtor Ali bin Ahmed bin Naseeb. The parties were summoned for the last sitting but they failed to appear. The case was adjourned till the next sitting.

8. *Civil Suit No. 51/51.*—The Plaintiff, Mohamed Rafiq, states that he paid the defendant a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and gave him a Sanad "promissory note" for Rs. 1,800/- in order that the defendant would pay the first amount and the value of the Sanad to the plaintiff's creditor, Ali Baksh. This was not done, and the plaintiff asked for the refund of Rs. 2,000/- and the return of the Sanad. The case was referred to the Shara' Court and was subject to several hearings by that Court. The Qadhies have found the defendant liable for the amount. It is now for the Court to ratify the award of the Qadhies.

9. *Civil Suit No. 233/1951.*—The plaintiff alleges that he gave the defendant, Salman bin Mohamed Buhmood, four Pilot radios to take them to Saudi Arabia, but he failed to deliver them to the person to whom the delivery was to be made. Abdulrahman Almisnad, the plaintiff, is now claiming for the recovery of the cost of the radios. He has three witnesses to bring.

10. *Civil Suit No. 161/1951.*—This case was filed in the Bahrain Courts by Husain bin Ali Albasrawi on behalf of his wife, Nasra bint Abdulla, against Haider bin Abdulla bin Asheera, claiming a share in the house of the defendant. The Bahrain Courts transferred the case to the Agency Courts when it appeared to them that the plaintiff was a foreigner. The Judicial Assistant referred the case to the Shiah Qadhies for arbitration and award and the parties agreed to abide by the award of the Shiah Qadhies. After the Qadhies' report was received, the defendant stated that he was a Bahrain subject, and the Court therefore transferred the case to the Joint Court (Junior). The Award of the Qadhies said that, although the defendant holds a title deed for the house in dispute, the plaintiff has two shares out of the twenty-four shares. It appeared to them that the house was originally possessed by the defendant's father, and after his death his son purchased the house from Shaikh Isa bin Ali Alkhalifa and registered it in his name while the plaintiff was a minor. The original owner of the house was Abdulla bin Asheera and the defendant purchased a thing which already belonged to him and his partners in the inheritance, from the estate of Abdulla bin Asheera. The Joint Court referred the case again to the Shiah Qadhies for reconsideration in view of the title deed, but the Qadhies adhered to their previous decision. The Junior Joint Court preferred the case to be decided by the Senior Joint Court.

ANNEX II, SECTION II

KUWAIT

There are only four points arising out of my visit to Kuwait of which any report is necessary.

The Ruler

I. My interview with the Ruler before breakfast on the day of my departure unexpectedly lasted between 1¼ and 1½ hours. On this, with the permission of the Political Resident, I attach Mr. Pelly's note on the interview, which will be found at the end of this section. It was an extraordinary experience. It was a long duologue and I felt I had not the faintest idea what impression anything I said really conveyed to his mind. Towards the end he quoted the Koran and I quoted Shakespeare, a writer of whom the Ruler has read a little in an Arabic translation. There seemed to be something of the "don" about him including a habit of expressing what he had to say in the most complicated way possible and scowling as if he was angry, though it became quite clear that he was feeling quite peaceful and possibly quietly amused.

Kuwaiti Courts: Police; Prison

II. We spent one and a half hours with Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak beginning with ten or fifteen minutes conversation in what might almost be called a Majlis judging by the number of distinguished figures in Arab robes lining the walls of the small room. Nothing very important transpired in this conversation in which I endeavoured to say a word about the necessity of legal developments accompanying material developments. We then saw Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak (in this case I think acting on behalf of Shaikh Abdullah bin Jabir) dealing very summarily with a number of very simple civil cases, viz., a family dispute about the custody of a boy, a dispute about a wife's right to separate accommodation from her mother-in-law, the case of a half-witted man who sold or was compelled to sell some property and refused to take the purchase price wishing to repudiate the transaction: the purchase money was ordered to be placed in Court to remain at his disposal when he asked for it.

We then passed to the Sharia Court in the neighbouring room where two Qadhies were dealing with a family dispute with regard to the division of a house. Both husband and wives were there and the wives did all the talking. Apparently the Qadhies had visited the house and had already made the division, but one or both wives were refusing to accept it. Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak did not hesitate to intervene in the proceedings although he was not sitting on the case. We were then taken round the headquarters of the Security Police. There are two police forces in Kuwait; the white-coats, the Town Police which are under Shaikh Subah bin Salim, and the Security Police who deal with the frontiers, ports and with immigration and passports, and I think the patrolling of the country-side under Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak. In the Security Police the Commandant is a former officer of the Palestine Police and speaks a certain amount of English. Mr. Edge, who was a British sergeant, holds an officer's rank, and obviously has a position of some influence but I think less influence than that of Inspector Hyde in the Bahrain Police. There is also a Mr. Robertson who holds officer's rank, whom I didn't see. I gather that there is another British officer in the Security Police round the oilfields at Ahmadi. Mr. Jordan, General Manager of the Oil Company, said these police were not bad, though not active enough, but the British officer was a great help. I saw the storerooms, dormitories, washing places, canteen, mess-room and amusement room at the headquarters of the Security Police. Unless it was specially tidied up for the occasion, things are kept as neat and orderly as in a Guards' barrack. In the dormitories six policemen were standing at attention by their respective beds. In the amusement room two policemen were playing ping-pong and three more engaged in a game of cards. In quite a small room the new police band played for our benefit all through a short piece. The time was clearly very good and the instruments gleaming with polish, but the big drum and brass in a small room produced a noise which was positively deafening.

A British Legal Adviser for the Ruler

III. I think there is great need for the Government of Kuwait to have in its service a British lawyer. There is no *one* British Adviser in Kuwait and the British lawyer would, I imagine, have to be attached to the department at present

administered by Abdullah Mubarak, who seems to be a combination of Home Secretary and Chief Criminal Judge, though he might also assist Abdullah bin Jabir who seems to be Administrator of Justice and Chief Civil Judge. In Kuwait, I think, even more than in all the other territories, there is and will be increasing need for a number of legal enactments by the Ruler which will require corresponding Queen's Regulations. These, no doubt, will be the chief work of the British lawyer (as regards the future procedure for a preparation of local legislation and of Queen's Regulations, see paragraph 6 of Section III below). He should also keep close watch on the administration of justice by the Ruler's Courts, and be prepared to act generally as Legal Adviser to the Kuwait Government in all matters other than Sharia law. He must be a man who will be able and willing to learn Arabic well and I think have to show a good deal of diplomatic qualities and political judgment as well as legal ability.

Motor-car accidents

IV. I want to deal at length with the question of motor-cars and the law applicable to them at Kuwait, both because of its own immediate intrinsic importance and because it affords an illustration of the way things are dealt with and gradually happen in that territory. In Kuwait, unlike Bahrain (*vide* section 21, paragraph 12), the Ruler really has no law but the Sharia law, apart from a few special enactments which he put into force. We are told, and Mr. Pelly's letter of 26th April (170/17/52) confirms it, that the application of the principles of Sharia law to the owner (and I suppose the driver) of a motor car results in what we would call in English law the "absolute liability" of the owner or driver of the car. If a pedestrian is injured, then irrespective of fault, the owner of the motor car must pay compensation. I have not been told, nor do I believe, that the Sharia law goes so far as to make the motor-car owner liable to pay compensation, where the pedestrian has quite deliberately thrown himself under the wheels for the express purpose of getting his legs broken, spending a few weeks comfortably in the magnificent State Hospital and then living for years on the monetary compensation which he receives. I am not sure how the principle of the Sharia law is supposed to work if a motor car collides with a building, another motor car or, for instance, a camel. Further, I am not aware of the law of Kuwait with regard to criminal as opposed to civil liability for reckless driving, causing damage to personal property or life. At any rate the procedure in force in Kuwait in cases of damage to pedestrians by motor cars is that such cases come before a certain committee, which presumes liability and simply assesses the damage. The owner of the motor car or driver of the motor car (if under Kuwait jurisdiction) will then be legally liable to pay the compensation assessed, irrespective of any question of fault. In practice the highest proportion of motor cars are owned by the Oil Company which is rich and prefers the expenditure of a certain amount of money to opposition and trouble with the local Government, and the company always pays up. (I am not aware what is the position under Sharia law of the respective liabilities of the owner of the motor car and the driver who may be his employee.) Now if a person subject to our jurisdiction in Kuwait wishes to dispute his liability or the amount of compensation, the legal position is that the finding of this committee is by no means binding on him. The case will be tried in the Agency Court which at present would be applying quite a different law from the Sharia principle applicable to persons under the Ruler's jurisdiction—namely, a law by which the owner of the motor car is only liable civilly, if the accident were brought about by his fault, and his criminal liability would depend at present on the principle of the Indian Code. It might well happen therefore that before the Agency Court the defendant will be found not liable or that if he were liable, he would be ordered to pay a compensation less than that assessed by the committee and I have little doubt that this result being so different from that, which happens in similar cases under the Sharia principles, might raise something of an outcry. I think that the question of the basic law relating to motor vehicles is in Kuwait important, and a question which really should be taken up. It is not merely that Kuwait needs technical laws about the licensing of vehicles, though it certainly will need them if it has not got them. It is not merely that Kuwait needs road traffic regulations, stating on which side of the road one should drive and what the effect is of making a crossing contrary to the signal given by the policeman on point duty. Kuwait needs a law in which the whole principles of liability for damages by the driving of motor cars—criminal and civil—are stated. I think that in setting forth these principles the new law cannot follow the principles

of Sharia law and that even civil liability must depend on fault, though personally I would see nothing very undesirable in a law which placed the onus of proof of absence of fault on the owner of the motor car. In pressing the Ruler to enact a law on these lines we would not be pressing him to do something contrary to his religion because the principle of fault is applied in Bahrain which is a strictly Moslem territory and I think no doubt it is applied in other Moslem countries. One may consider in this connection the question of Compulsory Insurance of Third Party Risks. While the rich oil company has no need to insure and perhaps can be depended upon to pay up without litigation in all cases where it is probably liable, this would not be true of many other members of the population who drive motor cars, including members of the Ruler's family. Perhaps "Third Party" insurance may be the only way of getting the liability of members of the Ruler's family litigated fairly because the member of the family who is insured would then really be personally indifferent to which way the case went in the Court.

Agency Court

V. In general the inspection of the Agency Court papers at Kuwait revealed a satisfactory position. Certain mistakes had been made but Judge Haines called attention to them and explained what should have been done.

Joint Courts

VI. By an oversight I omitted to ask Mr. Pelly for his views about Joint Courts in Kuwait. At present in Kuwait there are no Joint Courts. In a mixed case the court of the defendant or the accused has jurisdiction and where a mixed case is tried in the Ruler's Courts the Agency has the right to be represented at the trial. There is no corresponding legal right for the Ruler to be represented where a mixed case is tried in the Agency Court. It is possible that some demand in connexion with mixed cases may come from the Ruler's side.

Mr. Pelly to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

Sir Eric Beckett had an interview with the Ruler for an hour or so during which there was a good deal of discussion. He said that he would like to have my comments on the points that occurred and I am, therefore, letting you have them herewith so that you can, if you see no objection, forward them to Sir Eric.

2. The Ruler's criticism of lawyers was, as I remarked at the time, due to his experience of them in his dealings with oil companies and in the date gardens case. He becomes very impatient when representatives of the companies reply, to what he deems to be a simple proposition, that they must consult their lawyers, although he is quite ready to take the advice of lawyers himself. Kemp, as you know, employs a firm, called "Wishaw" I think, to advise him regarding the Ruler's affairs. I doubt whether he was convinced by Sir Eric's reply in the matter of the date gardens that if a competent lawyer's advice had been taken in the first place then the twenty-five years' litigation which followed would have been avoided. His impatience with the law's delays and favourable comparison of Kuwait with other countries was based on what he has heard of them from people anxious to please him by telling him that the Arab way of doing things, and more particularly, the Kuwaiti way, is better than anyone else's and also on the respect, which I think he shares with all Orientals, for a quick decision, whether it conforms with abstract ideas of justice or not.

3. The Ruler, I fear, did not really understand the implication of Sir Eric's statement that the law must develop in a society developing on modern lines. Nor did he fully comprehend its corollary, in Kuwait, namely that in most matters not dealt with by the Islamic law and in all "technical" matters (*e.g.*, traffic regulations, insurance) there must be the same law for Kuwaitis and for persons subject to our jurisdiction under the Order in Council.

4. I am not sure why the Ruler repeated before Sir Eric his injunction to Jakins and myself that we should conduct our business with him according to reason, and not by emotion. This, he said, he told Jakins in your presence, shortly after he acceded. As far as I know, he has never suffered from emotionalism displayed by any of Her Majesty's Representatives.

5. The Ruler's emphasis to Sir Eric on the simplicity of his life and tastes, on his distaste for ruling, and his insistence that he only carried the cares of State

out of duty to his people, was in accordance with his usual line. What, however, was new was his mention of the possibility of his abdicating. I do not mean to give a wrong impression in reporting this. All he said was that it was remarkable that a man as wealthy as he should continue to work so hard at ruling and he gave a fairly just summary of King Edward VIII's problem. I, however, had never heard him mention the possibility of his abdicating, even obliquely, before.

6. I imagine that Sir Eric got the impression that the Ruler is rigid and dogmatic in his views and I am sure that it is the correct one. His protestations of his willingness to co-operate in the matter of law making, as in everything else, were genuine enough; it is, as you know, when he comes to implement them by enforcing a general principle against sectional interests that he is sometimes lacking.

ANNEX II, SECTION III

QATAR

Judge Haines and I spent two nights at the Agency at Qatar and the intervening day was a Friday (Moslem holiday). During my visit there I exchanged calls with the Ruler and was entertained by him at dinner. Qatar was the "high water mark" in Guards of Honour provided by the local police. I had long discussions with Mr. Weir, Acting Political Officer, Mr. Plant, the Adviser, and Mr. Cochrane the Commandant of the Police. Judge Haines and I examined the records of the cases tried at the Agency court. There was also just time on the morning of our departure for us to spend about half an hour in the (new) Qatar court, where Mr. Plant, the Adviser, sits on the bench with Shaikh Ahmed the Ruler's eldest son, and another Shaikh. During this half hour, two brief summary cases were heard.

2. In Qatar it seems to me that there is the disadvantage that the Ruler and his family are the least promising and the least attractive of those in all the States in the Persian Gulf and the advantage that when wealth suddenly came to this most backward little State, we were able to get in at once with a British Adviser and British Commandant of Police and lay foundations on nearly virgin ground.

The Qatar Government Court

3. The Qatar Court was created two years ago. Previously there was nothing but the Qadhi and the most primitive trials by the Shaikh. The new court, which shares with the municipality of Dohah a small building recently built, does not have much business yet—it can get through its work by sitting on Saturday only. I was told that the opposition to it which existed at first is diminishing and there are signs that the population have more confidence in it. It has had its first murder trial (a Police Private shot a Police Sergeant) ending with a conviction and death sentence which was carried out by shooting by the Commandant of Police. It has imposed one year's imprisonment in another case. It appeared to Judge Haines and myself that the records of the small cases we heard were being properly kept. Shaikh Ahmed appeared to have the capacity for trying small cases which Shaikhs in Moslem countries traditionally possess. Shaikh Ahmed has been given this work by his father. He has an attractive appearance and good manners and is said to be the best of the family. It is doubted whether he has any serious altruism. In a half hour's conversation during a visit he paid to me I did my best to inspire him with a sense of the great opportunities he has as the first "Chief Justice of Qatar" and with the ambition to be the "Lord Mansfield" of Qatar, without of course using any of these words. I also urged him to visit England and see Courts there. He made all the right noises in reply.

The Prison

4. We looked at the Qatar Prison in an old fort and at the Police Headquarters. The prison was clean and conducted on humane lines—the 7 or 8 prisoners (half of whom had been sentenced by the Agency Court) were (unshackled) in large cells with beds (about four to a cell)—the doors were open and they could walk about freely inside the courtyard (and on the elevated pathway round the battlements) and visit the latrine. Indeed, they could without difficulty escape at one place, but Mr. Cochrane was certain that they would be promptly recaptured if they tried to do so and that they were unlikely to try to do so. The

prison and the treatment given in it is perfectly adequate for a small number of non-European prisoners. If we had a European prisoner it would be necessary to transfer him very quickly. The question of the reduction of sentences for good conduct was raised and also the Police Commandant's powers of punishment in cases of indiscipline in prison. I urged Mr. Cochrane to sketch out some draft rules for the prison (without prejudice to the question of their formal enactment), and I think he will do so, but if they are not produced soon he might be reminded.

Police

5. The Police Headquarters are in a building which is inadequate both for the office and in regard to the "lock-up cells." Passports and immigration (and traffic) are dealt with by Police Headquarters. While Mr. Cochrane or a similar officer is in charge and exercises such detailed supervision over everything that occurs, I think we can be satisfied that in general the methods employed by the police in arrests and detention pending charge will be satisfactory. Mr. Cochrane has had experience in the Police at Bahrain and is well acquainted with police work in Scotland. Again, however, it would be satisfactory if the principles on which he proceeds were written down for general guidance instead of being merely in the head of the Officer in Charge.

Legislation by Ruler and Queen's Regulations

6. There will soon be a great need in Qatar (as in Kuwait and Bahrain) for legislation by the Ruler which is to be applied to our jurisdiction by Queen's Regulation, and the position in this respect is unsatisfactory. In the first place, an Adviser has not the time, or as a rule the experience or taste, for drafting laws, though he may be a good judge of the issues of policy involved. Secondly, the machinery for preparation of English and Arabic texts, enactment by the Ruler and making of a Queen's Regulation by the Political Resident and its allowance by the Secretary of State, is at present too cumbrous and slow. Difficulty and irritation is caused when the Ruler has enacted a law in Arabic and then the Residency or Foreign Office want the text amended before a Queen's Regulation is made. Further, in this case a long interval elapses between the Ruler's enactment, which is law in his Courts, and the Queen's Regulation which makes the law applicable to the persons under our jurisdiction. In general the Ruler's laws should first be drafted in English and the text agreed with by the Agency and approved by Residency and Foreign Office (where the procedure must also be hastened) before the Arabic text is done. The Ruler will then enact an allowance of the Queen's Regulation by the Secretary of State and its making by the Political Resident should then only be a matter of a very few weeks. I think that it is desirable that there should be a British lawyer on the staff of the Adviser at Qatar. In addition to advising and drafting legislation, he might act as general legal adviser at Qatar, where he will be useful to the Agency as well as the Adviser and, if he is a man of the right type, he can become a right-hand man of the Adviser in a part of the latter's work. I think a salary in the region of £2,000 will be required. (My remarks in this paragraph apply *mutatis mutandis* also to Bahrain and Kuwait.)

Dangerous Drugs

7. I discussed with Mr. Cochrane the particular case of Dangerous Drugs—the selling and consumption of which in Qatar is criminal by the customary Moslem law. There has been no law by the Ruler or any Queen's Regulation. Mr. Cochrane has at this moment evidence against two persons subject to our jurisdiction and I had to advise that I thought that, in the absence of a Queen's Regulation under Article 85 of the Order, no conviction could be secured in the Agency Court under Article 89, which I regard not as an alternative to Article 85 but as meaning merely that local custom can be applied incidentally in a case which is based on other grounds (*viz.*, provocation is an excuse or a mitigation—local custom may show that something is provocative, &c.). Mr. Cochrane may, however, bring a prosecution none the less, expecting an acquittal on technical grounds in first instance or on appeal and perhaps some expression of regret by the Court that it has to acquit in the absence of legislation. I recommend, however, that the Political Resident should make an urgent Queen's Regulation for Qatar on the lines of the Bahrain Queen's Regulation of 1931 relating to Dangerous

Drugs as a purely interim measure, and that this should be replaced as soon as possible by an up-to-date law by the Ruler on Dangerous Drugs covered by an ordinary Queen's Regulation.

Motor Traffic

8. I think that at Qatar as in Kuwait it is probably desirable that the Ruler should enact a law regarding motor traffic which deals not merely with the rules of the road, the licensing of vehicles and drivers but also with the principle of liability for motor accidents and the cases on which dangerous driving may be also a criminal offence. They have indeed made a local law which covers only part of the ground I indicate above. The text of this law was criticised by the Foreign Office, who wanted amendments. This is an example of the difficulties and delays referred to in paragraph 6 (*cf.* on this point paragraph IV on Kuwait).

Joint Court

9. In Qatar I think the Joint Court should be used for all Mixed cases, criminal and civil, but a police prosecution should not be regarded as a Mixed Case although it may deal with an offence committed by a person under our jurisdiction against a local national or *vice versa*. In Qatar (unlike, I think, Bahrain or Kuwait) the Political Agent can even at the present stage assist in keeping straight a Qatari Judge and in guiding him how to administer justice. In Qatar in a mixed case a Political Agent with good Arabic could (in a way he could not at Bahrain or Kuwait) be the leading member of the Joint Court.

Agency Court

10. Judge Haines inspected the Agency records of cases tried by the Agency Court. There were no Joint Court cases. By reason of the happy coincidence that (1) the present Political Officer, Mr. Ewart-Biggs, has had judicial experience, (2) the Commander of Police has a considerable knowledge of legal procedure, (3) the number of cases has been few so that the Political Officer could deal with cases carefully and slowly, the records, which are well kept, show that the Agency Court at Qatar has perhaps achieved a standard which is as high as if not higher than that of any other Agency Court in the Gulf.

ANNEX II, SECTION IV

TRUCIAL STATES

Judge Haines and I spent two nights at Sharjah. We visited the Rulers of Sharjah, Dubai and Ajman, being entertained at meals by the two first. The Ruler of Sharjah and one of his brothers both referred to Sir Roger Makins' visit and sent friendly messages to him and to Mr. Rose. No other Ruler in the Gulf referred to this visit when talking to me.

Agency Court

2. We had ample opportunity for discussion with Mr. Wilton, the Political Officer, and Judge Haines examined the files of Court cases of both the Agency Court and the Joint Court. The records were well kept and the cases seemed to have been dealt with fairly and sensibly. The only errors noticed were technical ones, not affecting the merits. Judge Haines explained these points but while a Court such as the Agency Court for the Trucial States has to attempt to apply the complicated Indian Codes technical errors are inevitable.

Jurisdiction over nationals of other Trucial States

3. Under Article 8 of the Trucial States Order-in-Council 1950, each Trucial Coast Ruler has been left jurisdiction over his own subjects and over the subjects of other Trucial Coast Rulers. A question for consideration arises whether the position should be maintained as it is or whether each Trucial Ruler's jurisdiction should be confined to his own subjects only. Mr. Wilton is of the opinion that it is expedient to make this change on the grounds that Trucial States Rulers cannot be expected to treat fairly the subject of another Ruler in dispute with one of his own subjects, that if the Rulers deal with each other's subjects the friction between

them is likely to be increased, and that Rulers would generally prefer that the Agency Court should deal with these cases because (speaking generally) the Rulers prefer to avoid as much responsibility as they can. Admittedly the change would increase the number of cases with which our Agency will have to deal and where the cases take place in the more remote places (*e.g.*, Ras al Khaimah) this may cause difficulties and indeed the Agency may never hear of them. The change would also increase the need for each Trucial States Ruler to enact some sort of nationality law defining who his subjects are. It is, however, the case that applications for passports are showing the need for such nationality laws in any case.

A case which was reported to me on the airfield as we were leaving Sharjah by Shaikh Khalid—a younger brother of the Ruler—seems to support Mr. Wilton's view that the change is expedient. Shaikh Khalid, driving a Buick car, had a collision on the airfield at Sharjah with a lorry belonging to a rich merchant who is a subject of the Ruler of Dubai. Relations between Sharjah and Dubai are bad. Shaikh Khalid would certainly not like bringing a case before the Ruler of Dubai, which seems to be the only remedy open to him at present, if he cannot reach a settlement, and it would seem as if at present all that Mr. Wilton can do is to try to bring about a settlement out of court. Yet Shaikh Khalid clearly thought the case was within the Agency's jurisdiction and expected Mr. Wilton to deal with it.

Joint Court

4. The Joint Court procedure should, in my opinion, be used in the Trucial States for all mixed cases, except criminal cases where the accused is subject to our jurisdiction, which should be tried in the Agency Court. There would probably be political objections on our side to a Joint Court in these cases, and in any case in a Joint Court case it is questionable if any adequate system of appeals can be arranged and clemency presents difficulties. I think that an endeavour should be made to persuade the Rulers as and when cases arise that there should be an appeal in Joint Court cases where the matter is not trivial and that on our side the Judge in the appeal would not be the same as the Judge in first instance and, therefore, he should not sit personally on both. In these States the Political Agent is likely to be expected to act as the Senior Judge in a Joint Court case and the Ruler is likely generally to concur in the Political Officer's view as regards the decision to be given. In the Joint Courts on the Trucial Coast the administration of justice must for some time be "under the palm-tree" as it is in the Rulers' Courts, but the Joint Courts are definitely in these States a means of showing the Ruler something of our general principles of justice as well as being probably the fairest tribunal for mixed cases. There was one recent rather curious Joint Court case where the Political Officer, the Ruler of Sharjah and the son of the Ruler of Ajman, all three sat on the bench, and where it transpired during the proceedings that the real defendant was not the Ruler of Ajman but his son, who was sitting as a member of the Joint Court. Nevertheless the Court, presumably holding that the Ruler was responsible for his son's acts, made an order that the Ruler should pay the sum of 5,000 Rs. to the plaintiff, and this sum has now been paid.

Immunity of Rulers

5. I think that each of the Rulers must be regarded as exempt in criminal cases from the jurisdiction of the Courts of the other Rulers and of the Mixed Courts, but it would be expedient if civil cases to which a Ruler was party could be heard in the Mixed Court if the other party was not a subject of that Ruler.

Cultured Pearls

6. There has been some traffic in cultured pearls in the Trucial States and the Rulers of Sharjah and Dubai have enacted some legislation prohibiting it. Some of the other Shaikhs are unlikely to agree readily to similar legislation. It is obviously necessary for us to support the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Dubai by making a Queen's Regulation on similar lines to Bahrain King's Regulation No. 1 of 1930. The Queen's Regulation could be so drafted that it applied to the territories of those Shaikhs who prohibit traffic in cultured pearls on publication by the Political Officer of a notice that they have done so. The Queen's Regulation might include as one penalty the confiscation of the cultured pearls which, when confiscated, would, I imagine, be handed to the Ruler or destroyed.

ANNEX III TO No. 14

It is no part of my task to gauge or predict the future political development of these Persian Gulf States under our jurisdiction. In geographical size none is larger than the County of Devon and a quarter of a million people is the maximum population, which any of them are likely to support within the next generation or two. The great material progress which is being made or likely to be made in three of them, coupled as it is, or will be, with the great progress in education, will inevitably make stronger the movements of these States towards nationalism and democracy. These movements will, I imagine, be strong whatever the future political status of these States may be and whether they are inside or outside the British Commonwealth. The movement towards nationalism will lead to a demand for the abolition of the dual judicial system and the movement towards democracy will lead to the end of the paternal and palm-tree system of justice all based on vague principles in the Koran and administered solely by the Ruling Family (sometimes as in Bahrain and Qatar assisted by the Adviser) which generally prevails in the native courts of these territories, though this is not entirely true of Bahrain.

ANNEX IV TO No. 14

MIXED CASES

BAHRAIN

Cases and Recent Letters of the Ruler

The present position is based on the combined effect of (1) treaty provisions and (2) of practice concurred in by the Ruler on the one hand and the Political Resident on the other. We begin with one sentence in Article 4 of the Treaty of 1861 which reads as follows:—

“All offences which (British subjects of every denomination) may commit, or which may be committed against them, shall be reserved for the decision of the British Resident, provided that the British Agent located at Bahrain shall fail to adjust them satisfactorily.”

Stopping here we may observe (1) that this covers all criminal offences committed by British subjects, whoever the offence was committed against. (2) all criminal offences against British subjects whoever committed the offence. (3) That there is no mention of foreigners at all, though of course offences committed by foreigners against British subjects are covered under (2). (4) That there is no mention of civil cases at all. [(5) There is by implication a first hearing by the Political Agent with an appeal to the Political Resident.]

2. Here is the foundation of all our judicial arrangements in Bahrain. No doubt, by practice and consent, civil jurisdiction was regarded as covered too, possibly on the basis that the greater (criminal) must be regarded as covering the less (civil). All these cases (even if they are mixed cases) go to our Court but there is so far no provision for jurisdiction over foreigners as such.

3. The next step appears to be the letter from the Ruler of 1909 which the relevant sentence reads as follows:—

“I have had considerable trouble in many cases in my territory in which foreigners were involved. For this reason I wish that I may not be held responsible in those cases and I would be grateful to the British Government if they remove the trouble and responsibility from me. I mean that it (the British Government) should pass orders in all cases where foreigners only are concerned, but not in other cases, and in cases that occur between foreigners and of my subjects, it is necessary that you and I should settle them jointly.”

Here there are two important innovations, namely (a) there is a grant of jurisdiction over foreigners and (b) mixed cases between foreigners and subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain are to be decided jointly.

4. It may be that Shaikh Isa when in 1909 he referred to “foreigners” really meant the “subject of the great Powers” and did not mean to include for instance the subjects of other States in the Persian Gulf that therefore we, applying the

order of 1913 interpreted “foreigners” covering everybody except nationals of the Ruler of Bahrain went further than Shaikh Isa intended. The present Ruler in his letter of 8th March, 1952, referring to the Order of 1949, which enacts in terms the interpretation put on the Order of 1913, argues that we did go too far. I suggest, however, that this point does not matter very much now, because both in the new draft Order in Council to be enacted in this year and in the letters recently exchanged with the present Ruler, we are in fact agreeing that foreigners for judicial purposes will not include nationals of Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Kuwait, Qatar, Muscat or any of the Trucial States.

5. To return to the second innovation of the letter of 1909, namely, Joint Courts for mixed cases, the letter only stipulated Joint Courts when the mixed cases were between a foreigner and one of the Ruler's subjects and did not in terms ask for Joint Courts in mixed cases between British subjects and a local national. However, by a practice which must be regarded as having been assented to by both sides the following result has been arrived at, namely, (i) as a concession on our side to the Ruler, mixed cases in which British subjects are involved also in principle go to the Joint Court; (ii) as perhaps a concession by the Ruler, in civil cases it is only where the defendant is a local national that recourse is had to the Joint Court and where the defendant is a foreigner or a British subject the Political Agent's Court deals with the case; (iii) in the case of criminal cases instituted by the Bahrain Police (in which we may regard the Government of Bahrain as being the complainant, but where the offence may well be committed by a local national in relation to a person subject to the Order or *vice versa*) there has been no recourse to the Joint Courts at all and the Court of the Political Agent has assumed jurisdiction when the accused was a British subject or a foreigner and the Ruler's Court's jurisdiction where the accused was a local national. Here we have made a concession to the Ruler since by the terms of the Treaty of 1861 the Political Agent is entitled to jurisdiction when a local national commits an offence against a British subject and by the letter of 1909 we are entitled to demand a Joint Court, when the Bahrain Police are prosecuting a local national for an offence against a foreigner. On the other hand by a reciprocal concession the Ruler has not asked for Joint Courts in the case of a police prosecution where the accused is a foreigner (or a British subject) and has committed an offence against a local national; (iv) there remain the small and unimportant class of private prosecutions and there the Joint Court has been exercising jurisdiction in all mixed cases.

6. The picture, therefore, is one where, by an agreed practice, there have been concessions from both sides from the position as laid down by the Treaty and letter of 1909. Moreover, I think it can be demonstrated that once we have (as we are about to do) accepted the Ruler's limited definition of foreigners (*vide* paragraph 4 above) the present practice already involves a greater measure of concession from our side to him than the other way.

7. Two questions now arise, namely, (1) whether any change should be made in the present practice in regard to mixed cases and (2) whether the present text of Articles 68 to 76 of the 5th revision of the draft Order in Council can stand as printed or whether any change should be made. To take (1) first, it was recommended by the Foreign Office that the Joint Court procedure should be applied to all mixed cases, criminal and civil including the police prosecutions. The Political Resident is not in favour of endeavouring at present to make so great a change and Mr. Belgrave is doubtful whether at present the Ruler could easily be persuaded to make so great a change. Having discussed the matter with the Political Resident and Judge Haines and seen the Joint Courts in operation in Bahrain, I now recommend that the present practice should be maintained with no change at present, because I do not think that in Bahrain the Political Agent or whoever acts for him in the Junior Joint Court will be able, while the law to be applied by the Joint Court is so indefinite and the procedure so primitive, to play the rôle which the Foreign Office had in mind when they made the above-mentioned recommendation, though I think the position would be different if and when the Ruler adopts a code of law and procedure.

8. I now return to the text of the present draft Order in Council and I think that the following addition should be made to Article 68 (1) of the draft Bahrain Order (5th revision) “. . . parties, herein described as Mixed Cases, there shall be constituted a Joint Court. However, with the concurrence of the Political Resident and notwithstanding any other provision of this part of the Order, any mixed case or class of mixed cases may be tried by the Courts within the general jurisdiction of which the accused or defendant is.”

9. I already have referred to the Ruler's letter of 8th March last where the Ruler makes his complaint against our past excessively wide interpretation of the meaning of the word "foreigner," in the letter of 1909, and I mentioned that this now seems to be of no great importance since we propose to meet the Ruler on this point. There is, however, another letter of 22nd April in which he makes a rather extraordinary demand. In this letter the Ruler refers to "cases between foreigners" and by these words I presume he means cases, say between a Frenchman and an American, and that he does not mean to cover a case between say a British subject and an American. Further, by cases I think he means both criminal and civil cases. Anyway, he says that he is willing that cases between foreigners should be heard in other courts than his own (*i.e.*, by British court for Bahrain), but that it should be subject to his own assent in each case, and he ends up by saying that foreigners who live "in our country should be subject to our laws and regulations the same way as foreigners living in other countries." In reply to this letter it is important to notice that there are really two questions involved, namely, (1) the laws and the regulations which apply and (2) the Courts which enforce those laws. As regards the laws applicable we can truly reply that foreigners in Bahrain are subject to his laws just as much as British subjects and that in practice we never refuse to make applicable both to British subjects and foreigners the laws which the Ruler enacts and which he wishes to be applied to them. As regards the Courts to apply them, we can clearly make the point that his request that he should be asked in each case between foreigners whether he agreed that the Court for Bahrain should exercise jurisdiction has no basis either on the past practice or on the Treaty, and that, while we have shown our willingness to increase the jurisdiction of his Courts as compared with our own by our acceptance of a new definition of foreigners, we do not think the present request has any better basis in principle than it has in existing treaties or practice and past practice and it must therefore be refused.

EA 1084/292

No. 15

SAUDI AGGRESSION AT BURAIMI

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Eden. (Received 4th November)

(No. 105. Confidential) Bahrain,
Sir, 31st October, 1952.

I have been giving a good deal of thought to the genesis of the Saudi aggression at Buraimi and the course which events have taken and I now have the honour to submit some of the views I have formed.

2. I attribute the aggression in the first place to the Abadan *débâcle*. I was surprised at the time at the little apparent effect which that catastrophe had on our prestige, but I have little doubt that in reality it undermined our whole position in the Gulf and that but for it Ibn Saud would never have dared to embark on his present venture. I have been much impressed by the opening paragraphs of Mr. Pelly's Administration Report for Kuwait for 1951, in which he analyses the effects of the withdrawal from Abadan in the Sheikdom. The whole report is being forwarded to you separately but for facility of reference I enclose an extract⁽¹⁾ of the paragraphs concerned.

3. The readiness of the Buraimi tribes to accept Saudi rule is readily accounted for. Mr. Thesiger several years ago called attention to the prevailing anarchy and there is no doubt that the tribes genuinely desired to come under the rule of somebody who could introduce law and order and improve their economic position. Being Sunni they were unwilling to turn to the Ibadhi Imam and they despised the Sultan, who made no attempt to establish his authority over the territory which he claimed. They made several approaches to us to take them over, but I always advised against this, mainly in order to avoid the lasting resentment of our old friend the Sultan, and you, Sir, and your predecessors endorsed this policy. Had we followed a more opportunist line we should, I think, have avoided the present contingency, but we would have alienated the Sultan and would probably have found ourselves involved in increasing financial and perhaps military commitments and laid

⁽¹⁾ Not printed as enclosure. (See No. 16.)

ourselves open to accusations of imperialism.

4. The next point for consideration is whether any more effective action could have been taken earlier after Turki's arrival in Buraimi to stop the rot. Unfortunately, we did not realise early enough that Turki's communications lay through undisputed Abu Dhabi territory. Had we been ready and willing to cut these communications at once by military action something might have been achieved. The bulk of the blame, however, in my opinion lies with the Sultan. Had he been willing at once to send a small force with a responsible and able representative such as his brother Saiyid Tariq into the Buraimi area and the Dhahirah, something might have been achieved. As it was he waited to hear from the Imam, being too proud to address him in the first place, and precious time was lost. It was nearly a month before he sent any assistance to Saqr in Buraimi, and by the middle of October when he had collected a large force in the Batinah it had become clear that, if he were to advance, open war between Muscat and Saudi Arabia would almost inevitably result and we felt compelled to stop him.

5. I feel very pessimistic about the future. The standstill agreement will certainly be regarded as a defeat for us and increase Turki's prestige and however much we may protest I have little doubt that he will continue to suborn the tribes. Practically speaking all the Sunni tribes along the western edge of the Jabal Hajar from the Wadi al Qaur in the north to Ibri (exclusive) in the south have gone over to the Saudis and I have little hope that the Sultan with his inferior financial resources will be able

to win them back, though I think we should do our best to encourage him to do so. If it comes to arbitration his weak historical claims will I fear carry little weight against the *fait accompli*. The only encouraging feature is that there have been few defections from tribes owing allegiance to our Trucial Coast Rulers such as the Bani Yas, Dhuhahir and Bani Qitab, and that, provided the Rulers can maintain their hold over them, there should be little risk of their territory being awarded to the Saudis.

6. The attitude of the Imam has been the cause of much speculation. Even if he does come to a separate agreement with the Saudis this should arrest the advance of the latter further south and leave the Sultan free to establish his authority over the southern coast of Arabia opposite Masirah Island. This particular part of the coast is occupied by the Janabah, who are Sunnis, and their fellow tribesmen of the Sharqiyah (Izz), who in the past, so far as I can discover, have acknowledged the authority of neither the Sultan nor the Imam, have already called on Turki. Masirah Island is itself occupied by Janabah tribesmen, who, since the establishment of a Royal Air Force station there, have had perforce to accept the Sultan's rule, and it is now of great importance that we should give him the earliest possible assistance in strengthening his authority over their brethren on the mainland opposite.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Jeddah, Washington, the British Middle East Office (Fayid), Muscat and Sharjah.

I have, &c.

(For W. R. HAY),
MARTIN LE QUESNE.

EA 1011/4

No. 16

KUWAIT ADMINISTRATION REPORT* FOR 1951

Mr. Pelly to Sir R. Hay (Bahrain)

Kuwait.

1. In the Persian Gulf, 1951 is likely to be remembered as the year of Abadan. On the Arab littoral this was particularly true of Kuwait. The town is only half an hour's flight from Abadan and the Kuwait Oil Company is half-owned by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. There was constant inter-communication between the two places. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company took sand for their building operations from Kuwait

and supplied bitumen for the Kuwait roads. Their tugs with the Persian colours on the smoke stacks were a common sight in Kuwait harbour.

2. But even more important than these local manifestations was what Abadan stood for in men's minds. It was, if the expression can be used for something so huge, a symbol which not even the most sceptical Arab could deny of British energy, British wealth, British efficiency and British

⁽¹⁾ See No. 15 for Sir R. Hay's references to this report.

industrial might. Where age is a merit it was remembered that it had its origins in days when the Kuwait greybeards of 1951 were young men. In the Gulf not even the rising stars of the United States could outshine it. Singapore might fall and India be relinquished but these were in every sense far-away places to the concrete Arab mind. The Abadan refinery was almost within smelling range of Kuwait.

3. At first the Persian threat was not taken seriously. No Kuwaiti could believe that, as he would put it, the opium-ridden, decadent politicians of Tehran could take from the British what was rightfully theirs or that the British would allow them to do so. The endless parleys were difficult to understand except as displays of patience,—a quality which is locally supposed to predominate in British policy. Things, it was thought, became clearer with a show of force; the cruiser *Mauritius* off Abadan, the destroyers in the Shatt-al-Arab, the troop-carrying planes using the local aerodrome, and above all the tanks from the landing craft parked on the Kuwait beaches, were assumed to be a prelude to action in, incidentally, the hottest summer in the Persian Gulf for seventy years.

4. The most important effect of the abandonment of Abadan was the emergence of a belief, which was only diluted by our stand in Egypt, that it was merely necessary to bark loudly and lengthily enough to make the British let go anywhere. Even those whose dispositions were friendly would have thought it quixotic madness not to take advantage of this. Accordingly the Ruler of Kuwait made difficulties over control of the aerodrome by Her Majesty's Government, and drove as hard a bargain as possible with the Kuwait Oil Company. By the end of the year his secretary was talking about "nationalising" the Kuwait telephones, when Cable and Wireless, who operated them under their concession, ventured to try to increase rates which, with prices rising all round, had been static for ten years.

5. Kuwait had always acted as if it were in the tutelage of Her Majesty's Government with more reservations than were expressed, and certainly with more than any other Gulf State. Abadan gave this tendency a greater stimulus than any other factor in its history. The tremendous increase in the oil revenues, which was partly a result of Abadan's loss, boosted this further. In addition to giving material independence it seemed, in spite of their occasionally almost admitted ignorance, arrogance, and

pride, to be a genuine indication of the benevolence of an inscrutable Almighty towards his Kuwaitis.

6. The Ruler was affected far less by these great happenings than were his most prominent and over-mighty subjects, the latter mostly amongst his own family. His expressed attitude to rule and to life is now well known, his religious spirit, simplicity in living, dislike of display, devotion to the old Arab virtues (particularly to their individualistic brand of freedom), and to the old Oriental object in life—calmness of spirit. To such a man the main concomitant of great wealth was added responsibility. Whether he really, as he says, dislikes the exercise of this and only rules out of duty to his people, it is impossible to say. At any rate he is never happier than when away from them. He sold the million-dollar yacht, the *Ahmadi*, belonging to his predecessor, to the Iraq Government for £50,000, an amount which it almost cost to build the engined dhow (the *Bayah*, about 60 feet long). In this he escapes from Kuwait on his travels round the Gulf States or to his island of Failaka, often at a time when his advisers of the Political Agent are anxiously waiting his orders on, or reaction to some problem. Not even the hottest weather deters him from these excursions. There is no doubt that he wishes all to be done for the welfare of his people but shrinks from definitive action against sectional interests cherishing no such aim and only out for their own ends. This may arise from weakness or, perhaps a disinclination to disturb the balance of power in Kuwait politics.

7. The Ruler's health remained good during the year, though, towards the end he developed a swelling in the foot which limited his movement and about which he refused to see a doctor.

8. Relations of the Ruler with the agency remained good though they were clouded at the beginning of the year by the necessity of having to urge him to take action against Middle East Airlines for their unauthorised operations into Kuwait. This, because of the close commercial and other ties between his people and the Lebanese he was unwilling to do.

9. The Ruling family ran true to form during the year. Abdullah Mubarak acted for the Ruler during his absences and spent extravagantly both when he went away himself and when in Kuwait. It is calculated, for example, that the luncheons and dinners of which he

gave at least two a week in the winter and spring, cost about £1,000 a time. He spent £3,800 (Syrian) in dental fees. He visited Europe and the United Kingdom for the first time in July and August. The visit seems to have been a success in confirming his pro-British sympathies. Fahad al Salim returned in the beginning of the year from his protracted trip in Europe and the United States where he was given civic receptions and presented with the keys of no less than eight towns. Though darker and more "negroid" than most American negroes, he was also photographed drinking beer at a fashionable beach resort in Virginia. He went for a further three months to Damascus in August. His brother Subah visited Syria and the Lebanon. Abdullah Ahmed went to Syria. These were all holidays but they indicate a tendency, with increasing wealth, for the landlordism of the al Subah to become abstentee. The sons of the Ruler by slave mothers, Sa'ad and Khalid were sent to England to learn the language and two sons of Abdullah Jabir likewise went to England, one to a private tutor and the other to Sandhurst. Abdullah Mulla, the Ruler's secretary also visited England. All the Shaikhs got larger allowances, built more houses and bought more expensive cars. Many have cinema shows in their houses. With all their wealth some began to show signs of boredom through not having enough to do.

10. The distribution of Government portfolios amongst the Al Subah remained unchanged except that at the end of the year Shaikh Fahad al Salim, brother of the Ruler was appointed head of the municipality and of the Health Department. This subsequently caused trouble.

11. 1951 may be one of the last years in Kuwait in which, except in the material and commercial fields, there is no change whatsoever to record. The old medieval framework of society—the Shaikhs, merchants and the poor—prevailed. The nexus between them was intact. The Shaikhs borrowed money from the rich merchants and intermarried with them, living on the remnants of the tradition of what would now be called the protection racket, and behaving often as independently of the central authority of the Ruler as did the barons of pre-Tudor times. Though the poor were "exploited" there existed an element of patronage in the relationship between them and their masters. Generally they liked their Shaikhs or at least, tolerated them, being so inured by tradition to the horrors of civil strife that

they are still thankful for almost any stable government. The question as to whether Her Majesty's Government should support such an order of things is therefore in the womb of time. In the town, rumour, as prevalent and often as scurrilous as in 16th century London, was (and is) a major factor in public affairs. Politically, socially, legally, administratively Kuwait seemed as static as ever.

12. There were, however, signs of cracks in the structure. As the Shaikhs got richer through oil royalties their actual dependence on the merchants for money, if not their voracious appetites for it, grew less. The merchant community, with connexions all over the world, had no longer to fear beating up by negro bullies, disgrace, even ruin, at the instance of the Shaikhs. Amongst the poor the workers in the oil company had within them the seeds of organised labour. No less than seven Egyptian newspapers cram full of politics were in circulation in the town. The demand for the joint stock company in commerce and the spread of the use of the motor car brought with them a need, as yet unfulfilled, for law more complex and suited to the present-day than the provisions of the Shara, even though those were regarded as the expression of the immutable will of Allah. In December there were even elections, albeit by electors chosen by the Ruler, to the various committees which, under the Shaikhs, administer the departments.

13. Materially and even administratively there was more overt movement. Eight badly-needed new customs sheds were built to house merchandise awaiting inspection. A spacious one storey building was completed, ultimately as a home for the aged and indigent, though temporarily used as a T.B. sanatorium until the new one on the Basra road is completed. The contract given to Messrs. Ewbanks for the biggest water condensing plant in the world, is designed to supply Kuwait with 1 million gallons of water per day and provides for future expansion to five times this size. After surveys from the air Messrs. Minoprio and Spenceley produced a detailed town plan for Kuwait, including provision for drains. Two British experts, Lieutenant-Colonel Crichton and Mr. Roper arrived in the summer to take over the Finance and Customs departments respectively. After they had had time to look around both were appalled at the prospect of trying to introduce orderly administration, and the former very soon decided that he would have to import more British assistance; in particular a State

engineer, a government auditor and an assistant to his own department. Both the town electricity and the drinking water supply companies were taken over by the State. Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak's gendarmerie were increased in numbers to about 1,000 and greatly smartened up by imported Palestinian officers. One of these also affected great improvements in the town police (under Shaikh Subah al Salim) particularly on the traffic side.

14. The Health Department continued work with more or less the same staff as last year, expansion as far as hospitals and clinics are concerned being limited in the main by the rate of building which again is to some extent limited by the development of the town plan. One new lady gynaecologist and two assistant matrons were, however, newly employed. Tuberculosis continued to predominate over all other diseases and may indeed, in the opinion of some trained observers, blight the whole future of Kuwait. The quarantine service was handed over by Her Majesty's Government to the State and doctors appointed to operate it in both Kuwait and at Mina al Ahmadi. The Public Health building on the sea front with clinics for tuberculosis, venereal diseases and ear, nose and throat was almost completed. Two engine-driven TIFA (for D.D.T. or germaxane spraying) machines were brought into use. An attempt was made to introduce a system of elementary vital statistics by the registration of births and deaths.

15. The old American Mission Hospital, as indicated last year, has been overshadowed by the State Hospital but continued to do good work to its limit of 50 beds and about 300 outpatients a day.

16. The equivalent of about £1 million sterling was spent on education during the year. Schools increased from 26 to 31, teachers from 294 to 350 (about 200 Palestinians) and pupils from 6,292 to 7,449 (2,119 girls). There is a general enthusiasm in the Education Department and a praiseworthy desire to push on, which, however, is not without its dangers. They were commented upon in last year's report and, of course, increase with the number of students. Parties of these paid visits to Iraq, Bahrain and the Lebanon at the invitation of the authorities concerned. After discussion with Mr. Kemp, the Ruler's representative in the United Kingdom, the British Council agreed to place the Kuwaiti students there under Mr. Kemp's charge in various colleges away from London. One young

man had his British Council scholarship extended to enable him to complete his course for the Associate-ship of the Institute of Education. In local examinations for the London Matriculation and Cambridge Lower Certificate in English two Kuwaiti candidates were successful in each.

17. As *The Times* correspondent wrote, "Kuwait . . . after some centuries of quiet existence as an Arab trading centre has suddenly emerged as the fifth oil-producing country of the world" and "the oil deposits of Kuwait fabulously rich as they are—and for their combination of great volume with easy production and ready access to the sea, they are probably unequalled . . ."

18. In April the Kuwait Oil Company broke three of its own previous records. For the first time it produced over half a million barrels of oil in a day, exported 2 million tons (roughly seven barrels to a ton) of crude oil in a month and drilled a new well in 24.8 days. As Abadan production fell, that of Kuwait grew. In June it was over 600,000 barrels per day, in August 700,000 and in December 800,000. At the end of the year nearly 28 million tons had been exported as against 17 million in the previous year.

19. The following is the company's own report on its activities:—

"This year 1951 saw a very considerable increase in production and export of crude oil from Kuwait; production was doubled during the year. At Mina al Ahmadi, which is possibly the largest oil port in the world, 1,742 tankers were turned around as well as 146 cargo vessels.

"In the year under review the well at Burgan, which was drilling to procure information about sub-surfaces conditions in Kuwait, was completed at a depth of 13,852 feet. (This is the deepest in the Middle East.) A well was drilled at Magwa and production was obtained but it was not connected up for production during the year.

"Considerable building work has been completed, the emphasis being on housing for all grades of staff. Much of this work was concerned with housing our Arab labour and, by the end of the year, 400 houses in the Arab village were completed. (These were fitted with running water, electricity and fans and set a new standard in indigenous housing.) To give labour the best possible conditions, a survey was carried out of all jobs requiring labour, the jobs were classified and new wage rates introduced. In addition, a

start was made on the construction of a mosque for the use of the Muslim population.

"The school for senior staff pupils was completed, and it is expected that the school for Indian and Pakistani student will be completed in January 1952.

"Probably the most interesting side of our activities has been the building up of the training school at Magwa, where Kuwaiti boys are being instructed and trained in fifteen trades. By the end of the year, approximately 180 boys were under training and have shown very considerable aptitude in assimilating the knowledge of the various trades they have selected. The work of instructing non-Arab employees in Arabic has also gone ahead and produced considerable results.

"In line with our desire to make use of, and train, the local inhabitants, it is of interest to note that practically all our construction work was carried out by Kuwaiti contractors. Very few non-Kuwaiti contractors were employed during the year."

(The remarks above in parentheses are the writers.)

20. The company also constructed a pump house on the wells at Salabiya about 30 miles from Kuwait town to where it pumped the water which, though brackish, made a great difference to the possibility of what passes for gardens in Kuwait.

21. The conclusion of what has come to be known in the oil countries and industry as the "50-50" deal between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company in February excited, not unnaturally, great interest amongst the ruling family of Kuwait. Three years before, if not earlier, the late Ruler had asked Sir William Fraser of Anglo-Iranian for better terms from the Kuwait Oil Company. The present Ruler brought up the question in the middle of 1950. It is important to state these facts because of what subsequently happened and of the Ruler's reiteration that it never would have, if Kuwait's demands had been met when they were first made.

22. In fact it is doubtful whether even the Ruler could have prevented Kuwait falling into line with the "50-50" deal. The American oil industry, State Department and, to particularise, the Gulf Oil Corporation which owned half the Kuwait Oil Company, were convinced that it gave great hope, albeit at the expense of the American (and as far as Kuwait was concerned possibly the British) taxpayer of establishing

a much-desired stability in the relations of the oil companies and their concessionary countries. To be effective it had to be nearly as universal as possible. They were therefore determined, it might also be said, that Kuwait should have it whether it liked it or not.

23. The "50-50" deal is of course not as simple as it sounds. It is supposed to give half the profits from the oil company's operations to the State, but their calculation involves complicated accountancy. They are so large that the company does not pay them by a simple increase of royalty (which would be subject to income tax in its country of origin) but in the form, as well, of an income tax to the State thus endeavouring to secure exemption from this same tax in its country of origin.

24. There are further refinements of complication which, even without the introduction of political considerations, almost paralysed negotiations conducted by American lawyers (from behind the scene) on the one hand, and half educated Orientals on the other. The latter were advised, loyally indeed, but unobjectively, by Mr. Kemp.

25. From the first, it was the political considerations which prevailed. The first 50-50 proposals were made by the company in August. They were stalled by the Ruler under a smoke screen of rumour that they had been bettered by Arance in Saudi Arabia, while at the same time he kept an eye on Abadan and waited for the issue of the negotiations between I.P.C. and Iraq. He openly declared that it was not the money in which he was interested but that he should get as good terms as Iraq. In fact, he was unable to face his people if he did not do so; under any agreement in the region of practical politics, adequate money was bound to come to him.

26. Nuri Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, had visited the Ruler twice during the year and it is safe to assume that he concerted with him a policy upon oil. After the Iraq agreement had been signed in October, the Kuwait Oil Company made another offer which looked as if it was going to suffer the fate of the previous one, mainly because of the Ruler's insistence on minima of both payments and production and on 12 per cent. of the oil produced to be free to him—terms which he said he understood to be included in the Iraq agreement. The deadlock was resolved in the beginning of November by a sudden offer from the Ruler to give up his three unacceptable demands provided the company would give up theirs to certain islands and the "continental

shelf." This they did and the terms of the Kuwait 50-50 agreement were embodied in a document signed by the Ruler and Mr. Southwell of the oil company, on the 26th November. The formal documents were signed on the 30th December. Authoritative local opinion was to the effect that it was the British stand against Egyptian demands in the canal zone which tipped the scales in the Ruler's mind to the side of coming to an agreement quickly with the biggest British (and American) interest in his State.

27. Two other aspects of these negotiations should be mentioned. The first is the important one that, shortly before they terminated, the Ruler agreed to the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government that he should receive all his payments from the oil company in sterling, although he had previously demanded dollars from the American "half" of his company. The second is the misunderstanding and unsatisfactory relationship which they revealed between the oil company and the Ruler's representative, a state of affairs which could not be without effect upon the Ruler's attitude towards the company. This was shown most strikingly when, a few days before the final agreement was to be signed, the company, having let it be broadcast all over the world that the Ruler was going to receive about £50 million income from them in 1952, announced that this would not be payable until 1953. Mr. Kemp professed himself misled by them and, for a few days, it looked as if the whole agreement might again go into the melting pot. The Ruler, however, accepted the fact of the deferred payment. The company did not emerge well from the incident.

28. Aminoil, having drilled their fourth dry hole, did what they themselves admit they should have done in the first place. They undertook, through contractors, a complete seismic survey of the whole neutral zone, its territorial waters and the islands of Maradin, Qaru and Kubr. They completed a total of thirty "structure holes," i.e., exploratory drillings. At the end of the year, however, and of three years of their concession, they seemed as far away as ever from having a producing well. On the organisational side their colourful, popular and forceful general manager, Mr. MacPherson contributed and, in a small way, enforced an idea which may have an effect on the vexed question of the relationship between oil company personnel and local population. He would have none of the oil "camps" for European and American em-

ployees which are such a feature of other companies operating overseas. In the fields, only those actually engaged in production would work and live. All the personnel of ancillary services would have their offices and living quarters in the local towns in the midst of the local population. The idea is to avoid the segregating effect of the camps. It has its origin in another, typically American, one: to the effect that the more you mix colour, caste and creed in the nearest approximation possible to the American way of life, the more likely they are to get on well together.

29. Cable and Wireless continued to operate on lines which are becoming unsuitable to the new Kuwait. Their only efficient link with the outside world, even with Iraq, is through Bahrain. Their telephone exchange is obsolete and only able to handle 400 subscribers against demands for lines from several thousands. It is, therefore, their future plans which are of interest although, as mentioned above, they are not having a smooth passage in carrying some of them out. At Shuwaikh they are installing a high-powered transmitter including radio telephone facilities for direct communication with London. They plan to link Kuwait with Fao and Basrah by radio telegraph and telephone. Despite the difficulty of getting increased telephone charges sanctioned they propose to go on with the extension of the present system and the building of a new exchange.

30. The first American consul to Kuwait, Mr. Enoch Duncan, arrived to take up his duties on the 28th June. Though he himself gave them no encouragement, certain elements in Kuwait town, led by Shaikh Fahad al Salim, tried to adopt him as the focus of an "American" party of Kuwaitis in opposition to or, at least divided from, the British. Nothing much, except a great deal of talk, resulted from this but it might cause trouble, without necessarily benefiting the Americans. The numerical justification for the post in the number of American citizens is as exiguous as ever.

31. The financial state of Kuwait remained good and, so far as is ascertainable from the information available from the Kuwait administration the finances were prudently administered even if not, as bewailed by the financial "expert," according to orthodox canons. There is reason to believe that the following figures are accurate to a £½ million:—

The income was £13 million for the calendar year, 1951, of which £12 million

was derived from payments from oil. Only £4 million were spent, £2½ million in ordinary expenditure and £1½ million in capital expenditure. Of the former amount the five largest departments, Education, P.W.D., Municipality, Health and Public Security cost £1½ million, and the Ruler and his family nearly £¼ million. Of the latter, the major portion went on equipment for the water distillation plant, acquisition of land for development and of the electric supply company. The credit balance of £9 million at the end of the year was added to that in hand of

£7½ million giving a total balance in hand of £16½ million.

32. Trade was good during the year though there was a slight drop in re-exports (which form 70 per cent. of the whole volume) to Persia and Saudi Arabia. The import of gold by air from Switzerland and the smuggling of it into India flourished to the value of £10 million to £15 million, about 5,000 kilog. a month being flown in between September 1950 and March 1951. The pearling catch was valued at a mere £50,000. Only eighty boats with about 1,600 men went on the dive.

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APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EA 1012/1

No. 17

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Eden. (Received 20th August)(No. 83. Secret)
Sir,Bahrain,
14th August, 1952.

In accordance with Eastern Department's letter No. EA 1012/1 of 17th September, 1951, I have the honour to submit two copies of the revised version of Persian Gulf Leading Personalities for 1952. As orally instructed when in London recently, I have not included any Europeans or Americans.

I have, &c.

W. R. HAY.

Leading Personalities in the Persian Gulf, 1952

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BAHRAIN

1. Abdul Aziz al Qusaibi, Khan Bahadur

Born in 1877. The eldest of three surviving brothers. They are Nejdīs of plebeian origin and are said to have started life as coffee-shop boys. During the first Great War, they acted as Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrain and from this activity made their fortune. They also traded in pearls and invested much of their money in property in Bahrain, Hasa and Qatif, where they are big land-owners. Until 1941 they were in partnership, but in that year, after bitter quarrels, they separated and each is now independent of the others. Abdul Aziz is a pleasant intelligent little man, never physically strong. When excited he is apt to get hysterical. He was one of

the chief supporters of Major Daly's diving reforms and has been of great help to the Government on many occasions. Owner of the Pearl Cinema, built in 1948. For the last three years he has been unwell, has more or less retired from business, and spends much time in Hasa or the Lebanon. He was made a Khan Bahadur in 1921.

2. Abdullah bin Hamad, Shaikh

Brother of the Ruler (No. 10). Born in 1911. Very short-sighted and wears thick glasses. Abdullah is very ambitious and undoubtedly had hopes of succeeding his father. He has always been keen on learning and is the only one of the brothers who speaks any English. He is sensible, though rather slow-witted, careful over money and fairly progressive. For several years he was a magistrate on the Bahrain Court, but he retired from it twice in a huff because his father refused him something he wanted. He walked out a third time and then to his disgust his father appointed Shaikh Daij (No. 6) in his place. When Abdullah wished to return he was not re-appointed.

Abdullah and Daij accompanied Shaikh Hamad to England and the next year Abdullah spent six months living with a tutor in Oxford learning English. When he came back he was full of Western ideas, but little of this has survived except the furniture and European sanitation in his house. Shaikh Salman appointed him president of the Muharraq municipality, a post which Shaikh Salman had himself held before he succeeded. He is also President of the Majlis al Tijara (the official commercial tribunal) and Honorary President of the Bahrain Club. Besides his one trip to Europe, Abdullah has travelled several times in India. He is more conversant with European ways than any of his brothers. Physically he is not very strong.

3. Abdullah bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh

Second brother of the late Shaikh Hamad and uncle of the present Shaikh of Bahrain. Born about 1883. Shaikh Abdullah is the cleverest, wickedest, most entertaining and most powerful member of the Khalifah family. His education is very slight. He can read but can scarcely write, and often laments the lack of educational facilities in his younger days. He is very intelligent, with a sharp sense of humour; he has tact, political ability and an even temper, though he can be fierce when really roused. He is a skilful negotiator and arbitrator.

Shaikh Abdullah has travelled in India and the Near East and has visited England twice, once in 1919 and again in 1923 with Shaikh Hamad, who took him because he was afraid to leave him on his own in Bahrain.

Shaikh Abdullah was his father's favourite and the son of Shaikh Isa's last wife, a powerful old lady who is still alive. Although his elder brother Shaikh Hamad had been appointed heir apparent, Shaikh Abdullah was for many years the most powerful man in Bahrain. His mother bitterly resented her son not having been heir apparent. Shaikh Abdullah is always in debt, but cheerfully so, and is not mean. Most of his money is spent on sexual pleasures, for which he is notorious throughout the Gulf. His tastes are catholic and he does not trouble to hide his affairs. He has had countless wives and male and female attachments. He is feared and disliked by the Shia Baharinah on account of the wild doings of his earlier life. His servants used to carry off Baharinah women for their master. Respectable Arabs dislike and mistrust him. He is very popular with a section of the younger Shaikhs, who prefer him to Shaikh Salman. He strictly abstains from alcohol, but one of his sons is a notorious drunkard, cadging liquor from his European acquaintances as well as procuring it on the black market.

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Outwardly Shaikh Abdullah had always supported the Government of his brother, the late Shaikh Hamad, and has professed to be pro-British because Bahrain must be dependent, though he would himself prefer the country to be entirely independent. Whenever there has been political trouble, there have been rumours that Shaikh Abdullah was behind it, but this has never been proved.

Shaikh Abdullah is more energetic than most of the younger members of the family. He used to be a good horseman and is fond of hawking and shooting. He is careful about his health, and in spite of his unrestrained lasciviousness he is rarely ill.

Shaikh Abdullah is Minister of Education (the only person in Bahrain to bear the title of "Minister"), the administration of this department being however in the hands of a Bahraini Director, Dr. Ahmad Al Umran. He is also the chairman of Manamah Municipal Council and attends the Bahrain Appellate Court as a judge.

4. Abdur Rahman al Qusaibi

Brother of Abdul Aziz (No. 1). Born in 1892. Formerly Victor Rosenthal's pearl-broker. An intelligent and sophisticated man. Has travelled much in the East and in Europe and was appointed honorary Wazir of Saudi Arabia by Ibn Saud in 1951. He dresses in European style and stays in the Savoy Hotel when in London. He often has big schemes which do not come off. In intelligence and outlook he is far in advance of the ordinary Bahrain merchant and is able to take an objective view of his own people and the "Arab Cause," at least when talking to a non-Arab. He is a good and amusing talker.

5. Ahmad Fakhroo

Born about 1905. Since the death of his father, Yusuf Fakhroo, in 1952, he has become the head of the family, which conducts one of the most important businesses in Bahrain. The firm deal in all kinds of trade and hold the agency for Morris cars. They have connexions with Iraq and India and used to have a branch in Basra but it has recently been closed. A proposal was once made informally that Ahmad should be made honorary Iraqi Consul in Bahrain, but it was not pursued. Apart from this, he has not come to notice politically and confines himself to business. The family are Holis, i.e., Arabs who were previously domiciled in Persia and are considered to have lost the purity of their stock.

6. Daij bin Hamad, Shaikh

Brother of the Ruler. Born in 1915. An amiable and good-natured young man, who was his father's favourite son. He is practically illiterate, but quite intelligent. He accompanied his father on both his visits to England. He acquired a good deal of money and property from his father, for which reason most of his brothers dislike him. He is mentally energetic though physically slothful, and is much addicted to women. He is sometimes generous. He sits in the Joint Court with the Assistant Political Agent and in the Senior Bahrain Court jointly with the Adviser and Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed, a distant relation. At times when the local situation becomes difficult, such as when attacks on the Jews were threatened, he has shown a remarkable resolution in taking security precautions, and it was he who kept on urging his brother, the Ruler, to deal with matters firmly.

7. Hussain bin Ali Yatim

Born in 1914. The son of a small trader in Bahrain of Sunni Persian origin. Hussain Yatim, when quite young, was taken up by Major Holmes, a concession hunter through whom the Bahrain Oil Concession was arranged, and, after some years at

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in 1951 reassured and perceptibly thinner. Seems to have overcome the common local failing of eating too much. Reputed to be a heavy drinker in private. He is dashing and authoritative and makes himself feared. He is on very good terms with the Royal family of Saudi Arabia whence he doubtless gets his spendthrift habits and his self-importance. He paid his first visit to the United Kingdom in 1951, which he enjoyed sufficiently to return in 1952, and indeed seems to be developing a penchant for globe trotting. He is always in debt but has the excuse that unlike other members of the Ruling Family, he has no source of income other than the civil list. He is childish and his life is really made up of play-acting various romantic roles (the picture-book Shaikh, the disconsolate mourner and so on). He has little education and speaks with a very slight lisp. He has a marked taste for sycophants by whom he is surrounded. He is co-operative except in any matter that he thinks impinges on his personal dignity. In minor administrative matters he tends to be an embarrassment because he gives decisions in matters that are not his concern and is affronted if challenged.

The Jabir faction laugh at him. The Salim faction hate him. But he is not without support in the town and is very friendly with Shaikh Subah bin Nasir.

The Ruler has given him second place in the order of precedence and the succession should normally fall to him. He realises that both factions of the Subah family are against him and relies on the support of Her Majesty's Government. He proclaims his pro-British sentiments in which he is doubtless sincere but he may make an unstable Ruler. He is married but has no children.

5. Abdullah al Mullah Saleh, M.B.E.

Born 1906. Awarded M.B.E. 1947. Succeeded his father as Secretary to the late Ruler in 1938 and managed to retain the office under the present Ruler. Is intelligent and speaks good English.

The strength of Abdullah Mullah's position is that everyone in the town hates him. For that reason he is invaluable to the Ruler who is thus assured that he is not in league with any possible usurper. The present Ruler hated Abdullah Mullah during his predecessor's reign and tried to oust him then but when he became Ruler himself was wise enough to see his value.

Abdullah Mullah is the Ruler's representative with the Kuwait Oil Company and with the American Independent Oil Company so that he has an unrivalled knowledge of and experience in handling oil company matters. He has also much political experience. He protests that he is pro-British and probably is. From the point of view of Her Majesty's Government there might be a very much worse State Secretary in Kuwait than Abdullah Mullah.

His chief fault is that he uses his official position to further his private aims. He grew up in a Kuwait that was poor and he has not been able to resist the temptation to get rich quick. He has burnt his fingers and landed himself with a tobacco company that does not pay, an electric light company that is grossly inefficient and various other commercial activities that left him with a huge overdraft at the bank. He seems however to have retrieved his position and to be now on a firmer financial footing. He is certainly a much overworked man.

He has eight or nine children of whom two are at school in Somerset.

6. Abdullah al Salim, Shaikh, K.C.M.G., C.I.E. Ruler of Kuwait

Born about 1888, created C.I.E. in 1938 and honorary K.C.M.G. in 1952. Became Ruler in early 1950. Cousin of the last Ruler whom he actively disliked and nearly unseated in 1938. As a result

of the "democratic revolution" of that year he became head of the Advisory Council, which his predecessor allowed to lapse and he himself has refused to revive, and was placed in charge of the State Treasury.

Unlike his predecessor the Ruler is not greedy, authoritative or fond of display. He claims to have the welfare of the state at heart and his general behaviour supports that claim. He has sold the luxurious yachts of his predecessor and abandoned the pretentious scheme to build a marble-lined palace. He has had a local dhow built for his own use and is happiest when away from Kuwait resting on the island of Failaka. He is a bookish man with very simple tastes and has a reputation of never having incurred debts. He is invariably pleasant to deal with and to talk to although he has an impediment in his speech that makes him a little difficult to follow. His intentions are good but he is not a man of action. His health is not good, and in particular his legs give him considerable trouble. When in May 1952 his relatives gave trouble, he threatened to abdicate, and although he must have been sure that the threat would suffice to bring them to heel, he might not have been sorry if he had had to carry it out. He shows an increasing unwillingness to make up his mind. He professes the greatest friendship for Her Majesty's Government in which he is doubtless sincere but tends to exaggerate the difficulties of his position.

He is fatherly towards the younger sons of his predecessor and has not allowed his own half-brothers to acquire the dominating position they would like. To Abdullah Mubarak he is generous although he has been known to threaten to oust him. His only children are by slave women.

7. Abdur Razzaq Ruzzuqi, Khan Bahadur

Born 1900. Made a Khan Bahadur 1943. A Kuwaiti who was for many years Residency Agent on the Trucial Coast where he enriched himself before retiring in 1946. He now lives in Kuwait, where, like many other Kuwaitis, he burned his fingers badly in the boom period of 1948-50. He is now gradually paying off a very large overdraft. He lends his name to various enterprises with foreign backing that wish to work in Kuwait. Is a member of the Education Committee where he seems to exercise a good influence. Speaks good English, is very pleasant and has sensible views on the lines on which Kuwait should develop.

8. Fahad al Salim, Shaikh

Born 1906. Half-brother of the Ruler by a slave mother. Very black. Educated at the American University Beirut where he had a poor scholastic record. Speaks creditable English and is highly literate in Arabic. Although a forceful personality he has not in the past got all his own way with the Ruler. Formerly in charge of the State finances to his own profit and the State's loss. For some time after his brother's accession he was without any official post; but in February 1952 he was made head of the Health Department. His behaviour there produced a crisis that led to his "resignation"; but under the pressure of Subah al Salim, the Ruler reinstated him. The Committee, and after being struck by Fahad, the Director of the Department, resigned; but Fahad had his way and in the meantime was also made head of the Municipality, from which post he also claimed to control the Public Works Department. He nearly succeeded in disrupting completely the Development Board; but the Ruler was finally obliged to convey through Shaikh Yusuf bin Isa a firm warning, since which Fahad's behaviour has been better. He is now trying to pose as the champion of Kuwait for the Kuwaitis and to

promote xenophobia. Fond of travel. Visited the United States extensively in 1950 where he was extremely well received. A short visit to the United Kingdom on the way back from the United States made much less impression on him for various reasons including the execrable weather he met with. Is hot-headed but has charm, is an entertaining talker and obviously has ideas on a wide range of subjects.

Strongly opposed to Abdullah Mubarak and to the Jabir faction. Is the moving spirit of the Salim faction.

9. Izzat Ja'afar

Born 1912 in Egypt and educated in the Lebanon. Is believed at one time to have been a professional pimp. Has good manners and speaks English well. Attached himself to the late Ruler and ended up as his social secretary and controller of his household. Lived in the Ruler's palace where he made himself indispensable. The late ruler's sons Jabir and Subah, whom he saw grow up, are much attached to him as is the late Ruler's widow. His Majesty's Government insisted on his removal from Kuwait during the last war because of suspected intrigues with the axis Powers. He claims to have rendered assistance to the allied cause in the Lebanon during his absence. At the time of the late ruler's death he was steadily acquiring more and more influence in Kuwait to the exclusion of the State Secretary, Abdullah Mullah who refers to him as the snake. He brought members of his family into Kuwait, and has established them there with himself, as traders. He was the go-between in the negotiations for the American Independent Oil Company concession. That company took him to the States and feted him royally. He arranged the irregular Middle East Air Lines service from Beirut to Kuwait. He it was who introduced the (since departed) Egyptian schoolmasters and the Egyptian Qadhi and his son to Kuwait. He also tried to induce the Banque de l'Indo Chine to break the (legitimate) monopoly of the British Bank of the Middle East. Altogether he has been an apt and active instrument for diminishing, even excluding, the influence of Her Majesty's Government in Kuwait.

Since the late Ruler's death he has lost his former predominance although he still lives at the palace (not used by the present Ruler) with the widow and some of the sons of the late Ruler, and describes himself as an employee of the State. In 1950 under the pretext of taking Jabir and Subah to the Lebanon he took them to London without the Ruler's consent. He explained that he did this because he knew that if he had asked for permission it would be refused.

The present Ruler on his accession was pressed to expel him, but as a promise was given that he would not be allowed to regain the influence he had enjoyed under the previous régime the matter was dropped.

Izzat is clearly out to seize every opening to regain his former position and so while keeping Jabir and Subah in hand is trying to get foothold in the Salim camp and also that of Abdullah Mubarak. He is not liked by the Kuwaitis.

10. Jabir al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1926. Third son of the late Ruler. His particular claim to eminence, and the succession, is that both his father and mother were Subahs. His mother is in fact the full sister of the present Ruler. He is very like his father both in appearance and disposition and would make an arrogant and difficult Ruler. He is much under the influence of Izzat Ja'afar by whom he is being groomed for stardom. The present Ruler takes him about with him on his travels and may also be tutoring him for the succes-

sion. Speaks fair English and is in charge, under Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak, of the security guards in the Kuwait Oil Company's area at Ahmadi where his chief pre-occupation seems to be to ingratiate himself with the Kuwaitis to the detriment of the company's interests. Is a likely candidate to the succession in his age group.

11. Mohammad al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born in 1907. Second son of Shaikh Ahmad, the late Ruler of Kuwait. Although he is a full brother of Shaikh Abdullah al Ahmad, he is not so gross, and is of lighter complexion. He was educated in Beirut and speaks English. He has managed His Highness's affairs in Basra, and in particular the litigation over his date gardens, for some time, and does his work with reasonable efficiency. In 1946 he was shot by an Iraqi patrol close to the Iraq-Kuwait frontier, in the belief that he was a smuggler, and wounded in the neck, but has since fully recovered from his injuries. It is doubtful whether he is a strict teetotaler, and he is reported to have a fondness for poker and a convivial evening. He is popular in Iraqi circles and knows how to get round minor officials.

12. Nusf Yusuf al Nusf

Born about 1898. Member of a prominent Kuwaiti family and one of four brothers. From 1934 until the troubles in 1938 he was Director of the Municipality. He then went to Karachi to represent his brother's firm, later returning to Kuwait, where he continued such commercial activities until 1947. He then became director of finances in the Department of Education and in 1948 the director of the Department of Health, while remaining on the Education Committee until the new elections in February 1952. In the spring of 1952, when Shaikh Fahad took control of the Health Department, he resigned, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, and at present he has no position. He was a competent public servant in his time and as Director of Health gave full support to Dr. Parry, in charge of the State Hospital. His brother, Muhammad, is in charge of the Department of Public Works.

13. Salim al Ali, Shaikh

Born 1926. His father (killed 1938) was half-brother of the present Ruler. His mother was a sister of Subah al Nasir so that both his father and mother were Subahs. As he falls within the same age group as Jabir al Ahmad, the Salim faction are advancing him as a rival to Jabir al Ahmad. In his claim to the succession he might muster the Bedu support around Subah al Nasir that Abdullah Mubarak seems to be counting on. A pleasant looking young man with no education.

14. Subah al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1928. Fourth son of the late Ruler. Brought up, with his brother Jabir, by Izzat Ja'afar and is much attached to both of them. His point of dissimilarity is that everyone likes him. Has some English.

15. Subah al Nasir, Shaikh

Born in 1903. Strong supporter of late Shaikh Ahmad, who owed much to his assistance during the 1938 troubles. He is gross, gluttonous and possibly mentally unstable. Some years ago he murdered his younger brother while sitting beside him in a car in Kuwait town, threw the body out of the car and drove over it several times. He has been deeply involved in the smuggling between Kuwait and Iraq. In 1948 he was accused of murdering three Muntafiq tribesmen, including a member of the powerful Sadun family, who were participating in the smuggling racket on behalf of a rival Shaikh.

Shaikh Ahmad threatened to expel him, and he fled to Ibn Saud, who refused to receive him. He subsequently returned to Kuwait, where Shaikh Ahmad was loath to take further action against him owing to the assistance he had received from him in the past.

He spends nearly all his time out in the desert where he has reserved large stretches of grazing for himself. Is very friendly with and supported by Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak, doubtless for reasons of common interest. His claim to the succession which is strong if not serious derives from his being a grandson of the "great" Mubarak and having had a Subah mother and father. He is suspected of trafficking in slaves.

16. Subah al Salim, Shaikh

Born 1913. Half-brother of the Ruler. He runs the town police which is a body set up in opposition to the security police run by Abdullah Mubarak and also the police court. Is often ill, but is mentally very alert and an interesting conversationalist. His standard of education is considerably above the usual Subah level. He speaks a little English and is entirely under the influence of his half-brother Fahad. Generally pleasant to deal with.

17. Yusuf al Ahmad al Ghanim

Born 1903. Has travelled to England and the United States. Speaks English, has a son studying engineering at Glasgow University. Local agent of B.O.A.C. and A.I.O.C. and holds many trading agencies. Enriched himself through labour and other contracts with Kuwait Oil Company during the company's period of expansion. Has a joint local working arrangement with the Contracting and Trading Company of Beirut (Bustani). Very westernised and a steady drinker. Keen business man but pleasant socially. Politics liable to change with his personal interests. Is one of the many who are highly critical of the patriarchal administration in Kuwait and of the predominance of a largely uneducated and often worthless ruling family but is completely submissive to this order of things.

His old father who is still alive is much respected.

18. Yusuf bin Isa, Shaikh

Not of the Ruling Family, his title of Shaikh being given to him as head of the Qara'i sect. A very widely respected old man of considerable learning, who wrote one of the few books on Kuwait history. He is a close friend of the Ruler and is able to exercise considerable influence on him. He has somewhat reluctantly been occupying the post of Chief Qadhi, temporarily and as a personal favour to the Ruler.

MUSCAT

1. Ahmad bin Ibrahim, Saiyid

Born about 1898. Is a member of a junior branch of the Ruling Family of Muscat. His headquarters are in an old Portuguese fort at Hazm, commanding one of the routes leading into the interior of Oman. It is said that at one time he used to hoist the White Flag of Oman and the Red Flag of Muscat as suited his convenience, but for some years now he has been in the employ of the Sultan as Minister of Internal Affairs. He is a picturesque figure with a long grey beard and has a forceful personality, but is notorious for his cruelty and corruption.

2. Bhaquer, Abdul Latif, Haji

Born about 1885. Is the most prominent member of the Khoja community in Matrah, and the head of a firm which has branches in Gwadar and Mekran. A cunning old rogue and an expert smug-

gler. He owns a fish-meal factory at Matrah which is not at present working, and has recently been appointed by the Bahrain Petroleum Company as their agent for the sale of oil products in Muscat. He is a Muscat subject, although most of his community who have settled in Muscat for many generations, are still treated as British subjects.

3. Gokaldass, Rai Bahadur

Born about 1908. Head of the firm Khimji Ramdass in Muscat, and leader of the Hindu community there. Is a typical Hindu "bania" with smooth manners and plenty of business ability. Has from time to time undertaken Government contracts, especially for the present supply of rations to labour employed by the R.A.F. on Masirah island. Has always been anxious to keep in with the British authorities, and is very nervous about the attitude the Sultan is likely to adopt towards Hindus if they cease to be under British protection. His name was suggested to the Government of India for appointment as their non-career vice-consul at Muscat, but the Sultan refused to countenance the proposal. Can be trusted to make as much money as he can out of every transaction, regardless of other people's interests. With the establishment of a branch of the British Bank of the Middle East at Muscat, his firm has lost some of the financial hold which they previously had over the place.

4. Ismail Khalili al Rassassi

Born about 1908. A Palestinian who has been in the service of the Sultan of Muscat since 1929. He was originally a school teacher, but is now Wali or Governor of Matrah. He was at one time believed to be strongly anti-British, but is outwardly very friendly. The Sultan makes use of him owing to his lack of educated and experienced persons to hold positions of trust, but he must be regarded as rather a doubtful character.

He was formerly permitted to exercise some measure of supervision over the other Walis, but this supervision is now exercised by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sayid Ahmad (No. 1), as the Sultan is believed to have decided that Rassassi is too corrupt for the purpose.

5. Mohammad bin Abdullah al Khalili

Born about 1878. A member of the Beni Ruwahi. In 1920 he was elected as the Imam of Oman. As such he possesses spiritual authority over most of the tribes of the interior and also considerable temporal power. He resides at Nizwa, and has his own Walis or Governors stationed at various places throughout Oman. His influence is naturally opposed to that of the Sultan, who is anxious to bring the whole of Oman under his control. Mohammad bin Abdullah, is opposed to all progress and especially to the penetration of Oman by Christians in search of oil. His death has been expected and hoped for by the Sultan for many years but he shows remarkable powers of survival. Owing, however, to his advanced age and poor health, a deputy has recently been selected by the tribes to assist him.

6. Muhammad bin Ahmad

Shaikh of Bakhah, a small village on the west coast of the Musandam Peninsula, north of Ras al Khaimah. Though only a petty Shaikh of the Bani Hidayah section of the Shihuh tribe, he has come to notice through his participation in border disputes around Sha'am village (which is partly peopled by members of his tribal section) on the Northern boundary of Ras al Khaimah where it meets the Sultanate province of Ruus al Jibal. Having claimed to be an independent Shaikh and succeeded in getting himself included for purposes of supplies during the last war with Shaikhs of the Trucial

Coast in political relations with the Political Officer at Sharjah, in a recent disturbance at Sha'am in which Her Majesty's Navy had to be asked to intervene, he declared himself to be a Muscat subject and sought protection from the Sultan's Wali at Khassab. His status as a subject of the Sultan has now been recognised, and he and his family carry Sultanate passports.

7. Said bin Taimur, Saiyid, Sultan of Muscat

Born in 1910. He succeeded as Sultan on the abdication of his father in 1932. Is normally accorded the title of "His Highness," but he does not allow this to be used in official documents, and as an independent ruler is probably anxious to be given the title of "His Majesty." He is an honorary G.C.S.I. and K.C.I.E. but these titles are not used when addressing him and he made a mild protest in 1946 when the G.C.S.I. was conferred on him without his first being consulted. He was educated at the Mayo College, Ajmer, and speaks excellent English. He was at school in Bagdad from 1927-28. He visited the United Kingdom and United States in the winter of 1937-38. Is small in stature and rather shy and timid in his manner, but very astute and careful to preserve his dignity. He has a remarkable knowledge of correct procedure and can be relied on to "do the right thing" in public, although he appears terrified of appearing a fool on public occasions. He is always most polite and courteous, and reasonable regarding all matters which have no effect on his personal status. Is sincerely anxious to maintain his family's long-standing friendship with Her Majesty's Government. His rule is of an entirely personal nature and he has few competent persons to assist him, and few even whom he can trust. He has placed British officers, who have retired from the Indian services, in charge of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the municipal administration of Gwadar and his small force of infantry, but gives them little discretion. His chief ambition is to extend his control over the whole of Oman, of most of which he is ruler in name only. He spends much of his time in his province of Dhofar many hundred miles from Muscat, and the administration of his State is liable to suffer in consequence. Even when he is in Muscat he maintains a regal seclusion and does little to ingratiate himself with his subjects. He has one son, Saiyid Qabus, born in 1940, whom he proposes to send to the Lebanon for education in 1953.

8. Saif bin Ahmad bin Hamid al Rashidi

Born in 1910. Eldest of four sons of Ahmad, on whose death on 14th December, 1948, he succeeded as Tamimah of the Beni Ruwahi tribe. Lives in the Wadi Ruwahi. Is in opposition to the Imam of Oman, who belongs to the same tribe, and is on good terms with the Sultan. He is believed to wield considerable influence and to be well disposed towards the British.

9. Salih bin Isa al Harthi

The most influential Hinawi Shaikh and accepted as their Tamimah. It is said that his power extends to passing sentence of death upon any member of his faction. In August or September 1949 he visited Muscat on his return from India, where he went for medical treatment, as a guest of the Sultan, and called on the Political Agent. He received ammunition, rifles and Rs. 6,000 as a gift from the Sultan. His knowledge of Arabic poetry is said to be good. He is only about 30, and resides at Ibra in the Sharqiyah district of the Sultanate, headquarters of the Al Hirth, of which he is the Shaikh. He has two wives but no sons. He succeeded his brother Muhammad, who died in 1948. His heir is his cousin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Isa.

10. Shahab bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born in 1902. Uncle of the Sultan of Muscat and full brother of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur. He ordinarily acts as personal representative at Muscat for ceremonial purposes while the Sultan is absent at Dhofar. He has charming manners and speaks the best Arabic but in administrative matters is inefficient and corrupt, and is not trusted by the Sultan, who latterly has been unwilling to grant him any real authority during his absences.

11. Sulaiman bin Hamyar Al Nabhani, Shaikh

Probably now the most influential Shaikh in the interior of Oman. He is supposed to be the right-hand man of Muhammad bin Abdullah, the Imam (No. 5), but is also on good terms with the Sultan.

Has recently sought recognition by Her Majesty's Government as an independent Shaikh. Resides in the Jabal Akhdhar and is Tamimah of Ghafir. Aged about 45 and has three sons, the eldest, Sultan, being his heir.

12. Taimur bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born about 1888. Sultan of Muscat 1913-32, when he abdicated voluntarily. He was a weak ruler and was only too glad to be relieved of further responsibility for the management of affairs when his son Saiyid Said (No. 7) was old enough to take his place. He receives an allowance of Rs. 2,000 a month from the Muscat Government. He had a catholic taste in wives and married amongst others a Turkish and a Japanese lady. He lived for some years before the war in Japan, and had one daughter by his Japanese wife. He is now living as a private citizen in Bombay, and likes to be known by the name of "Mr. T. F. Al Said." He is on good terms with his son, the present Sultan, and paid a visit to him in Muscat in 1945, and has since been visited in Bombay by the Sultan.

13. Tarik bin Taimur, Saiyid

Born in 1922. Half-brother of the Sultan of Muscat and son of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur, by his Turkish wife. He was educated during his early years in the English school at Constantinople, and later in Germany, and speaks good English and German. He returned to Muscat shortly before the war, and his first task there was to learn Arabic. During the war, he spent some years in India, where he received training in police work and civil administration. He also spent some months attached as an officer with the Zhob Militia in Baluchistan. Is a man of strong physique and character, and is probably feared by the Sultan, who has so far failed to give him any position commensurate with his abilities. He is at present employed as President of the Municipality of Matrah and Muscat. He was married, it is believed somewhat against his will, to an Arab lady in 1946, and a son was born to him in 1947. Is very friendly and enjoys British society and games of hockey, tennis and bridge.

QATAR

1. Abdullah bin Darwish

Born about 1903. Lives at Dohah. A typically sharp, avaricious, vain and calculating merchant of Persian origin. Until the second world war, he was a man of meagre means but like many others, he profited by war conditions. His particular line was smuggling, in which he was helped by the laxity and avarice of the Ruler (No. 2) and the deceased Shaikh Hamad, who was the Ruler's second son and appointed successor. He paid them heavily for their compliance, but his immediate profits were large enough to stand the strain, and by making himself indispensable to them, he became executor of Shaikh Hamad's will and administrator of his estates, thus

recouping his initial expenditure with interest. It appears probable that he will succeed in laying hands on Shaikh Abdullah's fortune in the same way. He is distributor for the Bahrain Petroleum Company products in Qatar, contractor to Petroleum Development (Qatar), Limited, and the Gulf Aviation Company. He is the only Qatar merchant to hold any business agencies for European firms.

He has consolidated his influence over the present Ruler (No. 4) by lending him money and by avoiding the error made by Salih al Mani (No. 8) of quarrelling with Shaikh Abdullah, who still exercises great influence over his son. He is the virtual Ruler of Qatar, using both his wealth and influence over the Shaikh to secure a monopoly of all competitors, whom he has now all but eliminated. In spite of the fact that he spends an ever-increasing proportion of his time at Dammam in Saudi Arabia, where he has extensive and growing interests, mainly contracts with ARAMCO, his influence over the Ruler has not diminished. He has exercised it in fewer instances since the Adviser came to deprive him of his previous monopolistic position, but the Ruler still consults him on all important decisions. He is a coward, however, and will abandon Shaikh Ali in any crisis (usually crises within the Ruling Family, which constitute the only real threat to public order in Qatar) which is likely to involve him in taking sides without profit to himself.

He is a man of immense ability and energy, whose unpleasant and domineering nature encourages Europeans to criticise his activities frankly and even rudely. He does not enjoy this, but he profits from it, and his technical efficiency has increased and is increasing at a remarkable rate. He is noisily pro-British, and has intelligence enough to try to appear to be going our way, and to advocate the sort of thing which he knows we want, but fundamentally his nature and aims are incompatible with ours, and his influence on the course of affairs in Qatar at present is bad.

His moral character is said to be worse than that of the generality of people amongst whom he lives. He is probably the best-hated man in Qatar.

2. Abdullah bin Qasim al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh

Former Ruler of Qatar. Abdicated on 21st August 1949, about six months after losing his son Hamad, on whom he greatly relied, and whom he had designated as his successor. Took with him the entire contents of the Treasury, plus a pension of 4 lacs (£30,000) a year, leaving his eldest son, Ali, in the penniless state which contributed largely to the speed with which Darwish was able to establish control over him.

He now lives at Riyan, about ten miles from Dohah, where he dominates his son, and is dominated by the Darwish brothers, to whom he has practically abandoned the management of his property and affairs. He is a venerable, patriarchal, white-bearded figure, with a firm old face which does not belie his character, and even in his approaching dotage is quite clearly a stronger character than his son. He suffers from diabetes and some chronic complaint of the legs, and recently had a slight stroke which has left him unable to rise without assistance, and considerably more halting of speech than formerly.

His influence over Shaikh Ali, while still considerable, has gradually given place, in political affairs particularly, to that of Abdullah Darwish, and he now asserts himself only in family matters. The outstanding case was his intervention in the first allocation of the family allowances from the oil royalties, when he insisted on larger allowances for those of whom he approved personally, irrespective of the claims of justice and equity. He was unable

however to achieve the same success when the allowances were revised by the Adviser in October 1951, although he secured an increase in his own pension to 5½ lakhs a year. In general his continued presence in Qatar has had a bad effect on the Ruler.

3. Abdul Rahman bin Darwish

The youngest of the Darwish brothers. Gives an impression of oily untrustworthiness which is only too accurately borne out by subsequent acquaintance. His morals are loose, but he is an astute rogue, and his smooth manners help him to take in those whom he deals with more successfully than can his brother Abdullah. But whereas further acquaintance with Abdullah may lead to a more favourable appraisal of his character, based on his undoubted ability, second thoughts on Abdul Rahman are unlikely ever to do so. He is the family liaison man and do-all.

4. Ali bin Abdullah al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh

Born 1894 and succeeded his father as Ruler in August 1949. He is Abdullah's eldest son. A fine presence, and in repose a dignity too soon belied by the vacuity of his conversation and the hysterical fury of his ineffectual wrath. A weak, self-indulgent character, spendthrift where his father was miserly, and vacillating where his father was obstinate. Recent crises provoked by various outrages upon private individuals committed by members of his family, as well as their persistent demands for increased allowances, have been handled by him with a firmness hitherto unsuspected, although no doubt born to desperation.

He is bigoted in religious matters, having sought consolation in religious contemplation when, in his earlier days, his father's favour and trust was extended over his head to his brother Hamad.

His visits to the Ruler of Bahrain in 1950, to Beirut in 1952, and his attendance at the Dammam frontier conference in January 1952 have broadened his horizons to some extent and implanted in him, besides a new sense of his own importance, a genuine anxiety to see his country develop on the lines of what he has seen abroad. He remains, however, a man of limited intelligence and outlook. Although he can seldom be persuaded to wise courses by reason, a show of firmness will generally intimidate him and cause him to acquiesce though unconvinced.

He has six sons, of whom the second, Ahmad, is at once his favourite and the most intelligent and promising. The question of the succession is confused by the presence of the sons of Hamad, who in their father's life time were considered his most probable successors, and are the favourite grandsons of Shaikh Abdullah. But although they have reached a position where they virtually dictate their wishes to the Ruler and behave generally with insolence and in defiance of authority, they have simultaneously forfeited respect, and Shaikh Ahmad now seems to be generally accepted as heir.

5. Jasim bin Darwish

The eldest of the Darwish brothers, and an essential element in their system. The other brothers defer ostentatiously to Jasim, who is very much the "chef de famille." He is also of a pious disposition, and helps lend an air of respectability to a family sadly in need of it. He scrupulously avoids any appearance of mixing in "politics," but is of great use in translating into suitably Koranic language, for the benefit of Shaikh Ali, the latest questionable scheme hatched by Abdullah (No. 1).

He is said to be very fond of his Syrian wife, whom he treats with customary cruelty (she suffered for a week with toothache before she could escape clandestinely to the mission hospital) and he is considered by the ladies of Dukhan to be "rather a dear."

TRUCIAL COAST

1. Ahmad bin Rashid Al Mu'alla, M.B.E., Shaikh

Ruler of Umm Al Qaiwain. Born in 1904 and succeeded in 1929. He is enormously fat and quiet and, to meet him in audience, one would imagine that he was anchored permanently to his chair; yet in his small way he is a wise, straightforward, peaceful and efficient administrator. He keeps his word and avoids interference in other people's affairs. Is, therefore, popular and much respected by the other Shaikhs who, with their tribes, regard him as an authority on their affairs and approach him often for mediation in their disputes. He has full authority in his territory and is very loyal to Her Majesty's Government and uses his influence on other Shaikhs to be the same. Was awarded the M.B.E. in 1950 for his services as a pacifier and mediator in disputes between other Trucial Shaikhs. Is weakened in health by chronic diabetes which he can only check by a near-starvation diet.

2. Hazza' bin Sultan

Born about 1911. Brother of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 13). A skilful negotiator and great talker, he has a remarkable knowledge of tribal affairs, wider, in fact, than any of his brothers, and his views on tribal policy are generally sound. He is popular with the tribes, but less so than his brother Zaid (No. 16), who is more generous and more manly. During the past four or five years relations between him and Shaikh Shakhbut have become more and more strained (see under No. 16). About six months ago he moved from Abu Dhabi to Buraimi, where he is now living with Zaid.

3. Juma bin Maktum, Shaikh

Born about 1888. Eldest brother of the Shaikh of Dubai. Is entitled to a salute of one gun. This old man, with his direct noisy manner, used to be regarded as a source of comic relief to the ceremonial visits to the Shaikh. During the Dubai-Abu Dhabi dispute in 1946 he revealed himself, however, as an influential intriguer carrying weight in the Dubai councils which was thrown into the scale against the interests of His Majesty's Government. To them he indeed professed loyalty, but he seems in actual fact to have even more than usually the Arab dislike of the unbelievers. He is believed to have played a prominent part in the slave traffic before the institution of the Levies.

4. Khalid bin Sultan

Born about 1914. Brother of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 13). An unimpressive character with few interests apart from the pleasures of the flesh (prostitutes and perversion) and the bottle. He is stupid and illiterate and appears to be generally unpopular.

5. Muhammad bin Hamad al Sharqi

Ruler of Fujairah. Born in 1906. Became Shaikh of Fujairah after the death of his elder brother in December 1940. Recognised by Her Majesty's Government in April 1952, and thus joined the ranks of the Trucial Rulers. Much of the territory controlled by him used to be under Qawasim rule, but his father broke away from the Qawasim control and the latter exercise no influence in the Fujairah area now. Shaikh Muhammad is active and straightforward and his tribesmen, the Sharqiyyin, pay complete allegiance to him and he exercises full authority over them. He is friendly with the other Trucial Rulers and tribes with the exception of, of course, the Qawasim and the Beni Qitah, to whom he is hostile. The Qawasim he considers as his hereditary enemies and does not trust them. There is good security in his area and the robbers and

6. Mohammad al Mani'

Born about 1875. He is a cousin of Salih al Mani', and rather like a benevolent old goat (with spectacles) in appearance, but is an old-fashioned and courteous man. He is one of the wealthiest men in Qatar, having first made his money dealing in pearls. He was the first contractor to the oil company, and for years occupied in fact, though probably not as offensively and certainly not as efficiently, the monopolistic position which Abdullah Darwish now seeks to obtain. He was ousted from his pre-eminent place in business and the counsels of the Shaikh by Abdullah Darwish's greater thrust, ability and unscrupulousness, and has now firmly retired from politics and leads the life of a senior and respected member of the merchant community. He was recently stricken with angina pectoris and has retired to Beirut. His sons, although pleasant, are weak and incompetent, and his contracting business is unlikely to flourish in their hands.

7. Mohammad bin Uthman

Director of Customs, Doha. He is related to the Darwish family and is married to their sister. A member of the Fakhroo family (see Bahrain No. 5). He has been Director of Customs for about five years, and although his salary has only recently risen from 800 rupees a month to 1,500 rupees a month he has made himself one of the wealthiest men in Qatar. His house, completed two years ago, is said to have cost 2 lakhs. Neither the recent reduction of customs dues to 2½ per cent. nor the fact that he is now responsible to the Adviser appears to have affected his prosperity.

8. Salih al Mani'

Born about 1893, but despite his exclusively male household and the all-too-obvious presence of a still beneath his front staircase, he does not look his age. He is a Nejdī by origin, and started his career as a small pearl merchant, at the same time doing some clerking for the ex-Ruler, whose secretary and "Representative" he became. He acquired great influence and wealth while he had the ex-Ruler's complete confidence, but realised in 1949 that he was being eclipsed by the Darwish, and after they had several times over-ridden him in the Shaikh's counsels, he quarrelled violently with Shaikh Abdullah at the time of his abdication, in the engineering of which he undoubtedly played a considerable part. If he thought that he had thus cut the ground from under the Darwish feet, and substituted a Ruler more amenable to his own will, he was rudely disappointed. The Darwish consolidated their position with a flexibility and sureness of touch in marked contrast to his own touchy cantankerousness, and Salih's position has continued to deteriorate. He draws a salary as the local representative of Petroleum Development (Qatar), Limited, and used to draw a further salary as the representative of International Marine Oil Company, Limited, but he has long since ceased to do any work in connexion with these offices. The fact that Shell Group, when negotiating for the sea-bed concession, were able to dispense with the appointment of a local representative is symptomatic of his decline. He co-operates loyally with His Majesty's Government in most matters, both from conviction and from the clear realisation that only if things go our way does he stand any chance of survival. This enables the Darwish, who usually have more palatable advice to offer, to represent him as the creature of the British. He is the only active counterweight to the Darwish at present, but his addiction to alcohol and a number of other practices of dubious integrity make him a vulnerable ally.

marauders are chased and punished by the Shaikh himself. He is friendly towards Her Majesty's Government and actively pressed for recognition from the time of his accession until he achieved his object. He is also very anxious that Petroleum Concessions, Limited, should take up an oil concession in his area, but so far the company has shown no real interest in it.

He is married to the daughter of the Ruler of Ajman (No. 7) and has one son of four who lives at present in Ajman. His brother, the former Ruler, left a son now about 12 years old.

6. Muhammad bin Saqr

Born about 1913. Acted as Regent of Sharjah during the prolonged illness of his brother the late Shaikh Sultan, in 1949-51. Announced his succession as Ruler on the death of Shaikh Sultan in April 1951, but subsequently allowed himself to be displaced by the former Shaikh's eldest son, Saqr (No. 12). He receives a larger allowance than his brothers, though it does not meet his expenditure. He owns some landed property in Sharjah and a date garden in Ras al Khaimah.

He is a well-meaning, rather ineffectual character who co-operated loyally with His late Majesty's Government during his Regency provided he was not asked to do anything dangerous or unpleasant.

7. Rashid bin Humaid, Shaikh

Ruler of Ajman. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. He is tall with a long black beard, and a typical Bedouin in appearance. The saying that "he is too stupid to be dishonest" is probably true with him. He is even more parsimonious and avaricious than the average, but he is not unjust and is liked by his people. He spends a lot of time in the desert and is on good terms with the other Trucial Shaikhs and tribal chiefs, with the exception of Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan, chief of the Na'im in Buraimi, who bitterly dislikes him. He gets around a great deal and visited Shaikh Sulaiman bin Hamyar of the Jebel Akhdhar in 1948 and again in 1950, and has been in Bahrain, Muscat and Saudi Arabia more than once. His territory is secure and he chases robbers himself. He is a good shot and generally kills his man if he gets him in his sights, which has twice landed him in trouble in the past year, once when he killed a robber with whom he was at feud in Umm al Qaiwain territory, and once when he killed the cousin of the paramount Shaikh of the Beni Qitab by mistake. He can read and write Arabic fairly well and listens to the news on the radio (when it is in working order). He frequently visits the B.O.A.C. fort and Royal Air Force station at Sharjah, merely in order to pick up anything he can in the way of services and supplies.

8. Rashid bin Said bin Maktum, Shaikh

Eldest son of the Shaikh of Dubai (No. 10). Born about 1903. He is the *de facto* Ruler of Dubai, his father having retired from the active conduct of all affairs. Is half literate and wild but not unattractive. He is married to the daughter of Hamdan bin Zayid, a former Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Adopted an uncompromising and defiant attitude towards His late Majesty's Government during the Dubai-Abu Dhabi dispute, which he only changed after punitive measures against his father had been taken. He quickly becomes a victim to the intrigues of self-interested persons and, again like all Bedu, is always suspicious of good advice. He has lately shown signs of greater maturity and an ability to think for himself, and some disposition to judge cases on their merits. He is generous to the tribesmen and has a good deal of influence with them. He is much disliked by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and also works unmercifully the lordly airs of the Ruler of Sharjah.

9. Said bin Maktum, C.B.E., Shaikh

Ruler of Dubai. Born in 1882 and became the Ruler in 1912. He is a Bedouin in appearance and at heart, and is generous. He is conscious of the traditional duties and responsibilities of an Arab Shaikh, though he has now allowed these to devolve on his eldest son, Rashid (No. 8); he himself spending his time hawking, shooting and travelling in the desert and at sea. He has recently become interested in agriculture and spends much of his time in attending to his gardens in Ras al Khaimah, where he has installed water pumps and made other improvements. Shaikh Said's relations with the other Trucial Shaikhs and the tribes are good. His dispute with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi which absorbed most of his shaikhdom's resources for three years has been finally settled. He is on particularly good terms with the Sultan of Muscat, whom he occasionally visits, and is also friendly with the Shaikhs of Qatar and Bahrain. He is well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government and only persuaded to unwise courses occasionally by his son, and his brother, Juma (No. 3). Created C.B.E. in 1951.

10. Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim, Shaikh

Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1920. Seized power from Sultan bin Salim (No. 14) in February 1948, and was recognised as Ruler in August 1948.

This one-eyed young man has so far showed himself a strong Shaikh, strict, impartial, truthful and dignified. He attends to his business and security and good order prevails in his territory and crimes are uncommon. He is supported in his rule by his father and his five brothers and is friendly with all the other local Shaikhs and tribes and loyal to Her Majesty's Government. Although Sultan bin Salim made away with a large part of the funds of the Shaikhdom, Saqr has waived a number of taxes and reduced the customs duty.

He has a dispute with Shaikh Muhammad of Bakha (Muscat No. 6) over rights in the village of Sha'am which has led to several incidents. In 1950 he extended his rule near the island of Jazirat al Hamrah, and in 1951 he successfully occupied the rebellious village of Rams.

11. Saqr bin Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi

Born about 1927. Eldest son of the former Ruler of Ras al Khaimah (No. 13). Murdered Shaikh Hamad bin Sa'id al Qasimi, Ruler of Kalba, whose guest he was, on 4th July, 1951, and usurped the Shaikhdom of Kalba. His chief partner in the murder was Ali bin Amir, a former secretary of Shaikh Sa'id bin Hamad of Kalba and later of Shaikh Muhammad bin Hamad of Fujairah, and nominally a Muscat subject. Withdrew from Kalba to Murair in Muscat territory on 12th May, 1952, after having been threatened with expulsion by Her Majesty's Government, whereupon the former Shaikhdom of Kalba reverted to the rule of Sharjah.

Saqr is an unprepossessing character, whose manner is a compound of weak craftiness and ingratiating. His younger brother Khalid joined the Trucial Oman Levies in 1952.

12. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born about 1924. Officially recognised by His Majesty's Government as Ruler of Sharjah in succession to his father on 8th May, 1951, after having canvassed popular support for his claim to succeed instead of his uncle Muhammad (No. 10). Like all the Qawasim of Sharjah, he has an exaggerated notion of his own importance and a tendency to think of the glorious past of his family as though it had survived into the present day. However he is young, comparatively energetic, sometimes remarkably businesslike, and modern in his outlook. He

has a likeable personality and is the only one of the Trucial Rulers who has any real interest in, or knowledge of, the affairs of the Western world.

His younger brother, Khalid, a youth of about 22, visited England in 1951. He returned with a fluent command of English, but has clearly been influenced by some of the less wholesome aspects of Western civilisation. Another younger brother, Muhammad, who also visited England, joined the Trucial Oman Levies as a private in 1952.

Shaikh Saqr undoubtedly enjoys more local popularity than did either his father or his uncle, and if he can come through the first few years of his reign without being dismayed by the realities of his situation, should make a very able Ruler. He is loyal and co-operative with Her Majesty's Government.

13. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Zayid, Shaikh

Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. He is stubborn, a great procrastinator and parsimonious in the extreme, but is generally considered to be fair in judgment and does not extort nor sell justice. He is mentally ill-balanced. Over the past five years, he has become more and more unpopular with his brothers and the tribes, and is now widely disliked for his meanness and his cavalier treatment of tribal visitors.

Shaikh Shakhbut looks delicate, has very small bones, suffers from syphilis and may be consumptive; but he has an air of quiet dignity about him striking in an Arab Shaikh. After the death of his first wife, he took a second one, a young girl, one Hamdah bint Ahmad bin Khalaf bin Utaibah, who left him after one night and never returned. In 1947 he married the daughter of Hamid bin Buti, his maternal uncle and in August 1948 he also married a young girl whom he casually met near his fort.

Shaikh Shakhbut is well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government. He is on ostensibly friendly terms with the other Rulers and tribes but intensely dislikes the Ruler of Dubai and his son, because of their aggression against him. He seldom leaves Abu Dhabi except to go to Abu Dhabi Islands and Buraimi occasionally. Together with his brother Zaid (No. 16) and his son Said he visited Paris in August and September 1951 in connexion with the sea-bed concession arbitration between Superior Oil Company and Petroleum Development Limited, Trucial Coast. This visit did little to broaden his outlook or extend his very scanty knowledge of world affairs. He has great animosity against Ibn Saud, who has claimed a large slice of his territory; and his presence at the boundary conference with the Saudis which took place at Dammam early in 1952 did nothing to contribute towards a settlement.

His mother, Salamah bint Buti, is said to have great influence over him. He has two sons, Said and Sultan. The former is a wretched creature, a drunkard, and has syphilis. The latter, though barely fifteen, is growing up thoroughly spoiled, and has already taken to wine, women and perversion.

14. Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi

Ex-Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1891. An unpleasant character—thoroughly untrustworthy and intriguing. He neglected the interests of his Shaikhdom for years in order to squeeze money out of the people to aggrandise himself through trade. In February 1948, his nephew, Shaikh Saqr bin

Muhammad bin Salim (No. 10) seized power with the people of Ras al Khaimah and the Khawatir tribe during Sultan bin Salim's absence in Dubai. He has not ceased unsuccessfully to intrigue and is at present, practically speaking, an outlaw. He is a wild creature, liable to take violent courses, one of which obliged Her Majesty's Government to impose upon him a fine and a year exile in Muscat. The year having been completed he is now once more living in Trucial Coast, dividing his time between Sharjah, Dubai, and his date gardens in the Wadi al Qaur.

15. Zaid bin Sultan

Born in 1916. The youngest of the three brothers of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and the strongest character of the four. In this family, notorious for its moral laxity and sexual perversion, he alone of the four has an unsullied reputation for clean living. He is now the most efficient, most powerful, most generous and most popular of all the desert Shaikhs of the Trucial States. Though slightly less well versed in tribal politics than his brother Hazza' (No. 2), he has a remarkable memory for names and places and is a very good judge of character. Like most Bedu he prefers ease to action, but has great organising talent and is undoubtedly a fine leader. Against these good qualities must be set the fact that at Buraimi, where he lives when not hunting or travelling in the desert, he presides over a thieves' kitchen, and has shown an altogether irresponsible attitude over the misdeeds of the Awamir, whom he claims as a subject tribe.

Over the past five years his relations with his brother Shakhbut have steadily worsened, and the breach is now so serious that Zaid never visits Shakhbut unless obliged to.

Obituary

(from 1951 Report)

Khalid bin Ahmad bin Sultan al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born in 1878. Shaikh Khalid was the Ruler of Sharjah until he was deposed in 1924 by the late Ruler, Sultan bin Saqr. He then made several abortive attempts to retake Sharjah. He was appointed Regent of Kalba on 17th September, 1937, and his regency was terminated with the recognition of Shaikh Hamad in May 1950.

Shaikh Khalid has grown old, and lives most of the time in Hira (Sharjah) and in the last few years of his regency left the conduct of affairs in Kalba almost entirely in the hands of his dissolute and wilful nephew Humaid, whose death in February 1950 was the signal for his uncle's downfall. He receives a pension of Rs.10,000 a year from the Kalba revenues, and an allowance from the Ruler of Sharjah. He was considered to possess Dhaid and Dibbah/Hisn independently, not as part of Kalba, but his influence there has also declined, and it is likely that on his death they will pass to Sharjah and Kalba respectively, who now exercise "*de facto*" control in them.

He is illiterate, but is an authority on the history of the Jawasim. He gets intermittent attacks of malaria. He is friendly with all other rulers and tribal chiefs, and particularly with the Shaikh of Fujairah; he is well disposed towards the British Government.

CHAPTER II.—SAUDI ARABIA

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

ES 1201/1

No. 18

WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 4th January)

(No. 113)

Jedda,

Sir,

29th December, 1951.

With reference to Jedda telegram No. 225 of the 3rd November, I have the honour to inform you that Brigadier J. E. A. Baird, C.B.E., head of the British Military Mission to Saudi Arabia left Jedda for Egypt on the 16th December. A few days later the last officers and n.c.o.'s from Taif followed and the mission had ceased to exist. There remains only one officer in Jedda who will leave when the shipment of stores required in the Canal Zone has been effected.

2. The mission had been five years in Saudi Arabia. It was provided at the express wish of His Majesty King Ibn Saud and it was withdrawn at least with his acquiescence and probably because the Crown Prince wished to have an army in the Nedj and thought he could get more arms and equipment from the Americans. It is to some extent a measure of the way things have changed in Saudi Arabia during these five years that the King's attitude in this matter should have been thus reversed.

3. During the later war years British and American training teams were sent to Saudi Arabia and worked together at Taif. After these had been withdrawn the Saudis felt the need for assistance in bringing their army up to date. At an audience of His Majesty's Minister and Brigadier Clayton with Ibn Saud on the 5th November, 1945, the Amir Mansour prompted the King into asking for a British Mission to be sent to train the Saudi army. With characteristic phraseology the King announced that he wanted none but the British to train the Saudi army and none but the British to provide the arms. While offering the bait of arms purchases and his "traditional friendship" to attract British attention, the King may also have considered the fact that the United States administration, being under strong Zionist pressure at the

time, was not in a position to give military support to an Arab State.

4. In the following year the problem was maturely considered and Washington duly consulted. The latter eventually raised no objection to a British Mission provided that it was understood that the United States were to have a free hand in the appointment of a Financial Adviser to the Saudi Arabian Government. After some pressure from the Saudi Arabian Government and the visit of two British Staff Missions in February and September 1946 it was finally decided to send the mission which arrived in Saudi Arabia in January 1947.

5. The mission found itself faced with an extremely difficult task. The material from which the Saudi army is recruited is unsuitable even for peace-time military purposes. Ophthalmia is almost universal and the men are so awkward that in a despatch describing a parade before the Chief of General Staff M.E.F. in 1945 the Chargé d'Affaires wondered if some of the Saudi soldiery did not conceal tails beneath their uniform.

6. The army was equipped with every variety of weapon that could be bought cheaply during the pre-war years or which had been taken over from the Turkish régime. There were Belgian, Polish, Austrian, Italian and Turkish rifles of different calibres and the heavier weapons were more dangerous to those who fired them than to an enemy. The senior officers were and still are corrupt, lazy and incompetent while those officials with whom the mission had to deal were, like most of their breed in this country, apathetic where their personal interest was not concerned or else deliberately obstructive in order to prove their zeal. The mission also suffered the misfortune of having to deal with a very parsimonious Defence Minister, the Amir Mansour, who, however, did not possess all the faults of his successor, the Amir Mish'al. While

Ibn Saud may have been willing to spare no expense in developing the army, his favourite son Mansour not only diverted much of the money intended for that purpose into his own pocket, but also introduced many senseless measures prompted by irrational miserliness. For instance, when a soldier broke the bolt of his rifle the Amir instructed that no bolts should be opened except under his orders. He probably did not realise that this diminished arms drill to purely ceremonial movements and prevented the ability of a sentry to fire. Similarly, when training wireless sets were imported for the Signals School, the Amir forbade their use for fear they should become worn out and said that the signalmen should use their imagination and visualise how the controls were manipulated.

7. The Palestine troubles in 1947 and 1948 also indirectly handicapped the work of the mission, for they resulted in an embargo by His Majesty's Government in the export of the very arms with which the mission was to modernise the Saudi army. The pick of the troops was also taken away to play an inglorious part alongside the Egyptian contingent in Palestine.

8. Despite all these handicaps the mission achieved a considerable amount of progress. By concentrating initially on training the cadets in the officers' school who were keen and quick to learn, they were soon able to show the rest of the army and the Defence Minister how things should be done. They thus made a good impression from the start.

9. The army was however pathetically far from being the ideal of the King and the Defence Minister, namely to have one trained and effective division. It seems reasonable to assume that though the Saudi authorities have at various times agreed with the contention of foreign advisers that the organisation of the army into a Western style division is unsuited to the needs and human resources of the country this ambition nevertheless remains. The King now probably hopes to get his division formed under American training and probably imagines that a force as effective as a Western division can be created and maintained in operations if necessary.

10. The value of the work of the British Military Mission will only be appreciated when they are replaced by another mission attempting the same task. When the mission arrived the army was a shambling disorganised mob whose sole training con-

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sisted of disporting themselves apathetically on the parade ground for two hours a day. They had no knowledge of tactics, fieldcraft or any of the arts of war. Their specialist troops such as gunners and signallers were completely incompetent to handle their obsolete and frequently mechanically useless equipment. By the time the British Military Mission left an effective officers' school was functioning which had turned out a number of competent and keen young officers. In addition there were n.c.o.'s and recruits' schools and a 25-pounder gun battery which was making satisfactory progress. The army as a whole had not only mastered foot drill as well as they are ever likely to but had acquired some knowledge of elementary tactics. For the first time the men had also gained some experience in the handling and firing of their weapons. A consignment of arms, including field and anti-tank artillery, scout cars and armoured cars and medium and light machine guns had arrived in February 1951 and the army was gaining some aptitude at handling these weapons.

11. There is no doubt that the keenness and efficiency of the British Military Mission in tackling their very difficult task under such adverse circumstances won many friends for Britain and created a very good impression. This was particularly the case with Brigadier Baird whose knowledge of Arabic and the Arabs was of great value. Indeed the brigadier was to a considerable degree personally responsible for the success of the mission. There was little doubt that the bulk of the Arabian officers at Taif were sorry to see the British Mission go. Their sorrow may not have been unmixed with regret that the military centre of Saudi Arabia was to be shifted to the inhospitable Nejd and that they would be uprooted from their families and friends in the Hejaz. However, with the characteristic Saudi attitude towards the outgoing no attempt was made to bid any ceremonial or even informal farewell to the departing head of the mission.

12. The history of the withdrawal of the mission is a sorry tale. The eagerness which the Americans displayed to prolong their tenure of the Dhahran air base evidently inspired the Saudi negotiators to insist on their pound of flesh. The British policy had always been to supply arms on payment. The Saudis, however, have become accustomed for some time to getting things free from the Americans who are

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understandably anxious to ensure the peaceful continuation of their oil concession. They have now it appears succeeded in getting the Americans to promise them free arms and though the latter have not yet disclosed what they intend to provide, the Saudis seem to have the impression that the quantity is quite considerable and that heavy weapons will be included. It is likely therefore that Ibn Saud has gone back to his old idea of one fully equipped division.

13. A good example of the King's persistence in such old ideas is the arms factory which is at present under construction at El Kharj near Riyadh. This proposal was originally conceived several years before the war when Ibn Saud opened negotiations with a private firm in Britain. The King was consistently advised both by His Majesty's Government and by the United States Government that an arms factory could not be an economic proposition so far from sources of raw materials and that in the event of hostilities it might have to be closed down for the lack of these. Nothing daunted the King engaged a French combine more interested in profit and political potentialities than the usefulness of the work.

14. In the same way it is evident that the King believes that given the weapons and a little training the Saudi army can easily be converted into a modern force capable of fighting alongside regular units and providing a major contribution to the defence of the country against a first-class aggressor. He cannot see the problem with the eyes of the British and American experts who have decided that the Saudi army could at best be trained for lines of communication and garrison duties and possibly for irregular fighting. He has seen only the scuffles and skirmishes of primitive Arab fighting at which he once excelled and he is naturally incapable of appreciating the difference between his subjects' aptitude for this and their ineptitude at the modern military technique.

15. The Crown Prince's outlook has been different. While his father would probably have been content to have British and American missions functioning side by side it was not in the Crown Prince's interest that this should happen. For some time he has been advocating the move of the army to El Kharj near Riyadh where it would be in his zone of influence. He has feared the ambitions of the Defence Minister, the Amir Mansour, who was also the King's

favourite son, but during the latter's lifetime was unable to achieve anything. The death of Mansour early this year did nothing to allay the Crown Prince's anxiety, for it was then revealed that Mansour had saved a very large sum in gold. The Crown Prince, who is said to have saved a larger sum, suspected that Mansour's purpose was similar to his own—to facilitate the winning of the tribes over to his side by the distribution of lavish gifts. I suspect that the Crown Prince did his best to ensure that the British Military Mission did it to remain at Taif so that the whole of the army could move across the Nejd, of which he is Viceroy, and thus be available to him when his father dies.

16. The way the recall of the British Military Mission was requested adds some point to this suspicion. At the very moment of his departure from London after the conclusion of his talks with the British Government on the frontier and island problems in August 1951 the Amir Feisal communicated a message from the King which, though ambiguous, seemed to indicate a desire that the British Mission should continue to function alongside an American mission. It seems certain that two members of his suite at least were under that impression. During the pilgrimage ceremonies in September King Ibn Saud was prostrated by the intense heat. For some time his faculties were at a low ebb and the opportunities for intrigue enhanced. On 23rd September the Emir Mish'al, the callow successor as Defence Minister to the Amir Mansour informed the Head of the British Military Mission that all training was to cease forthwith. On 25th September the Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Riches, saw Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Deputy Foreign Minister, and pointed out to him that this action seemed hardly consistent with the Amir Feisal's message. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin seemed surprised at the news and unprepared to make any answer. An answer eventually came on 30th September in the form of a written and apparently amended version of the Amir Feisal's message which explained rather ambiguously that there was no more work for the British Military Mission to do.

17. On 2nd November Mr. Riches had an audience with the King on the subject and the latter made no attempt to press for the mission to remain but only asked to see the officers before they left. I myself mentioned the mission to Ibn Saud on 29th November during my visit to Riyadh

to present my credentials. The King then affably stated that he was sorry that the British Mission was leaving but as there was an American Mission in the country which had arms and was training his troops while the British Mission had no arms with which to carry out any training the latter was obviously wasting its time. The King may by this gross distortion of the facts have been angling for free arms, or have been attempting to save our faces. On the other hand he may genuinely have believed that these were the facts and I think this is the more likely explanation. I did not attempt to disillusion the King as even if I had succeeded it would not have altered the situation and would have led to some embarrassment.

18. The United States Military Mission will be faced with a difficult problem when they eventually reach this country. It is true that the army have now some grounding of basic military training and a set of functioning military schools. But the Saudis evidently expect the Americans to provide free arms on a liberal scale and to achieve the miracle of making a silk purse out of an ox's ear.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representative at Washington and to the head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 1781/1

No. 19

THE PILGRIMAGE TO THE HEJAZ DURING THE YEAR 1951

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 15th January, 1952)

(No. 114. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *30th December, 1951.*

With reference to Mr. Trott's despatch No. 124 of 24th October, 1950, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the Pilgrimage to the Hejaz during the year 1951, for the preparation of which I am indebted to Mr. Maynard.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the British Middle East Office. I shall be grateful if the report may be sent to the usual recipients of Jedda Pilgrimage Reports.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure in No. 19

Memorandum

This year's pilgrimage to Mecca was unusual in several respects, especially as regards health matters.

2. The annual epidemic—or rather threat of an epidemic—which everyone expects to accompany the pilgrimage, took place rather earlier than usual this year. Though the number of cases seems to have amounted only to a matter of dozens at the most and though the outbreak took place on the very southern boundary of Saudi Arabia, a long way from Mecca, and was quickly isolated by an effective *cordon sanitaire* it caused more alarm and confusion than a serious

epidemic and scared many thousands away from the pilgrimage. The Saudi Arabian Government estimate that 97,757 pilgrims from abroad performed the pilgrimage, of whom 83,552 arrived by sea, 12,687 by air and 1,518 overland. If these figures are accurate it would seem that the attendance from abroad was 10 per cent. less than last year. The Saudis estimate that the total attendance at Arafat was 400,000, compared with 500,000 last year. As usual a number of pilgrims from abroad remain in the Hejaz but precise figures are unknown. The Government has given the number of departures by sea as 80,088, with 12,806 by air.

3. This year's pilgrimage was headed by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, who also headed the list of those prostrated by the heat on pilgrimage day. Despite his great age and thanks to prompt first-aid treatment His Majesty managed to recover and he beat an early retreat to Riyadh. The climate there suits him better and he seems to have made a satisfactory convalescence.

4. Though no epidemic occurred among pilgrims the death rate was unusually high owing to the intense heat.

5. The travel arrangements for the pilgrimage were very much in advance of those of previous years. For the first time the new Jedda pier and its administrative buildings were in full operation. Similarly at Jedda airport pilgrims arrived for the first time at a modern building where they could quickly

be dealt with by customs and immigration authorities instead of having, as last year, to squat for hours in an exposed and insanitary area.

6. The greatest improvement was the abolition of sambukage. Until this year pilgrim ships were obliged to anchor some miles to sea outside Jedda's coral reefs and pilgrims were conveyed ashore squatting perilously on top of their luggage, exposed to sun and wind in small sailing craft called sambuks. The Quarantine Pier where they first set foot on the Holy Land was old-fashioned, insanitary, and when it rained, a stinking morass.

7. This year ships were able to come alongside the new pier where buses were already drawn up to take the pilgrims. An announcer in a Land Rover fitted with a public address system speaking the language of the pilgrims explained to them carefully what they had to do when ashore and what benefits were being conferred on them by the benevolent Saudi Government. The pilgrims were then taken by bus to the adjoining administrative buildings, recently completed by a British firm, where, thanks to a well-planned layout, they were quickly passed through the hands of customs and into those of the mutawwifs or pilgrim guides. Buses then conveyed them either to overnight accommodation in Jedda or straight to Mecca.

8. The new system had its inevitable teething troubles, especially as there was a dispute between various departments as to responsibility at the pier. The first Malay pilgrims who arrived very early in the season were the unfortunate guinea pigs who exposed the system's faults. However, after a protest by the Malay Pilgrimage Commissioner to the Minister in charge of Pilgrimage Affairs, the difficulties were smoothed over and subsequent pilgrims had an easy passage through the hands of the Saudi Arabian authorities.

9. It was a pity, with travel arrangements so very much improved, that the Saudi Arabians should be let down so singularly by their medical arrangements. Early this spring when the Saudi Arabian Government pathologist, the late Colonel Manifold, O.B.E., R.A.M.C., was making a tour of inspection in the Asir, he heard rumours of an outbreak of plague on the Yemeni border. When he returned to Jedda and reported these rumours he was put in charge of a medical team assigned to visit the area and investigate. Sensing the threat to the pilgrimage and the potential loss of revenue,

the Saudis endeavoured to cover the object of the mission with the greatest possible secrecy. However, rumours of plague soon began to leak out and since, as is usual at Jedda, no accurate facts were obtainable, a scare soon started. If it had not been for the tragic accidental death of Colonel Manifold on 15th June all might still have been well. For if an accurate report had been forthcoming from an unimpeachable source the alarmist rumours that soon spread in Jedda would have been allayed.

10. As it was the Saudis were quick to issue a sweeping denial, which may well have been true, that there was no outbreak of plague or any other disease in Saudi Arabia and that the plague outbreak was in the Yemen. Unfortunately for them the Moslem Missions in Jedda seemed to suspect—perhaps from experience of previous denials—that the Saudis were more concerned with assuring the safety of their revenue than that of the pilgrims. The Iraqi and Indonesian representatives soon came to the British Embassy to ask what they should advise their Governments. Since the Embassy had no more reliable sources of information than anyone else, it was impossible to give them any advice other than to intimate to them that His Majesty's Government were being informed that no evidence was available to confirm or deny the reports of plague, but that the outbreak had certainly not reached the pilgrimage centres of the Hejaz. We should have learnt of it very quickly if it had. After the Indonesian Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda and the Indonesian Minister in Cairo had sent a number of conflicting telegrams to their Government the latter cancelled all further pilgrim sailings.

11. The Egyptian Government were even more suspicious of the reliability of the Saudi denial and thereby earned considerable ill will from the Saudis from the Royal Family downwards. The rumour soon became current that the Egyptian Government were deliberately using the alleged outbreak of plague as an excuse to cancel their pilgrimage and thus save foreign exchange. An Egyptian medical mission under Dr. Omar Wasfi Bey arrived in the Hejaz on 7th August to verify that there was no plague and was very neatly handled by the Minister of Health, Emir Abdullah Feisal. The Minister told them frankly that they were welcome to make the very unpleasant trip of some 400 miles over rough unmade tracks to the area concerned and they would be allowed every facility to see for themselves but that it was unlikely that they

would get back from such a journey in time for the pilgrimage. It is not known whether he used any other arguments, but after a quick glance round Jedda, Mecca and Taif the Mission lost no time in certifying that the pilgrimage was safe. The Egyptian shipping programme, which had been held up, was set in motion again.

12. Thus though most Moslem Governments ultimately accepted that there was no serious threat of infection of the pilgrimage by plague, the general lack of confidence in the Saudis and their medical service resulted in delays and alarm which resulted in a smaller pilgrimage than there would otherwise have been.

13. The Mecca road was in good condition over most of its length, its resurfacing by an American firm being at a fairly advanced stage. One result was the usual number of accidents through cars being driven too fast. The Medina road, under construction by a British firm, had progressed to some thirty miles from Jedda though the surface was not completed owing to difficulties in the supply of bitumen.

14. The Saudis had planned to abolish third class road travel by lorry during this season, and with this in view had ordered a number of cheap buses of the type normally used in the United States for rural schools. The announcement of this change was made rather prematurely for there was a delay in the delivery of the buses, many of which arrived too late. As the announcement meant that some pilgrimage tariffs (which included the cost of transport at minimum rates) had to be altered and then changed back again, there was some unnecessary confusion.

15. In Jedda and the holy cities the usual exorbitant charges were made for all the essentials of life and pilgrims were even paying a riyal (then about 2s. 6d.) for a bottle of Coca Cola. The results were serious to many and when, for example, the Sudanese return shipping programme fell behindhand large numbers of pilgrims found themselves unable to pay even for the bare necessities of life during their enforced stay at Jedda. They vented their indignation by demonstrating outside the British Embassy and rioting outside the shipping agency.

16. A small party of Bokharis—as Chinese Turkestanis are traditionally called here—arrived with the Indian pilgrims. The vigilance of the Saudi Arabian authorities in respect of both them and the local Bokhari community was very strict this year and no

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political or Communist activity was reported.

17. His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud left Riyadh for Taif (the summer capital of the Hejaz some eighty-five miles south-east of Mecca) several weeks before the Haj. There he set up a great tented camp for his harem, his offspring and entourage. It was reported at this time that a woman petitioner to the King had been searched before being admitted to an audience and had been found to be armed with a revolver. Whether or not this report was true the King was very heavily escorted everywhere during the pilgrimage ceremonies and this gave rise to a good deal of comment.

18. With his customary religious zeal King Ibn Saud insisted on performing the full pilgrimage rites though religious sanction exists for their non-observance by a man of his age. It is reported that he was only brought round from the resulting heat stroke by the prompt and liberal use of ice and it is certain that he was in a bad condition for some time after the end of the pilgrimage.

19. The heat during this pilgrimage season was intense. Some 200 Malay pilgrims had already died as a result of this and of old age and decrepitude before the period of the actual pilgrimage had even begun. Not even the Saudi Arabian authorities have an accurate idea of how many died during the four days of the pilgrimage. Rumoured estimates vary between 5,000 and 7,000 and though one must allow for the oriental tendency to exaggerate numbers it seems at least fairly certain that the figure is not below 2,000. The preliminary official report which was evidently made after only a perfunctory survey gave a figure of 1,579. According to the reports of reliable witnesses the scene was surprising. Quite apart from the pilgrims who were collapsing as though on a battlefield even the professional pilgrim guides were dying off in some numbers and many of the medical staff who were supposed to help them were themselves put out of action by the heat. The bodies were taken away by the lorry load and notable work is said to have been done by the Emir Abdullah Feisal, Minister of Health, in ensuring that some of the pilgrims who had been given up as dead were resuscitated. It is understood that bulldozers were used to dig the communal graves.

20. After the pilgrimage was over the Ministry of Health circularised Medical Missions and leading guides to try to obtain

an accurate estimate of numbers. No result has yet been published. It is unlikely in any event that this enquiry will produce an accurate picture since parties of pilgrims became so split up that all attempt at organ-

isation disappeared and guides simply led those who happened to be nearest to them.

Notable pilgrims from the Commonwealth this year included the Emir of Kano and the Sultan of Brunei.

JE 1052/32

No. 20

KING IBN SAUD'S PROPOSALS FOR AN ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SETTLEMENT

(1)

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 12th January)

(No. 9) *Jedda,*
(Telegraphic) *11th January, 1952.*

King Ibn Saud summoned me to Riyadh on 10th January to communicate in writing his proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, translation of which is in my immediately following telegram.

2. The King sent proposals to King Farouk and to Nahas Pasha on the 6th and 7th January respectively under cover of letters stressing his friendship for Egypt and his concern at Anglo-Egyptian situation. He explained to them that he had hitherto refrained from action hoping that relations would improve, but in fact they had gone from bad to worse and were jeopardising not only Britain and Egypt but other States as well. The other Arab States had been pressing him to take some action. He had therefore taken it upon himself to make "non-committal" suggestions which he would not discuss with the British Government until King Farouk, for his part had accepted or commented on them.

3. The King told me that, in view of Egyptian press speculations, he had now decided that he must inform you of his move. If you wished to make comment on his proposals as they stood he would be glad to have them but otherwise he would expect nothing from you until, after studying reply from Egyptians, he was able to put them to you officially either as they stand or in a modified form.

4. I promised to report to you accordingly but observed that, so far as the first two points were concerned, it had been the consistent policy of Her Majesty's Government to revise the present treaty by negotiation and that it was very disappointing that the King's suggestions made no mention of duty incumbent on the Egyptian Government to stop terrorism.

5. The King replied that his proposals were designed to open a door which was now tightly closed. Once he could see a way through he would have plenty to say to the Egyptians.

(2)

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden

(No. 10.) *Jedda,*
(Telegraphic) *11th January, 1952.*

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following are King Ibn Saud's proposals:—

1. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 shall be considered as cancelled.

2. A new treaty of friendship shall be concluded between Egypt and Britain to regulate the friendly relations between the two parties.

3. Question of defence shall be arranged by an agreement based on sincere co-operation between parties with whom agreement may be reached in that respect. The agreement would show clearly the form of that co-operation in peace-time and in war-time.

4. British forces shall evacuate Canal Zone and move to place outside Egypt within a period not exceeding one year.

5. Egyptian army shall take place of British forces in Suez Canal Zone.

6. Egyptian army shall be equipped with war material and assisted in training in its use so as to become capable of defence by itself.

7. As for Sudan the choice shall be left to her own people who shall be allowed to give their opinion completely free from all interference.

ES 1011/1

No. 21

SAUDIA ARABIA: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1951

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 21st February)

(No. 26. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *5th February, 1952.*

I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying Annual Review of events in Saudi Arabia for the year 1951 for the main drafting of which I am indebted to Mr. Riches and the other senior members of my staff.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the B.M.E.O. and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure in No. 21

Saudi Arabia: Annual Review for 1951

Saudia Arabia continued in 1951 to provide a study in the virtues and defects of a system of benevolent despotism as practised in a mediaeval Arab State which is rapidly increasing its contact with the outside world. King Ibn Saud's benevolence is, however, frequently misplaced and results in the enrichment of the few and undeserving or in grandiose projects mainly of prestige value, while his despotism is only partial because with increasing decrepitude he can no longer move freely and control the loose-knit creaking machinery of Government. With rising oil revenues and consequent economic development the necessity for able administration has greatly increased while the King is ageing and ever less able to grapple with new problems. All authority still rests theoretically with the King but it is often delegated haphazardly among his old friends and those who win his favour, and increasing scope is thus afforded to opportunists to line their pockets at the expense of the country. Moreover it cannot now be certain that important matters are always brought to the King's attention by his advisers and there is some reason to believe that the King's instructions are not always carried out or at least that they are

not carried out strictly in accordance with his intentions.

2. Of the other members of the Royal Family, the Crown Prince, the Amir Saud, continued to consolidate his position and appeared to have no serious challenger. The Amir Feisal remained as Foreign Minister and Viceroy of the Hejaz. Constantly in poor health he impressed both by his knowledge of world political affairs when he could be induced to take an interest in his work, and by his normally apathetic attitude. Some think, however, that he is merely biding his time as he knows that little can be done for the advancement of his country until after King Ibn Saud dies. His son, the Amir Abdullah Feisal, was appointed Minister of Health and of the Interior in June and showed a certain amount of energy and administrative efficiency in both capacities. The Amir Mansour, Minister of War, died in Paris in May and was succeeded by the Amir Mishaal. The other princes continued to distinguish themselves by their useless profligacy and extravagance and one—the Amir Mushari—descended to the infamy of the premeditated murder of the British Vice-Consul in Jedda.

3. Sheikh Yusuf Yassin maintained his position as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs while Khalid Bey El Qargani was the other chief adviser to the King in evidence when His Majesty's Ambassador visited Riyadh. Rashid Ali remained in Riyadh at the King's side but another old anglophobe in the King's entourage—Fuad Bey Hamza—died suddenly in November in the Lebanon.

4. In foreign affairs the King himself still takes a lively and intelligent interest and though he tends to some extent to live in the past, he seems to be able to grasp the essentials of present-day politics. His opposition to communism at home and abroad remained implacable in both theory and practice. A striking feature of the year were the growing indications of the political

effects of the predominant American economic interest in Saudi Arabia. It was the American rather than the British Ambassador who was now summoned to Riyadh for advice on international political matters (including Anglo-Saudi relations). The apparently generous terms in the shape of military equipment and training facilities conceded by the American Government to obtain their five years' agreement on the Dhahran airbase led to the decision of the Saudi Government to entrust all the training of the Saudi army to the Americans and to the dismissal of the British Military Mission which had been in the country since 1947. Yet the King continued to protest that his old friendship for the British Government endured and there seems no reason to doubt the genuineness of these protestations though they rarely led to any practical results.

5. As regards relations with the West, which as far as he is concerned consists only of Britain and America, the King's overriding consideration has been the preservation of his oil revenues and his religion, the chief threat to which is the possibility of direct or indirect Russian intervention in the Middle East. The negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Dhahran air base agreement in June enabled him to demand considerable free American material assistance in building up a Saudi Arabian army. What the King wants is modern weapons and with these he hopes to build up a modern army. He is likely to be disillusioned about the quantity of free arms available unless the United States changes her intentions. He may never be disillusioned as to the usefulness of the army, for only practical experience can show him that a force under Arab officers with foreign officers purely as advisers could only be of limited use.

6. With regard to the defence of the Middle East as a whole King Ibn Saud realised that British and American aid was essential. In connexion with the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the Four-Power proposals for an integrated Middle East Command, he had some difficulty in grasping the full importance of an adequate base organisation in modern warfare and inclined to the view that the United Kingdom could solve the problem by establishing a base elsewhere than in the Canal Zone. For a tribal warrior this incomprehension was not unnatural. However, he understood enough to feel it necessary to advise Egypt to do her best to settle differences with the United

Kingdom and to keep from dallying with the U.S.S.R.

7. The King's goodwill towards the United Kingdom was to some extent vitiated by his desire, doubtless played upon by some of his advisers, to do nothing to offend Egypt or general Arab nationalist aspirations. He made it clear that he could not take action independently of other Arab opinion or associate himself with the defence organisation proposed by the Four Powers until the Anglo-Egyptian question had been solved. On the other hand he promised to do his best to take no action which would prevent an eventual accommodation.

8. In the narrower sphere of the frontier and island disputes in the Persian Gulf area Anglo-Saudi relations were improved by the visit to London in August of the Emir Feisal, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister. The fact that the London talks narrowed differences over the sea bed and islands and that at least a new proposal for a conference on the frontier problem was agreed resulted in a reduction in the tension which had previously arisen over a number of minor frontier incidents and the formation of the Trucial Levies. At the end of the year there was a good prospect that the conference would in fact take place in late January 1952.

9. The events of 1951 demonstrated fairly clearly Ibn Saud's policy in more parochial Middle Eastern affairs; the maintenance of the *status quo*. The death of King Abdullah of Jordan removed Ibn Saud's main fear of encroachment, but he showed that Abdullah was not the only force he feared by his active discouragement of Colonel Shishakli of Syria, whom he had previously wooed with gifts of gold, from any attempt to absorb Jordan. It seems likely that the King is opposed to any alteration in the balance of Arab power because any union even if it were not Hashemite-sponsored would encourage the Arab nationalist pressure for unity and tend to threaten the independence of Saudi Arabia and the position of its Royal Family.

10. Ibn Saud was quick to take the opportunity of the decease of his old enemy and the accession of a weaker King in Jordan to make overtures of friendship. On his visit to the Hejaz and Nejd in November, King Tallal met with a number of signal marks of respect and left loaded with valuable presents. Nothing very new seems to have been arranged but it is likely that the threat of a reconquest of the Hejaz has receded even further. Despite some apparently friendly

Saudi-Iraq talks during the summer it seems probable that Ibn Saud's dislike of the Hashemites will in future be mainly concentrated on Iraq. His Majesty expressed himself with considerable force against the autumnal raiding into Nejd by Iraqi tribes. He has also recently made bitter remarks against Nuri as Said.

11. Internally Saudi Arabia remains free from the hysterical mob nationalism which, although politicians in other Middle East States may know to be contrary to the national interest, they tend by their rivalries to incite. Law and order still prevail, especially in the rural areas which are as yet unaffected by progress and where the local Governors exercise absolute sway. Nevertheless Saudi Arabia is, with the possible exception of the Yemen, the worst administered Arab State. How long an administration based on an anachronistic social organisation can continue to control a country progressively more exposed to new influences from the West and from the more advanced Arab countries is difficult to say. It is safe to surmise, however, that the prospects of a popular explosion are at present slight. There is much grumbling—particularly in the Hejaz—against the corruption and self-seeking of the Royal Family and the oligarchy surrounding them. But it has not found concrete expression during the year and the universal tendency is to climb on to the band wagon when one has the intelligence and opportunity to do so rather than to use these same circumstances to change its whole appearance or at least the direction in which it is going. The officially controlled press is normally filled with innocuous items of home and foreign news, and fulsome praise of the Royal Family but there has been an occasional anti-foreign article and at the time of the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty by the Egyptian Government in October the foreign news items deviated for a short period into a bias in favour of Egypt. Of rather more importance has been the open importation and sale of newspapers and magazines from Egypt for the first time in the history of Saudi Arabia. The anti-Western and particularly anti-British slant of many of these publications has had some inevitable influence on the attitude of leading Saudis and the *intelligentsia*, though its exact extent is difficult to gauge.

12. King Ibn Saud himself led the pilgrimage in 1951 and nearly 100,000 Moslems from abroad attended. This was less than the Saudi Government had expected, the

reduction being mainly due to erroneous reports spread abroad of an epidemic of plague before the time of the pilgrimage. Administrative arrangements for overseas pilgrims improved considerably but medical arrangements unfortunately showed little or no change. The exceptional heat at the time of the pilgrimage (early September) led to a great number of deaths, some estimates putting the number as high as 7,000. It is quite certain that over 2,000 died, but precise figures will never be known.

13. In the internal affairs of the country, however, attention has, during the year, been mainly concentrated not on the administration or on the pilgrimage but on the ever-increasing flow of money across the Government's account. The oilfield expansion programme of the Arabian American Oil Company (the Aramco), based on expanding demand and sales facilities and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, had already brought Saudi Arabia to the position of the foremost oil producer in the Middle East early in the year. Production was further increased to help fill the gap left by the cessation of Persian oil export, and totalled about 36.5 million tons for the year, compared with 26.2 million tons in 1950. The Government's revenue increased much more than proportionately as the 50-50 Profit-sharing Agreement on December 1950 and the new general income tax decrees (from which Saudi Arabia firms were, however, exempted) came into operation. In the second budget in Saudi Arabia's history, published in June, revenue was conservatively estimated for the year September 1951-September 1952 at 490 million rials (approximately equivalent to £54 million)—a far cry from the pre-war average annual revenue of £2-3 million. Of this total of 490 million rials at least three-fifths was expected to come from oil royalties and taxes and indications up to the end of 1951 were that this would certainly be an underestimate.

14. With no repetition of the early 1950 set-back to the progressive increase in revenue to disturb the administration and the merchant community, nor any repetition of the 1948-49 droughts to disturb the tribes (and make them even more dependent upon the King's subsidies) the Government had little impulse to bring the financial administration more into line with the development of oil production, revenue and commerce. The authoritative but unpredictable Minister of Finance did show signs of concern in the spring but caused temporary chaos by

reverting to the old practice of assuming personal control over all Government disbursements; and, in August, he suddenly telegraphed to the former Egyptian and German Finance Ministers, Drs. Metaal and Schacht for help, though nothing came of either appeal. Neither he nor the King gave any evidence of understanding the grossly unbalanced state of the country's economy nor of the need to save and create a reserve. 3.4 million of the budgeted 490 million rials revenue was allotted, under the budget, to State Palaces, Princes and the Royal Cabinet; whilst 87 million rials were allotted to Defence and 12.25 million to the Saudi Airlines; 91 million to General and Construction Schemes; 9.8 million to Education; 6.5 million (later increased—see paragraph 16 below) to Public Health; and 7.3 million to the Directorate of Agriculture. The production of the budget marked a progressive step, but it could only be regarded as an elementary and not very reliable guide to the proportionate division of the revenue amongst the various departments of the Government and schemes. It bore witness to the profligacy of the Royal Court and to the inadequacy of the administrative machinery, but not to the universal nepotism and corruption or to the vast fortunes being made by the few merchants and officials in a position to call the tune. Meanwhile the instability of the Saudi Arabian bimetallic currency continued to exercise many minds. A scheme providing for a Saudi Arabian gold guinea was nearly introduced in the early part of the year but divided counsels led to the shelving of a decision. Altogether 50 million rials and, it is believed, about 1½ million gold sovereigns were imported to maintain the circulation. The Government ended the year overdrawn on their credit and engaged in an unpleasant squabble with the Aramco over the sterling element in the latter's payments, the profit-sharing accounts and the location of the company's Management Board.

15. For their part the Arabian-American Oil Company have not had the peaceful year they hoped for when they embarked on their expansion programme and concluded the agreement of December 1950. Somewhat frightened by the fate of the A.I.O.C. and, periodically, by the behaviour of the Minister of Finance and his advisers, they have at the same time shown an increasing awareness of their responsibility and interest in fostering reform and general development in the country—against a welter of

vested interest. Whilst maintaining their formal policy of strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of the country except on invitation, nominally at least, they have found the United States Government a willing and useful front in this respect. The Dhahran Airbase Agreement has already been mentioned. During the year the United States Government have also provided the Saudi Arabian Government, under the Mutual Security Programme, with an experienced financial adviser and a tariff expert who have been patiently feeling their way since their arrival in the summer, and who are to be joined by a customs and statistics expert, a budget expert and an accountancy expert. Comprehensive water surveys in various parts of the country have been made, under United States Government auspices, by an aerial photography unit and two geologists, and a Technical Co-operation Administration Mission visited Saudi Arabia late in the year to see what further assistance could be rendered especially in the fields of agriculture and public health. A small F.A.O. Mission has also been working in the country, mainly in the Asir, during the year. The British-staffed Desert Locust Control Mission expanded its operations during the year and its relations with the Saudi Government were generally friendly apart from one dispute over the alleged poisoning of stock by locust bait.

16. No developments of any particular note took place during the year in the fields of agriculture (except the F.A.O. Mission) and Education, but Public Health received much attention, especially in the Hejaz, following the appointment in the summer of the young and energetic Amir Abdulla al Faisal as Minister of Interior and Health. By the end of the year the Health budget had been increased to 35 million rials and some progress had been made towards the recruitment of more foreign doctors and the building of more hospitals; also the contract for the construction of the Jedda hospital and quarantine complex had been settled (though not, unfortunately, in favour of either of the British firms who had been engaged in the planning).

17. In the field of communications the much-debated Dammam-Riyadh railway came into full operation in October to the accompaniment of many eulogies on the King's wisdom in sponsoring it. Work progressed, with many set-backs, on the Jedda-Medina road, whilst the resurfacing of the Jedda-Mecca road and surveys for the proposed Mecca-Taif road were completed.

There was also much discussion and planning and wire-pulling in connexion with the proposed expansion and reorganisation of the Saudi Arabian internal and external telecommunications network. The Jedda, Dhahran and Riyadh airports were improved to a high standard and the main (Dakota) section of the Saudi Arabian Airlines improved its maintenance organisation and facilities to an equally high standard. The Bristol Wayfarer Unit of the Airlines however improved but little under the Misrair operating contract signed in the summer, though the aircraft again did valiant service, especially during the pilgrimage season. Several foreign airlines inaugurated new services, through Jedda during the year and again many charter companies assisted in transporting to and from Jedda nearly 13,000 pilgrims in the few weeks before and after Arafat Day. British Airlines continued to play a prominent part in serving the Jedda airport though certain difficulties which arose in the latter part of the year have given rise to further consideration of the desirability of persuading the Saudi Arabian Government to establish some sort of policy on aviation matters in line with the internationally-accepted rules and regulations.

18. Work on the development of several public utilities began or progressed during

the year, including the electrification, water supply and drainage of Mecca, Jedda and Riyadh, and the electrification of Dammam and al Khobar on the Persian Gulf and Jizan in the Asir. The new port buildings (and Pier) at Jedda were in full use in time for the pilgrimage, under a commercial operating concession secured by a prominent Saudi firm; whilst the new port of Dammam continued to be operated by the American-managed Saudi Railroad and Port Administration. British firms have played a prominent part in the various constructional schemes though they continue to suffer all manner of difficulties on account of the peculiar operating conditions in this country. The American firm of International Bechtel Inc., who were responsible for the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline and part of the Dammam-Riyadh railway and who, as Government constructional agents, had established themselves as the foremost engineering firm in the country, ended their engagement with the Government at the end of the year and were replaced, nominally, by an American firm of consulting engineers. The year saw a noticeable increase in the number and growth of indigenous contractors as well as an influx of Egyptian and Levantine contractors, all eager to participate in the continuing building boom.

ES 1013/1

No. 22

IMPRESSIONS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 2nd April)

(No. 47. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *24th March, 1952.*

Four months have elapsed since I took up my mission in Saudi Arabia. During that period despite the isolation from the rulers of Saudi Arabia to which, I am told, foreign envoys in Jedda are normally condemned, I have been so fortunate as to have paid four visits to His Majesty King Ibn Saud at Riyadh, on three occasions also meeting the Crown Prince. I have had a number of discussions with His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, his Deputy. I have also met and talked with the powerful Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleiman, and one of his most important coadjutors, Najib Salha, with His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Feisal, Minister

of the Interior and of Health, with the redoubtable Saud bin Jaluwi, Amir of Hasa, and with a number of lesser notables and officials who make up the small group ruling Saudi Arabia or exercising significant influence on those who do. I have also had discussions with members of the foreign communities of experience in the country and have been in frequent touch with my diplomatic colleagues, more particularly with the French and Turkish Ministers and almost continuously with the American Ambassador. In addition to my journeys to Riyadh I have been able to visit Dhahran and other places in the oil-bearing area now being exploited by the Arabian American Oil Company; and to have cast a brief glance at the whole country from the exterior observation post of Bahrain.

2. Although this short period in the country and comparatively limited acquaintance does not imbue me with profound knowledge I think that it may be of some use to record my early impressions of the state of the country and its position in the world to-day.

3. An appreciation of the present state of Saudi Arabia is a study in the sudden impact of "oil," in all its implications, on a mediæval Moslem State. The most striking consequences of this impact and the themes which I shall attempt to develop in the following paragraphs are three. First, the total inadequacy of King Ibn Saud's administrative, financial and legal ideas to cope efficiently with developments. Secondly, the collapse of the traditions and morality of centuries in face of a few years of easy money from oil. And, thirdly, the progressive penetration of the country by American interests and the decline in British influence and fortunes. I end the despatch with some observations on the perennial conundrum of what will happen when the King dies.

4. King Ibn Saud is an absolute monarch. In his earlier days his personal intelligence and courage, his power, prestige and benevolence enabled him to gather together by conquest and strong government Nejd, El Hasa, the Hejaz and Asir and the desert tribes and to form what is now known as Saudi Arabia, a kingdom over which he has continued to rule with the aid, first of the trusted friends of his early days, and later with the addition of his two eldest living sons and his counsellors (mainly Syrians and others, leading Arabs who have found their own countries unappreciative of their abilities) who have gained his favour. The King has done well and until the discovery and exploitation of the oil wealth of the country it is doubtful if, in all the circumstances, his system of mediæval, personal and, on the whole, benevolent rule could have been bettered. Now in his old age and decreasing capacity, wealth beyond his former dreams is flowing out and he is not competent to conceive of and organise an administration which can control and use it wisely.

5. As indicated above I have had several opportunities of seeing the King. His apparent state of health and mental energy has varied. On a recent visit the King himself told me that President Truman's personal physician and a French doctor had just examined him and declared him in fair condition for a man of his age and hard

life. Owing to arthritic knees the King now only moves from his wheel chair to go to bed. There had been some difference of opinion between the doctors as to whether he should undergo an operation for his arthritis in view of his general weakness owing to arterio-sclerosis but the King himself had eventually decided against it. Though still quite capable of mental energy King Ibn Saud is drifting into senility and has periods when his mental processes seem to be retarded and which may almost be described as "coma." The doctors are apparently of the view that though the King may live for some considerable time, he may suddenly die. Yet so long as he lives, however much power may slip from his grasp it will never be possible to introduce the reforms which are essential to enable the country really to profit by the golden stream from oil and perhaps to take her eventual place as a civilised and progressive Moslem State. The King's prestige and the reverence in which he is held will preserve the façade of his régime. But behind the façade trusted but incompetent and venal advisers, old and new, are largely enriching themselves instead of increasing the general welfare and standard of living of the people.

6. The primary objectives of Ibn Saud's primitive desert administration were to maintain the subjection of his ancestral lands and the other lands he had conquered and to collect revenue. These two objectives were and are inextricably mingled; and even now that the oil revenues have given the State great and increasing resources and have increased the largesse available for payments to the tribes to keep the peace, the Saudis continue to extract every penny from the previously major but now relatively minor source of revenue—the pilgrimage. The fortuitous circumstances which have hitherto resulted in a continuously increasing annual revenue from oil seem to the Saudis to be the natural order of things and their demands on the oil company, on the pilgrims and on foreigners in general increase with every increase in the revenue they obtain. This revenue is only used, to a limited extent, to strengthen the administration of the country, to educate and train Saudis technically and administratively, to improve health and other services, to encourage agriculture, to establish secondary industries or to endow the country with a system of communications and public utilities designed to yield an economic return. On the contrary, it is

mainly squandered on personal extravagance, on the building of palaces for princes, on such luxuries as an airline which is mainly used for official passengers and can never pay its way; and on other prestige projects such as the Dammam-Riyadh railway which seem unlikely ever to pay an economic return. Moreover, every project costs far more than it need both to build and to operate because of the universal graft and corruption associated with it. Such development as has taken place has been mainly engineered by British and Americans with great difficulty and usually by gaining the King's personal interest.

7. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to think that no useful development has taken place or that some of the benefits from oil do not eventually reach the mass of the people. Health services are improving, communications and public utilities are being built and developed, more subsidies are available for the tribes, and the people of the towns are being brought more and more into contact with the products of the industrialised West, are getting high wages, and are able to pay for a sufficiency of food at least. The rich and the bedu as classes are both getting more and for doing no more work. Indeed apart from the sad waste of resources which could be put to useful purposes the most distressing aspect of the present situation is the demoralisation which has affected every stratum of society—the avid desire for money for nothing which has hitherto been only too easily satisfied by the oil company.

8. One aspect of this demoralisation has been the decline in religion, though the outward observances to a large extent continue. But in a country where strong drink and such immoral amusements as cinemas are forbidden one finds the Minister of Finance often drunk, the young princes generally known to be drinkers and the night air hideous with the sounds of privately-owned projectors showing Egyptian films. The Amir Talal, the favourite younger prince, has openly constructed a cinema in the grounds of his new villa in Jedda. The rulers and the upper classes may appear no longer to bother to set a good outward example; but disoriented by the stream of gold and the march of events they are only too willing to fall back on their nominal religion to save themselves both the trouble of introducing a reformed administrative and legal system and to maintain for themselves the advantages of an obsolete social order. Despite the striking development of

trade, commercial disputes are still determined by the Sharia law which better fitted conditions of a past age. Despite the influx of automobiles and refrigerators the Saudi is still amenable in theory (and if poor and of no account in practice) to such penalties as the severance of a hand for theft or stoning to death for adultery.

9. The radical change in the Saudi scene has been brought about by oil produced by Americans and specifically by the Arabian American Oil Company—Aramco. It is hardly therefore surprising that American influence and ways are penetrating the country to an increasing degree; or that Aramco is now a dominating economic—and perhaps political—influence in Saudi Arabia. British influence and aid were afforded to King Ibn Saud in consolidating his kingdom. It seems not unlikely that it will be American aid and influence which will support his son with both advice and economic aid. Dr. Samuel S. Stratton has arrived in Saudi Arabia as Director of Technical Co-operation and it has been announced that he will, with the aid of about thirty-five other Americans, work with Saudi officials in formulating plans for technical co-operation in economic development and will direct the Point-Four programme in this country. Some of these officers have already arrived and although they may meet with much obstruction from the King's advisers as long as he lives and though the latter will feather their nests out of the funds allocated to any projects which are actually brought to fruition it is not inconceivable that the power and position of this body will increase when the Amir Saud comes to the throne. In addition there is the number of Saudi and other merchants who are tied to America by business interests and there is the influence wielded by the presence of Americans at the established Dhahran Air Base and the potential influence of the American military mission to be set up at El Kharj in due course when the American arms promised to the Saudis begin to arrive.

10. Saudi Arabia is a country ringed by territories under British control or influence, yet there are relatively few Britons in the country itself—almost all included in the Locust Mission and the commercial commercial community in Jedda. For the Saudis in Hasa a foreigner is an American and the Saudis are used to them. Philby—who has had vast experience of this country—says that the Americans have killed xenophobia by acting as though it

did not exist. A relationship between Saudi and foreigner has been brought into existence entirely different from the British idea of hushed intrusion on old customs to be respected and preserved.

11. In this American invasion one may well ask where present-day British interests within the country come into the picture. Apart from old-established agency firms or other agencies for the import of British consumer goods, businesses which will have carefully to guard their laurels or give way in time to Arab firms as the latter acquire more knowledge and seek control of lucrative business, there are four British engineering firms operating tenuously in Saudi Arabia. Whether or not they shall operate at all depends at present on the intrigues behind the throne and the money which the Minister of Finance can spare after satisfying the Royal Family, himself and those of the King's entourage who may have the King's ear. It would seem also that they may increasingly depend on the direction of American influence in the country and, not least, on whether they are able to command the supply of requisite materials and machinery from British sources with which favourably to compete with others. As long as American enterprise is so firmly entrenched at the source of wealth it seems unreasonable to expect that in the long run British enterprise will obtain much more than the work which it may suit the Americans to leave to it either for reasons of economy or convenience. Great Britain still has friends in Saudi Arabia, led by the King, but this friendship stems mainly from past personal contacts when the British influence alone was important to the régime, and it has been maintained under the moral influence of the King, guided by the principles of his religion. The sudden advent of wealth has released the latent materialism which tends to find friends only amongst those who can undertake, while themselves gaining from, the development of Saudi wealth. Great Britain now has little or no place in this *galère*. We have little to offer but diplomatic advice. America is putting in advisers free of charge and American enterprise is causing money to flow into the hands of those who run the country. It would seem that only a major upheaval and change in policy could now lessen this interest.

12. It may be as well, however, to note the difference between American and British practice in the aiding of the backward countries of this area. The most striking

example on the British side is Iraq. That country employs and pays for its British advisers and gets its money's worth. The American advice and assistance to Saudi Arabia is an organised gift and will, therefore, while being used if the Saudis find some personal advantage therein, carry less value and influence than the advice bought by Iraq. The advisers in Iraq are part of the governmental machinery; the advisers in Saudi Arabia seem likely to be a more easily removable foreign body.

13. From the broad view of Western defence and the development of the Middle East to heighten the standard of living and to withstand communism, the maintenance of American interest and influence in Saudi Arabia, if it is steadfast, appears to be most desirable. We may, if only because of our considerable influence in countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, retain a position of respect and regard but I feel we should not delude ourselves into thinking that we may at the present stage much participate in economic development unless it should suit the Americans deliberately to bring us into it (and Aramco do not, to do them justice, seem by any means averse to this). Later, if Saudi Arabian development continues and the demands of rearmament on United Kingdom production decreases, there may yet be increased opportunities for United Kingdom enterprise to enter this market when, as is likely, the Saudis themselves learn more how to control their own affairs. To this end we must be patient and I hope all possible will be done at home to ensure that the British firms operating here are enabled to maintain a foothold. If, as I understand is the case, Saudi Arabia is now regarded as a "dollar saving market" it would seem advantageous to give special treatment to those British exporters who wish to hold and expand their markets here.

14. There is, to my mind, one thing that could alter the picture. This would be the introduction of British oil interests into the country. I have been told by the Deputy Minister of Finance that the Government intends shortly to exert pressure on the Arabian American Oil Company to relinquish much of their unexploited concession area and that there are other likely areas over which no concession rights are yet held. There has been expressed to me the frank desire to get these areas exploited and producing wealth. Should British enterprise seek and succeed in participation, British economic interests in general would

no doubt benefit and British political influence be quietly strengthened.

15. I have frequently heard it said that there is danger of the Saudis playing the Americans and ourselves against each other. But the very fact that we wish to maintain a solid Anglo-American front, in all except perhaps commercial competition, itself tends as things are at present to weaken our political influence in this country. Where the United Kingdom and the United States talk with one voice, with the growing American influence in the shape of Aramco, diplomatic and consular staff, and Point-Four officers, the tendency will be to take this voice as being the voice of America; in matters of concern between only us and the Saudis the tendency will be for the latter to seek for American pressure to be borne on us. Some warning of this may even be read into the King's recent pointed remarks to me when obliquely referring to the frontier problem. He said that differences between himself and the Americans were always resolved by discussion but that countries which did not follow a straight policy would cease to be his friends.

16. While the Americans do not particularly like to be used in this manner and they at least give lip service to the idea that they should not alone be the exploiters and guides, in fact they do little to help us maintain a position. In practice, while the local American authorities headed by the United States Ambassador are openly helpful and co-operative in most matters, they exhibit an extraordinary sensitivity to possible Saudi resentment at a joint Anglo-American front and are averse to any action that might in their view give this impression.

17. I do not propose to say much in the present despatch about Saudi Arabia in relation to countries other than Britain and America. But (after remarking in passing that the educated and semi-educated professional classes of Egypt and the Lebanon are playing an interesting part in the development of Jedda, and perhaps of other parts of the country, on Levantine lines) I would mention that Egyptian influence arising out of her dominant position in the Arab League and the anti-Hashemite obsessions of King Ibn Saud, to say nothing of her ubiquitous press, is a serious factor in the determination of Saudi foreign policy. King Ibn Saud is, however, a realist and is fully aware that the fundamental enemy of his own country and religion and of the Arabs in general is not Western imperialism or Israel but Russian communism. He seems

now to believe that the best protection both against this menace and of his oil revenues lies primarily in friendship with America, and while doing everything possible to secure an accommodation between the Arabs and the West, in the last resort and in the very unlikely event of his being faced with a simple choice, he would, I think, be with America rather than Egypt.

18. Finally, in a consideration of the vast changes now under weigh in Saudi Arabia, one question inevitably poses itself: "What will happen when the King dies?" Mr. Scott Fox wrote an able appreciation of this problem in his despatch No. 149 of 6th August, 1949, with which I generally agree. The Crown Prince Saud shows every sign of quietly consolidating his position, as far as he is able, while his father remains alive, and I have been told that unobtrusively he more and more performs internal administrative duties which formerly his father would not delegate. He appears to have effected the removal of the main military strength from the Hejaz to Nejd where it will be more under his control and where it may be trained by the aid of an American mission. His tastes inasmuch as they are not oriental are American and he has spoken to me of his desire to modernise and develop the country. As far as my observation goes he and his brother, Prince Feisal, the Viceroy of the Hejaz and Minister for Foreign Affairs, are friends. My view is that the latter, whose health is indifferent, would prefer to continue his present rôle in support of his brother rather than to endeavour to usurp his position. Moreover, I should think that Feisal is intelligent enough to realise that an upheaval would probably do him no good. It has been suggested to me that Mohammed, the King's third son, who lives much with the tribes, might cause a revolt or that the Amir Saud bin Juluwi might seek to rule Hasa as a separate kingdom. To my mind neither of these moves is likely as long as Saud does not immediately seek to curtail the considerable power of bin Juluwi or interfere with his brother's mode of life. Prince Saud's troubles may more likely be with the King's trusted but rather unworthy Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleiman and his venal assistants and with some of the King's advisers. But all these appear to be friendly with the Prince who would, I feel, be wise enough to make no sudden dismissals. Indeed my impression is that when the time comes Saud may be inclined to lean on American support and

assistance and only pare off the old régime as it can be replaced by something better; and even in this he may require some pushing. Change in fact is most likely to come not through the conscious drive of Saud as a reformer but through the pressure of economic development; and he may thus gradually give way to the institution of delegated controls which can be demonstrated as enhancing his own security.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Damascus, British Middle East Office (Fayid), Bahrain (Residency), Washington, Tel Aviv and Tripoli.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 1942/4

No. 23

THE SUCCESSION QUESTION IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Pelham to Sir J. Bowker. (Received 17th April.)

Jedda,

(1942/2/52. Secret) *6th April, 1952.*

Thank you for your letter No. ES 1942/1 of 14th March about King Ibn Saud. I have already to some extent anticipated your request for an assessment of what is likely to happen in the event of his death in my Top Secret reply dated 16th March to the communication referred to in your paragraph 3; and in paragraph 18 of my despatch No. 47 of 24th March, so part of the following may seem repetitive.

2. I agree with your prediction that Saud will probably succeed without a struggle. But though he will inherit all Ibn Saud's dignities it is less certain that he will acquire all his father's authority. Even now Saud is not the man his father is, and still less the man his father was. Unlike his father he will enjoy neither the prestige of an Arab conqueror in the grand poetic tradition, nor the veneration due to an irreproachable Moslem. In a more complicated situation without either the opportunities or the talents of Ibn Saud he will live in the shade of his father's reputation.

3. Yet this, though unglamorous, is unlikely to be fatal to him, for none of the King's sons have inherited the King's peculiar blend of shrewdness and fire. The inheritance of a settled Kingdom should more than outweigh the deficiencies of Saud's personality. If the succession question does not split the kingdom—and I do not believe that it will—there is at present no other reason of sufficient potency to do so. One of the most interesting points of speculation is the question of Prince Saud's relations with the present King's advisors. It is expected that he will maintain them in their positions, replacing them only gradually, or as they die. It is probable, however,

that there will for a time be a gradual, almost imperceptible, slackening of control from the centre. This might be a double consequence of Prince Saud's undistinguished personality and the desirability of making some concessions to the power and ambitions of certain notables, both Royal and otherwise. But in my opinion there would be a more fundamental cause which is nothing less than the growing complexity of the economy and government of the kingdom.

4. Amongst the Arabs personality will never be a negligible consideration, but its position of dominance in a primitive society is giving way in Saudi Arabia before a common ignorance of modern administration and an almost universal incapability in the face of technical and perhaps social developments which occupied many decades in Western European history. Midas-like they are cursed by their own wealth. This is not to say that the Arabs will not learn, for they have throughout their history shown a remarkably high degree of adaptability, but at present the rate of change is too swift to give them much opportunity to catch up. Much will depend upon the employment and influence which the Saudis accord both to Americans and to other more experienced Arabs. Yet whatever this may be there must, I think, in the approaching years be some greater degree of decentralisation which will not necessarily be conducive to efficiency.

5. As for the effect of Prince Saud's succession upon Anglo-Saudi Arabian relations, it is, I feel, unlikely to be great. We shall inevitably lose something of Ibn Saud's personal (and ostentatious) regard for certain of our national characteristics; but his

policy has always followed the star of self-interest. Prince Saud is by all calculations likely to be guided by the same star. The state of Anglo-Saudi Arabian relations will continue to depend upon the demonstrable power and prestige of Britain and an avoidance or smoothing of friction between the two countries. American power, both military and economic is at present most conspicuous in Saudi Arabia. As long as this continues we may expect America to have the predominant foreign influence in the country. In Saudi Arabia power and influence are directly connected.

6. No more than in the general situation of Anglo-Saudi Arabian relations is the accession of Prince Saud likely to have a marked effect upon the course of the frontier dispute. The death of Ibn Saud will tend to remove the personal antagonism between the ruler of Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Shakbut of Abu Dhabi, but it may also weaken the mutual respect between the King of Saudi Arabia and the ruler of Qatar. The frontier question, however, is no longer, if it ever was, a personal dispute. It has become a subject for Governments and a matter of national prestige. Above all, it is an affair of oil (with all the unhappy suspicions that this subject seems to breed), and therefore of self-interest. Whatever the personalities of the parties concerned

the character of the dispute will scarcely be altered.

7. Apart from the effect on internal administration already discussed the chief consequence to be expected from the replacement of the present King by Prince Saud is in a diminution of the personal authority of the King of Saudi Arabia in the Arab and, to a lesser extent, in the Moslem world. In particular we shall lose one of the few Arab statesmen who both realises the Communist danger and has the courage and authority to act as though he does. But in other respects Saud's lack of personal authority may be largely overlooked in consideration of the vast wealth of his kingdom. This is another example of the growing eclipse of personality by administration and technology, in short, by the complexities of the modern State. Saud's power, like almost everything else in Saudi Arabia, will depend upon oil, and perhaps not merely upon oil but upon a constantly expanding economy based upon rising oil revenues. If, for any reason, this situation were to be altered, then most of the premises of this letter would have to be reconsidered. Even the prestige associated with the control of the Holy cities might not then save him.

I am sending copies of this letter to Rapp and Hay.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 1112/2

No. 24

SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGET, APRIL 1952-MARCH 1953

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 12th May)

(No. 57 E.)

Jedda,

Sir, *29th April, 1952.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy in translation of the Saudi Arabian Government's budget, for the year Rajab 1371 to Rajab 1372 (April 1952 to March 1953), which has just been published in the official organ of the Government, Umm al Qura No. 1409 of the 18th April, 1952.

2. In form this budget shows little advance on its two predecessors of 1948 and 1951-52. Except for the Minister of Finance's forceful and sound accompanying circular letter (copy attached to the enclosed⁽¹⁾), which is an innovation, the budget is still little more than an elementary statement of what the Government roughly expects to receive and to spend in the coming financial year. In

intent however it clearly demonstrates a more serious effort than did the previous rather farcical budgets, to grapple with the immense problem of bringing the finances of the Government under control. On the expenditure side departments of the Government have this time been called upon to give fairly exactly their requirements and proposed disbursements and, so long as the author of the budget, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, Najib Bey Salha, retains the effective control he recently resumed over budgetary matters, there is some reason to believe that most of the departments concerned will be kept within their budgetary limits. The principal exception in this regard is bound to be in the Riyadh Affairs section of the budget, under which fall the expenses of

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

the Royal palaces, Princes, and Royal Diwan, and the tribal subsidies. In the 1951-52 budget the Riyadh Affairs Office was allotted in total about 150 million rials out of a total budgeted expenditure of 490 million rials. In the event, according to Najib Salha, the office overspent to the extent of about 50 million rials. This year the same section of the budget has been relegated to second place on the expenditure side: it has been allotted only the same total as last year, 152 million rials, whilst the allotment to development constructional works has been increased to a total of about 230 million rials out of a total estimated Government expenditure of 758 million rials. In addition it is proposed, according to Najib Salha, to abolish the semi-independent Riyadh Affairs Office so that the Ministry of Finance might have a little more direct control over the flow of money through the bottomless Riyadh bucket—and also, manifestly, so that more power might fall into the hands of Najib Salha at the expense of his rival Sheikh Mohammed Suoor, the author of the two previous budgets and the official in charge of the Riyadh Affairs Office.

3. The budget thus marks some advance (though there is still nothing comparable to a Civil List) and there is some justification for the claim in the accompanying General Review that it is a development and constructional budget. I shall refer later in this despatch to the noteworthy items on the expenditure side. On the revenue side the principal point of interest is the 50 per cent. or so increase on the estimated 1951-52 revenue: the current budget estimates a revenue at around 730 million rials (approximately \$200 million dollars at the present Jeddah rate of exchange), compared with the previous budget's estimate of 490 million rials. This great increase is partly the result of a genuine increase in revenue but largely the result of more accurate forecasting: as reported in Jeddah despatches Nos. 53 and 76 E. of 22nd May, 1951 and 22nd July, 1951, respectively. Oil revenues in 1951-52 were greatly underestimated in last year's budget. In the present budget (as in last year's) the main oil revenue element is concealed under the item "Income Tax." At 350 million rials this item constitutes the largest on the revenue side—and is a monument to the energy of Najib Salha in squeezing money out of the foreign firms operating in this country. Most of it will be derived from the Arabian American Oil Company, from

whom, according to Najib Salha, a total in tax payments, royalties and rentals of \$160 million is to be expected in the budget year. In fact this may, according to the same source, rise to between \$180 and \$200 million dollars if the Government gain their aims in the resumed negotiations with the Aramco later this month.

4. The budget is also more realistic than its predecessors in that it openly acknowledges the probability of a deficit, estimated at 26 million rials, although this is covered by an item called budget savings on the revenue side. As there is no National Debt or funding of debt in this country a deficit simply represents expected over-spending. On past experience it will probably be an under-estimate, but against it can be put the expected increase in oil revenues and, according to Najib Salha, probable under-spending on some of the constructional schemes as well as the "Budget Savings" item. Also it is, on past experience, extremely unlikely that the Government will devote as much as the budgeted 100 million rials to the repayment of debts. The Minister has also pleaded, in his circular letter, for economies and savings to avoid over-spending and, if possible, to create a reserve. Najib Salha claims that they have, in fact, now a running reserve of between 80 and 100 million dollars in undrawn Aramco tax payments, which are always paid in arrears. This, however, is hardly a reserve in the normal sense and is already taken into account on the revenue side of the budget.

5. On the expenditure side of the budget the list of constructional projects contains many new items though none of importance that have not previously been publicly discussed. 55 million rials have been allotted to the proposed Riyadh-Jeddah railway, the total cost of which in the five years it might take to build, is expected to be between 550 and 750 million rials (between 150 and 200 million dollars), according to Najib Salha. The much talked of and much needed Jeddah sewage scheme has been budgeted for, at 6 million rials. Buildings for the new army base at al Kharj, near Riyadh, and the two ammunition factories under construction by French firms at the same place, have been allotted 87 million rials. This is in addition to the Ministry of Defence's own budget allocation of 48 million, its subsidiary Aviation Department's allocation of 13 million rials (mainly for Saudi Arabian Airlines), and

the 10 million rials allotted separately to continued development of Saudi Arabian airfields. Work on the proposed Mecca-Taif road, which was surveyed by the American firm of International Bechtel Inc. last year, is supposed to be begun this year and has therefore received an allocation of 2 million rials. The programme also contains provisions for the expenditure of 14 million rials on new mosques and improvements to the Holy places in Mecca and Medina, and provision has been made in the Posts and Telegraphs budget to allow a start to be made on the proposed reconstruction and expansion of Saudi Arabia's internal and external telecommunications system.

6. The new Ministry of Health, under its young and active Minister, has had its budget increased considerably to 21 million rials (compared with 6½ million rials last year), in addition to which 4 million rials has been allotted for the completion of the Jeddah Quarantine complex, and 8 million rials for the building of the several new hospitals planned by the Minister. The Directorate of Agriculture, on the other hand, has had its budget reduced from 7·3 million rials last year to the miserable sum of 1·3 million rials this year, although agriculture is bound to benefit from the various water conservation and supply schemes listed separately and allotted a total of 23 million rials, and a good deal of agricultural development expenses in this country is now being met by the F.A.O. The upkeep and development of private farms and gardens has been allotted separately 2½ million rials under the cloak of "agricultural expenses, land adjustments and loans to farmers." Industrial projects, including the Minister of Finance's pet soap factory in Jeddah, and technical schools, are to receive no more than 1 million rials in total: a fair comment on the Government's lack of interest in developing secondary industries in this country. The only industry the Minister is really interested in is the Government's gold-mining scheme in the Nejd which, in the view of Najib Salha and other observers, is a waste of money. The Minister's belief that he will soon have a rich supply of gold from these old mines, from which he will be able to mint his own gold coins, has not, however, prevented him from being persuaded to purchase recently the 1 million Saudi Arabian gold guineas minted for the Government in France last year. Part of the cost of these and possible further sup-

plies together with possible further supplies of rials from Mexico and other currency purchases are budgeted at 30 million rials on both the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget.

The main features of this budget are thus the great increase in estimated expenditure, largely on account of Public Works, Defence and Public Health; and the limited advance it represents in intent, if not in form, on previous budgets. I should mention that the American Point-Four Financial Adviser and newly-arrived budget expert were consulted in the later stages of the preparation of this budget, and it was on their recommendation that the Minister publicly announced, in the above-mentioned circular letter, that in future he intended to impound departmental savings and to create a reserve fund. Also it was on their advice that mention was made, in the same letter, of the Government's proposed new Monetary Agency, about which I shall be addressing you separately.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the head of the British Middle East Office, the head of the Development Division at Beirut, the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, the Political Agent, Kuwait, the Treasury representative in the Middle East, the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, and the Treasury.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure in No. 24

Government Budget for the Year, 1371-1372

		REVENUE	
		S. Rials	S. Rials
(a)	Cattle Zakat	400,000	
	Fruit Zakat	2,500,000	
	Chattels Zakat	2,500,000	
	Machinery and Factories dues	30,000	
			5,430,000
(b)	Income Tax	350,000,000	
	Estate Tax	600,000	
			350,600,000
(c)	Residence dues	600,000	
	National Registration fees	8,000	
	Passport dues	500,000	
	Revenue stamp fees	1,300,000	
			2,408,000
(d)	Legacy Registration fees	7,000	
	Documentary Certifica- tion fees	5,000	
	Notary Public fees	800,000	
			812,000
(e)	Quarantine dues	6,000,000	
	Port dues	4,000,000	
	Harbour dues	1,180,000	
	Airport charges	270,000	
			11,450,000

in Arab lands and our countries can help each other. This leads me to express the sincere hope that whatever differences may arise from time to time with regard to matters under discussion between our two Governments, these will be settled in a spirit of friendly compromise which would accord with our long-standing and close relationship.

"I know your interest in the achievement of a satisfactory solution of our differences with Egypt, and I can assure you that I too should like to see such a solution. It would be a great contribution to the settlement of the problems of the Middle East. We are doing our best, and I hope that, as

in the past, you will continue to exercise your moderating influence.

"I am grateful for the help given by Your Majesty to promote wise solutions of the matters concerning Her Majesty's Government in the Middle East and I am strengthened by the knowledge of your support and friendship."

2. In view of your report [of April 15th] that an important source of Ibn Saud's disquiet may be his fear of some federation of the Persian Gulf States under Iraqi hegemony, you may assure him and his advisers orally that this is not contemplated by Her Majesty's Government.

ES 1013/1

No. 26

ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION IN SAUDI ARABIA: FURTHERING OF LOCAL BRITISH INTERESTS

Mr. Eden to Mr. Pelham (Jedda)

(No. 46. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *12th May, 1952.*

I have read with great interest your Excellency's despatch No. 47 of 24th March and wish to thank you for your clear analysis of the difficulties confronting British interests in Saudi Arabia to-day and the conflicting factors affecting Anglo-American relations there. Although the general picture is one that has grown familiar in recent years, there are certain matters brought out in your despatch on which I wish particularly to comment.

2. I note in the first place the difficulties to which you refer in regard to the maintenance of a solid Anglo-American front in Saudi Arabia. I do not, however, believe that British interests in the long run stand to lose by close co-operation with the United States. Indeed, such co-operation throughout the Middle East in the spheres of defence and development, and particularly in regard to oil, is essential, and it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to promote it by all possible means. As you know, Her Majesty's Government avail themselves of every opportunity for the closest co-operation with the United States Government in these vital matters, and I appreciate the efforts by which you contribute to this end.

3. This collaboration need not prevent Her Majesty's Government from giving full support to direct British interests in Saudi

Arabia. The heavy demands on United Kingdom resources made by the rearmament programme make it difficult at present to strengthen our commercial position in Saudi Arabia. But every effort must, as you say, be made to maintain a foothold in the spheres both of trade and engineering works until increased material strength enables the United Kingdom again to expand her activity. In this policy your local support for British enterprise must be backed by an adequate supply of materials. To this end I, for my part, will take such steps as may be possible to ensure favourable consideration of requests for exports to Saudi Arabia.

4. The possibility of the entry into the Saudi Arabian oil industry of British interests has been under consideration in this Department. It would furnish a welcome means of strengthening our position in Saudi Arabia. I consider, however, that such entry should be effected by arrangement between oil companies, backed if necessary by an understanding between the Governments concerned, rather than by some independent move by a British company. I shall inform you of developments on this subject.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

ES 1051/8

No. 27

ANGLO-SAUDI ARABIAN RELATIONS

Audience with King Ibn Saud

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 23rd May).

(No. 65. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *14th May, 1952.*

I have the honour to report that, on receipt of your telegram, No. 214 of 8th May conveying a personal message from yourself to King Ibn Saud, I immediately requested an audience. In reply His Majesty sent me a message to say that a special aircraft would be placed at my disposal on 13th May. To avoid the heat I flew very early that morning, accompanied by my wife (on the King's special invitation) and Mr. Thomson, and arrived at Riyadh at 9 a.m.

2. I was received by the King at 10.30 a.m. and, after the usual courtesies obtained the King's permission for a careful translation of your message to be read out by the interpreter. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Khalid Bey El Qargany were present.

3. His Majesty, who appeared to be in very much better health and spirits than any time since I have been here, listened intently. While at this time he showed little emotion he expressed his appreciation of your courtesy in sending him such a welcome message. Saudi Arabia and Great Britain had always been friends. From the beginning he had been on the side of the British, standing by us, as Mr. Churchill had put it, in the darkest days and nights during two world wars. He did not wish to appear to be boastful but he was the leader of the Arabs and, of them all, our original ally. We would do well to stand by him. If we wished him to be a friend his wholehearted friendship was ours; if not, there was nothing he could do about it.

4. Before he died, said the King, he wished to leave the kingdom, which he had conquered by the sword, in proper order. He wanted only his rights which were as clear as the sun. With particular solemnity he said that he required only the proper and full-spirited observance of two treaties which we had made with him, the treaty with Sir Percy Cox and the treaty with General Clayton. His Majesty was presumably referring to the Treaty of 1915 and the Treaty of Jedda of 1927. He declared broadly that the former treaty gave him from Kuwait to Oman. He had had occasion recently to tell the Persians that Bahrein was an Arab territory. Bahrein,

he said, was independent. He had a half share in the Kuwait Neutral Zone. He had a letter from a former agent of ours in Bushire acknowledging his grazing rights and overlordship in the disputed territories in Muscat and Oman.

5. Apart from one contemptuous reference to Abu Dhabi the King confined further talk on the frontiers only to Muscat and Oman to which he vaguely returned several times (Sheikh Yusuf Yasin said later that only that morning the King had received news of improper activities by our agents in the Buraimi district). He had a right to various lands there because they were granted to the present occupants by his grandfather, his father and himself.

6. Addressing me in a personal manner the King said that he rested great faith in me. He appointed me his agent and gave me his power of attorney. Half seriously he begged me to be the arbitrator of the dispute, to go through the treaties, to give him nothing but what was in the treaties but to give him all of that. He would not consent to the loss of an inch of land which rightfully belonged to him. If it was a question of oil he had given us the first chance at this and we had refused. It was petty to argue over a few acres when he asked only for his minimum rights. Even if he had asked for more he would have expected the British Government to be generous. He had become so entangled in the mesh of friendship with us that he could not think of other peoples. He was an old man and was thinking of making his will and was thinking of making Great Britain his executor to look after his people.

7. Being able to get a word in I said that it was of course my duty to represent His Majesty's views to my Government. Regarding the matters of which he had spoken I begged him to observe that passage in your message which expressed your sincere hope that all matters under discussion would be settled in a spirit of friendly compromise which would accord with our long-standing and close relationship. I made further remarks about the great sincerity of your message and added that it had come to your ears that His Majesty was disquieted by fears that Her Majesty's Government

would support some idea of federation of Persian Gulf States under Iraqi hegemony. I was authorised to assure him that no such thing was contemplated by Her Majesty's Government.

8. The King felt so energetically on this subject that he several times interrupted the interpreter and I had some difficulty before I could be assured that he had got this message correctly. He expressed great animosity towards the Regent Prince Abdulillah and Nuri Pasha who were unjustly ruling over his brethren in Iraq. It was solely because of his respect for our susceptibilities that he had not invaded Iraq. If we would step aside he would settle the matter. Abdulillah had had the colossal cheek to suggest, about three months ago, that he, the King, should meet him aboard a yacht in the Persian Gulf. This to an old and sick man, the true King of the Arabs, and after Abdulillah had been trampling around the Gulf trying to whip up opposition to him. Even Abdullah had been better; he at least had come to Riyadh. Why did the British Government allow Iraqi newspapers to make propaganda against him and even claim the province of Hasa?

9. The King referred to newspaper articles and gave instructions that I should be given copies of the offending portions. I will report on this in a later despatch.

10. The King interspersed his bitter remarks with friendliness and courtesy towards me and, having vented his spleen, said rather heartily that he was afraid he had talked too much and exhausted me and that he was now hungry. This ended the morning audience.

11. At 9 p.m. I was called to a further audience. (During the interval Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had handed to me the Arabic text of a reply to your message, a translation of which I transmit to you herewith.) Owing to the great heat, by which however the King seemed to be unaffected, this audience was held in an open courtyard. The King was very affable. He said he had little to add to what he had said earlier; the important thing was that we were friends. He again went over some of the ground but this time laid no stress on his grievances and became more emotional about friendship between our countries. I must, he said, and so must the Government led by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden which he welcomed, know how to distinguish between true and false. He had always stood by us and we should examine the records carefully and know how to deal with our friends.

12. I again recommended to His Majesty the study of your message and the strong spirit of friendship evident therein. I mentioned the impending visit to England of the Amir Abdullah Faisal. The King expressed great pleasure at the invitation by Her Majesty's Government and discussed it most cordially. He expected that his son Prince Faisal would be able to return to Saudi Arabia in about three weeks time. The young prince could then go and he hoped that the uncertainty of the date would not be too inconvenient.

13. On my requesting permission to leave, the King said that he was glad I was now going to England and could fully represent his views and explain his position. Only the question of the boundaries stood between us. This was a great hurt to him since he prized our long-standing friendship. He expressed confidence that a solution which he could accept would be found and urged all possible speed.

14. This despatch is being hastily written to catch a bag which leaves but a few hours after my return from Riyadh. I should, however, add that, after my first audience with the King, I had a talk with the Crown Prince. He, although not present at the audience, had already read your message and praised it highly. He desired that I should transmit through you, Sir, his greetings and best wishes to Her Majesty the Queen, and to add expressions of regard and esteem addressed to the Prime Minister and yourself. He piously hoped to God that our differences would soon be solved, the important thing was that our friendship should endure.

15. On the afternoon of 13th May my wife visited Umm Talal, the King's favourite wife, generally known as the Queen. In the course of conversation Umm Talal asked my wife why Great Britain was not so friendly these days. The King was very worried and had been talking incessantly of this. The Americans were very friendly but we, their old friends, seemed to be falling away and niggling in an undignified manner over areas of land which had for generations belonged to the Saudis. My wife told Umm Talal that the main purpose of my visit was to deliver a message of sincere friendship from you, Sir. This greatly cheered the Queen, who hoped that the King would not now be so worried. There was another matter, she said. The B.B.C. were constantly broadcasting news and comments about the other Arab countries, for instance about King Faisal and the Prince Regent of Iraq. She

and the King listened to the B.B.C. Arabic broadcast practically every day but nothing about Saudi Arabia was ever mentioned. Would we see if this could be rectified? It would please the King to feel that we did not take so much more notice of other countries than we did of Saudi Arabia.

16. It is unusual for Arabs to discuss affairs with their women-folk and as the Queen had not seen the King that day I do not think that her remarks were inspired. They seemed to show that much of the King's worries are real and genuine to him however exaggerated and unfounded they may be. I venture to suggest that some special effort be made to ensure that from time to time some pleasant mention of Saudi Arabia may be made in the B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts and, when possible, in the English news broadcasts. The latter are monitored and reported to the King. It would be particularly suitable if, when it takes place, the visit of Prince Abdullah Faisal to England might be given such publicity.

17. To conclude, I should say that, while the King used many fanciful terms of speech which should not be taken too literally, I think he was undoubtedly sincere in his meaning. He has a basic friendship for us and is anxious to maintain it. I think he also believes that we are not giving him his due, not that we are trying to cheat him but that we are niggling and should be generous. There was no real sense of an impending explosion but the King made it quite clear that he considered he was being unjustly treated and implied that his honour was involved. I regret that he never mentioned the word compromise nor responded to my references to that portion of your message in which the word occurs.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Bagdad, Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bahrein and the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure in No. 27

Riyadh, 12th May, 1952.

I have received with great pleasure the message from His Excellency Mr. Eden, my dear friend, a pleasure which is doubled because the message has reached me at a most difficult and important time.

2. I experienced a feeling of pleasure in the expectation that questions outstanding between us and the British Government would be solved when the Government in Britain was taken over by a Ministry headed by Mr. Churchill and including your Excellency in the important office of Foreign secretary. And I welcomed most warmly and still do so the friendly message which you sent when you assumed office. The sentiments which your Excellency expresses in your friendly message are the same as those entertained by me: and I am endeavouring, for these reasons, to strengthen my friendship with the British Government.

3. I do not hide from your Excellency that my astonishment was extreme when I saw a succession of events affecting me and my country happening in the sight and hearing of the British Government. This made me concerned for the friendly relations which have existed between me and the British Government since my earliest days. These claims of the Gulf Sheikhs which are supported by the British Government to territories which belong to me now and belonged to my fathers and ancestors before me. These repeated actions of British officials among the tribes and in places whose peoples owe allegiance to me and to no one else. And these activities which are being pursued in some of the Sheikdoms by persons from neighbouring countries. All this at a time when our discussions with the British Government to solve the differences about frontiers have gone on a long time without result. We have been unable to reach a solution whilst British officials and propaganda are at work in those places. Detailed information about this has already been given to Her Majesty's Ambassador at our Court.

4. It is a fact that it is my right and the right of the friendship which subsists between me and the British Government and you personally that I should be reproachful and attribute blame. For, while I have always done and am still doing everything in my power not only to maintain the friendship between me and the British Government but also that between me and them and all those of importance in the Middle East—while I have been and still am continuing these efforts, I see these things happening against an intimate friend who all the time is doing his utmost to maintain the friendship.

5. I should like to assure your Excellency that my former efforts are still continuing to do what is possible to solve the Anglo-Egyptian question. The important thing is

that I should know the way in which your Excellency thinks these actions and occurrences on the borders of our country can be brought to a halt; and the just way in which the problems on the frontiers can be brought to an end. I await with impatience

a solution of these problems. I have great hopes of your wisdom and friendship. There is no one who welcomes more than I the maintenance of the friendly spirit to which your Excellency gives expression in your kind message.

ES 10393/1

No. 28

SAUDI POLICY TOWARDS THE HASHEMITES

Mr. Riches to Mr. Ross, Eastern Department. (Received 30th July)

(No. 1942/5/52. Secret) *Jedda,*
23rd July, 1952.

In your letter ES 1942/4 of 14th July you asked for my views on whether the Amir Saud is likely to inherit any or all of his father's animosity against the Hashemites.

2. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of his letter 1942/2/52 of 6th April to Bowker the ambassador expressed the view that the Amir Saud was likely to be guided by the same star of self-interest that his father's policy had always followed; and that the frontier question had ceased to be a personal dispute and become a matter of national prestige. I think that Saudi policy towards the Hashemites may be described in similar terms, and I do not therefore expect the Amir Saud to introduce any personal change in that policy when he ascends the throne.

3. I think it fair to say that even Ibn Saud has never allowed his natural belligerency and personal dislike of the Hashemites and their minions such as Nuri, to lead him into an inflexible policy of antagonism towards Jordan and Iraq, when his clear self-interest in having peaceful relations with his Northern neighbours has dictated otherwise and no loss of face was involved. As you know he very quickly established a *détente* with Jordan when circumstances permitted. If circumstances arise which might enable the Saudis similarly to improve their relations with Iraq, without losing face, I should expect them to seize the opportunity whether Ibn Saud or the Amir Saud were

then on the throne—with the one reservation that, under the Amir Saud, such a move would carry less authority and be less sure-footed than if Ibn Saud were behind it. The Saudis, who have a guilty conscience over the Hejaz, are well aware of the superiority of the Iraqi armed forces over theirs, and they are equally aware that Iraqi oil production and revenues may soon become as important as those of Saudi Arabia. The resultant fears and suspicions, exacerbated by the ingrained Saudi-Hashemite distrust are, to my mind, the factors which will continue to determine Saudi policy towards Iraq, rather than any personal animosity the Amir Saud may inherit from his father. The story of Hashemite perfidy and irredentism will doubtless live on in Riyadh for many generations; but, in any case, new personalities and fading memories (and such previously important factors as the settlement of the frontier tribes) on the Saudi side, are not, of themselves, likely to produce any immediate change in Saudi-Hashemite relations. If of course when the Regent and Nuri leave the Iraqi scene, Iraqi policy were to become more flexible *vis-à-vis* the other Arab States a rapprochement between the two countries might be easier to achieve as part of a general strengthening of Arab co-operation as a whole.

I am sending copies of this letter to Rapp, Hay, and Beeley.

D. M. H. RICHES.

EA 1084/143

No. 29

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR

Mr. Eden to Mr. Riches (Jedda)

(No. 103. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, 30th September, 1952.

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador called to see me to-day to talk about Buraimi. He

said that he had decided to fly to Riyadh, leaving here on 3rd October in order to discuss the question with King Ibn Saud. He hoped to be able to induce him to agree

to a settlement of the incident by the withdrawal of Turki bin Ataishan and his armed retainers, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the levies. He said it would help him if I could give him a letter referring to King Ibn Saud's message and to the Ambassador's journey, and expressing confidence that a solution would be found after the Ambassador had discussed the question with His Majesty.

2. I told the Ambassador that the despatch of levies to the Buraimi area and the flights made by aircraft had been forced on us by the armed incursion of Turki bin Ataishan. Her Majesty's Government,

however, had no wish to keep levies in the area or to send aircraft to fly over it, and they would be very ready to withdraw the levies as soon as Turki bin Ataishan and his armed retainers departed. I thought this would provide a sensible settlement of the incident which would hold the position until we could agree to a delimitation of the frontier. I thanked the Ambassador for undertaking a journey to Riyadh, which I felt sure would be most helpful, and said I should be glad to give him a letter on the lines suggested.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

EA 1084/234

No. 30

SAUDI FRONTIER DISPUTE

Audience of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires with His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on 9th October, 1952

Mr. Riches to Mr. Eden. (Received 21st October)

(No. 117. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, 11th October, 1952.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a record of my audience with His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud at Riyadh on 9th October.

2. Accompanied by Mr. Thomson, I left Jedda at noon on 9th October and some three and a half hours later was met at Riyadh airport by Sheikh Yusuf Yassin. I was informed that the King was waiting for me and, without the customary formality of changing into Arab dress, I was immediately conducted to His Majesty's presence.

3. King Ibn Saud seemed in relatively good health and appeared more active and cheerful than at the time of my last visit to Riyadh. His Majesty's voice gained in volume and vigour during the audience and at times he spoke with great vehemence, particularly when he declared that Bureimi was his land and that never would he withdraw Turki bin Ataishan nor permit any derogation from his right or honour. His Majesty also spoke with great earnestness when referring to his old friendship for Britain. But at no time did he recognise that there was any cause for dispute or suggest any way of settling the matter privately between our two Governments except by talking with Sheikh Yusuf Yassin. Again he did not use the word compromise, or even so much as hint at it. His whole position was that he was right, we were

wrong, that he would not withdraw and that our action was endangering our old friendship upon which he still set the highest store.

4. It is possible that Sheikh Yusuf's evident anxiety to conclude the audience was due to a fear lest the King's vigour of expression might make agreement impossible. There is, however, no reason at all to suppose that Sheikh Yusuf is more favourably inclined towards us than the King; but he was clearly worried about the Saudi military position and anxious to achieve a standstill agreement.

5. On the evening of 9th October I dined with Sheikh Yusuf. The other guests were Khalid Al Qarqani, Mr. Thomson and the interpreter Abdul Aziz bin Muammer. Yusuf told me that he had been instructed by the King to inform me that the Saudi Arabian Government had at no time reinforced Turki bin Ataishan in Bureimi. When we had cut his communications with the coast, supply columns had been sent through from Hasa and the guards had naturally been armed, but they had always returned to Hasa with the trucks. Yusuf said that the drivers had been instructed not to pass through Abu Dhabi territory, but he conceded that it was possible that they had done so by mistake. Yusuf later returned to the point saying that he wished to emphasise that reinforcements had never been sent to bin Ataishan and that as yet no

preparations had been made to reinforce him. He put the Saudi forces in Bureimi at about thirty men. He wished to make it clear that in the last ten days bin Ataishan had not made any move which was provocative or likely to excite the tribes.

6. Yusuf said that telegrams from Turki which had reached the King just after my audience with him had very much perturbed His Majesty. It was reported that a force of fifty men sent by the Sultan had reached Hillah (presumably Bureimi village), the seat of Saqr bin Sultan. A meeting had then taken place between the leader of this force, Saqr and the British officer commanding the levies, as a result of which it was decided to move the latter from Al Ain to the village of Umm Qatra with the intention of cutting bin Ataishan's communications with Hasa. When pressed to say where Umm Qatra was, Yusuf eventually thought that it was north of Bureimi on the way to Abu Dhabi.

7. Turki had also reported that the Sultan had sent appeals to various tribes asking them to meet him in Sohar on 10th October. Turki believed that an attack upon himself was intended. Speaking rather excitedly, Yusuf declared that Turki had received instructions to resist force by force. If any Saudi were killed, His Majesty would order a general mobilisation to defend himself. The situation, said Yusuf, had now reached a critical point.

8. I explained and elaborated your message, omitting, however, as I had done in my audience with the King, any reference to the "engineer" about whom we have received no information. Yusuf showed no more disposition to understand our position than the King had done and recited much the same arguments. In particular, he laid great stress upon the novelty of the claim of the Sultan of Muscat to part of Bureimi, saying, indeed, that up till now he had made no such claim. As usual, Yusuf wanted to have everything both ways. On the one hand, it was Mr. Wilton's visit to Bureimi in March that had constituted the first movement of forces, but, on the other, the Saudi protest on this occasion did not amount to a recognition that Bureimi was a matter of dispute.

9. I again urged upon Yusuf your proposal for a mutual withdrawal of forces by both sides, but Yusuf merely replied that he had nothing to add to His Majesty's statement that he refused to withdraw Turki. He declared that it was up to us to stop the developing spiral of events (the meaning of

the word Bureimi is a spiral) because we were the stronger Power.

10. Khalid's only contribution to the discussion was a statement that our cutting off Turki's supplies was an aggressive act and that we were encouraging Muscat to be aggressive. He added that His Majesty and all his advisers wished to settle the matter in a friendly way. The meeting ended when I said that other than joint withdrawal there seemed to be no solution but that the Saudis might wish to give me something other than a blank refusal the following day.

11. On 10th October I had a private talk with the American Ambassador, who had already been kept in Riyadh for some days, partly on account of the Bureimi situation and partly because of prolonged negotiations over the legal terms of the agreement to cover the functioning of the proposed American Military Mission in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Hare told me that on 4th October, acting on instructions from the State Department, he had proposed mutual withdrawal of all forces by both sides, but he had found the King adamant in refusal. He had even declared that it was better that Turki should die than that he should be withdrawn. The next day Mr. Hare had made the personal suggestion that there should be a standstill at Bureimi, a restoration of normal conditions and an immediate reopening of negotiations. On 6th October the State Department had telegraphed their endorsement of this suggestion.

12. I re-stated the position of Her Majesty's Government to Mr. Hare and explained to him that in our view a restoration of normal conditions meant the withdrawal of Turki. I also endeavoured to allay the fears aroused in him by an unconfirmed State Department report that we intended an air reconnaissance to observe the reported Saudi troop concentration at El Kharj. Mr. Hare told me in great confidence that Yusuf had admitted to him that Abu Dhabi territory had been violated, though by mistake, greatly to the King's anger.

13. Mr. Hare said that his chief pre-occupations were to encourage a speedy settlement of the dispute and to avoid United States mediation in it. He made it a rule not to enter into discussion with the Saudis on the merits of their claims. He also told me that Yusuf had consulted him more than once about his proposals.

14. On the evening of 10th October I had a second meeting with Yusuf Yassin and Khalid al Qarqani at which Yusuf handed me a communication, a full translation of which I enclose, embodying the Saudi counter-proposals. It was no surprise to see that these were exactly Mr. Hare's proposals. Yusuf said that the Saudi Government had approached the United States Government with a request for mediation. He understood that the American Government had endorsed these proposals.

15. I questioned Yusuf as to what was meant by the phrase "normal movement" in paragraph 6 (a). He replied that we had restricted the movement of tribes; by that he meant that we had tried to prevent them from acknowledging their loyalty to King Ibn Saud. I then pressed him on the question of the passage of armed Saudi forces through Abu Dhabi territory, both that in dispute and that which was undisputed. Yusuf replied that the proposals were a matter of principle and that when the principle was accepted the details could be amplified. On my asking him what his understanding of the proposals was, Yusuf declared that they meant that no armed forces were to be moved by anyone or under any name. All forces were to stay where they were at present. The supply position was to revert to normal, no restrictions should be put upon supplies, whether they came from Hasa or Dubai or from elsewhere. He was emphatic that no reinforcements were to be sent by any party.

16. I enquired what had been meant by various Saudi references to the Treaty of Jeddah justifying their claim to Bureimi. Were they referring to the text of the treaty or to letters exchanged at the time? Yusuf confirmed that they relied solely on article 6 of the treaty.

17. I again attempted to get Yusuf to consider your proposals for mutual withdrawal, explaining they achieved our common object of pacifying the situation even more effectively than did the Saudi counter-proposals. The normal conditions Yusuf was proposing was only the stabilisation of an abnormal situation. He refused, however, to consider this point.

18. I returned to Jeddah on the morning of 11th October.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and the head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid and three copies to the Political Resident at Bahrain.

I have, &c.

D. M. H. RICHES.

Enclosure in No. 30

His Majesty King Abdul Aziz has been and still is eager to preserve his friendship with the British Government and he never thought that he would ever meet with such an attitude from the British Government in so far as concerns his rights in his country and the country of his fathers and forefathers before him.

2. His Majesty the King has taken no action whatever at Bureimi or any of the areas attached to it which conflicts with the provisions of the Jeddah Agreement or with the provisions of the London Agreement of 1951. On the contrary, the British Government itself has taken actions which conflict with what she admitted in the Jeddah Agreement and which are not in keeping with the spirit of friendship between the two countries.

3. The Saudi Arabian Government has no knowledge that the Sultan of Muscat has any claim in Bureimi, the Sultan of Muscat had no existence in Bureimi before and the Saudi Government deny any right to him or any other than the Saudi Arabian Kingdom in that area.

4. The Saudi Arabian Government have not sent fresh forces to Bin Ataishan at Bureimi and the lorries that Turki bin Ataishan received recently are only provisioning lorries. All that was said about preparations to reinforce Bin Ataishan with Saudi forces is untrue. In fact the instructions given to Bin Ataishan are that he should endeavour to calm the situation in the area and prevent any gatherings around him so that a quiet situation may be established in that area, thus helping to solve the problem.

5. The Saudi Arabian Government mentions with regret that after Mr. Riches, the chargé d'affaires of the British Embassy, Jeddah, had communicated the verbal message from Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to His Majesty the King about stoppage of aircraft from flying over Bureimi and stoppage of other actions, His Majesty received information about concentrations arranged by the Sultan of Muscat in the direction of Sohar and his planning to attack Bin Ataishan at his place and the undertaking of other actions likely to disturb relations. The Saudi Arabian Government wish to state that, should this be carried out, it means that the differences have reached a climax which will force the Saudi Arabian Government to take all means to defend her rights and honour.

6. The Saudi Arabian Government expressed her desire to solve the problem by negotiation with the British Government and, when the difficulties and problems increased on the side of the British Government, the Saudi Arabian Government was compelled to ask the American Government to mediate with a view to a solution of the dispute. His Excellency the American Ambassador at Jedda, Mr. Raymond Hare, has put before His Majesty the King a proposal consisting of three items, and that is—

- (a) The British shall remove the restrictions and obstacles imposed by them (such as flying low over Bureimi, stopping the supply of provisions and restrictions on normal movements), it being understood that the Saudis are also to desist from provo-

cative actions. In other words, life is to revert to its normal course.

- (b) The two sides shall remain at present at Bureimi and maintain their present positions.
- (c) After that discussions will be resumed between the British and the Saudis.

His Majesty has provisionally agreed to these proposals, it being understood that provisioning the parties of the two sides in that area does not conflict with these proposals, and that the foregoing applies to those in whose name Britain acts.

7. The Saudi Arabian Government sincerely hopes that a spirit of friendship and wisdom will prevail over the actions of the British officials in the Gulf areas so that it may be possible to cross this stage of difficulties which have arisen between two friendly countries.

ES 1051/16

No. 31

ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 4th November)

(No. 122. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *29th October, 1952.*

I have the honour to report that I presented my Letter of Credence from Her Majesty the Queen to His Majesty King Ibn Saud on 20th October.

2. I flew to Riyadh early on 20th October accompanied by Mr. Thomson and Mr. Towlson, and had an audience of His Majesty lasting about thirty-five minutes, on the afternoon of the same day. Also present at the audience were the Amir Feisal, Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, Sheikh Khalid al Qarqani and Rushdi Bey Malhas, the King's secretary. His Majesty graciously accepted my letter of credence declaring that it was a beloved letter from a beloved person about a dear friend.

3. This remark set the tone for the whole audience during which the King expatiated upon his friendship for Britain, twice declaring that she was his oldest friend. He appeared to refrain deliberately, sometimes with a conscious effort, from discussing political questions. When I mentioned the standstill proposals for Bureimi which His Majesty had put forward he waved aside the subject. Indeed, he never mentioned Bureimi by name except once to deny that there had been an incident there. I told the King briefly of your instructions to me to which he replied that the Amir Feisal

who stood in his position and knew all he knew would discuss business with me. I reminded His Majesty that when I had last seen him in May he had given me his power of attorney and that I had, as was my duty, stated his views in London where he had old and tried friends in Mr. Churchill and yourself. The King responded warmly to these sentiments and said that I still had his power of attorney to bring about a just settlement of our differences.

4. Differences and disputes, the King remarked, would arise even between friends. I replied that the important thing was to solve them by means of friendly negotiations. In this case we had a difference, and it was no use going back to the origins and causes of the dispute with mutual recriminations, we must just recognise that a dispute existed and do our best to solve it. Yes, said the King, it had happened. Having thus for the first time specifically admitted that a dispute existed he embarked upon a long disquisition in the course of which he said he could think of no good reason for the dispute, and if I could show him how he had offended he would be glad to rectify his fault, but he could not, of course, do anything derogatory to his honour. Finally, however, he begged me not to reply at present, but to discuss these things with Prince Feisal.

5. This speech showed signs of having been prepared, and as soon as it was delivered his counsellors betrayed an impatience to conclude the audience which I did shortly afterwards. Immediately afterwards Yusuf Yassin remarked to me that the audience had been "very good." I gained the clear impression that if they did not intend to be actually conciliatory the Saudis were at least anxious to avoid friction. Not once, *mirabile dicta*, did the King refer to his ancestral lands and he did not complain, as he had done ten days previously to Mr. Riches, that the British had surrounded his men and were dubbing him an aggressor. It was hopeful, too, that the King instructed the Amir Feisal to discuss things with me rather than merely the argumentative Yusuf Yassin. It seemed clear that your acceptance in principle of the standstill proposals had reduced the former crisis atmosphere in Riyadh to something calmer and more reasonable. Yet the relaxation in tension did not imply any change in the fundamental Saudi attitude. There was no hint that any concessions would be made, and a good deal of irritability was at least pretended at the delay in resuming discussions. However, I spoke as instructed in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 542 of 12th October and Yusuf Yassin later said that I had made a good impression.

6. The same evening I dined with the Amir Sultan, a son of the King and the Governor of Riyadh. He is a pleasant but, as I thought, rather a shallow, self-opinionated young man. Amongst the other guests were Bashier Sadawi and Yusuf Yassin. In the course of this and former visits to Riyadh I have had some opportunity of observing the characters and personal relations of some of the King's principal advisers. It may be useful if I now give some brief description of their various attitudes.

7. Prince Feisal is a man of considerable personal charm and ability. He has a regal air about him which puts him above the mere scoring of debating points. He has travelled considerably and of all those who deal with foreign affairs he is the most reasonable and sympathetic to a Western mind. Unfortunately, he is disinclined to apply himself continuously to detailed work. His fundamental attitude is difficult to penetrate, for he is cynical and suave. I have no reason, however, to suppose either that he wishes to break the traditional

friendship between our two countries or that, apart from this, he is actively more favourably disposed towards us than the rest of the King's advisers. His Majesty King Ibn Saud himself is probably our best friend.

8. Yusuf Yassin, the deputy Foreign Minister, is in complete contrast to his chief in all save ability. He is a Syrian, and he appears never seriously to have deviated from his early career as an Arab Nationalist. I have little doubt that if he could manage it he would oust us from our position in the Persian Gulf and, indeed, from the whole Arab world, but his opposition to us is not greater than that to other Western nations. Nor does he display his antipathy in ordinary conversation in which he is quite lively and shows a pungent sense of humour. His reputed meanness (he remarked incidentally that he would soon be one of the richest men in Syria), disrespect of persons, and stiffness in argument are frequently the object of good natured but pointed comment which he receives imperturbably, and often manages to turn rather neatly. In political discussion, which is the very breath of life to him, he is always persistent, dogmatic and occasionally excited. In our recent discussions he quoted Talleyrand rather appositely and may well fancy himself in the rôle. It is certain that he has a firm grasp of realities and respects power more than any other material thing.

9. Khalid al Qarqani, who in the absence of Yusuf takes his place, is a milder, less peremptory, person. Though of more or less equal status with Yusuf he does not often intervene, but when he does it is usually to explain or palliate Yusuf's dogmatism. Certainly he is less fond of making debating points than the latter, but I should suppose that his political views, though expressed less forcibly, are much the same.

10. Of the King's other counsellors his brother, Prince Abdulla, seems to have a prominent position; and then there is that curious trio of exiles, Rashid Ali, Bashier Sadawi and Jamal Hussein, all of whom are usually supposed to be anti-British. However, though they are all three much respected (the King set the fashion, jokingly, of calling Bashier Sadawi "our father") and consulted on Arab affairs they are none of them of the King's daily council, and it is not observable that they have any direct effect on policy. Yet their mere presence helps to create the atmosphere that Riyadh

is a centre of a pure movement asserting Arab and Moslem claims. The Crown Prince seems to have a less independent mind than King Ibn Saud and may, when he comes to the throne, be more swayed by them than his father is.

11. One afternoon I went under the conduct of Philby to visit Dariyah the ancient Saudi capital until it was destroyed by Mohammed Ali's troops in 1819. The well-preserved ruins, which are only now beginning to be re-peopled, are impressive and give substance to the King's proud claims for his family.

12. Apart from this excursion my time and that of my staff was fully occupied in struggling with the difficulties, including hopeless corruptions in telegrams, of trying to work an office in my bedroom in the Palace in Riyadh and, of course, with the negotiations on which I am reporting separately.

13. When these negotiations were completed, and I had signed the document with the Amir Feisal, I had a second audience of the King on the afternoon of 26th October. As in the previous audience, His Majesty seemed to be in reasonably good health and though he spoke in his customary hoarse whisper there was no weakness about it. Indeed he assured me that the various doctors who had seen him had pronounced that all his organs were sound; and he said that for a man of seventy-three his health was reasonable.

14. After the preliminaries were over, I said that it was satisfactory and promising that we had been able to reach an amicable agreement in our present little difference, and that if I sometimes appeared to quarrel with His Majesty's counsellors I was at least as assiduous in presenting the Saudi views to my Government as I was in putting the British views to His Majesty's Government. I said that I was anxious to make it clear to His Majesty that all we desired was a just solution to a problem that had never been settled, the problem of the boundaries, and that we did not favour our other friends more than His Majesty who well knew our true feelings towards him.

15. Thereupon His Majesty launched into a long exposition of his position, which was so nearly identical with that given me immediately afterwards by the Amir Feisal, who was not present at the audience, that it is not worth reporting them separately. It was clearly an agreed statement. First, His Majesty very earnestly assured me that whatever else he might do he could not as a

true Moslem possibly tell a lie. Then there was a re-affirmation of friendship for Britain, our oldest friend, which was supported by a query as to whether British policy had altered, for Saudi policy certainly had not. I reassured His Majesty on this point. Then he said that his claims to Oman, or, as he put it (and I think it is a significant distinction), to the people of Oman, were not new, they were at least 200 years old. These people had been his subjects even when he had been in exile in Kuwait; the continuity had never been broken. He was not making these claims because he expected material advantage from them. Far from it, it was the people of Oman who benefited from being his subjects as he gave them liberal presents. Both the King and Feisal stressed that they sought no material advantage and both complained at the British attitude which they said was unreasonable in a friend. The causes of these present differences were of negligible importance to Britain whereas they were of vital concern to Saudi Arabia.

16. The King said he would give up anything in order to maintain his friendship with Britain except one thing only. This thing he divided into three branches which he specified as his honour, his religion, and the welfare of his people. He made it clear that each and all of these were involved in his claim to the Oman tribes. His honour because he must protect his subjects, his religion (as Prince Feisal explained at greater length) because the Oman tribes whom he claimed, were Sunnis like himself, whereas the counter-claimants were heretics, and the welfare of his people, because the tribes appeared to desire to continue in their Saudi citizenship. The only way in which these obstacles could be overcome would be for the tribes to declare that they did not wish to be his subjects. That was why he proposed a plebiscite. The King said that this should be carried out by a tripartite commission including the Americans because when one had a difference with a friend it was natural to consult other friends. If the tribes declared against him he would be quite satisfied. Indeed he stated very emphatically that it would be a "blessed event" as it would put an end to our differences.

17. I have reported this statement at length because it is the fullest and most coherent explanation of the Saudi position which I have yet heard. In making it I thought the King and Prince Feisal were sincere, though obviously stressing the

points which favoured them. The point about religion was new as a specific argument and may be worth very little. Feisal connected it with a demonstration which he said had been made in Riyadh by weeping tribesmen from Oman beseeching the King to go to the rescue of their persecuted brethren. He also said that feelings in Riyadh had been much stirred by events in Bureimi, and that the religious leaders had spoken strongly on the subject. While this argument may be little more than a bogey with which to scare us, yet even without any real substance it could become extremely dangerous if it were given wide publicity.

18. For the rest, the King's statement emphasises once again the Saudi inflexibility where questions of tribal loyalty are concerned. I am tempted to believe the King's own protestations that he seeks no material advantage in this claim. I am sure he is not concerned with oil in itself, but with the dignity of being the great Arab King. In this distinction I feel there may lie some means of accommodation.

19. In the King's scale of values, and I think probably in that of his two senior sons, honour comes incomparably higher than a desire for more wealth. The superficial modernity of the oil-wells, football matches and air conditioning sets make it more difficult than ever to realise how remarkable an institution is the court at Riyadh. It seems to resemble very much a competent medieval court with Ibn Saud playing the part of Henry II or an Edward I. In such an atmosphere, which is basically the atmosphere of Arabia, personality is of great significance and the King's personality is of

paramount importance. In the case of Ibn Saud his personality is strong enough to make itself felt in the furthest recesses of Oman. He exercises a magnetic attraction upon a very large number of Arabs because he embodies so many of the virtues they consider most noble. To be a subject of Ibn Saud is not a position of servitude, but one of honour and very likely also of profit.

20. The King I am sure feels this very strongly and is determined to be, in all respects conformable with Arab tradition, the father of his people. No doubt as his reputation has grown, so has his conception of who are his people. But, given the character of the King, that is really irrelevant, for once something has become a matter of honour with him it is automatically removed from the field of possible controversy.

21. I am not sure whether it is possible to separate territorial rights and oil concessions from tribal sovereignty, but I am certain that on the latter point we will find Ibn Saud passionately adamant. The King, however, would I think go a long way, if it were consistent with his conception of honour, to retain our friendship. His advisers I think would not go nearly so far. Such thoughts as these were behind the arguments set forth in my telegram No. 4 from Riyadh which I at present see no reason to modify.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to Washington, Bahrain, Muscat and the British Middle East Office (Fayid).

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 1013/2

No. 32

SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 26th November)

(No. 133. Secret)
Sir,

Jedda,

19th November 1952.

I have the honour to put before you my appreciation of some fundamental aspects of the present situation in Saudi Arabia. The recent crisis in the long standing differences between Her Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government on the question of the frontiers of the Saudi kingdom provide both an occasion and an opportunity for probing the potentialities of Saudi Arabia and the intentions of her rulers.

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2. In my despatch No. 122 of 29th October I endeavoured to delineate the principal characteristics and attitudes of those persons in whose hands the conduct of Saudi foreign policy lies. I attempted to show that their ability and strength of will is of no ordinary kind. Yusuf Yasin, for example, is driven by his love and instinct for power to be greedy for what most men would regard as excessively arduous labour. Now after centuries of obscurity the resources and instruments of policy available to the rulers of Arabia are

beginning to match their abilities and their ambitions. Nevertheless, it is to the personalities of the King and his principal advisers that one returns again and again in considering Saudi foreign policy. This, no doubt, is partly due to the forcefulness of these personalities, but it is also a consequence of the peculiar structure of society in Arabia.

3. The classical Arab class structure with distinct and almost unconnected strata of society which is becoming much blurred elsewhere in the Middle East still subsists in Arabia and is likely to continue with little change. At the top of the pyramid is the small and all-powerful ruling class. Below it but almost entirely separate from it are the rich merchants of the cities, below whom are the utterly down-trodden, the porters, slaves and servants. Then again, quite separate are the bedouin. This form of society is not intrinsically very strong since there is no cohesive bond to bind the various classes together save a common interest in amassing wealth and possibly a common interest in security. But nonetheless, the individual elements of it are stable, and since the only disruptive element, the new and largely foreign middle class of clerks and professional men, is unlikely to be allowed to grow to a position of much significance the various strata which compose this society are likely to remain happy and quiescent so long as the oil revenues do not diminish.

4. Such a society clearly facilitates the manipulation of foreign policy. It is unnecessary to take account of a public opinion which in this field simply does not exist. There is, moreover, no fear of internal dissension or even unrest. Philby said that when he asked the Crown Prince what his opinion of recent events in Egypt was the answer came "we manage things better here. If anyone dares to raise their head we cut it off." There can be few foreign ministers who have not sometimes reflected that their task would be easier were they the servants of a despotic power. Saudi Arabia is undoubtedly a despotism, albeit a benevolent one, and therefore the makers of foreign policy are able to mobilise all the existing resources of the country as they please. In my Secret letter No. 1942/2/52 of 6th April to Sir J. Bowker, I gave it as my opinion that the accession of the present Crown Prince would have no very large effect either on the internal or on the external position of Saudi Arabia. The events of this summer,

which I am reporting separately, have shown that the Crown Prince has acquired an even greater grip upon the country than previously and I have therefore less reason than ever to suppose that Saudi policy will change significantly upon the death of King Ibn Saud.

5. Outside the peninsula, Saudi Arabia has few problems. King Ibn Saud maintains his traditional feud with the Hashemites, or at least with the Iraqi branch of the family. His advisers, however, and perhaps he himself play upon this theme rather in the hope of eliciting a statement or promise from Her Majesty's Government than in any real expectation of Hashemite aggression. The information contained in Mr. Furlonge's Secret letter of 29th September from Amman that King Ibn Saud is paying the medical expenses of ex-King Talal demonstrates the quiet influence which Saudi wealth may acquire particularly in a part of the world where payment for "extra-curricular activities" is so common.

6. The Saudis have devoted much attention to cultivating the non-Hashemite countries in the Arab world. Dr. Jamali's remark reported by Mr. Evans in his letter No. 1071/52/52 of 20th September that "Syria was at present run by the French Military Attaché aided and abetted by the Saudis" probably has some truth in it.

7. As for the threat from Russia it is too remote to be urgent or particularly frightening. The rulers of Saudi Arabia are certainly sincere in their anti-communism, but they are content to let the weight of combating the menace rest upon Western shoulders.

8. It is with the peninsula of Arabia itself that the Saudis are principally concerned. Geographically speaking the peninsula is a single entity and it is largely the accident of history that it is divided into a number of separate states; but the power and wealth of these states is quite disproportionate. It would seem to be in the logic of history that the vast central mass of Saudi Arabia, with a present revenue of about two hundred million dollars and a great possibility of increase, should absorb the petty states on her periphery. I have no doubt that she would have done so already had it not been that all these states are to a greater or lesser extent under the protection of Her Majesty's Government. If these states are to be maintained in their independence, British or some other power must be put into the scales against Saudi

power. In the past the Wahhabi or Saudi hegemony in Central Arabia has been frequently disorganised and has always been poor, it has therefore not required much more exertion on our part than naval patrolling to maintain the integrity of the littoral states. Now, however, Saudi Arabia is, on the Middle Eastern scale, becoming a powerful nation.

9. The corollary to this is that more British power must be exerted on the periphery of Saudi Arabia if the scales are to be kept even. There is much cogency in the dictum contained in Sir Roger Makin's Report on a Visit to the States of the Persian Gulf that "Her Majesty's Government's mission in the Persian Gulf cannot be carried out on the cheap."

10. Moreover, Britain is the only foreign power of importance established upon the periphery of Saudi Arabia. There is no counter irritation to distract the Saudis, nor any natural ally upon whom we might rely. Recently another great Power, the United States, has entered the area. This Power has no territorial interests in the Arabian peninsula, but it has great economic and strategic interests both of which depend, or so the Americans judge, upon the goodwill of Saudi Arabia. It is therefore natural that the Saudis should seek the support of America against us and natural that the Americans should listen. We are fortunate that it is with America that we have to deal with and not with some other Power.

11. This, I believe, is the trend of events, but the course they take and the speed at which they develop naturally depend upon the instruments of policy employed. The Saudis possess in varying degrees the two classical and direct instruments of policy, wealth and force. I have already indicated how their wealth may be used abroad. At home a not inconsiderable proportion of it is being expended upon the production of force.

12. As you are aware, the first contingent of a permanent American Military Mission has begun work in this country. Their object is to organise, train and equip a Saudi army of over 17,300 men, some 16,000 of whom are to be combat troops. An Air Force consisting of an air transport and fighter force is also to be established. The whole programme is designed to be completed in a four-year period, and the first delivery of aircraft is scheduled for this year. There is already a considerable number of Saudis training as

pilots in Britain, America and Egypt. In addition, Eastern Department letter No. EQ 1193/23 of 2nd July reports that the Saudis are planning to acquire a miniature navy consisting principally of two motor gun boats and four motor torpedo boats.

13. The whole of this force is, of course, on a very small scale and is no doubt fully justifiable with a view to defence of the oilfields against a possible Russian attack. Nevertheless, the implications of its mere existence upon our positions in the Persian Gulf, in Muscat and in the Aden Protectorate should not, I feel, be neglected. In the first place the force will be fully at the disposal of the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it is by no means negligible and possibly upon occasion may even be superior to the forces which we deploy in the same area. The army and air force are to be based at Al Kharj and the bulk of the navy will probably be kept in the Persian Gulf. The Saudi forces will thus easily be in a position to impress wavering sheikhs.

14. The indirect instruments of policy at the disposal of the Saudi Arabian Government are less impressive, but may, nevertheless, upon occasion be of considerable value. The Saudis may be able to embarrass us by appeals to the United Nations or to the Arab League but of more practical importance is the influence which they may attempt to exert through America.

15. My appreciation of the instruments of policy available to the rulers of Saudi Arabia is not meant to imply that the Saudis will use these instruments in any very decisive or clear-cut manner with the object of supplanting us in the littoral states. But I find it difficult to suppose that this is not the ambition of some at least of the King's advisers, and Ibn Saud himself would no doubt be gratified by such an enhancement of his position which in any case he tends to regard as his by right.

16. The Bureimi incident illustrates the process of Saudi expansion which I think we may reasonably expect to continue so long as a definite settlement has not been reached. In previous communications I have stressed that time is on the Saudi side. There is no need to labour the obvious, but it is equally clear that it will be expensive to us in many ways, including probably a loss of prestige, if we have constantly to prepare for and meet a Saudi expansionist movement. Only abdication of our position

or a definite, total and speedy settlement can save us this expense. I believe that such a settlement would be respected by the Saudis, and it would in any case provide us with a more secure basis for the maintenance of our position.

17. If a settlement is so much to our advantage the question then arises whether the Saudis would be prepared to come to a reasonable agreement. Here I must once again return to the personalities of those who control Saudi foreign policy. I have previously said, and still believe it to be true, that where King Ibn Saud supposes his honour or his religion is involved he is most unlikely to retract, yet I believe that he is genuinely anxious for a settlement in his own lifetime. I very much doubt whether the same can be said of some of the others, for example, of the Crown Prince and Yusuf Yasin. They may very well be tempted to continue the process of attrition which thus far has proved so successful. I am sure that Yusuf Yasin, the Arab nationalist, would gain great satisfaction in attempting to out-imperialise the imperialist. That is my principal reason for hoping that the Amir Feisal and even the Crown Prince can be persuaded to take a serious interest in the frontier question and give scope for the influence of Ibn Saud's basically friendly attitude.

18. Nearly forty years ago on 10th August, 1913, the Viceroy of India telegraphed his views. "As long as Ibn Saud confined himself to Al Hasa he could be ignored with impunity. Such a policy, however, cannot in our opinion safely be pursued now that there is a possibility of his interference in El Katr, with the Trucial Chiefs, and possibly in Oman, where the rebellion may give him an opportunity for encroachment on Muscat territory Unless we come to some mutual and amicable understanding with the Amir, who has hitherto been friendly disposed towards us, the probability is that we shall force him to adopt an attitude of

permanent hostility, which cannot but react unfavourably on the chiefs of the littoral." I do not wish to seem importunate, but I feel that the time has fully come for some more precise agreement than the treaty of Jedda which should preferably cover all the boundaries from Kuwait to Aden. In the absence of such an agreement the permanent temptation of the petty coastal states is causing the Saudis to drift dangerously close to an "attitude of permanent hostility."

19. To avert this and the consequences which would stem from it I feel that we must make proposals for a settlement, such as our suggested proposal of arbitration, which it will be difficult for the Saudis to refuse. In order to ensure their acceptance of our proposals and their final adherence to an agreement it may be necessary to make what we should regard as considerable concessions. I believe, however, that if done judiciously these would prove to be in every way an economy. For the same reasons it may well be necessary to make some display in order to impress the Saudis and the Sheikhs with our wealth and power. Finally, if we are to maintain our position in this part of the world we must base our influence more solidly which probably can only be achieved through the medium of a British oil company and preferably one operating, at least in part, in Saudi Arabia.

20. In brief, the conclusions of this despatch appear to show that however insignificant Arabia may be upon a world scale, yet it is now beginning to achieve a degree of importance which it has not known since the time of Muhammed, and in the process British interests are being undermined.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Bahrain, Washington and British Middle East Office, Fayid.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

leave the Hejaz to return to Riyadh after a stay of some three and a half months.

2. In his Secret letter to Mr. Ross, No. 1942/6/52 of 24th September, Mr.

Riches made a preliminary report on the increasing consequence and authority which is now being enjoyed by the Crown Prince. Since that time a spate of new orders and new appointments which seem to have the intention of reorganising the administration of the Hejaz have flowed from the Crown Prince's Diwan. It is my purpose to examine the significance of the Crown Prince's actions this summer and to assess their probable effect.

3. King Ibn Saud who, as it now seems probable, will never attend another pilgrimage in person, appointed the Crown Prince to lead this year's pilgrimage in his place. On 11th August the Crown Prince arrived in Mecca with regal pomp and ceremony. On 13th August he received the Diplomatic Corps in Jedda, and for the remaining two weeks before the pilgrimage he was busy receiving distinguished pilgrims and supervising the final arrangements. At the pilgrimage itself he is said to have lacked his father's easy comradeship with the ordinary pilgrims, but he joined his brother the Amir Feisal in personally directing the traffic and twice returned to Arafat to round up the stragglers.

4. He performed all the royal functions, both those of the monarch and those of the religious leader, in connexion with the pilgrimage. Immediately after they had completed their religious duties the pilgrims began to manifest their usual violent impatience to escape from this country, and the customary chaos seemed about to ensue. The Crown Prince intervened with a firm hand. All but two of the shipping agents were fined for not producing their ships on time, and nearly all of them were imprisoned, at least nominally. The Crown Prince personally did a good deal to relieve distress and he compelled others by force and example to behave in an unaccustomed spirit of Moslem brotherhood. The result was that the dispersal of pilgrims from the Hejaz was carried out with less suffering to the pilgrims themselves than has probably ever been the case before. No doubt this will have enhanced the prestige of the Crown Prince abroad as much as it has done at home.

5. The only shadow upon this bright reputation is the suspicion that the Crown Prince's efforts were the direct result of the King's command to him. There is no doubt that the general feeling is that the Crown Prince possesses only an imperfect reflection of his father's qualities. When Mr. Riches had an audience of the King on 9th October,

Ibn Saud was pleased to hear of his son's prowess, but remarked that he had ordered him to stay in Jedda until the pilgrimage was completed. The King added that he knew his son did not like it and was anxious to get back to Riyadh.

6. Whether the recent series of administrative decrees issued by the Crown Prince was also a result of an order from the King is more of a matter for speculation, but it is at least very possible. The King is known to have been disturbed at the tergiversation of the Shari'a Courts in the Hejaz and at the degeneration of morals allegedly brought about by the import of liquor. Certainly the Crown Prince could not have done what he has without the approval of the King, but in my opinion this by no means robs the Crown Prince of all the credit. He, too, was struck by the laxity of administration in the Hejaz; and, moreover, coupled with his ambition for the title of reformer are some genuine, though vague, ideas of how it is to be achieved.

7. The moral laxity he attempted to counter by offering a reward to anyone who could prove an offence against the royal decree forbidding the import of liquor, and by reorganising the moribund Societies of Virtue. This he did by creating the President of the Riyadh Society of Virtue, to whom a successor has now been appointed, head of all the Societies of Virtue in the Hejaz. I enclose a translation of the Crown Prince's order in the form of a letter to his brother the Viceroy of the Hejaz, conferring powers of summary punishment upon the new Head of the Societies in the Hejaz. Already there has been a campaign against the playing of music and other things obnoxious to the Wahhabis. At prayer times the coffee shops are now empty and the mosques full. The members of the Society of Virtue are said to be assisted by voluntary snoopers, and it is clearly the intention to extend the societies to the villages. This by no means amounts to a revival of Wahhabism, an event which I consider to be unlikely. Indeed the chief effect may well be a strengthening of the Crown Prince's personal position rather than a reformation of morals, for, as is the case with many other new appointments, the members of the Societies of Virtue seem likely to be his men. I have not heard that any penalties have yet been imposed by the new Head of the Societies of Virtue, and on the whole I think it unlikely that the moral policing which seems to be envisaged will either take an obnoxious form or become effective.

THE INCREASING PROMINENCE OF THE CROWN PRINCE, THE AMIR SAUD

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 3rd December)

(No. 142. Secret)

Jedda,

Sir,

26th November, 1952.

I have the honour to report that the Crown Prince, the Amir Saud, is about to

8. Another of the Crown Prince's innovations is an order directing all public employees to pray together at the correct times: each director or supervisor, "unless he is illiterate," is to lead his subordinates in prayer. The order declares that whoever fails to join the communal prayers will be penalised and his failure will be considered as a major fault. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is thus incapacitated from doing business at certain hours.

9. His Royal Highness has also demonstrated his piety by giving liberal grants to mosques, including one in the Lebanon, and by issuing orders for the opening of new schools and the support of existing Koranic institutions: he does not appear to have taken much interest in the new trade schools. In more practical affairs, however, he has eclipsed Abdulla Feisal by opening, with a vast display of ceremony, three new hospitals for which the latter was chiefly responsible. He has even put the brash Minister of Defence and Aviation in the shade by dining with great acclaim at the Officers' Club at Taif, by reviewing the Saudi army at Muna during the pilgrimage and by carrying out a detailed inspection of the Jeddah aerodrome which was reported at great length in the local press. The King reviewed a great military parade at Riyadh on 22nd October, at which he was so impressed by his air force that he donated a million Saudi rials to building it up. The Crown Prince and Prince Feisal have been swift to contribute half a million each.

10. In the purely administrative sphere the Crown Prince has not scrupled to interfere and reform as he sees fit, despite the fact that the King's second son, the Amir Feisal, is Viceroy of the Hejaz. He has issued an order reorganising the Public Security Department in a neat pyramid of authority. Scandalised, quite properly, by the appalling delays in the procedure of the Shari'a courts in the Hejaz, he has brought in two judges from Nejd to sweep them clean and has simultaneously issued a vast compendium reorganising the procedure of the Shari'a courts. He has decreed the abolition of stamp dues on Shari'a documents, declaring rightly that it is not in accord with Islamic precepts. He has promulgated a new scheme for the administration of pilgrimage affairs, which henceforth are to be controlled by a representative body entitled "The General Management of the Haj and Broadcasting." Apart from the fact that the scheme omits altogether any mention of broadcasting, it appears to have arisen out of the Crown

Prince's experience of this year's pilgrimage and probably for that reason seems to be more sensible and practicable than most of the other reforms. An example of the latter would appear to be an omnibus order reaffirming that the Ministry of Finance has, or should have, control over the budget and expenditure, establishing a Council for Economic Affairs, setting up a department to administer oil affairs, establishing a Directorate-General for Public Works which, incidentally, is authorised to employ suitable Europeans, ordering the reclamation of fallow land, the boring of artesian wells and the establishment of Co-operative Agricultural Companies, and finally the formation of a Directorate-General for Customs.

11. As a climax to his reforming campaign the Crown Prince has just opened a new session of the Viceroy's Consultative Council at which he had the pleasure of listening to several fulsome eulogies of himself. The council has been enlarged and considerably reconstructed. Five of the former members, including some of the most prominent, have been retired, eight have been retained and thirteen new members have been appointed. The members of the council are nominally appointed by the King but it seems very probable that the Crown Prince had a large share in the decision. The new members seem mostly to be wealthy merchants of the younger set who have become more or less familiar with the Crown Prince in the course of the summer.

12. It seems, however, that the coping stone to the Crown Prince's endeavours was refused by the King. The Crown Prince is said to have proposed that a five-man committee should be established in Riyadh which should be responsible to himself for Hejaz affairs. Had he achieved this the Crown Prince would indeed have been "in the saddle" as Philby said he already believed himself to be. As it is, his succession to the throne seems to be assured. There is no longer any hint of a rival.

13. I have never thought that the Amir Feisal would contend with his brother for the throne and though there are now persistent rumours of an estrangement between the two as a result of Saud's blatant invasion of his brother's province, I cannot suppose that it will become very serious, for Saud is too firmly in the ascendant and Feisal is too disinclined for exertion for there to be much risk of an open clash. It was noticeable that Feisal avoided the Hejaz as much as possible while his brother

was in residence here. Feisal's son, Abdulla Feisal, has privately admitted that he is out of favour and has lost power. It may well be that Feisal and Abdulla Feisal will fade away from the centre of the Saudi political scene when Saud becomes King.

14. Saud has considerably increased in stature and power since my Secret letter, No. 1942/2/52 of 6th April, to Sir James Bowker and I should not now expect him to have to make any major concessions or allow any slackening of centralisation when he succeeds to the throne. It is, however, still likely that there will be an increasing degree of *de facto* decentralisation, but this, as I said in April, will be the result of the growing complexity of the economy and Government of the kingdom.

15. The Crown Prince's relations with Ibn Saud's advisers and in particular with Abdulla Suleiman, the powerful Minister of Finance, are not altogether clear. Some of the recent reforms of the Crown Prince might be interpreted as an attack on Abdulla Suleiman's vast preserves, but equally an effect of them might be a strengthening of his influence, so much depends in Saudi administration upon the interplay of personality and the informal organisation of detail. I am inclined to think that though Abdulla Suleiman will lose some of his influence under the rule of Saud, yet he will maintain his present position for some considerable time and will only gradually be supplanted. In the main the King's advisers seem to be faithful to the King and few of the Court notables remained in the Hejaz to advise Saud. Those responsible, after the Crown Prince himself, for the recent series of decrees seem to have been relatively unknown persons in his entourage, such as his secretary and his postmaster. These men may later rise to greater prominence, but I do not think that Ibn Saud's trusted advisers will lightly be discarded. The Crown Prince is already used to them and knows their worth for, according to Philby, the inner council goes through what must be a tiresome process of discussing everything first with the King and then separately with the Crown Prince, when he is in Riyadh.

16. In brief, the changes which will follow the accession of the Crown Prince will be those of evolution, not of revolution or chaos. These changes will to an increasing extent proceed under their own momentum and by force of circumstances. In the primitive conditions of Saudi Arabia,

however, there is still much scope for the influence of the personality of the ruler.

17. The events of this summer have shown that the Amir Saud is determined both to reign and rule. His ideas of kingship are ostentatious and arbitrary. On visits to his harem he is announced by a wailing siren and escorted by a bevy of jeeps with fixed machine guns. Already, even in the presence of his father, he has been known to order the arbitrary and immediate execution of a murderer. But the manner in which he dealt with the pilgrimage shows that he is not without ability, and of those princes who are allowed any power he is probably the most energetic. Unfortunately, he is surrounded by an atmosphere of adulation which probably helps to obscure the difficulties which face him. He has this summer joined the trinity of power. Everything beneficial in the country, irrespective of its origin, is ascribed to God, the King, and the Crown Prince. Nevertheless, the fact remains that though most of his reforms are jejune and unlikely at present to have much permanent effect he is ambitious to be a reformer. However much foreigners may scoff, it is undoubtedly true that the condition of the country is improving and that every stratum of society is benefiting, though not equally, from the new-found wealth. Some part of this untidy, irregular improvement is due to the Crown Prince, and I am sure that within the framework of a despotism he is anxious to be benevolent.

18. In my despatch No. 133 of 19th November, I attempted to show that the importance, wealth and power of Saudi Arabia are increasing to a significant extent. Though the Crown Prince is often ignorant both of his difficulties and of the solution to them, I am sure that he will not allow his growing resources to remain uncultivated either at home or abroad.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Bahrein and B.M.E.O. (Fayid).

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure in No. 33

From Saud bin Abdel Azziz bin Abdel Rahman Al Feisal to Brother Feisal bin Abdel Azziz. God save him.

Peace be with you and God's mercy and blessing upon you.

In view of the appointment of Sheikh Abdel Malek bin Ibrahim Al El Sheikh as

head of the Society of Virtue in Mecca, and of the placing of the Jedda, Taif and Medina Societies of Virtue under his jurisdiction, and of the coupling of these to the Viceroy's Cabinet for instructions—as is the arrangement for the Society of Virtue of Riyadh—Sheikh Abdel Malek will be empowered to impose the penalty of imprisonment for one month and under or thirty lashes as considered by him suitable to meet an offence. As for offences which call for stricter punishment the offender will be referred to the competent courts which will deal with him. Execution of penalties shall be done under the direction

of the Viceroy's establishment and in the presence of a representative of Sheikh Abdel Malek. Sheikh Abdel Malek will be empowered to appoint or discharge the employees of these societies as in the procedure followed by the Riyadh Society.

I do not believe any Moslem, whether adult or child, employee or otherwise, will refrain from giving his support to the members of the Societies of Virtue as we shall only prosper by obeying God and following his orders and we beseech God to grant us success.

SAUD.

ES 1051/18

No. 34

POSITION OF AMERICA IN SAUDI-ARABIA

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 24th December)

(No. 153. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *17th December, 1952.*

Two years have elapsed since Mr. Scott Fox wrote his memorandum on the position of America in Saudi Arabia enclosed in Mr. Trott's Secret despatch No. 13 of 30th January, 1951. Then America was feeling her way to a position of paramountcy against those foreign nations taking an interest in Saudi Arabia: now in every field—military, economic and diplomatic—her influence is supreme. I have the honour to attempt in this despatch a description of the manifestations of American influence in this country together with some reflections as to the effect of the relationship between ourselves and the Americans upon the British position in Saudi Arabia.

2. The personal relations existing between this embassy and the American Embassy are extremely cordial and in relatively minor matters a good deal of information and assistance is exchanged. My American colleague is a charming person and a shrewd judge of political events in the Middle East, of which he has had much experience. He is, however, rather cautious and uncommunicative when it comes to discussing major matters of policy. He rarely volunteers information or opinions and often evades my approaches. This, I think, is partly due to the rather passive attitude of the State Department and partly to his own belief that in Saudi Arabia a close partnership with Britain is likely to prove as much of a hindrance as a help to America. Hence his almost pathetic attempts to remain

neutral in the frontier dispute. Inevitably, however, he finds it difficult to avoid the implications of American paramountcy; Ibn Saud has changed his solicitors and it is now to the American Embassy that he applies for general political advice or legal or economic aid. At the request of the King and against his own inclination Mr. Hare is frequently in Riyadh.

3. The fact is that the Americans are now unmistakably the bigger firm and spare no pains to show it. A large new compound has recently been built for their embassy on the outskirts of Jedda with extensive air-conditioning (which in Jedda is often taken as a convenient index of power); but even before the embassy staff moved to their new premises it became clear that these were going to be too small. Though their diplomatic staff establishment is no larger than ours it is usually fully up to strength and they have a total of twenty Americans employed in the embassy, with motor transport, United States Military Air Transport Services and other facilities on a lavish scale. At Dhahran they maintain a large Consulate-General and, of course, if necessary, Mr. Hare has the support of the Aramco organisation and of the senior United States army officers in Saudi Arabia. The latest addition to the United States Embassy is a Major Ragland, a promising young officer of the United States Army Air Force, who, though he does not bear the title, is in effect an air attaché. Such a proliferation of staff and the organisation and display of wealth involved, for example,

in flying in their own fresh vegetables, fruit and eggs from Asmara, is impressive to the Saudis.

4. Nor does the American Embassy hide its light under a bushel. *Bilad as Saudia*, almost the only local newspaper here, recently published a long article describing a party given by Mr. Hare on the occasion of the presentation to the United States chief interpreter (a native of Jedda, who is highly paid) of a certificate of appreciation signed by Mr. Acheson; the article concludes with an expression of appreciation of the American Government's co-operative attitude. Except on the subject of Israel the Americans enjoy a good press, which may in part be stimulated by the plums, in the shape of visits to the United States, which the American Embassy is able to distribute. A young official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is about to leave for a one or possible two years' course of study in America, part of which is actually to be spent in the Institute for Foreign Affairs.

5. The United States Government T.C.A. Mission to Saudi Arabia has grown, under the wing of the United States Embassy, to be the largest non-commercial group of foreigners in the country, having, at the moment, no fewer than thirteen officers of executive standing with plans providing for a total of thirty-four experts eventually. The success of the mission in establishing the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency with an American as governor and in recasting the Government Tariff Structure is good evidence that their influence is weighty and that the Saudi Arabian Government are at least partly convinced of the disinterestedness of the advice offered them (which, no doubt, is the result of the relatively high standard of experts sent to Saudi Arabia). In addition the surveys, carried out mostly with Point Four money, of the Riyadh-Jedda railway route and the sites of possible irrigation schemes (these latter in conjunction with the F.A.O. mission) have drawn American equipment and personnel into and right across the country. It is unfortunate that the work of the F.A.O. mission overlaps, and even duplicates, some of that being done by the T.C.A. mission, for the position of the F.A.O. mission is now that of a United States vassal, even though only two of the seven present members of the mission are American born. They work in the same building as the T.C.A. mission (in an almost exclusively American compound), sharing the clerical staff, using the resources of T.C.A., drinking their coffee

and receiving their mail through the United States Embassy. It is scarcely surprising that the United States and United Nations have become synonymous to so many in this country.

6. The position of Government constructional engineers, carrying with it a nearly exclusive right to specify plans, materials and standards for Government construction schemes, is held by an American company—Michael Baker, Junior, Inc.—who occupy a large compound in Jedda. In the same compound are to be found the American staff of Saudi Arabian Air Lines, consisting of the whole of the technical management and many of the pilots, crew and technicians. The planes themselves are mainly American.

7. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of my despatch No. 133 of 19th November I described briefly the potential growth of Saudi military power under American tutelage. However misplaced, the Saudis have a considerable pride in their army and this, together with their expansionist ideas and their new-found enthusiasm for an air force, makes American assistance peculiarly necessary to them. Being determined to have the best of everything, the Saudis are led to exalt the prestige of their American instructors. It is true that the Saudis have conducted apparently endless and niggling negotiations with the object of ensuring that the Americans should not obtain a tittle more than must be conceded to them. The fact remains, however, that the Americans have a considerable air base of their own at Dhahran and that when the Saudi military and air headquarters at Al Kharj are completed they will be firmly entrenched in the key position there. From what I can learn the American naval visits in the Persian Gulf are at least on a par with ours and the display of air power which they can put up (including some efficient air-sea rescue units) is, of course, much better than anything we can show the Saudis.

8. The arrival of Major Ragland and the delivery at Jedda of the AT-6 aircraft reported in my letter No. 1221/7/52 of 26th November to Mr. Ross seems to indicate that the Americans are extending their military assistance to the Hejaz, a province which we have always liked to consider as being predominantly under British influence. The Americans, of course, have had for some time a foothold there through their virtual control of the Saudi Arabian Air Lines. This has brought them into close touch with the Amir Mishaal, the Minister

for Defence and Aviation, and his principal advisers. Now they are reaping the fruits and I have even heard an unsubstantiated rumour that the Saudis intend to ask for American assistance in establishing a naval base at the small port of Yenbo on the Red Sea. An Arab source has also just stated that there are at present about fifty American army personnel assisting in military training in Taif, though I have not heard of this from the American Embassy.

9. While it was unfortunate that our own military mission had to be removed, it is clearly in the interests of the Western Powers that one at least of its members should possess bases and facilities in Saudi Arabia, particularly such as may assist in defending the oil-fields. I do not, therefore, think that in themselves these American activities are necessarily injurious to our interests, but I feel keenly, within the limitations of my knowledge, that in the military as well as the diplomatic sphere there is insufficient co-ordination. It is a subject on which my American colleague is most reticent and my impression of General Day, the late commander of the Dhahran air base, was that he was not anxious for any truck with the British. In other words, here as elsewhere, the Americans seem anxious to build their empire on their own and, in so far as they seek our co-operation at all in dealing with the Saudis, seem to find us embarrassing partners. Their attitude reminds me of those advertisements warning against bad breath.

10. I feel it is unnecessary to write at length of the operations of the Arabian American Oil Company. You know, Sir, that all the newly won American influence in this country has sprung from the discovery of large deposits of oil at Dammam in 1937. The impact of oil wealth on the primitive culture of Saudi Arabia was not fully felt until shortly after the late war, but now the stage has been reached at which the Saudi Arabian Government seem to feel that one of their main duties is to mulct the company by every means available. The Aramco have brought some five and a half thousand Americans, employees and their families, to live mainly in unimaginative, air-conditioned self-imitation at Dhahran and also at stations along the Tapline, at Jedda, and as nomads (modern style) with trucks full of canned foods and drilling and surveying equipment cruising across the desert. The uncritical public attitude of the company towards the Government and institutions of the country, their magnificent

propaganda arrangements (emphasised again on 10th December when the new \$3 million bulk plant outside Jedda was opened by Prince Abdulla Feisal), their indiscriminate beneficence and their ubiquity have given them a unique position in the country. The company's officials deal with the Saudi Arabian Government as if Aramco were an autonomous State and they only call in the American Ambassador when it suits them. Cautiously pedestrian though they are in developing their influence, they have built a magnificent foundation upon which to lay any political policy. However, actuated to some extent by the Aramco, State Department policy seems, unfortunately, to be content merely to keep this influence passive by the simple expedient of not using it in any way in which it could possibly offend.

11. Whenever their advice is sought, Aramco act as unpaid consultants to the Saudi Arabian Government. Some of it I suspect is not altogether in line with the policy of the United States Government, but, from our point of view, perhaps the most objectionable of these activities has been the legal, historical and topographical advice which Aramco has furnished in connexion with the frontier disputes. In my letter No. 1082/99/52 of 12th May to Mr. Ross, I commented on the excellence of Aramco's Oriental Department, which is headed by George Rentz, an Arabist of repute, and staffed by several bright young men. It appears to have a greater knowledge of conditions in the frontier areas than Yusuf Yasin's own Political Department. Various scraps of information reaching me suggest that Aramco's legal adviser is consulted by the Saudis in the drafting of the replies to some of our communications.

12. The Saudi national income, so far as any accurate estimate can be reached, now amounts to about \$200 million. Of this, perhaps \$140 million is received in United States dollars, most of the remainder being in sterling or related currencies. Despite the advantages (in terms of exchange and in the smaller freight charges from most of the sterling area) of buying sterling goods, the Saudis have adopted the baubles of American civilisation—coca-cola, cadillacs and the rest—and obtain most of their heavy engineering equipment as a matter of course from the United States. The influence of Baker's (paragraph 6 above) provides a substantial outlet for American exports and in many cases where T.C.A. or F.A.O. need to buy services or materials American firms

receive preferential treatment. A striking example of the way this process may be applied is provided by the proposed Jedda-Riyadh railway (paragraph 5 above). The Point Four survey team, containing members of three closely related firms which are interested in securing parts of the eventual contract, will provide the report upon which tenders will be based and the represented firms will thus be in a privileged position when the call for tenders is eventually issued.

13. In the field of consumer goods, the United States hold a less-privileged position, even though they probably still have a lead over all the other exporters put together. Not only are many British and continental goods held in high regard in Saudi Arabia, but Saudi confidence in (and supplies of) sterling have improved noticeably since the matter was discussed in my predecessor's despatch No. 59 of 2nd June, 1951. Not an inconsiderable proportion of the sterling earned annually is being spent in the United Kingdom on direct imports (nearly £6 million in the first three quarters of this year). It is not yet possible to form a complete impression of the balance of Saudi trade, but it is evident that the effects of the Caltex Agreement are already being felt. At the same time as sterling is becoming more readily available it is encouraging to find that it is also more buoyant, even though still at a slight discount against the dollar (this buoyancy may, however, be due in part to the increasing penetration of German and other commercial interests which accept payment in sterling). As Aramco have their own hard-currency problem, are anxious to purchase more soft-currency goods and increase the proportion of sterling in their royalty payments, the current trend in sterling trade may well continue.

14. The economic picture for us is not one of unrelieved gloom. Apart from the encouraging trade figures, there still remain a few evidences of British influence, though these seem insignificant beside the mighty new figure of Uncle Sam with his bag full of dollars. There are two British firms and a British bank, with branches in Jedda and Al Khobar, operating in Jedda, there are two construction companies with good relations with the Government and Royal Family; there is Philby, albeit almost a spent force now, there is the Desert Locust Survey who normally reach into the uttermost corners of the country and oblige the sheikhs when date palms are threatened; and there is the widespread use of the British sovereign (now being replaced by a gold Saudi

coin). Last, but not least, there is a large community, who fall under the British Crown and have experienced British administration in the Sudan, Aden, Palestine, Hadramaut, Bahrein, West Africa and elsewhere, in general faithful Anglophils, among whom there are many who hold posts of trust by virtue of the education which has been available in Middle East countries under British influence.

15. To sum up: the American position in Saudi Arabia rests upon a very different basis from our own and partly for that reason their attitude towards the Saudis is in distinct contrast to ours. Whereas our position, which formerly had the secure basis of our control of India, the Persian Gulf and the Pilgrimage trade, now rests only on some degree of inherited respect and such power as we can maintain upon the periphery of the peninsula, the Americans are here as overwhelmingly the principal producers of wealth in the country and have scrupulously avoided political or territorial commitments. As I remarked in my despatch No. 47 (1017/4/52) of 24th March, practically the only thing we now have to offer the Saudis is diplomatic advice, and such show of force as we can muster is on the whole anti-pathetic to them. The Americans on the other hand have luxury, wealth and modernisation to offer, and their show of force is in general considered beneficial to Saudi Arabia.

16. Proceeding from so different a foundation the American attitude towards the Saudis is replete with bonhomie, exaggerated praise, eager acquiescence in unsound foibles and sometimes genuine idealism. Their object is not only to provide the Saudis, at a cost, with the instruments of Western life, but also to make them feel grown up, equal in status to westerners and as much like Americans as possible. There is a good deal of truth in Philby's remark that the Americans have killed xenophobia in Saudi Arabia by ignoring it. The consequence is that the Americans are popular and occasionally loved but rarely respected. In contrast we are rarely loved and sometimes hated but we are, or were, respected.

17. I should not regret this contrast provided the respect for us was equal to the popularity of the Americans, but I fear that this is no longer so. Our position, however, may now be near its nadir and there may be some possibility of improvement, for just

as the Americans were welcomed as offsetting our influence so there have not been lacking signs recently that the Saudis are casting about for a counterweight to the Americans. From our point of view and probably from that of the Saudis too the most effective counterweight would be a British interest in the production of the basic wealth of the country—oil. It is, as yet, too early to say whether the effect of the frontier dispute will be to strengthen or weaken our position.

18. While I would certainly welcome an increase of British influence in Saudi Arabia whether it came from a display of strength in the Gulf, increased commercial activity or the entry of a British oil company I consider that a greater degree of co-operation with America than exists at present is still more to be sought. I am sure that co-ordination of our efforts and policies is not only in the best interests of the western world in general but, in the long run, would be in our own individual best interests. There is not in the foreseeable future any prospect of our supplanting the Americans in their position of paramountcy. Their benevolence is therefore more important to us than ours is to them, but I should hope that considering the general Middle Eastern scene and common defence interests of the Western Powers it should not be too difficult to persuade them to co-operate more

and pursue a common policy with us in Saudi Arabia. They, as much as we, must avoid being played off against the other, but I feel it would be a pity if we were to depend upon the Americans for the first or major initiative in an effort towards greater co-operation. If we are to carry the Americans with us in resisting Saudi hegemony over the whole peninsula and in promoting joint interests jointly it will be necessary to make them feel that our policy is their policy, and to achieve this we may have to bring them, whether we like it or not, more into consideration in formulating our policy in Gulf affairs. Just because the events in the frontier dispute are now probably convincing the Americans of the undesirability of having us as partners in Saudi Arabia and of the rightness of their own attitude towards the Saudis it should be a matter for special effort and care in the future to achieve co-operation with the Americans and to avoid their cold neutrality. The latter alone could be the most potent of the influences working against us in the Arabian Peninsula while, on the other hand, it seems that only through co-operation can we achieve a permanently satisfactory position.

I am sending copies of this letter to Washington, B.M.E.O. (Fayid) and the Political Resident, Bahrein.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ES 1902/1

No. 35

SAUDI ARABIA: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Mr. Riches to Mr. Eden. (Received 9th July)

(No. 81. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *1st July, 1952.*

With reference to my despatch No. 68 of 27th June, 1951, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

I have, &c.

D. M. H. RICHES
(*Charge d'Affaires.*)

Enclosure in No. 35

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda 1st July, 1952

Afghanistan

Sayid Mohammed Sadaq Mujaddadi who had been Minister since 1935 relinquished his post in May 1952. His successor, Abdul Hadi Khan Dawi, has not yet appeared in Jedda.

The Minister normally resides in Cairo.

Belgium (see Netherlands)

Egypt

Maitre Al Huseini Al Khatib, Minister.

Presented his credentials on 14th August, 1951. Formerly consul in Bombay and chargé d'affaires in Karachi. A heavy youngish man who speaks French and English and has established good relations with the Saudis. Behaved rather stupidly in not calling on Her Majesty's Ambassador on the latter's first arrival which coincided with the troubles in the Canal Zone, but has since been affable and friendly.

Ethiopia

M. Taffassa Hapte Mikael, Minister.

Presented his credentials on 25th May, 1949. He is also Ethiopian Minister in Cairo and has not yet appeared in Jedda. A Saudi national named Mohammed Gabil member of a well-known Hejazi family, was appointed honorary consulate in 1949.

France

M. Georges Gueyraud, Minister.

Presented his credentials on 13th June, 1949. He is also accredited to the Yemen which he visited in 1950 and again in 1952.

M. Gueyraud has previously served in Venice, Zagreb and Ankara and before his transfer to Jedda was head of the Eastern European section at the Quai d'Orsay.

He is ineffective and protocolaire but in official dealings has recently become much more friendly and communicative than when he first arrived.

Mme. Gueyraud is an ambitious and forceful woman both more effective and more popular with the foreign community than her husband.

Indonesia

Radeen Suleiman, Minister.

Presented his credentials on 31st March, 1952. Unlike his predecessors is resident in Jedda.

A Javanese born in 1897 and educated at the University of Leyden where he also taught from 1930 to 1945. Returned to Indonesia after independence and held posts in the Ministry of Religion and the Foreign Office. He is a student of oriental languages and literature and also speaks some European languages including fair English. Friendly socially.

Iraq

Najib Bey Al Rawi, Minister.

Presented his credentials on 7th September, 1951. Has not reappeared. The legation is in charge of junior secretaries from Cairo who do penance in Jedda in spells of three to six months each.

Italy

Ugo Turcato, Minister.

Presented his credentials on 17th November, 1949. Is also accredited to the Yemen which he visited in 1950. Has had fairly wide diplomatic experience including service in Albania before coming to Jedda and has also served as consul in Nairobi. His tour in Kenya has left him and his wife with an abiding affection and regard for things English. A popular elderly couple, they have proved good colleagues, though M. Turcato is not normally well-informed. His chief official interest is the protection of the new large Italian community who have moved from Eritrea to Jedda.

Jordan

Ali Bey Sayide, Chargé d'Affaires.

Arrived 1950. A learned and agreeable little man educated partly in Jerusalem who speaks good English. Was formerly a school teacher. Did not distinguish himself during King Talal's visit to Saudi Arabia in 1951 was then said to be about to be replaced. But he is still here. A friendly and helpful colleague who enjoys good relations with everyone including the Saudis. His wife is pleasant and will now attend mixed dinner parties if no Saudis are present.

Lebanon

Sheikh Sami El Khoury, Minister.

Presented his credentials on 11th March, 1946. Is also Minister in Cairo where he spends most of his time, paying perhaps two visits to Jedda every year.

The present chargé d'affaires, M. Chaleb Turc, arrived in Jedda on 28th October, 1950. He is a pleasant, hospitable and well educated man and a very good tennis player and mixes more with the European community than any other Muslim diplomat in Jedda. His relations with the Saudis are good and he is usually well-informed. His wife has led the move against the unwritten law whereby

Muslem diplomats' wives, however free in their own countries avoid public and social appearances in Jedda.

Netherlands

M. Henrick Entrop, Honorary Consul.
Director of the Netherlands Trading Society at Jedda. He is a slow moving solid Dutchman with considerable experience of Jedda and the Saudis. He is also honorary Belgian Consul.

Persia

Mouzaffar Aalam, Minister.
Presented his credentials on 10th October, 1951. A former Minister for Foreign Affairs who is stated to be aged 67 and to have been pulled out of retirement for appointment to Jedda. Holds the personal title of "Ambassador."

Mr. Aalam is a charming courtly man with delightful manners. He speaks good Arabic and French and some English. The sole thing that he has done since he came here has been to intervene with the Saudi Government—without success—to try to secure the reconstruction of Shi'a shrines at Medina.

Spain

Don Domingo de las Barcenas, Minister.
Resident in Cairo. Visited Saudi Arabia in the suite of the Spanish Foreign Minister in May 1952.

Syria

Jawad Bey Al Murabit, Minister.
Presented his credentials on 22nd February, 1950. He had little or no experience of diplomacy having been in the police before entering his country's foreign service. A very devout Muslem. He speaks French and has recently been attempting to mix more with European diplomats. His wife will also go out to selected parties. Was taken to Syria by Colonel Shishakli on the latter's return from his visit to King Ibn Saud in April 1952 and conceived an admiration for the colonel in the aeroplane.

Turkey

M. Cevdet Dulger, Minister.
Presented his credentials on 22nd February, 1951. Is aged about 50 and has had considerable experience both in the Middle East and Europe having been among other things consul-general at Paris and Brussels before becoming Assistant Secretary General for Personnel at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Ankara. Speaks good French and some English.

M. Dulger used to play tennis and indulge in other physical pursuits but his bulk and the influence of the climate have obliged him to give them up. Always cheerful and agreeable and anxious to co-operate in any joint activity touching the diplomatic corps or the foreign community, but otherwise spends most of his days playing bridge with the foreign ladies of Jedda.

United States

Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador.
Presented his credentials on 24th October, 1950. A career diplomat of wide experience in the Middle East, London and the State Department. Speaks some Arabic and French. A believer in the personal touch in dealing with Arabs, in infinite patience and in the value of Western technical aid. He is also a sincere believer in Anglo-American co-operation in Saudi Arabia as elsewhere, though he thinks that this is best achieved by parallel action not in competition, rather than co-operation and collaboration in the sense of presenting an obviously united front to the Saudis.

Mr. Hare is a very agreeable and cultured man who has proved an excellent colleague with whom all matters of common interest can be discussed freely without fear of any confidence being violated or misunderstandings arising. He performs the functions of doyen effectively and has achieved a position of considerable personal respect amongst Saudi notables, including the King.

Other Missions

Argentina

The last representative, a *depositaire des archives*, left Jedda in 1950 though no official notification has been made that the legation has been closed.

China

There used to be a Nationalist consul in Jedda during the pilgrimage but he has not appeared since 1949.

Philippines

A consul, Mr. Soto, appeared during the 1951 pilgrimage.

Finland

There is an honorary Finnish Consul, a local match merchant called Said bin Zagr.

CHAPTER III—THE YEMEN

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EM 1892/1

No. 36

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE YEMEN

Mr. Jacomb to Mr. Eden (Received 4th January, 1952)

(No. 1. Confidential) *Taiz,*
Sir, *23rd December, 1951.*

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 1 of 9th December in which I reported that I had arrived in Taiz the previous night. My arrival in the Yemen, as the first Representative of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to be accredited to the Government of His Majesty the King of the Yemen and to reside in the Yemen, is the outcome of the agreement reached last year in London between the two Governments, wherein it was decided to establish normal diplomatic relations before the end of this year. My arrival in the Yemen has, therefore, fulfilled this point of the agreement since there is already a Yemeni Minister in London.

2. The exchange of Diplomatic Representatives was the subject of letters between His Majesty's Government and the Yemeni Minister in London, in which it was envisaged that His Majesty's Legation would be established in San'a the proper capital of the Yemen. However, the Yemeni Government have, in the event, made arrangements for His Majesty's Legation to be situated here in Taiz. This accords with the desire of His Majesty's Government that His Majesty's Legation should be here, where His Majesty the King of the Yemen lives and an important part of his Government functions. I shall submit a separate report on this change of the previous arrangements.

3. I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information an account of my journey from Aden to Taiz.

I have, &c.

M. B. JACOMB.

Enclosure in No. 36

Before setting out for the Yemen I spent ten days in Aden. Most of this time was needed to arrange for the transport of the seventy-odd boxes and packing cases I had to take with me, and to engage staff. After the usual changes, which seem to be in-

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escapable in the East, all was ready for us to start on 8th December for Taiz.

We left very early in the morning at 5.30 a.m. in order to complete the 120-mile journey before dark, allowing ample time for inevitable mishaps on the road. My party travelled, with personal luggage, in the legation landrover and a jeep station wagon lent by the Yemeni Government Agent in Aden, a merchant called Ali Mohamed Jabali. Besides the driver and his mate for the jeep, I had with me a clerk, two personal servants and my own driver. The packing cases were to follow in due course in lorries provided by the Yemeni Government Agent through Messrs. Mitchell Cotts in Aden.

We showed our Aden Government pass at the Aden Colony barrier and went through to the Lahej customs barrier where we entered the Aden Protectorate. At once the road deteriorated. Although there was at one time an asphalt road through the Abdali country, it is no longer in order and we had to find the best way through the holes and bumps. After some miles of barren sands we entered the fertile part of Lahej; luxuriant green crops and trees covering every acre of ground fed by the waters descending by the Wadi Tiba from the Yemen. After the barrenness of Aden it was amazing to see the water swiftly flowing down the irrigation channels beside the road.

We passed through more customs barriers on either side of the town of Lahej where the Sultan has his palace, through a flourishing bazaar, and soon started to climb into the Haushabi country. Here the road was better, and though not asphalt the going was good because the road has been kept in good repair. We wound in and out of the mountains, great towering black masses for the most part, and occasionally dipped down to the wadi bed where every square yard of cultivable ground seemed to have something growing in it, and a fair amount of water was flowing past. The fields in the wadi beds were strongly buttressed against the periodic floods of rain water. Quite often

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we passed herds of cattle, goats and sheep, all in excellent condition.

The road continued to climb higher and higher, with great ranges of mountains in front of us and on both sides. On this hard and flinty ground the jeep had its first puncture, but this was soon mended. Sometimes we had to cross the running water to take the road up the other side of the wadi, or follow the course of the stream before climbing up again onto the mountainside. As we neared the Yemen the lower parts of the mountains were greener, covered in scrub and various sorts of cactus.

The actual approach to the Yemen is up a dry wadi bed. Here the jeep had its second puncture, again soon mended as two spare wheels were carried, but not before a small crowd of locals had gathered and had pointed to us where the frontier lay. Very soon afterwards we came to the Yemeni frontier post with an iron bar across the track.

Once through this we had to go on climbing for some way. All the time the mountains seemed to get a little greener, and it was still noticeable that almost every patch of soil was cultivated. Again the jeep had a puncture, mended this time by repairing the inner tube with a sound one. There were a good many people moving about, and we knew that we were not far from the Yemeni customs post.

At length the road flattened out and we came out of the mountains onto the plain of Khadir. Ahead of us, perched on a hill lay Rahida, the small village round the customs post. As we drove up into the village bugles and trumpets blared forth a welcome or salute, a fair-sized guard of honour, dressed colourfully in every sort of garment, presented arms and the officers (effendis) saluted. We halted in the middle of a sort of Khan or Caravanserai which houses the customs post and up came the commander of the guard, who might have been either a soldier or a policeman, and the Director of Customs. There were smiles and friendly words all round and an apparently genuine welcome for us. I accepted an invitation to lunch upstairs in a clean room furnished with tables and chairs and a bed on which I could rest after the bumps of the journey.

The lunch did not give me so much pleasure as my arrival seemed to have given the people. However, it had been provided on the Imam's orders, and the local hotel-keeper, who had learnt a little of European ways at the big hotel in Aden, made a noble

effort. The Director of Customs said that he had been expecting us the previous day, but there was a more or less general opinion that this was the fault of the Imam's Government: perhaps the director felt strongly on this point if he had had to feed the guard for longer than he had hoped.

After a short rest to recover from the shakings of the journey we continued on our way, but not before I had had to accept a gift of *qat*. We were now on the huge plain, surrounded on all sides by mountains, and were making for the north-west corner where the road climbs over the mountains and descends to Taiz. Again, every bit of fertile land was cultivated and many more trees covered the landscape. Some of the way the road seemed to be hedged, for cactus and scrubs had been allowed to grow on both sides, in contrast to the clean fields. Magnificent terracing could be seen up the mountain sides, where onions, potatoes, tomatoes, cauliflower and cabbage grow. Down in the plains it is mostly maize, Indian corn and millet.

Cattle in good shape were everywhere, and as we neared the mountain again, and started climbing, the fields were damp and water flowed in the irrigation channels. The road up the mountainside was steep and difficult and, although early in the afternoon, it was almost dark, because the sun had already disappeared on the top of this mountain, Sabr. All the way up the terracing was splendid.

At length we reached the pass and began to descend again. We were now only six miles from Taiz, but the road was steep and very bad. Before reaching Taiz we came to Sala where the Imam has a vast and impressive palace built of red and grey stone on the mountainside with huge boulders used in places as foundations for the walls. This palace is surrounded by outbuildings, garages and a mosque and lots of work still goes on: it must be about four or five years since work began.

Here, at another barrier, I was met in the road by an official from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs who had messages of welcome from Saif al Islam Abdulla and Qadhi Mohamed al Amri, the Minister and his Deputy respectively, and by the Director of Aeroplanes, who also controls, amongst other things, the guesthouses. Both were, of course, chewing *qat*. There was another guard, more salutes and presenting of arms and we continued down the mountain side to the main guest house.

We went through the newer part of Taiz, built on higher ground, well outside the town walls, past the power house, printing works, workshop and round the side of the Imam's other palace which is backed by extensive barracks. This palace has a garden and fountain in front of it, with peach and apricot trees flourishing, and across an open space is the fairly new Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a two-storeyed building with the Ministry upstairs and the telegraph office and stores downstairs.

By the side of the garden of the palace lies the guest house. This is a large and old stonefloored building with many bedrooms upstairs. Three of these were at my disposal (for myself and servants), and a large reception room furnished with a desk and lots of uncomfortable steel chairs. It was clean, and I found soap and towels in my bedroom. But the bathroom, in spite of good hot running water, was dirty and the lavatory was ghastly.

After a refreshing bath I had a fair European style meal. The servants were all very willing and cheerful and told me that strict instructions had been given a month ago for a really thorough cleaning of the rooms. After listening to the nightly high-pitched singing of the soldiers, and beating of their drums, I went to bed.

The next morning I awoke to the sounds of many people talking and passing below my window, on foot, on horses, mules and donkeys. Most were dressed in the long Yemeni *Qamis* with brightly coloured sashes and turbans. The rich had their servants running behind their donkeys, and the Government officials, under-secretaries, &c., had a servant running beside them with a bulg-

ing brief case and thermos flask. There were jeeps and ancient Ford cars to be seen, and quite a number of lorries in various stages of disrepair coasting down the tracks to start their engines. The road from this high part of Taiz called Urdhi, to the walled city tucked against the mountain side below, was a mass of people moving in both directions.

The city which is quite small, looked attractive, with its white minarets and domes, tall houses and gardens. Many feet above it is the citadel where political prisoners, and others, are kept. Two gates give entry through the city walls, but there is no restriction on movement after sunset as there is in San'a.

To the north of the city lie small green hills and fertile valleys. There is no real plain, but the high mountains do not begin again for some miles to the north of Taiz. Behind the city and Urdhi towers the mountain of Sabr with houses built at all levels and even on the top. There is much terracing up this mountain; *qat* grows in profusion. In the distance, to the North, East and West, rise up the higher mountains, range upon range of them.

The air was fresh and the green of the countryside most welcome. The people looked sturdy enough, but were obviously for the most part very poor, and the vast majority of houses were stone hovels. Though animated, the scene was very peaceful; indeed, the security of the country is almost perfect. But the atmosphere and signs of neglect and maladministration are obvious. The whole is entirely different to the small part of Arabia that I have seen before.

EM 1961/2

No. 37

YEMENI VICTORY DAY CELEBRATIONS

Mr. Jacomb to Mr. Eden. (Received 20th February)

(No. 4)

Taiz,

Sir,

5th February, 1952.

I have the honour to state that, in accordance with the instructions in your telegram No. 5 of 23rd January, I conveyed formal congratulations to His Royal Highness Saif al Islam al Abdullah, the Foreign Minister of the Government of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, on behalf of His Majesty's Government on the occasion of the celebration of Victory Day in the Yemen on 30th January. I also conveyed formal congratulations to the

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Foreign Minister on behalf of the Governor of Aden, as requested by him. In order to conform with the customs, set apparently by visiting diplomats, I sent similar letters in both cases to Qadhi Mohamad al Amri, the Deputy Foreign Minister.

2. The anniversary of Victory Day falls on 3rd *Jama'ad al Awwal*, which day does not, of course, correspond to the same day in our calendar each year. It was on this day in 1948 that the forces of the present King of the Yemen stormed and pillaged

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the town of San'a and captured the leaders of the revolutionary party who had assassinated his father. The celebrations are elaborate, last for three days, and are devoted to extolling the virtues of the present King while at the same time providing some gaiety for the Yemeni people, the poorest of whom receive charitable gifts of money. There is a certain similarity to the Roman custom of providing bread and circuses for the people.

3. It is, in fact, the great anniversary in the Yemen, and His Majesty the King receives congratulations from many Governments and from Yemenis abroad. The celebrations are much more elaborate than those at the end of the month *Ramadan*. I attended them on all three days and they afforded me a striking example of the fanaticism of these people. Not only the singing of the Royal bodyguard and the fulsome speeches congratulating His Majesty the King, but the whole atmosphere imparted religious fervour of a kind not usually seen in Europe but not uncommon in the Middle East.

4. In view of the importance in the Yemen, of these celebrations, I have the honour to transmit herewith an account of them. My account covers only the celebrations in Taiz, but in San'a His Royal Highness Saif al Islam al Hassan and in Hodaidah His Royal Highness Saif al Islam al Badr, the Crown Prince, presided over similar events. In smaller towns celebrations took place and Yemeni flags decorated the houses. In Aden, although the Government did not permit the Yemenis to make a procession, I expect that their flags were in evidence.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch with enclosure to the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

M. B. JACOMB.

Enclosure in No. 37

For some months past a great deal of work has been done to prepare an area, a little larger than a football field, beside the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the arena for these celebrations. All along the south side of the arena eight stone steps were built for spectators, with a covered grandstand in the centre. Here, on a semi-circular dais, was the seat of the Imam, with prominent Yemenis around and behind him. Immediately beside these Yemenis were the chairs for foreigners with one in the front row for me.

2. The arena was surrounded by tall wooden poles gaily decorated with Yemeni flags and joined by streamers of coloured cloth and paper, carrying coloured lights. A fairly elaborate triumphal arch gave entry to the arena and bore a banner extolling the virtues of the Imam. All houses and Government buildings were covered with Yemeni flags; gay wooden arches had been built in places on the roads; the market in the town was a mass of colour with laudatory streamers hanging across the streets and the gateways of houses decorated with flags and illuminated designs.

3. The night before the first day of demonstrations, and the following two nights, are as much part of the celebrations as the events during the daytime. Coloured lights and designs brighten the scene and on the walls round the flat roofs of all the houses small piles of ashes soaked in paraffin are lit, and give the impression of a blazing town. At the same time fireworks are let off on every side making a formidable noise, much like a battle.

4. I had been asked to be seated on the first morning at 8.30 a.m. Everyone was in place in good time, but, due either to the Imam being in particularly bad humour or to the over-eagerness of his officials, we had to wait nearly two hours for the Imam's entrance. Preceded by five Fargo power wagons with mounted machine guns, four jeeps similarly armed, his Royal guard of about eighty very fine looking men singing in their forced falsetto voices, the Imam, protected from the sun's rays by an immense parasol, walked under the triumphal arch. He walked, with his sword on his shoulder as a woodsman might carry his axe, the full length of the north side of the arena, along the east end and in front of the stands on the south side. On this first morning he was in a very bad humour and seldom saluted the crowds. Once the King had taken his seat, everyone stood for the National Anthem after which the Imam's two standards were marched across the arena to their positions beneath, and on the sides of, his dais.

5. The first day was devoted to the army, the forty students of the Military School quite athletic youths of 18 to 22 years, sang three songs in praise of the Imam, each one followed in turn by a speech in praise of the Imam by the director of the school, a student, and a soldier. Then the students gave a good display of gymnastics and drill, which was followed by a relay race

between four military units. After some exercises with lances by nine mounted officers the army marched past, with a good deal of confusion. The various units were, the Royal bodyguard in their pale blue uniforms (about 80 men), regular army and irregular army in no sort of uniform (about 1,500 men), five power wagons with mounted machine guns, six jeeps similarly armed, four Yemeni Government buses, a gaily decorated taxi, and three mountain guns (of about 1908 vintage) drawn by mules. At the end of the soldiery, but before the "motorised units" came about sixty very young boys, with soldiers before and behind: these were hostages from Yemeni tribes. While the march past was in progress the three Yemeni Dakotas flew over in formation, turned and flew back one after the other over the parade at rooftop level, much to the consternation of some soldiers who fled in terror.

6. The Imam then stepped down, after a general salute and the National Anthem, mounted a magnificent horse and rode round the arena for about ten minutes, followed by those officials and officers who could find horses. The Imam left the arena at a gallop after showing that, in spite of his great weight, he could ride very well.

7. The next day was devoted to celebrations by the Department of Education. The Imam was again late in arriving, his entry was the same, but he was quite obviously in much better humour and saluted the crowd as he walked. After a recitation from the Koran came speeches by the District Director of Education and by the Principal of the Taiz School. Then about 150 schoolboys gave a remarkably good display of gymnastic exercises to music; they had been taught by the Palestinian school masters. Next came two poems, one written by Saif al Islam al Ali, the Minister of Education. The schoolboys then acted two plays, one about the conquest of Andalusia by Tariq and the second a comedy about three blind

people in San'a. For these, as for all the speeches on this day, full use was made of a wooden stage built in front of the Imam's dais, and of a powerful loud-speaker. After the National Anthem the Imam again rode round the arena.

8. On the third day, also devoted to the Department of Education, the Imam arrived early as he had promised. There were many speeches and poems, the continuation of the play about Andalusia (in which the Spaniards were made to speak in English, much to the amusement of the crowd), and a play about the rewards which come to those who help others. After a rather ridiculous but well delivered speech by an elderly Yemeni who had, until recently, been in prison for taking a small part in the revolution, the National Anthem was played and the Imam left his dais and walked back to his palace.

9. On the whole the events were fairly well managed. However, vehicles were inclined to be in the wrong place, soldiers and onlookers did not always remain where they should have, and the arrival of servants with free lemonade and sweets for the crowd was always the signal for many small boys to dash towards them no matter what event was in progress, while the microphone occasionally gave forth a piercing shriek. It was, none-the-less, a colourful and quite impressive performance. Some of its effectiveness did, I think, stem in part from the work of the Palestinians. There were a number of photographers present, but the only cine-camera was working expressly for the Imam.

10. The celebrations have obviously given great pleasure to the Yemeni people and will be a good topic of conversation for some time to come. A fairly frequent comment is that this year's celebrations have been better than any before them. I gather that this is true and is another example of the rather halting progress of this country under the present Imam.

EM 1022/1

No. 38

CONDUCT OF THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Mr. Jacomb to Mr. Eden. (Received 23rd July)

(No. 14. Confidential)
Sir,

Taiz,
2nd July, 1952.

I have the honour to submit the following account of how the Yemeni Government

conduct their diplomatic relations with foreign Governments. My impressions are based on what I have learnt in Taiz during the seven months that I have been here,

and may, I feel, be of some use in assessing the effects of the opening of diplomatic relations between Her Majesty's Government and the Yemeni Government.

2. Although the Yemeni Government have had a representative in Cairo for about five years, their representatives in London and in Washington have only recently established themselves and it is not unfair to them to say that they are still comparatively inexperienced and untried, and that they have not yet come to play the full part expected of the representative of a foreign Government. This is not surprising when it is remembered that there never have been, in the Yemen, people conversant with the outside world or with diplomatic usage. Moreover, in addition to such a disadvantage, which can be overcome in time, the Yemeni representatives abroad have always to remember that they serve their Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a very much lesser degree than they serve their absolute Monarch. The fact that his displeasure can, and does, cause immediate distress by such acts as the stoppage of funds for the expenses of the legations which are in their charge, is unsettling to his representatives abroad.

3. Yemeni representation at the meetings of the United Nations Organisation is no more experienced than it is in foreign capitals. Even so, such delegates as Qadhi al Amri, the Deputy Foreign Minister, and Tala't al Ghusain, a Palestinian who works in the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are allowed, in nearly every case, to say what they please on any matter under discussion. It is, in fact, almost incredible to learn that no instructions are issued to Yemeni delegates and that no reports are called for when they have returned to their country. Indeed, for most of the Yemeni delegates the chance of getting abroad is one to be used to their best personal advantage and to be treated much like a holiday.

4. The same lack of appreciation of the need for issuing instructions applies, in general, to all Yemeni representatives abroad. For example, I was told in confidence by the United States Consulate in Aden that the Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires in Washington had recently complained to the State Department that His Majesty the Imam never replied to his repeated requests for instructions. The dangers inherent in such a course of action are apparent in any case, but could, in the case of the inexperienced Yemeni representatives, lead to

unusual difficulties. However, on particular matters where His Majesty the King holds strong views, instructions are, of course, sent.

5. Nevertheless, such instructions cannot overcome Yemeni inexperience of diplomatic language and custom, for His Majesty the King knows practically nothing about either. For instance, he has no clear understanding of the expression "to take note," and to say, as his Excellency the Governor of Aden did in his telegram of 19th April to Qadhi al Amri, "Please convey to His Majesty the Imam my gratitude to him for the message he sent . . ." about the Lahej affair, will unhesitatingly be interpreted as an invitation to continue correspondence on the subject concerned. And again, such incidents as the issue of the unfortunately worded statement of the Yemeni Minister in London on 22nd April about the Lahej affair, implying that Her Majesty's Government had committed a breach of trust, are almost certain to be repeated for some time to come.

6. It is of course, difficult for the Yemeni representatives to please such a master as His Majesty the King, who is frequently guilty of inconsistency. But if the Yemeni representatives or such people as Qadhi al Amri had the courage to resist some of His Majesty's less admissible demands, or even to press their own points of view, the situation might be easier. As things are, I have seen very little sign of any such efforts being made. All the Yemeni Government officials seem only too inclined to comply with all His Majesty's demands and to avoid submitting to him requests which they think he will not wish to meet.

7. Against their ineffectiveness, however, must be set the apparent friendliness of such persons as Qadhi al Amri and Saiyid Hassan Ibrahim in London. I feel that such people do wish to be friendly and to conduct their business in a proper manner, but I also feel that we should in no way rely on their friendship or their support in putting our point of view to His Majesty the King. Not only will they be over-inclined to present the Yemeni views in an exaggeratedly favourable light, but they will, in my opinion, cast aside without hesitation any promises they may have made, rather than run the risk of incurring His Majesty's wrath.

8. I feel that this fear of His Majesty the King is one of the most important points that should be borne in mind in our dealings with the Yemeni Government. The little

courage and hope that has sustained the Yemeni representatives is, in my opinion, diminishing, and the usefulness to us of these people will diminish accordingly. My reasons for saying that it is diminishing are that Qadhi al Amri, who hoped that progress would be made by opening diplomatic relations with a number of Governments, is no longer actively working to that end; that Qadhi al Halali, nominally head of the Royal Cabinet, has refused to take part in affairs of State; that the Yemeni Minister in Cairo, whose conviction that he can work more effectively for progress outside the Yemen has led him to refuse to comply with repeated orders to return, will, according to Qadhi al Amri, retire in Cairo rather than return to the Yemen in its present state; and that the Yemeni Chargé

d'Affaires in Washington, who sees the chance of Point IV assistance slipping away, has confessed his very great disappointment at the likelihood of the State Department shelving their proposal to open a legation in the Yemen.

9. In conclusion I feel it is not incorrect to say that, although there is a desire to see their diplomatic relations properly conducted, Yemeni representatives are unable to play an effective part. Even if they appear friendly there are no grounds for hoping that they will properly present the views of a foreign Government. Hence their value, already limited by their inexperience, is not, at present, very great.

I have, &c.

M. B. JACOMB.

EM 10322/1

No. 39

ITALO-YEMENI RELATIONS

Mr. Jacomb to Mr. Eden. (Received 21st August)

(No. 20. Confidential) Taiz,
Sir, 7th August, 1952.

I have the honour to submit the following report on relations between the Yemeni and Italian Governments.

2. The Italian Government has always shown considerable interest in the Yemen, even before their formal relations with the Yemeni Government began in 1927 with the signing of the treaty of San'a. This treaty, which contained references to technical assistance, was soon followed by the arrival of a largish Italian medical mission and a number of other technicians. Commercial relations began to develop, and the Italian Government was always ready to undertake such assistance as the training of six Yemenis as pilots and the provision of six Italian fighter aircraft. There is no doubt that Italian influence in the Yemen, exerted by many of the Italians in the Yemen on the instructions of their Government, was strong during the Fascist régime. It remained strong as long as Italian policy in East Africa was successful.

3. After the last war, however, this influence declined. Only three doctors, all originally officials of the Ministry of Italian Africa and on its demise officials of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remained in the country. The new Government of democratic Italy no longer seemed to regard the Yemen as a sphere of Italian

influence. They were, however, still apparently eager to provide technicians and help of other sorts and to foster their commercial relations. This is shown by the recruitment of six Italian airmen for the Yemen Airlines in 1948, by the recent arrival of nine Italian doctors, as well as a number of engineers for the salt works at Salif and by the provision of facilities at Genoa for the repair of ships of the Yemen Navigation Company and at Venice for the aircraft of the Yemen Airlines.

4. It appears, however, that these Italian technicians in the Yemen are not under instructions, as were those in the past, to play any political rôle. It may be that some of the older officials of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be happy to see the old policies continued, but the Italian Government themselves seem to have adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Yemeni Government.

5. An example of this attitude is provided by their action when the Italian pilots flew one of the Yemeni Dakotas to Cairo for repairs, in 1948. The pilots at first did not show any wish to hasten their return to the Yemen, but when they did inform the Yemeni Government that they would soon be returning, they were told that His Majesty the Imam had dismissed them and forbade them to re-enter the Yemen. In doing this His Majesty broke their contracts

and when they appealed to the Italian Consul in Aden he wrote a letter of protest to the Yemeni Government. They took exception to the tone of his letter and complained to the Italian Government who immediately recalled their Consul.

6. A further example is afforded by the case of Dr. Toffolon, who is an official of the Italian Foreign Office and has been in the Yemen for fourteen years. About nine months ago he was accused of being an agent of the British Intelligence Service. His Majesty the Imam accepted this accusation and ceased to trust him, in spite of Toffolon's vociferous denials. When the nine Italian doctors were recently recruited in Italy by His Majesty the Imam's agent, Shaikh Ali Mohamad Jabaly, who was the originator of the accusation against Toffolon, he told them all that they should have no contact with Toffolon (or, incidentally, the British Legation) if they wished to remain in the Yemen. When the doctors questioned their Government's officials about this they were told to act in accordance with the advice of His Majesty's agent. This acceptance of the Yemeni point of view was confirmed by the Italian Consul in Aden when he was recently in Taiz.

7. In general, the Italian Government seem to wish to maintain their relations with the Yemeni Government by accepting their point of view rather than arguing against it. I feel that it was as a result of this attitude that their Consul in Aden was treated rather badly when he visited Taiz from 6th June until 9th July. He had intended to stay about one week, but was forced to remain for almost five. He had to wait many days before he received a satisfactory reply to his

suggestions for arrangements for a visit by the Italian Minister who is accredited to His Majesty the Imam as well as to His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia. He obtained no satisfaction in his discussions of various difficulties encountered by the Italian doctors, and thereby incurred their displeasure. And, in fact, he did little more than accept the Yemeni Government's views in each case, and gave the impression that he was under instructions to adopt such a line or risk being recalled like his predecessor. It was perhaps as a result of this that his departure, in a Yemeni Government vehicle for which he had to pay about £50 for the journey to Aden, was delayed for a number of days by His Majesty the Imam's slowness in granting an exit permit.

8. By persisting in such an attitude the Italian Government may be able to introduce more Italian technicians, since the Yemeni Government will not be seriously concerned about their treatment of such people. I do not feel that this will lead to the Italian Government gaining either influence or advantage in their dealings with the Yemeni Government. Nor do I think that it can really be wise to maintain relations with the Yemeni Government by ignoring the appeals of Italians working for them. It remains to be seen, however, whether such an attitude will help the Italian Government to establish a legation or a consulate in Taiz, as they wish, and whether it will persist if a permanent representative is established here.

9. I shall submit a further report after the visit of the Italian Minister.

I have, &c.

M. B. JACOMB.

EM 1015/11

No. 40

REACTIONS IN THE YEMEN TO THE ABDICATION OF EX-KING FAROUK OF EGYPT

Mr. Jacomb to Mr. Eden. (Received 21st August)

(No. 21. Confidential) Taiz,
Sir, 9th August, 1952.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the reactions in the Yemen to the abdication of ex-King Farouk of Egypt. My report is short and not very detailed because officials of the Yemeni Government and the Yemeni people themselves are too frightened of His Majesty the Imam to voice any very definite opinions. They fear that their absolute Monarch will accuse them of subversive action if they show too much

pleasure at the virtual elimination of the powers of the Egyptian throne.

2. His Majesty the Imam is not displeased at the disappearance of the person of ex-King Farouk from the scene of Arab politics. He never approved of his mode of life and scorned his recent acquisition of the title Saiyid. Nevertheless, His Majesty the Imam was quite considerably disturbed by events in Egypt and the somewhat similar events in Persia. He feels that his position is a little less secure, since such events

undoubtedly encourage the numerous but disunited Yemenis who oppose him.

3. The titular Yemeni Foreign Minister, His Royal Highness Saif al Islam al Abdullah, who is now in Taiz, was guarded in his replies when I broached the subject with him. He professed no love for ex-King Farouk and admitted no knowledge of General Mohamad Naguib. He did, however, hazard the view that the recent events in Egypt might well be followed by similar events in other Arab States.

4. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Qadhi Mohamad al Amri, was a little more forthcoming. He felt that General Naguib's action would provide the Egyptian people with their first real opportunity to put their country in order. He also expressed some admiration for the way the *coup* was carried out without bloodshed. In effect he seemed

to approve of the action against ex-King Farouk, and his mention of the Egyptian people is worthy of note.

5. On the whole the Yemeni people were at first rather stunned by the news that the Egyptian army had acted against the throne, and were surprised at the ease with which it disposed of the palace entourage. Those Yemenis who are opposed to the present régime in the Yemen hope that events in Egypt will be followed by similar events elsewhere, and by a loosening of the tight control of His Majesty the Imam. However, there is no sign that any action against him is contemplated and no real hope that the Yemeni people will ever have a say in affairs of State.

I have, &c.

M. B. JACOMB.

EM 1051/12

No. 41

ANGLO-YEMENI RELATIONS

Assessment of the Present Position

Mr. Jacomb to Mr. Eden. (Received 8th October)

(No. 23. Secret) Taiz,
Sir, 7th September, 1952.

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 69 of 4th September, in which I reported a further deterioration in my position here in Taiz, and to my despatch No. 22 of today's date about the internal situation in the Yemen, and to submit the following report on the present state of Anglo-Yemeni relations.

2. In the past these relations were confined to relations between the Aden Government and the Yemeni Government. The Imam Ahmed's conviction, which stemmed from such events as the flight of the British Agent for the Western Aden Protectorate over San'a in an aeroplane with two of the leaders of the *coup d'état* of 1948, that the Aden Government had facilitated the assassination of his father, whose death was a severe blow to him, did not augur well for the future. In the event there was a serious deterioration in Anglo-Yemeni relations in 1949 which led to the Conference held in London in 1950. This in turn was followed by the signing of the *modus vivendi* early in 1951 and the opening of diplomatic relations later that year. On this

fresh basis it was hoped that relations would improve.

3. Unfortunately, however, no real improvement seems to have taken place in the eighteen months which have now elapsed since the signing of the *modus vivendi*. As I have reported in the past, the Imam Ahmed has never felt really satisfied with the terms of the *modus vivendi*, and his memories of what he feels were unfriendly acts and insults in the past and the lack of what he considers conciliatory gestures since the signature of the *modus vivendi*, coupled with the retreat of persons advocating progress and the lessening of his feeling of insecurity, which I have covered in my despatch under reference, are probably the reasons for this lack of improvement. For I am sure that the Imam was encouraged to hope that after the signature of the *modus vivendi* most of his wishes, and particularly those concerning the Aden Protectorate, would be granted. In this he was destined to be disappointed. In fact what happened was that Her Majesty's Government stood firm on their attitude to Yemeni claims to parts of the Aden Protectorate and only in other respects, such as the offer to

help in the supply of medicines and the purchase of cotton seed, and the generosity of the Governor of Aden in granting a licence for the re-export of small arms and ammunition and facilities for the purchase of foreign currency and for Yemen Airlines aeroplanes to visit Aden, was there a consistently helpful attitude towards the Yemeni Government.

4. Such an attitude has not been appreciated by the Imam, whose main interests lie in forwarding his claims to the Aden Protectorate. Here he surely regards Her Majesty's Government's attitude to his complaints about such matters as the road through the Aulaqi country, the entry into the Khalifi country, the flight of the ex-Sultan of Lahej and the request of the new Sultan for an advisory treaty as a series of unfriendly gestures inconsistent with the spirit and the terms of the *modus vivendi*. Certainly he himself has ignored the provisions of this agreement by interfering among the tribes of the Aden Protectorate, by not always restricting anti-British propaganda and by not fulfilling his obligation to allow this legation the customary facilities. What few signs there were of a reasonable attitude on the part of the Imam, such as the written confirmation of permission for this legation to be established in Taiz, the work on a new building for this legation and the permission for the entry of couriers with my mail, were, I feel, mainly due to the efforts of Qadhi al Amri, the Yemeni Deputy Foreign Minister. Now, in concert with others who had hoped for a better state of affairs in the Yemen, and whose present lack of hope I have reported in my despatch under reference, he too has decided to cease his efforts to improve relations.

5. So not only am I denied many of the customary facilities, but I now have no means of properly presenting the views of Her Majesty's Government to the Yemeni Government, which is, as you, Sir, know, the Imam alone. So long as I have no access to him, I can only discuss matters with Qadhi al Amri and if, as is now certain, he is no longer prepared to influence the Imam even when I have convinced him of the need for him to do so, there is little value in my discussing matters with him. The only way open to me to maintain the semblance of relations with the Yemeni Government seems to be to communicate in writing in the hope that such communications will reach the Imam.

6. I realise that this is a poor substitute for the normal openings for communica-

ting with a foreign Government, but there will still be some value in it as long as the Imam is not too prejudiced against me. In the hopes that he will not be I have taken great pains to be perfectly open in my activities in this country and to establish friendly relations with as many people as possible. In this I do not think that I have been altogether unsuccessful, but there is always the danger that the Imam believes reports that I am encouraging those opposed to him or persuading his foreign employees to leave. Such reports are sure to be more numerous the longer I stay here, and though I am able to assure you, Sir, that they are absolutely groundless, they do reduce the value of my efforts.

7. The prevailing state of affairs has affected Yemeni relations with other governments and it is, of course, because Anglo-Yemeni relations are difficult in any case and because this legation exists, that the effect is more apparent in the case of Anglo-Yemeni relations. It is evident that some improvement is desirable, but while the Imam entertains these misconceptions of Her Majesty's Government's attitude and retains memories of what he deems to have been unfriendly acts in the past, and while there is no effective means of persuading him of our sincere wish for the most friendly relations, I am unable to suggest where the remedy lies. It is really a change of heart on his part that is needed and it is, therefore, worth considering whether we can try to effect such a change. This is, indeed, the core of Qadhi al Amri's argument as recorded in the enclosure in my despatch under reference.

8. In considering first the wisdom of exerting pressure on the Imam by, for example, restricting the facilities accorded to him by the Governor of Aden for the purchase of foreign currency or similar generosities, I can report that the Governor of Aden has hinted that he feels such restrictions are called for while the Imam's attitude remains as difficult as it is at present. But there are accompanying risks such as the possibility that the Imam will break off diplomatic relations altogether, or will intensify his already multifarious activities in the Aden Protectorate or that any resultant publicity will show Her Majesty's Government in the rôle of oppressor. And such restrictions may have no effect, for the Imam is an unusual person and can convince himself that he is not really harmed by them.

9. In considering the other extreme, the making of some conciliatory gesture, I feel that it is true to say that the only gestures which the Imam will consider really sincere are those which entail an offer to cede part of the Aden Protectorate to him. Anything less, I am quite sure, will have no effect at all, and I therefore feel that, since no cession of territory can be contemplated, it is not worthwhile considering such a policy. Hence the only alternative to exerting pressure on the Imam is the continuation of the present policy of perseverance.

10. But, with very great respect, I feel that this carries with it a danger of a further deterioration in Anglo-Yemeni relations and the possibility that the Imam will eventually break off diplomatic relations. For, while Her Majesty's Government continue to stand firm on matters connected with the Aden Protectorate, the Imam can be counted upon to continue his interference

there and his discourtesy elsewhere. Because, if his actions are not met with similar actions, he will for some time think that he will be able to change Her Majesty's Government's policy. Presumably he will not be able to do so, and the point will then come when he sees no further use in diplomatic relations.

11. However, bearing in mind the sort of person he is, I have to admit that this may not be a completely true appreciation of his present attitude. If it is not, then there is, of course, advantage in persevering. But I recommend that no further assistance should be offered to, or undertaken on behalf of, the Yemeni Government and that in matters involving interpretation of rules or regulations a strict attitude should be adopted if they request exceptional treatment.

I have, &c.

M. B. JACOMB.

EM 1051/19

No. 42

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS SAIF AL ISLAM ABDULLAH, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE YEMEN

Review of Anglo-Yemeni Relations

Mr. Eden to Mr. Jacomb (Taiz)

(No. 25. Confidential) Foreign Office,
Sir, 24th October, 1952.

The Yemeni Minister brought His Royal Highness Saif al Islam Abdullah, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen, to call on me this afternoon. In welcoming His Royal Highness to this country and thanking him for the courtesy of his call, I said that I welcomed the opportunity to review Anglo-Yemeni relations with him.

2. Saif al Islam said that his country was in need of development. The Government of the Imam felt that it was high time that progress was made and believed that this could best be done by collaboration between the Yemen and other friendly countries. The Yemen was a fairly rich country, but its resources, particularly its mineral resources, had to be developed. He mentioned oil in particular. The Yemen would like her friends to help to exploit these resources.

3. I assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government would be glad to help if they could. I understood that these matters had not yet been discussed in detail, but I should be

glad to arrange for discussions to take place between him and the competent departments as he might desire. The Head of the Eastern Department would call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following day to find out what topics His Royal Highness had it in mind to discuss, and further meetings could be arranged accordingly.

4. His Royal Highness hoped that these discussions would lead to a general understanding between our two countries which, he said, the Yemen had long sought and for which she hoped the time was now propitious. I replied that I was always ready for an *entente cordiale* and would be glad to collaborate with His Royal Highness in any way he desired. His Royal Highness went on to say that he regarded economic collaboration as a means to friendship between our two countries. It would thus help to smooth out difficulties which His Royal Highness described as relatively insignificant. (He did not say what the difficulties were, but I have no doubt he had the frontier question in mind.) At this I remarked that I knew His Royal Highness

to be a sincere supporter of Anglo-Yemeni friendship and I knew that he took a broad view of affairs. I wished, therefore, to tell him frankly that I was disturbed by the difficulties with which you were faced in carrying out your mission. I mentioned your isolation from the people of the country and the fact that you had not yet been received by the Imam. I would like matters to be made easier for you so that like the Yemeni Minister in London you could contribute to the improvement of our mutual relations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that you were highly regarded in the Yemen and that such difficulties as you might have encountered must be ascribed not to any ill-will but to the fact that it was a novelty for the Yemen to have diplomatic relations with foreign countries.

Also, the Imam's interests lay in other directions (which His Royal Highness did not specify) and he was in indifferent health. Again he assured me that your difficulties would vanish if we could collaborate.

5. I agreed with the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should have a further talk after the technical discussions with the departments concerned.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda, to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid, and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in case he should wish to transmit a copy to his Excellency the Governor of Aden.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

EM 1533/8

No. 43

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS SAIF AL ISLAM ABDULLAH OF THE YEMEN

Development of Oil in the Yemen

Mr. Eden to Mr. Jacomb (Taiz)

(No. 26. Confidential) Foreign Office,
Sir, 31st October, 1952.

I went to take farewell of His Royal Highness Saif al Islam Abdullah of the Yemen this evening. In the course of our conversation His Royal Highness reverted to possible oil-bearing territories on the Saudi border—some of them, I understood, in disputed territory. The Yemeni Foreign Minister said that he knew we had had certain difficulties with his "Northern neighbour" recently in Muscat and that part of the oil from Kuwait also came from neutral territories between the Sheikdom of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Did I see any reason, His Royal Highness asked, why the Yemen should not proceed to development of oil, perhaps jointly with Saudi Arabia, in this area where it seems the frontier has never been fully demarcated?

2. Not wishing to be drawn into so delicate a topic, I suggested that on the whole I thought it was always preferable to search for oil well within one's territory if one felt confident one had it there, as I understood was His Royal Highness's

fortunate position. Prince Abdullah replied that the Yemenis did indeed believe that they had such oil and it was also true to say that while oil had advantages it brought many complications, too. I observed that this had been our experience in Persia, and managed to avoid the conversation coming back to the topic of his Saudi neighbour. It was clearly much in His Royal Highness's mind. He appears to be convinced that the best oil-bearing strata in his country are those that lie in the disputed territory.

3. He expressed his gratitude for the help and hospitality he had received during his visit and added that he understood that the views of our oil companies would be sent to him in New York.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda, the head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid, and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in case he should wish to transmit a copy to his Excellency the Governor of Aden.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.